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Books > Philosophy > Western philosophy > Ancient Western philosophy to c 500
The epics of the three Flavian poets-Silius Italicus, Statius, and
Valerius Flaccus-have, in recent times, attracted the attention of
scholars, who have re-evaluated the particular merits of Flavian
poetry as far more than imitation of the traditional norms and
patterns. Drawn from sixty years of scholarship, this edited
collection is the first volume to collate the most influential
modern academic writings on Flavian epic poetry, revised and
updated to provide both scholars and students alike with a broad
yet comprehensive overview of the field. A wide range of topics
receive coverage, and analysis and interpretation of individual
poems are integrated throughout. The plurality of the critical
voices included in the volume presents a much-needed variety of
approaches, which are used to tackle questions of intertextuality,
gender, poetics, and the social and political context of the
period. In doing so, the volume demonstrates that by engaging in a
complex and challenging intertextual dialogue with their literary
predecessors, the innovative epics of the Flavian poets respond to
contemporary needs, expressing overt praise, or covert anxiety,
towards imperial rule and the empire.
In this exciting interpretation of the Odyssey, the late renowned
scholar Seth Benardete suggests that Homer may have been the first
to philosophize in a Platonic sense. He argues that the Odyssey
concerns precisely the relation between philosophy and poetry and,
more broadly, the rational and the irrational in human beings. In
light of this possibility, Bernardete works back and forth from
Homer to Plato to examine the relation between wisdom and justice
and tries to recover an original understanding of philosophy that
Plato, too, recovered by reflecting on the wisdom of the poet. At
stake in his argument is no less than the history of philosophy and
the ancient understanding of poetry. The Bow and the Lyre is a book
that every classicist and historian of philosophy should have.
This volume is a detailed study of the concept of the nutritive
capacity of the soul and its actual manifestation in living bodies
(plants, animals, humans) in Aristotle and Aristotelianism.
Aristotle's innovative analysis of the nutritive faculty has laid
the intellectual foundation for the increasing appreciation of
nutrition as a prerequisite for the maintenance of life and health
that can be observed in the history of Greek thought. According to
Aristotle, apart from nutrition, the nutritive part of the soul is
also responsible for or interacts with many other bodily functions
or mechanisms, such as digestion, growth, reproduction, sleep, and
the innate heat. After Aristotle, these concepts were used and
further developed by a great number of Peripatetic philosophers,
commentators on Aristotle and Arabic thinkers until early modern
times. This volume is the first of its kind to provide an in-depth
survey of the development of this rather philosophical concept from
Aristotle to early modern thinkers. It is of key interest to
scholars working on classical, medieval and early modern
psycho-physiological accounts of living things, historians and
philosophers of science, biologists with interests in the history
of science, and, generally, students of the history of philosophy
and science.
This book features a major new critical assessment of Heidegger's
interpretation and political use of Plato's "Republic". Heidegger's
"Platonism" challenges Heidegger's 1940 interpretation of Plato as
the philosopher who initiated the West's ontological decline into
contemporary nihilism. Mark A. Ralkowski argues that, in his
earlier lecture course, "On the Essence of Truth", in which he
appropriates Plato in a positive light, Heidegger discovered the
two most important concepts of his later thought, namely the
difference between the Being of beings and Being as such, and the
'belonging together' of Being and man in what he eventually calls
Ereignis, the 'event of appropriation'. Ralkowski shows that, far
from being the grand villain of metaphysics, Plato was in fact the
gateway to Heidegger's later period. Because Heidegger discovers
the seeds of his later thought in his positive appropriation of
Plato, this book argues that Heidegger's later thought is a return
to and phenomenological transformation of Platonism, which is
ironic not least because Heidegger thought of himself as the West's
first truly post-Platonic philosopher. "Continuum Studies in
Continental Philosophy" presents cutting-edge scholarship in the
field of modern European thought. The wholly original arguments,
perspectives and research findings in titles in this series make it
an important and stimulating resource for students and academics
from across the discipline.
This book deals with some Aristotelian philosophers of the
Hellenistic Age, ranging from Theophrastus of Eresus to Cratippus
of Pergamum. The problem of knowledge, the question of time, and
the doctrine of the soul are investigated by comparing these
Peripatetics' views with Aristotle's philosophy, and above all by
setting their doctrines within the broader framework of
post-Aristotelian and Hellenistic philosophies (the Old Academy,
Epicureanism, and Stoicism).
Pharmakon: Plato, Drug Culture, and Identity in Ancient Athens
examines the emerging concern for controlling states of
psychological ecstasy in the history of western thought, focusing
on ancient Greece (c. 750 - 146 BCE), particularly the Classical
Period (c. 500 - 336 BCE) and especially the dialogues of the
Athenian philosopher Plato (427 - 347 BCE). Employing a diverse
array of materials ranging from literature, philosophy, medicine,
botany, pharmacology, religion, magic, and law, Pharmakon
fundamentally reframes the conceptual context of how we read and
interpret Plato's dialogues. Michael A. Rinella demonstrates how
the power and truth claims of philosophy, repeatedly likened to a
pharmakon, opposes itself to the cultural authority of a host of
other occupations in ancient Greek society who derived their powers
from, or likened their authority to, some pharmakon. These included
Dionysian and Eleusinian religion, physicians and other healers,
magicians and other magic workers, poets, sophists, rhetoricians,
as well as others. Accessible to the general reader, yet
challenging to the specialist, Pharmakon is a comprehensive
examination of the place of drugs in ancient thought that will
compel the reader to understand Plato in a new way.
From Homer to Aristotle, understanding anger and harnessing its
power was at the core of Hellenic civilization. Homer created the
framework for philosophical inquiries into anger, one that
persisted until it was overturned by Stoicism and Christianity.
Plato saw anger as the guardian of justice and Aristotle conceived
of it as bound to friendship. Yet both showed that anger can become
a guardian of injustice and a defender of our psychological
abnormalities. Plato claimed that reason is a tertiary factor in
controlling anger and Aristotle argued that non-cognitive powers
can issue commands for anger's arousal - findings that shed light
as to why cognitive therapeutic approaches often prove to be
ineffective. Both proposed nurturing the "thumos," the receptacle
of anger and the seat of self-esteem. Aristotle's view of public
anger as an early warning sign of social dissolution continues to
be relevant to this day. In this carefully argued study, Kostas
Kalimtzis examines the theories of anger in the context of the
ancient world with an eye to their implications for the modern
predicament.
The philosophical and philological study of Aristotle fragments and
lost works has fallen somewhat into the background since the
1960's. This is regrettable considering the different and
innovative directions the study of Aristotle has taken in the last
decades. This collection of new peer-reviewed essays applies the
latest developments and trends of analysis, criticism, and
methodology to the study of Aristotle's fragments. The individual
essays use the fragments as tools of interpretation, shed new light
on different areas of Aristotle philosophy, and lay bridges between
Aristotle's lost and extant works. The first part shows how
Aristotle frames parts of his own understanding of Philosophy in
his published, 'popular' work. The second part deals with issues of
philosophical interpretation in Aristotle's extant works which can
be illuminated by fragments of his lost works. The philosophical
issues treated in this section range from Theology to Natural
Science, Psychology, Politics, and Poetics. As a whole, the book
articulates a new approach to Aristotle's lost works, by providing
a reassessment and new methodological explorations of the
fragments.
In several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his
interpreters as to which of the various subjects discussed in them
is the main thesis. The speakers have the freedom of conversation;
no severe rules of art restrict them, and sometimes we are inclined
to think, with one of the dramatis personae in the Theaetetus, that
the digressions have the greater interest. Yet in the most
irregular of the dialogues there is also a certain natural growth
or unity; the beginning is not forgotten at the end, and numerous
allusions and references are interspersed, which form the loose
connecting links of the whole. We must not neglect this unity, but
neither must we attempt to confine the Platonic dialogue on the
Procrustean bed of a single idea. (Compare Introduction to the
Phaedrus.) Two tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of
Plato in this matter. First, they have endeavoured to hang the
dia-logues upon one another by the slightest threads; and have thus
been led to opposite and contradictory assertions respec-ting their
order and sequence. The mantle of Schleiermacher has descended upon
his successors, who have applied his method with the most various
results.
The awe with which Plato regarded the character of 'the great'
Parmenides has extended to the dialogue which he calls by his name.
None of the writings of Plato have been more copiously illustrated,
both in ancient and modern times, and in none of them have the
interpreters been more at variance with one another. Nor is this
surprising. For the Parmenides is more fragmentary and isolated
than any other dialogue, and the design of the writer is not
expressly stated. The date is uncertain; the relation to the other
writings of Plato is also uncertain; the connexion between the two
parts is at first sight extremely obscure; and in the latter of the
two we are left in doubt as to whether Plato is speaking his own
sentiments by the lips of Parmenides, and overthrowing him out of
his own mouth, or whether he is propounding consequences which
would have been admitted by Zeno and Parmenides themselves. The
contradictions which follow from the hypotheses of the one and many
have been regarded by some as transcendental mysteries; by others
as a mere illustration, taken at random, of a new method. They seem
to have been inspired by a sort of dialectical frenzy, such as may
be supposed to have prevailed in the Megarian School (compare
Cratylus, etc.). The criticism on his own doctrine of Ideas has
also been considered, not as a real criticism, but as an exuberance
of the metaphysical imagination which enabled Plato to go beyond
himself.
The Cratylus has always been a source of perplexity to the student
of Plato. While in fancy and humour, and perfection of style and
metaphysical originality, this dialogue may be ranked with the best
of the Platonic writings, there has been an uncertainty about the
motive of the piece, which interpreters have hitherto not succeeded
in dispelling. We need not suppose that Plato used words in order
to conceal his thoughts, or that he would have been unintelligible
to an educated contemporary. In the Phaedrus and Euthydemus we also
find a difficulty in determining the precise aim of the author.
Plato wrote satires in the form of dialogues, and his meaning, like
that of other satirical writers, has often slept in the ear of
posterity. Two causes may be assigned for this obscurity: 1st, the
subtlety and allusiveness of this species of composition; 2nd, the
difficulty of reproducing a state of life and literature which has
passed away. A satire is unmeaning unless we can place ourselves
back among the persons and thoughts of the age in which it was
written.
In this important and highly original book, place, commonality and
judgment provide the framework within which works central to the
Greek philosophical and literary tradition are usefully located and
reinterpreted. Greek life, it can be argued, was defined by the
interconnection of place, commonality and judgment. Similarly
within the Continental philosophical tradition topics such as
place, judgment, law and commonality have had a pervasive
centrality. Works by Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben amongst
others attest to the current exigency of these topics. Yet the ways
in which they are interrelated has been barely discussed within the
context of Ancient Philosophy. The conjecture of this book is that
not only are these terms of genuine philosophical importance in
their own right, but they are also central to Ancient Philosophy.
Andrew Benjamin ultimately therefore aims to underscore the
relevance of Ancient Philosophy for contemporary debates in
Continental Philosophy.
This book develops a new account of Socratic method, based on a
psychological model of Plato's dramatic depiction of Socrates'
character and conduct. Socratic method is seen as a blend of three
types of philosophical discourse: refutation, truth-seeking, and
persuasion. Cain focuses on the persuasive features of the method
since, in her view, it is this aspect of Socrates' method that best
explains the content and the value of the dialectical arguments.
Emphasizing the persuasive aspect of Socratic method helps us
uncover the operative standards of dialectical argumentation in
fifth-century Athens. Cain considers both the sophistic style of
rhetoric and contentious debate in Socrates' time, and Aristotle's
perspective on the techniques of argument and their purposes. An
informal, pragmatic analysis of argumentation appropriate to the
dialectical context is developed. We see that Socrates uses
ambiguity and other strategic fallacies with purposeful play, and
for moral ends. Taking specific examples of refutations from
Plato's dialogues, Cain links the interlocutors' characters and
situations with the dialectical argument that Socrates constructs
to refute them. The merit of this interpretation is that it gives
broad range, depth, and balance to Socrates' argumentative style;
it also maintains a keen sensitivity to the interlocutors'
emotional reactions, moral values, and attitudes. The book
concludes with a discussion of the overall value, purpose, and
success of Socratic method, and draws upon a Platonic/Socratic
conception of the soul and a dialectical type of self-knowledge.
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