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Books > Social sciences > Politics & government > International relations > Espionage & secret services
Uncertainty surrounds every major decision in international
politics. Yet there is almost always room for reasonable people to
disagree about what that uncertainty entails. No one can reliably
predict the outbreak of armed conflict, forecast economic
recessions, anticipate terrorist attacks, or estimate the countless
other risks that shape foreign policy choices. Many scholars and
practitioners therefore believe that it is better to keep foreign
policy debates focused on the facts - that it is, at best, a waste
of time to debate uncertain judgments that will often prove to be
wrong. In War and Chance, Jeffrey A. Friedman explains how avoiding
the challenge of assessing uncertainty undermines foreign policy
analysis and decision making. Drawing on an innovative combination
of historical and experimental evidence, he shows that foreign
policy analysts can assess uncertainty in a manner that is
theoretically coherent, empirically meaningful, politically
defensible, practically useful, and sometimes logically necessary
for making sound choices. Each of these claims contradicts
widespread skepticism about the value of probabilistic reasoning in
international affairs, and shows that placing greater emphasis on
assessing uncertainty can improve nearly any foreign policy debate.
A clear-eyed examination of the logic, psychology, and politics of
assessing uncertainty, War and Chance provides scholars and
practitioners with new foundations for understanding one of the
most controversial elements of foreign policy discourse.
Between 1940 and 1945, Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE)
carried out sabotage and organised resistance across occupied
Europe. Over 5 years, SOE sent over 500 agents into Norway to carry
out a range of operations from sabotage and assassination to
attempts to organise an underground guerrilla army. This book is
the first multi-archival, international academic analysis of SOE's
policy and operations in Norway and the influences that shaped
them, challenging previous interpretations of the relationship
between this organisation and both the Norwegian authorities and
the Milorg resistance movement.
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