Anthony Summers peels back layers of fact and hearsay to reveal the truth about one of the most powerful Americans of the twentieth century No one exemplified paranoia and secrecy at the heart of American power better than J. Edgar Hoover, the original director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. For this consummate biography, renowned investigative journalist Anthony Summers interviewed more than eight hundred witnesses and pored through thousands of documents to get at the truth about the man who headed the FBI for fifty years, persecuted political enemies, blackmailed politicians, and lived his own surprising secret life. Ultimately, Summers paints a portrait of a fatally flawed individual who should never have held such power, and for so long.

Assigned to the National Indications Center, Cynthia Grabo served as a senior researcher and writer for the U.S. Watch Committee throughout its existence (1950 to 1975), and in its successor, the Strategic Warning Staff. During this time she saw the need to capture the institutional memory associated with strategic warning. With three decades of experience in the Intelligence Community, she saw intelligence and warning failures in Korea, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Cuba. In the summer of 1972, the DIA published her "Handbook of Warning Intelligence" as a classified document, followed by two additional classified volumes, one in the fall of 1972 and the last in 1974. These declassified books have now been condensed from the original three volumes into this one. Ms. Grabo's authoritative interpretation of an appropriate analytic strategy for intelligence-based warning is here presented in a commercial reprint of this classic study. (Originally published by the Joint Military Intelligence College)

This National Defense Intelligence College publication defines critical thinking in the context of intelligence analysis, explains how it influences the entire intelligence process, explores how it toughens the art of intelligence analysis, suggests how it may be taught, and deduces how analysts can be persuaded to adopt this habit. "David Moore has added his powerful voice to those calling for America's intelligence analysts to be more self-conscious about their methods and more venturesome in applying more formal methods." - Gregory F. Treverton, Rand Corp. ." . .a valuable initiative on behalf of the Intelligence Community" - Francis J. Hughes, National Defense Intelligence College.

The author of the present paper has examined how the Coast Guard became a member of the Intelligence Community, how Congress was involved, and how Congress will likely be increasingly involved in the organization of the Community. Derived from a thesis completed in 2003, this paper illustrates the importance of gathering electronic data immediately, since much of the reference material on which this study is based existed only as informal e-mail or documents stored on computers. Much of it likely would have been erased had the research started even a year later.

The case study presented here illustrated the combination of personality and process that resulted in the establishment of NIMA in 1996. It has been written specifically for those who are studying Congress and the U.S. Intelligence Community. It highlights the role of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees and how those committees interact with other committees. It augments the few good sources that exist on this very narrow subject.

The purpose of this book is to inform the larger community of federal government agencies, including law enforcement, national security, and other interested entities, as well as the citizens of this country and beyond, about the intelligence analytical capabilities existing in local and state levels of law enforcement.

Today's intelligence community faces challenges that would have been inconceivable only a dozen years ago. Just as al-Qaeda's destruction of the Twin Towers heralded a revolution in global diplomacy, the events of 9/11 also threw two centuries of spy-craft into turmoil - because this new enemy could not be bought. Gone were the sleepers and moles whose trade in secrets had sustained intelligence agencies in both peacetime and war. A new method of intelligence had been born. The award-winning former Financial Times security correspondent Mark Huband here takes us deep inside this new unseen world of spies and intelligence. With privileged access to intelligence officers from Rome to Kabul and from Khartoum to Guantanamo Bay, he reveals how spies created secret channels to the IRA, deceived Iran's terrorist allies, frequently attempted to infiltrate al-Qaeda, and forced Libya to abandon its nuclear weapons. Using accounts from ex-KGB officers, Huband vividly describes the devastation caused by the West's misreading of Soviet intentions in Africa, and explains how ill-prepared western intelligence agencies were when the Cold War was replaced by the perception of a new terrorist threat. Benefiting from privileged access to intelligence sources across the world, Trading Secrets provides a unique and controversial assessment of the catastrophic failure of spies to grasp the realities of the Taliban's grip on Afghanistan, and draws upon exclusive interviews with serving officers in assessing the ability of the major intelligence agencies to combat the threat of twenty-first century terrorism.

It is a rare season when the intelligence story in the news concerns intelligence analysis, not secret operations abroad. The United States is having such a season as it debates whether intelligence failed in the run-up to both September 11 and the second Iraq war, and so Rob Johnston's wonderful book is perfectly timed to provide the back-story to those headlines. The CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence is to be commended for having the good sense to find Johnston and the courage to support his work, even though his conclusions are not what many in the world of intelligence analysis would like to hear. He reaches those conclusions through the careful procedures of an anthro-pologist-conducting literally hundreds of interviews and observing and participating in dozens of work groups in intelligence analysis-and so they cannot easily be dismissed as mere opinion, still less as the bitter mutterings of those who have lost out in the bureaucratic wars. His findings constitute not just a strong indictment of the way American intelligence performs analysis, but also, and happily, a guide for how to do better. Johnston finds no baseline standard analytic method. Instead, the most com-mon practice is to conduct limited brainstorming on the basis of previous analy-sis, thus producing a bias toward confirming earlier views. The validating of data is questionable-for instance, the Directorate of Operation's (DO) "clean-ing" of spy reports doesn't permit testing of their validity-reinforcing the tendency to look for data that confirms, not refutes, prevailing hypotheses. The process is risk averse, with considerable managerial conservatism. There is much more emphasis on avoiding error than on imagining surprises. The analytic process is driven by current intelligence, especially the CIA's crown jewel analytic product, the President's Daily Brief (PDB), which might be caricatured as "CNN plus secrets." Johnston doesn't put it quite that way, but the Intelligence Community does more reporting than in-depth analysis. None of the analytic agencies knows much about the analytic techniques of the others. In all, there tends to be much more emphasis on writing and communication skills than on analytic methods. Training is driven more by the druthers of individual analysts than by any strategic view of the agencies and what they need. Most training is on-the-job. Johnston identifies the needs for analysis of at least three different types of consumers-cops, spies, and soldiers. The needs of those consumers produce at least three distinct types of intelligence-investigative or operational, stra tegic, and tactical. The research suggests the need for serious study of analytic methods across all three, guided by professional methodologists. Analysts should have many more opportunities to do fieldwork abroad. They should also move much more often across the agency "stovepipes" they now inhabit. These movements would give them a richer sense for how other agencies do analysis. Together, the analytic agencies should aim to create "communities of practice," with mentoring, analytic practice groups, and various kinds of on-line resources, including forums on methods and problem solving. These communities would be linked to a central repository of lessons learned, based on after-action post-mortems and more formal reviews of strategic intelligence products. These reviews should derive lessons for individuals and for teams and should look at roots of errors and failures. Oral and written histories would serve as other sources of wherewithal for lessons. These communities could also begin to reshape organizations, by rethinking organizational designs, developing more formal socialization programs, testing group configurations for effectiveness, and doing the same for management and leadership practices. Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

To his friends and neighbors, Glenn L. Carle was a wholesome, stereotypical New England Yankee, a former athlete struggling against incipient middle age, someone always with his nose in an abstruse book. But for two decades Carle broke laws, stole, and lied on a daily basis about nearly everything. I was almost never who I said I was, or did what I claimed to be doing. He was a CIA spy. He thrived in an environment of duplicity and ambiguity, flourishing in the gray areas of policy.
The Interrogator is the story of Carle's most serious assignment, when he was surged to become an interrogator in the U.S. Global War on Terror, and assigned to interrogate a top-level detainee at one of the CIA's notorious black sites overseas. It tells of his encounter with one of the most senior al-Qa'ida detainees the U.S. captured after 9/11, a ghost detainee who, the CIA believed, might hold the key to finding Usama Bin Ladin.
As Carle's interrogation sessions progressed, he began to seriously doubt the operation. Was this man, kidnapped in the Middle East, really the senior al-Qa'ida official the CIA believed he was? Headquarters viewed these misgivings as naive troublemaking, so Carle found himself isolated and progressively at odds with his institution and his orders. He struggled over how far to push the interrogation, wrestling with whether his actions constituted torture, and with what defined his real duty to his country. Then, in a dramatic twist, Headquarters spirited the detainee and Carle to the CIA's harshest interrogation facility, a place of darkness and fear, which even CIA officers dared mention only in whispers.
A haunting tale of sadness, confusion, and determination, The Interrogator is a shocking and intimate look at the world of espionage. It leads readers through the underworld of the Global War on terror, asking us to consider the professional and personal challenges faced by an intelligence officer during a time of war, and the unimaginable ways in which war alters our institutions and American society.

These documents (released by the Combating Terrorism Center) provide a fascinating and chilling look into the minds of the world's worst terrorist **** These top secret papers captured by US forces during the raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad provide a previously unimaginable glimpse into the workings of Al Qaeda and their slain leader. **** This book contains the complete text of the seventeen documents released by the Combating Terrorism Center on May 3, 2012.

The press called him a "real-life James Bond."

Fidel Castro called him "the most dangerous CIA agent."

History remembers him as a Watergate burglar, yet the Watergate break-in was his least perilous mission.

Frank Sturgis--using more than thirty aliases and code names--trained guerilla armies in twelve countries on three continents and spearheaded assassination plots to overthrow foreign governments including those of Cuba, Panama, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. "

Warrior "follows the shocking, often unbelievable adventures of Sturgis, brought to life by his nephew, Jim Hunt, and his cowriter, Bob Risch. Also included are never-before-seen personal photos of Sturgis and his compatriots.

Frank Sturgis was well-versed in a life of shadows: familiar to world leaders and underground kingpins, to spies and couterspies..."Warrior" is his story.

This primer highlights structured analytic techniques-some widely used in the private sector and academia, some unique to the intelligence profession. It is not a comprehensive overview of how intelligence officers conduct analysis. Rather, the primer highlights how structured analytic techniques can help one challenge judgments, identify mental mindsets, stimulate creativity, and manage uncertainty. In short, incorporating regular use of techniques such as these can enable one to structure thinking for wrestling with difficult questions.

This text presents the secrets of how British intelligence officers working undercover as liaison officers in East Germany stole advanced Soviet equipment and penetrated top-secret training areas. For 40 years the men from all three armed services, the SAS and the Foreign Office conducted an intelligence war against the massive Soviet military strength.

This textbook offers a way of gaining the analytic skills essential to undertake intelligence work. It acquaints students and analysts with how intelligence fits into the larger research framework. It covers not only the essentials of applied research, but also the function, structure, and operational methods specifically involved in intelligence work. It looks at how analysts work with classified information in a security conscious environment as well as obtain data via covert methods.

This is a study of the CIA's relationship with Congress. It encompasses the period from the creation of the Agency until 2004-the era of the DCIs. When Congress created a new position in December 2004-the director of national intelligence-to supersede the director of central intelligence (DCI) as head of the US Intelligence Community, it necessarily changed the dynamic between the CIA and the Congress. While the director of the Agency would continue to represent its interests on Capitol Hill, he or she would no longer speak as the head of US intelligence. While 2008 is too early to assess how this change will affect the Agency's relationship with Congress, it is safe to say it will never be quite the same. This study is not organized as one might expect. It does not describe what occurred between the Agency and Congress in chronological order nor does it purport to describe every interaction that occurred over the period encompassed by the study. Rather it attempts to describe what the relationship was like over time and then look at what it produced in seven discrete areas. The study is divided into two major parts. Part I describes how Congress and the Agency related to each other over the period covered by the study. As it happens, this period conveniently breaks down into two major segments: the years before the creation of the select committees on intelligence (1946-76) and the years after the creation of these committees (1976-2004). The arrangements that Congress put in place during the earlier period to provide oversight and tend to the needs of the Agency were distinctly different from those put in place in the mid-1970s and beyond. Over the entire period, moreover, the Agency shared intelligence with the Congress and had other interaction with its members that affected the relationship. This, too, is described in part I. Part II describes what the relationship produced over time in seven discrete areas: legislation affecting the Agency; programs and budget; oversight of analysis; oversight of collection; oversight of covert action; oversight of security and personnel matters; and the Senate confirmation process. It highlights what the principal issues have been for Congress in each area as well as how those issues have been handled. Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 2008.

The CIA's Greatest Hits details how the CIA: * hired top Nazi war criminals, shielded them from justice and learned--and used--their techniques * has been involved in assassinations, bombings, massacres, wars, death squads, drug trafficking, and rigged elections all over the world * tortures children as young as 13 and adults as old as 89, resulting in forced "confessions" to all sorts of imaginary crimes (an innocent Kuwaiti was tortured for months to make him keep repeating his initial lies, and a supposed al-Qaeda leader was waterboarded 187 times in a single month without producing a speck of useful information) * orchestrates the media--which one CIA deputy director liked to call "the mighty Wurlitzer"--and places its agents inside newspapers, magazines and book publishers * and much more. The CIA's crimes continue unabated, and unpunished. The day before General David Petraeus took over as the twentieth CIA director, federal prosecutors announced that they were dropping 99 investigations into the deaths of people in CIA custody, leaving just two active cases they're willing to pursue. The first edition of The CIA's Greatest Hits sold more than 38,000 copies. This fully revised and updated second edition contains six completely new chapters.

From literary journalist Sara Mansfield Taber comes a deep and wondrous memoir of her exotic childhood as the daughter of a covert CIA operative. Born under an Assumed Name portrays the thrilling and confusing life of a girl growing up abroad in a world of secrecy and diplomacy-and the heavy toll it takes on her and her father. As Taber leads us on a tour through the alluring countries to which her father is assigned, we track two parallel stories-those of young Sara and her Cold War spy father. Sara struggles for normalcy as the family is relocated to cities in North America, Europe, and Asia, and the constant upheaval eventually exacts its price. Only after a psychiatric hospitalization at age sixteen in a U.S. Air Force hospital with shell-shocked Vietnam War veterans does she come to a clear sense of who she is. Meanwhile, Sara's sweet-natured, philosophical father becomes increasingly disillusioned with his work, his agency, and his country. This is the question at the heart of this elegant and sophisticated work: what does it mean to be an American? In this fascinating, painful, and ultimately exhilarating coming-of-age story, young Sara confronts generosity, greatness, and tragedy-all that America heaps on the world.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in support of a Marxist-Leninist government, and the subsequent nine-year conflict with the indigenous Afghan Mujahedeen was one of the bloodiest conflicts of the Cold War. Key details of the circumstances surrounding the invasion and its ultimate conclusion only months before the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 have long remained unclear; it is a confidential narrative of clandestine correspondence, covert operations and failed intelligence. The Secret War in Afghanistan undertakes a full analysis of recently declassified intelligence archives in order to asses Anglo-American secret intelligence and diplomacy relating to the invasion of Afghanistan and unveil the Cold War realities behind the rhetoric. Rooted at every turn in close examination of the primary evidence, it outlines the secret operations of the CIA, MI6 and the KGB, and the full extent of the aid and intelligence from the West which armed and trained the Afghan fighters. Drawing from US, UK and Russian archives, Panagiotis Dimitrakis analyses the Chinese arms deals with the CIA, the multiple recorded intelligence failures of KGB intelligence and secret letters from the office of Margaret Thatcher to Jimmy Carter. In so doing, this study brings a new scholarly perspective to some of the most controversial events of Cold War history. Dimitrakis also outlines the full extent of China's involvement in arming the Mujahedeen, which led to the PRC effectively fighting the Soviet Union by proxy. This will be essential reading for scholars and students of the Cold War, American History and the Modern Middle East.

This book presents frightening, but truthful, facts that will shake many of your deepest beliefs to the core. A dark plan, put into place centuries ago, has come to fruition. Consider Battle Hymn your wake-up call... Painstakingly researched through hundreds of sources and interviews, Battle Hymn rips the cover off the invisible government that controls our leaders and soon, our very lives. Composed of just a few hundred powerful but unelected people, this elite cadre seeks to create a one-world government to complete its already advanced globalist plans to end the sovereignty of all nations--including the United States. Its ultimate goal is complete control through a New-World Order where a socialist dictatorship ensures that every citizen is tagged, mollified and productive. www.battlehymn.com

In today's Russia, information technical solutions influence the way they do businesses and how they govern their state. The information age has created incredible possibilities concerning how societies use information. However, technical development seldom means only advantages; it also means challenges. This book examines how Russia faces these challenges. In particular, which threats against its information society the Russian governmental power considers valid, if the threats have changed over time, and if this discussion of threats is a prioritised question in Russia. The author also identifies which authorities that currently are working with these issues or have in the past, and whether Russia is participating in international cooperations in order to combat threats against its information society. Finally, the author examines how the Russian political elite view threats against its information society, and compares how that perception differs from to real, existing threats.

Corporate espionage is an inescapable reality of the modern global business world. The Grey Line is the comprehensive examination of how modern day private sector spies operate, who they target, how they penetrate secure systems and subvert vulnerable employees. Additionally, the book provides invaluable resources for companies and individuals to use in deterring and defeating corporate spies.

In the 2010 federal election, independent candidate Andrew Wilkie grabbed headlines after winning the seat of Denison, and with it a key role in deciding who would form the next government of Australia.Before he was a politician, however, Wilkie was Australia's most talked-about whistleblower. In March 2003, Wilkie resigned from Australia's peak intelligence agency in protest over the looming war in Iraq. He was the only serving intelligence officer from the 'coalition of the willing' - the US, the UK and Australia - to do so, and his dramatic move was reported throughout the world. Wilkie's act of conscience put him on a collision course with the Australian government. Why was he willing to risk his career and reputation to tell the truth? What happened when he decided to take a stand? In Axis of Deceit, Wilkie tells his story. He exposes how governments skewed, spun and fabricated intelligence advice. And he offers a rare glimpse into the world of international intelligence and life as a spook. With a brand-new preface, this is the fascinating inside story of a man now set to play a pivotal role in our public life.