This study addresses the future of the Intelligence Community in light of 21st century issues/challenges/threats. In addressing this issue, the author reviews many of the chief intelligence reform proposals or legislative activities during the early years of the U.S. intelligence service and throughout the Cold-War era, to include the turbulent mid-1970s, on into the 1990s, and concludes with a review of the recommendations from the Joint Inquiry Report and the 9/11 Commission Report leading to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. At issue is whether these ongoing schemes for reform, including the new legislation, are sufficient for the effective operation of the Community in a globalized environment.

The three papers presented here are by well-known experts and were delivered at SSI's third annual conference on Russia that took place at Carlisle, PA, on September 26-27, 2011. This conference, like its predecessors, had as its goal the assemblage of Russian, European, and American experts to engage in a regular, open, and candid dialogue on critical issues in contemporary security.

In recent years, it has become increasingly clear to many observers that the Department of Defense must better communicate to the officers at the tactical end of the nuclear mission a rationale for nuclear weapons and deterrence, the critical role that they play in the post-Cold War strategy of the United States, and the value of nuclear weapons to the security of the American people. This report tracks the changing conceptual and political landscape of U.S. nuclear deterrence to illuminate the gap in prioritizing the nuclear arsenal and to build a compelling rationale for tactical personnel explaining the role and value of U.S. nuclear weapons.

In this work, Patrick Kelley interprets the intelligence environment of political, military and information empires. His contribution sheds light on the cause of enduring intelligence collection deficits that afflict the center of such empires, and that can coincide with their ebb and flow. Alert intelligence practitioners, present and future, can note here just how useful a fresh interpretation of the intelligence enterprise can be to a coherent understanding of the global stream of worrisome issues. The long-term value of this work will be realized as readers entertain the implications of Churchill's comment that "The empires of the future are the empires of the mind.

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) and the Department of Justice's (DOJ) United States Marshals Service (USMS) experience a range of challenges in their efforts to provide effective security screening. FPS and USMS conduct building security screening at thousands of GSA buildings across the country. This book examines the challenges federal entities face in their efforts to prevent prohibited items and individuals who may pose a security threat from entering GSA buildings; and actions federal entities have taken to assess the effectiveness of their screening efforts, and the results of those actions. Furthermore, the book examines the extent to which DHS and other stakeholders are prepared to address cyber risk to building and access control systems in federal facilities.

After the September 11 attacks, the 9/11 Commission argued that the United States needed a powerful leader, a "spymaster," to forge the scattered intelligence bureaucracies into a singular enterprise to vanquish America's new enemies: stateless international terrorists. During the 2004 presidential election, Congress and the president remade the post-World War II national security infrastructure in less than five months, creating the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Blinking Red illuminates the complicated history of the bureaucratic efforts to reform America's national security after the intelligence failures of 9/11 and Iraq's missing weapons of mass destruction, explaining how the National Security Council (NSC) and Congress shaped the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks. Michael Allen asserts that the process of creating the DNI position and the NCTC is a case study in power politics and institutional reform. By bringing to light the legislative transactions and political wrangling during the reform of the intelligence community, Allen helps us understand why the effectiveness of these institutional changes is still in question.

On September 11, 2001, The USA suffered a devastating surprise attack by international terrorists bent upon slaughtering Americans in the name of their God. This attack is the subject of the findings and recommendations of the unprecedented Joint Inquiry conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). In this document, Senator Richard C. Shelby Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence offers his assessments and suggestions, based upon his four and a half years as Chairman of the SSCI and one and a half years as its Vice Chairman. These additional views are intended to complement and expand upon the findings and recommendations of the Joint Inquiry.