A lot of recent attention has been given to one of the central paradoxes of trust: namely how people can restrict self-interest in order to trust. Existing perspectives, theories, and models offer partial explanations, but this volume presents a novel framework that expands on the findings of recent studies of trust and exchange. This book offers a new angle for the understanding of exchange and trust in an interactive context, describes the interactive characteristics of trust in exchange systems, and develops a theory explaining the co-evolution of trust and exchange systems. A new framework is used to incorporate the theory of systems of trust and evolutionary game-theoretical approach to investigate four important questions: How can trust emerge in exchange when people pursue self-interest? After its emergence, how does exchange affect trust in a dynamic process? When are dynamics of trust stable? Do interactive trust phenomena differ under different exchange systems? This book concludes with a discussion of the implications of the theoretical findings for three areas: the improvement of trust, potential economic growth, and mechanism design in exchange systems. This volume makes a significant contribution to the literature on evolutionary and institutional economics and is suitable for those who have an interest in political economy, economy theory and philosophy as well as economic psychology.

A lot of recent attention has been given to one of the central paradoxes of trust: namely how people can restrict self-interest in order to trust. Existing perspectives, theories, and models offer partial explanations, but this volume presents a novel framework that expands on the findings of recent studies of trust and exchange. This book offers a new angle for the understanding of exchange and trust in an interactive context, describes the interactive characteristics of trust in exchange systems, and develops a theory explaining the co-evolution of trust and exchange systems. A new framework is used to incorporate the theory of systems of trust and evolutionary game-theoretical approach to investigate four important questions: How can trust emerge in exchange when people pursue self-interest? After its emergence, how does exchange affect trust in a dynamic process? When are dynamics of trust stable? Do interactive trust phenomena differ under different exchange systems? This book concludes with a discussion of the implications of the theoretical findings for three areas: the improvement of trust, potential economic growth, and mechanism design in exchange systems. This volume makes a significant contribution to the literature on evolutionary and institutional economics and is suitable for those who have an interest in political economy, economy theory and philosophy as well as economic psychology.

China's 30-year market transition and its integration into the world economy provide a unique opportunity for exploring the nature of large-scale economic and political transformation and the mechanisms underlying organizational behavior during such a transition. Management and Organizations in Transitional China explores how managers and firms cope with transition-related challenges by adapting to, manipulating, or even creating the complex institutional environment. This book examines the way transitional institutions shape individual decisions and organizational strategies, the mechanisms that promote the diffusion of innovative management practices and economic policies, and the formation and evolution of interfirm networks. Based on a comprehensive review of the studies on market transition, this book investigates how firms manage their relationship with important stakeholders in the environment. It highlights the importance of network-based strategies for institutionally less-advantaged actors (like private firms, foreign entrants, and entrepreneurs) to establish legitimacy, gain institutional support, and mobilize financial resources. Moreover, this book studies the mechanisms that facilitate the adoption of innovative management practices and economic policies in the transitional context, comparing the mainstream diffusion theories and evaluating the relative potency of the diffusion drivers. Furthermore, Management and Organizations in Transitional China provides empirical analyses using longitudinal data of alliance formation, network evolution, and the effect of both alliance formation and network evolution on firm decision-making and performance. Combining theory, data analysis, and rich contextual description to provide a comprehensive understanding of the organizational transition process, this book will appeal to scholars and practitioners in general management, organizational studies, international business, entrepreneurship, and related disciplines.