Collective ratemaking in the motor carrier industry is undoubtedly one of the most poorly understood issues in the literature on economic regulation. While strongly held opinions are commonplace, real knowledge of the collective ratemaking process and of how trucking tariffs are constructed is scarce. William Tye closes this gap in our knowledge with the most comprehensive study yet of the effects of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 on competition on the trucking industry.

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the application of the new theory of contestable markets to the problem of the transition to deregulation in regulated industries. It offers an extensive review of both the theory and practice of contestable markets, as well as guidelines for the practical application of the theory to regulated industries and antitrust, with special consideration given to the problems of the rail industry. As applied in this industry, the theory promised to help balance the conflicting goals of regulatory transition and to define standards for revenue adequacy, cooperation among competitors, maximum reasonable rates, and antitrust immunity for mergers. Unlike other, chiefly theoretical, treatments of the subject, the author has provided a study of the theory of contestable markets as well as its past and potential applications. His introduction discusses such topics as the relevant theory of perfect contestability, implications for economic welfare, and recent applications of the theory. Chapter 2 deals with vertical mergers into contestable markets, while chapter 3 concerns itself largely with the transition to deregulation in regulated industries. Unlike other theoretical studies, however, the work also addresses the theory in practice. Using the insights gained when the theory was employed in the rail industry, the author draws conclusions regarding a broad range of regulatory and antitrust issues affecting all industries, such as economic analysis of vertical mergers and vertical economic practices.

William Tye draws on his large body of work in the area of railroad deregulation to address specific economic problems associated with deregulation. He elucidates principles that can be applied to any major industry entering the competitive marketplace--particularly telecommunications and other utilities, including gas and electric. Tye has updated and revised his previous articles and structured them into an integrated framework. Each section addresses a major issue and can be read on a stand-alone basis. By providing appropriate economic models and rules for successful transition, this work is designed to encourage a smooth changeover to deregulation.

It is important, Tye says, to recognize that the original problems regulation sought to solve do not simply go away, and that new problems can be created by the transition itself. He stresses the need to deal with legacies from the regulated past, such as investments, policies, labor contracts, and sunk investment costs by buyers. He explains why explicit regulatory intervention may be required to correct equity and efficiency imbalances. Sections cover topics such as finance and revenue adequacy, pricing, mergers, and competitive access and will serve as a valuable resource for attorneys, regulatory commission staff, academics, and consultants.