This fascinating account of how two young Americans turned traitor during the Cold War is an "absolutely smashing real-life spy story" (The New York Times Book Review). At the height of the Cold War, some of the nation's most precious secrets passed through a CIA contractor in Southern California. Only a handful of employees were cleared to handle the intelligence that came through the Black Vault. One of them was Christopher John Boyce, a hard-partying genius with a sky-high IQ, a passion for falconry, and little love for his country. Security at the Vault was so lax, Boyce couldn't help but be tempted. And when he gave in, the fate of the free world would hang in the balance. With the help of his best friend, Andrew Daulton Lee, a drug dealer with connections south of the border, Boyce began stealing classified documents and selling them to the Soviet embassy in Mexico City. It was an audacious act of treason, committed by two spoiled young men who were nearly always drunk, stoned, or both--and were about to find themselves caught in the middle of a fight between the CIA and the KGB. This Edgar Award-winning book was the inspiration for the critically acclaimed film starring Timothy Hutton and Sean Penn--a true story as thrilling as any dreamed up by Ian Fleming or John le Carre. Before Edward Snowden, there were Boyce and Lee, two of the most unlikely spies in the history of the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War presented a paradoxical dilemma for the Intelligence Community (IC). The demise of the Soviet Union brought about a significant downsizing of the nation's intelligence apparatus while concurrently necessitating a major reallocation of intelligence resources to cover a more complex array of trans-national threats such as counter-proliferation, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and ethnopolitical conflict. The combination of shrinking budgets and expanding analytical requirements placed enormous demands on the Community. Among the most pressing challenges was the need for an on-demand, surged intelligence capability for coverage over a diverse range of operational requirements. A key recommendation of a 1996 House Permanent Select Committee investigation of the nation's intelligence capabilities called for the creation of a dynamic surge capacity for crisis response. The Committee concluded that such resources "need not be self-contained within the IC," but must be quickly marshaled "without undue concerns about who owns the assets." Several other independent reform studies at the time proposed initiatives to satisfy surged collection demands by leveraging nongovernmental resources. Despite these recommendations, during the 1990s there was little effort to create such a surge capacity. Bureaucratic inertia and lack of clear consensus on an intelligence reform agenda made major initiatives impossible. With the enormous intelligence demands of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) the issue of surge capacity has reemerged as a critical issue for community leaders. Collection management, remote sensing, linguistic support, document exploitation, interrogation, and technical analysis are just some intelligence support functions currently being performed by private contractors. This ad hoc response to meet the intelligence requirements of GWOT operations has produced mixed results. One report strongly recommended the permanent integration of commercial imagery products into the conventional collection management cycle for operational commanders. Conversely, a key fi nding of the Army Inspector General's report on OIF detainee operations in Iraq clearly identifi ed poor training and misuse of contract interrogators as a contributing factor in detainee abuse. These examples speak to both the promise and the liability of utilizing commercial augmentation for intelligence surge capacity. Given the current mismatch between operational requirements and intelligence force structure, there will be continuing reliance on commercial augmentation. As critical intelligence requirements are increasingly resourced through commercial augmentation, IC leaders must determine the appropriate roles for private sector firms and provide effective plans for legal oversight, operational integration, and management of contracted support. To date, few studies have adequately considered the policy implications of integrating non-governmental providers into the operational intelligence cycle. GWOT operations have required significant reliance on private sector resources for intelligence collection and analysis but have done so without sufficient measures for effective acquisition, management and accountability over commercial providers. This study assesses the value of current commercial activities used within DoD elements of the Intelligence Community, particularly dealing with operational functions such as analysis, collection management, document exploitation, interrogation, production, and linguistic support. These functions were selected due to the extensive use of commercial augmentation in these areas during recent GWOT operations.

Ron Evans was probably the most notorious Soviet spy of British nationality working out of Scandinavia in the post-War era. Here, for the first time, the full story of the Ron Evans spy case is told in all its drama and excitement as it occurred in the mid-1960s. Whilst on the one hand Ron Evans was a leading radio engineer with a brilliant intellect, working on sensitive defence contracts; on the other, he was a determined and deft conspirator, manipulating a wide circle of oddly assorted people to achieve his illicit ends. KGB and MI6 agents play a prominent part in this account of seething conflict, an assassination attempt, and death; and only now, in deference to the spirit of the Thirty Year rule and its equivalent application on the international scale, is it possible to reveal the true facts behind this Cold War drama. Many nationalities and colourful individuals, including diplomats and an eccentric Finnish aristocrat, were involved in the complex intrigue surrounding Ron Evans' underhand activities. The author, who unwittingly found himself in conflict with the Soviet agent, was by a curious set of circumstances led into the role of spy-hunter, which eventually led to the arrest and conviction of Ron Evans. But that was not the end of the story. Worse was to follow. Due to an unfortunate set of events, an MI6 agent who was implicated in a counter-plot, found that his cover was blown, and following his capture and arrest by the authorities of a neutral power, Britain's entire Scandinavian intelligence network came crashing down. Despite the seriousness of the subject matter the author's observations are often filled with ironic comedy and ridicule.

The book aims to educate officials as well as students about the vicissitudes that accompany the development and execution of the government intelligence function. The authors demonstrate that national, strategic intelligence in any country of the Hemisphere can experience episodes of devolution as well as positive evolution, at the same time that the culturally modulated practices of government professionals can oscillate between periods of repression and democratic observance.

This volume helps identify how to produce good or better intelligence - intelligence that is of use to policymakers. The authors have - across a range of areas of interest -identified some of the practices that work best "to bring about" good intelligence. The focus is on analysis rather than operations and includes pieces from currently serving professionals in the armed forces, CIA, and NSA. Editor Dr. Russell G. Swenson directed the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research at the Joint Military Intelligence College when this book was published by the Joint Military Intelligence College.