This title presents an exploration of the life and philosophical reflections of this complex Stoic philosopher and Roman emperor. This book is a clear and concise introduction to the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. His one major surviving work, often titled 'meditations' but literally translated simply as 'to himself', is a series of short, sometimes enigmatic reflections divided seemingly arbitrarily into twelve books and apparently written only to be read by him. For these reasons Marcus is a particularly difficult thinker to understand. His musings, framed as 'notes to self' or 'memoranda', are the exhortations of an earnest, conscientious Stoic burdened with the onerous responsibilities of ruling an entire empire. William O. Stephens lucidly sketches Marcus Aurelius' upbringing, family relations, rise to the throne, military campaigns, and legacy, situating his philosophy amidst his life and times, explicating the factors shaping Marcus' philosophy, and clarifying key themes in the Memoranda. Specifically designed to meet the needs of students seeking a thorough understanding of this key figure and his major work, "Marcus Aurelius: A Guide for the Perplexed" is the ideal guide for understanding this Stoic author - the only philosopher who was also an emperor. "Continuum's Guides for the Perplexed" are clear, concise and accessible introductions to thinkers, writers and subjects that students and readers can find especially challenging - or indeed downright bewildering. Concentrating specifically on what it is that makes the subject difficult to grasp, these books explain and explore key themes and ideas, guiding the reader towards a thorough understanding of demanding material.

Against the background of age-old Greek wisdom, Epicurus' advice to 'live unnoticed' (lathe biosas) was particularly provocative and scandalous. Why, after all, would an unknown Greek soldier in Agamemnon's army have been happier than famous Achilles? Or why should an ordinary Athenian be regarded as more blessed and enviable than Pericles? Yet Epicurus' ideal was far from unattractive, guaranteeing as it did a quiet and untroubled existence far from the dangerous turmoil of public life. This book casts new light on Epicurus' socio-political philosophy through a careful analysis of his arguments. It also shows how the ideal of an 'unnoticed life' was received during the later history of Epicureanism and how it occasionally occurs in ancient Latin poetry.

This book offers an original account of one of Aristotle's central doctrines, his theory of material substance. Gad Freudenthal argues that Aristotle's concept of heat is a crucial but hitherto ignored part of this account. Aristotle's 'canonical', four-element theory of matter fails to explain the coming-to-be of material substances (the way matter becomes organised) and their persistence (why substances do not disintegrate into their components). Interpreters have highlighted Aristotle's claim that soul is the active cause of the coming-to-be and persistence of living beings. Dr Freudenthal draws on dispersed remarks in Aristotle's writings, to argue that Aristotle in parallel also draws on a comprehensive 'naturalistic' theory, which accounts for material persistence through the concepts of heat, specifically vital heat, and connate pneuma. This theory, which bears also on the higher soul-functions, is central in Aristotle's understanding of the relationship between matter and form, body and soul. Dr Freudenthal aims not only to recover this theory and to highlight its explanatory roles, but also to make suggestions concerning its origin in Presocratic thought and in Aristotle's own early theology. He further offers a brief review of how later ages came to grips with the difficulties inherent in the received version of Aristotle's matter theory. This book is an important contribution to the proper understanding of a central Aristotelian doctrine, which straddles 'chemistry', biology, the theory of soul, and metaphysics.

In this authoritative discussion of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, A. W. Price considers four related areas: eudaimonia, or living and acting well, as the ultimate end of action; virtues of character in relation to the emotions, and to one another; practical reasoning, especially from an end to ways or means; and acrasia, or action that is contrary to the agent's own judgement of what is best. The focal concept is that of eudaimonia, which both Plato and Aristotle view as an abstract goal that is valuable enough to motivate action. Virtue has a double role to play in making its achievement possible, both in proposing subordinate ends apt to the context, and in protecting the agent against temptations to discard them too easily. For both purposes, Price suggests that virtues need to form a unity--but one that can be conceived in various ways. Among the tasks of deliberation is to work out how, and whether, to pursue some putative end in context. Aristotle returns to early Plato in finding it problematic that one should consciously sacrifice acting well to some incidental attraction; Plato later finds this possible by postulating schism within the soul. Price maintains that it is their emphasis upon the centrality of action within human life that makes the reflections of these ancient philosophers perennially relevant.

The topic tackled in this book is Philo's account of the complex, double-sided nature of God's acting - the two-sided coin of God as transcendent yet immanent, unknowable yet revealed, immobile yet creating - and also the two sides of acting in humans - who, in an attempt to imitate God, both contemplate and produce. In both contexts, divine and human, Philo considers that it would not be proper to give precedence to either side - the result would be barren. God's acting and man's acting are at the same time both speculative and practical, and it is precisely out of this co-presence that the order of the world unfolds. Philo considers this two-sided condition as a source of complexity and fertility. Francesca Calabi argues that, far from being an irresolvable contradiction, Philo's two-fold vision is the key to understanding his works. It constitutes a richness that rejects reduction to apparently incompatible forms and aspects.

Christianity is commonly held to have introduced an entirely new and better morality into the ancient world, a new morality that was decidedly universal, in contrast to the ethics of the philosophical schools which were only concerned with the intellectual few. Runar M. Thorsteinsson presents a challenge to this view by comparing Christian morality in first-century Rome with contemporary Stoic ethics in the city.
Thorsteinsson introduces and discusses the moral teaching of Roman Stoicism; of Seneca, Musonius Rufus, and Epictetus. He then presents the moral teaching of Roman Christianity as it is represented in Paul's Letter to the Romans, the First Letter of Peter, and the First Letter of Clement. Having established the bases for his comparison, he examines the similarities and differences between Roman Stoicism and Roman Christianity in terms of morality.
Five broad themes are used for the comparison, questions of Christian and Stoic views about: a particular morality or way of life as proper worship of the deity; certain individuals (like Jesus and Socrates) as paradigms for the proper way of life; the importance of mutual love and care; non-retaliation and 'love of enemies'; and the social dimension of ethics. This approach reveals a fundamental similarity between the moral teachings of Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism. The most basic difference is found in the ethical scope of the two: While the latter teaches unqualified universal humanity, the former seems to condition the ethical scope in terms of religious adherence.

The "Cratylus" has puzzled many readers with its lengthy discussion of the 'true meanings' of more than a hundred Greek names. This book aims to give a coherent interpretation of the whole dialogue, paying particular attention to these etymologies. The book discusses the rival theories of naming offered by Cratylus, Hermogenes, and Socrates, arguing that Socrates presents a prescriptive theory, laying down what names should be, rather than describing what they are. This distinction between prescriptive and descriptive theories is elaborated and used to illuminate the etymologies themselves. After discussing possible sources for the etymologies, the author argues that the etymological section amounts to a Platonic critique of the muddled attitude of Greek poets and thinkers towards names.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is an annual publication which includes original articles, which may be of substantial length, on a wide range of topics in ancient philosophy, and review articles of major books. Contributors to this volume; Paul A. Vander Waerdt, Christopher Rowe, Rachel Rue, Paula Gottlieb, Robert Bolton, and John M. Cooper.

Early Greek Thought calls into question a longstanding mythology - operative in both the Analytic and Continental traditions - that the 'Pre-Socratics had the grandiose audacity to break with all traditional forms of knowledge' (Badiou). Each of the variants of this mythology is dismantled in an attempt to not only retrieve an 'indigenous' interpretation of early Greek thought, but also to expose the mythological character of our own contemporary meta-narratives regarding the 'origins' of 'Western', 'Occidental' philosophy. Using an original hermeneutical approach, James Luchte excavates the context ofemergence of early Greek thought through an exploration of the mytho-poetic horizons of the archaic world, in relation to which, as Plato testifies, the Greeks were merely 'children'. Luchte discloses 'philosophy in the tragic age' as a creative response to a 'contestation' of mytho-poetic narratives and 'ways of being'. The tragic character of early Greek thought is unfolded through a cultivation of a conversation between its basic thinkers, one which would remain incomprehensible, with Bataille, in the 'absence of myth' and the exile of poetry.

Anonymous' and Stephanus' commentaries, written in the 12th century AD, are the first surviving commentaries on Aristotle's Rhetoric. Their study, including the environment in which they were written and the philosophical ideas expressed in them, provides a better understanding of the reception of Aristotle's Rhetoric in Byzantium, the Byzantine practice of commenting on classical texts, and what can be called "Byzantine philosophy". For the first time, this book explores the context of production of the commentaries, discusses the identity and features of their authors, and reveals their philosophical and philological significance. In particular, I examine the main topics discussed by Aristotle in the Rhetoric as contributing to persuasion, namely valid and fallacious rhetorical arguments, ethical notions, emotional response and style, and I analyse the commentators' interpretations of these topics. In this analysis, I focus on highlighting the value of the philosophical views expressed, and on creating a discussion between the Byzantine and the modern interpretations of the treatise. Conclusively, the two commentators need to be considered as independent thinkers, who aimed primarily at integrating the treatise within the Aristotelian philosophical system.

Discussions on akrasia (lack of control, or weakness of will) in Greek philosophy have been particularily vivid and intense for the past two decades. Standard stories that presented Socrates as the philosopher who simply denied the phenomenon, and Plato and Aristotle as rehabilitating it straightforwardly against Socrates, have been challenged in many different ways. Building on those challenges, this collective provides new, and in some cases opposed ways of reading well-known as well as more neglected texts. Its 13 contributions, written by experts in the field, cover the whole history of Greek ethics, from Socrates to Plotinus, through Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics (Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Epictetus).

This volume is a continuation of "Philo of Alexandria: an Annotated Bibliography" 1937-1986, published by Roberto Radice and David Runia in 1988 (second edition 1992). Prepared with the collaboration of the International Philo Bibliography Project, it contains a complete listing of all scholarly writings on Philo in all languages for the period 1987 to 1996. Part One lists texts, translations, commentaries etc. (75 items). Part Two contains critical studies (880 items). In part Three additional works for the years 1937-1986 are presented (170 items). In all cases a brief description of the contents of the contribution is given. Seven indices, including a detailed Index of subjects, complete the work.

Plotinus (205-269 AD) is considered the founder of Neoplatonism, the dominant philosophical movement of late antiquity, and a rich seam of current scholarly interest. Whilst Plotinus' influence on the subsequent philosophical tradition was enormous, his ideas can also be seen as the culmination of some implicit trends in the Greek tradition from Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Emilsson's in-depth study focuses on Plotinus' notion of Intellect, which comes second in his hierarchical model of reality, after the One, unknowable first cause of everything. As opposed to ordinary human discursive thinking, Intellect's thought is all-at-once, timeless, truthful and a direct intuition into 'things themselves'; it is presumably not even propositional. Emilsson discusses and explains this strong notion of non-discursive thought and explores Plotinus' insistence that this must be the primary form of thought. Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect raises a host of questions that Emilsson addresses. First, Intellect's thought is described as an attempt to grasp the One and at the same time as self-thought. How are these two claims related? How are they compatible? What lies in Plotinus' insistence that Intellect's thought is a thought of itself? Second, Plotinus gives two minimum requirements of thought: that it must involve a distinction between thinker and object of thought, and that the object itself must be varied. How are these two pluralist claims related? Third, what is the relation between Intellect as a thinker and Intellect as an object of thought? Plotinus' position here seems to amount to a form of idealism, and this is explored.

Seneca's Natural Questions is an eight-book disquisition on the nature of meteorological phenomena, ranging inter alia from rainbows to earthquakes, from comets to the winds, from the causes of snow and hail to the reasons why the Nile floods in summer. Much of this material had been treated in the earlier Greco-Roman meteorological tradition, but what notoriously sets Seneca's writing apart is his insertion of extended moralizing sections within his technical discourse. How, if at all, are these outbursts against the luxury and vice that are apparently rampant in Seneca's first-century CE Rome to be reconciled with his main meteorological agenda? In grappling with this familiar question, The Cosmic Viewpoint argues that Seneca is no blinkered or arid meteorological investigator, but a creative explorer into nature's workings who offers a highly idiosyncratic blend of physico-moral investigation across his eight books. At one level, his inquiry into nature impinges on human conduct and morality in its implicit propagation of the familiar Stoic ideal of living in accordance with nature: the moral deviants whom Seneca condemns in the course of the work offer egregious examples of living contrary to nature's balanced way. At a deeper level, however, The Cosmic Viewpoint stresses the literary qualities and complexities that are essential to Seneca's literary art of science: his technical enquiries initiate a form of engagement with nature which distances the reader from the ordinary involvements and fragmentations of everyday life, instead centering our existence in the cosmic whole. From a figurative standpoint, Seneca's meteorological theme raises our gaze from a terrestrial level of existence to a more intuitive plane where literal vision gives way to 'higher' conjecture and intuition: in striving to understand meteorological phenomena, we progress in an elevating direction - a conceptual climb that renders the Natural Questions no mere store of technical learning, but a work that actively promotes a change of perspective in its readership.

Anyone interested in theories of moral or human practice will find in Aristotle s Nicomachean Ethics one of the few basic models relevant through to today. At the centre of his analysis, both sober and cautious, are such concepts as happiness, virtue, choice, prudence, incontinence, pleasure and friendship. Aristotle s arguments are by no means of merely historical interest, but continue to exert a key influence on present-day ethical debate. The thirteen contributions in this volume present the foundations of Aristotle s investigation, along with the modern background of its reception.

This book argues that Aristotle offers us a consistent theory of definition, according to which a particular type of definition - one which states the formal cause of a simple item - is fundamental. It begins by considering definitions as indemonstrable first principles in demonstrations, and inquires how such definitions can have the certainty required by that role. Later chapters look to the "Metaphysics" to understand how the unity of definitions guarantees their certainty, and to the "Topics" to discover why definitions must be formulated in terms of the genus and differentia(e) of the object defined. This work contributes to our understanding of the connection between the function of definition in demonstration and its character as a statement of essence.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. From 2000, OSAP is being published not once but twice yearly, to keep up with the abundance of good material submitted; and it is being made available in paperback as well as hardback, in response to demand from scholars wishing to purchase it. This volume, the first of 2000, features contributors from Britain, America, Europe, and Japan contributing pieces on Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epicureanism, Pyrrhonism, and the recently discovered papyrus text of Empedocles.

Consensus holds that Lucretius admired the literary prestige of Homeric epos, the form that Ennius famously introduced to Latin literature. However, some hold that Lucretius disagreed with Ennius' quasi-Pythagorean claim to be Homer reborn, and so uniquely qualified to adapt Homeric poetry to the Latin language. Likewise, received wisdom holds that Lucretius followed in the path of poets writing in the wake of Ennius' Annales, most of whom employed an Ennian style. However, throughout the De Rerum Natura, Lucretius' use of Ennius' Annales as a formal model for a long discursive poem in epic meter was neither inevitable nor predictable, on the one hand, nor meaningful in the simple way that critical consensus has always maintained. Jason Nethercut posits that Lucretius selected Ennius as a model precisely to dismantle the values for which he claimed Ennius stood, including the importance of history as a poetic subject and Rome's historical achievement in particular. As the first book to offer substantial analysis of the relationship between two of the ancient world's most impactful poets, Ennius Noster: Lucretius and the Annales fills an important gap not only in Lucretian scholarship, but also in our understanding of Latin literary history.

The volume discusses important chapters of Platonic philosophy, including its pre-Socratic origins and later developments. It particularly focusses on the relationship between Plato's logico-semantics and his metaphysics. Plato's linguistic views are deeply rooted in the Platonic metaphysical system, and vice versa. The strong connection between the two and its development into the Middle Ages form a major subject of this volume. Other themes featuring in this book are Plato's philosophy of nature, his epistemology, his theology, his cosmology, as well as his conception of the soul and his philosophy of art. Contributors include: E.P. Bos, Frans A.J. de Haas, Maria Kardaun, C.H. Kneepkens, Jaap Mansfeld, Denis O'Brien, Johannes M. van Ophuijsen, Willemien Otten, David T. Runia, and Joke Spruyt. Publications by L.M. de Rijk: * La philosophie au moyen age, ISBN: 978 90 04 06936 7 * Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Volume I: General Introduction. The Works on Logic, ISBN: 978 90 04 12324 3 * Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Volume II: The Metaphysics. Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument, ISBN: 978 90 04 12467 7 * Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis). Edited by L.M. de Rijk, Syncategoreumata. First Critical Edition with an Introduction and Indexes, ISBN: 978 90 04 09434 5 * Edited and Translated by L.M. de Rijk, Nicholas of Autrecourt: His Correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo, ISBN: 978 90 04 09988 3 * Giraldus Odonis O.F.M. Edited by L.M. de Rijk, Opera Philosophica. Vol. I: Logica. Critical Edition from the Manuscripts, ISBN: 978 90 04 10950 6 * Giraldus Odonis O.F.M. Edited by L.M. de Rijk, Opera Philosophica. Vol. II: De intentionibus, ISBN: 978 90 04 11117 2

Roslyn Weiss contends that, contrary to prevailing notions, Plato's Crito does not show an allegiance between Socrates and the state that condemned him. Weiss argues that Socrates considers the laws of the state to be more concerned with creating deference than justice, and asserts that, by submitting to his judgement, Socrates acts from a personal sense of justice rather than a set of imposed rules.

Brill's Companion to the Reception of Aristotle provides a systematic yet accessible account of the reception of Aristotle's philosophy in Antiquity. To date, there has been no comprehensive attempt to explain this complex phenomenon. This volume fills this lacuna by offering broad coverage of the subject from Hellenistic times to the sixth century AD. It is laid out chronologically and the 23 articles are divided into three sections: I. The Hellenistic Reception of Aristotle; II. The Post-Hellenistic Engagement with Aristotle; III. Aristotle in Late Antiquity. Topics include Aristotle and the Stoa, Andronicus of Rhodes and the construction of the Aristotelian corpus, the return to Aristotle in the first century BC, and the role of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry in the transmission of Aristotle's philosophy to Late Antiquity.

Aristotle s logic first became known in the Middle East through the medium of the Syriac language at a time prior to the rise of classical Arabic philosophy. The present volume makes available for the first time the earliest Syriac translation (sixth century AD) of the Categories, which is here edited together with an English translation, analytical commentary, glossaries and indices. The availability of such an important early work will enable the beginnings of the Semitic Aristotelian tradition to be studied more comprehensively. This will open the way to a better understanding of both the study of Aristotelian logic in Syriac and also of the significance of the Syriac tradition for the genesis and rise of Arabic logic.

Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Opponents of skepticism--including externalists, contextualists, foundationalists, and coherentists--have focussed largely on one particular variety of skepticism, often called Cartesian or Academic skepticism, which makes the radical claim that nobody can know anything. However, this version of skepticism is something of a straw man, since virtually no philosopher endorses this radical skeptical claim. The only skeptical view that has been truly held--by Sextus, Montaigne, Hume, Wittgenstein, and, most recently, Robert Fogelin--has been Pyrrohnian skepticism. Pyrrhonian skeptics do not assert Cartesian skepticism, but neither do they deny it. The Pyrrhonian skeptics' doubts run so deep that they suspend belief even about Cartesian skepticism and its denial. Nonetheless, some Pyrrhonians argue that they can still hold "common beliefs of everyday life" and can even claim to know some truths in an everyday way.
This edited volume presents previously unpublished articles on this subject by a strikingly impressive group of philosophers, who engage with both historical and contemporary versions of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Among them are Gisela Striker, Janet Broughton, Don Garrett, Ken Winkler, Hans Sluga, Ernest Sosa, Michael Williams, Barry Stroud, Robert Fogelin, and Roy Sorensen. This volume is thematically unified and will interest a broad spectrum of scholars in epistemology and the history of philosophy.