How has the end of the Cold War affected America's intelligence agencies? When are aggressive clandestine operations justifiable, and who should be responsible for deciding to proceed with them? Should the United States engage in more aggressive economic espionage? These are just a few of the issues Loch Johnson examines in this thoughtful assessment of strategic intelligence and its vital role in modern governments. Johnson draws on historical data, more than five hundred interviews, and his own experience working for Congressional committees on intelligence. He begins by defining the functions of intelligence: espionage, counterintelligence, and covert action. He then provides an overview of America's secret operations abroad, assesses the moral implications of clandestine operations, and offers guidelines for a more ethical approach to the use of secret power. Johnson explores the question of intelligence accountability, looking closely at how well intelligence agencies have been monitored through the forum of Congressional hearings. He compares America's approach to intelligence with that of other nations, discusses the degree to which intelligence agencies should provide information about foreign businesses, and evaluates how well the U.S. intelligence agencies fared during the Cold War against the USSR. Secret agencies have the capacity not only to safeguard democracy but also to subvert it, says Johnson. As such, they deserve both our support and our scrutiny.

Even those well-read in the American Revolution are probably unaware of the extensive and often crucial espionage developed by both the British and Continental armies during the conflict. Besides reexamining in fresh perspective such well-known figures as Paul Revere, Nathan Hale, Benedict Arnold, and John Andre, the author, a former general staff intelligence officer in World War II, reveals the exploits and tribulations of scores of other spies: Ann Bates, the Tory agent who spied at Washington's headquarters and who, when fleeing for her life, paused to count American artillery; the high-ranking traitor Dr. Benjamin Church, the Continental Army's Director General of Hospitals, caught as a result of a careless mistress; Lydia Darragh, the Quaker housewife who spied for Washington himself; Sergeant Major John Champe, who posed as a deserter from the rebel army in order to capture Benedict Arnold; and many others. From the plot to kidnap George Washington to the fall of Yorktown, here are the clandestine activities of the spies, counterspies, and double agents who risked life and honor fighting a silent, anonymous shadow war.

This book is the first to provide, in English translation, the full extent of Zola's writings on the Dreyfus affair, and features the complete text of "J'accuse", Zola's public letter to the French authorities, a century after its first publication in 1898. It also includes impassioned "open letters" to leading French newspapers, interviews with Zola at his home, intimate letters to his wife and friends written during his year long exile in England, and his final articles, written when Dreyfus was close to being pardoned. The documents represent, in their polemical entirety, a classic defense of human rights and a seating denunciation of fanaticism and prejudice.

"The book offers a fascinating juxtaposition of the grand public Zola, breathing fire and sweeping history before him, and the lonely, conflicted, doubt-ridden figure in exile". -- James R. Oestreich, New York Times

"Zola's many essays and open letters balance a seething fury at injustice with unrelenting, fiercely logical assaults on Dreyfus's accusers. Balancing these polemics are Zola's poignant, sadly domestic letters home during the year he spent exiled in England after his 1898 libel conviction. Levieux's readable translation lets Zola's forceful, somewhat bombastic tone shine through". -- Library Journal

"For students of this complex and reprehensible moment in French history, the Pages anthology presents the full panoply of Zola's writings about Dreyfus, and by doing so reminds us that "J'accuse" is only the best known of a series of open letters penned by the great novelist". -- Washington Post Book World

"The translations are highly readable and they give a dramatic insight into developments as eventsunfolded....Pages gives a comprehensive background account of Zola's involvement in the case". -- John A. Mizzi, Sunday Times

"A spellbinding study in revolution from the top down."--New York Times Book Review Most Americans know that John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry was one of the events that sparked the Civil War, but very few know the story of how a circle of Northern aristocrats covertly aided Brown in his quest to ignite a nationwide slave revolt. These influential men, who called themselves the Secret Six, included the editor of the Atlantic Monthly, a world-famous physician, a Unitarian minister whose rhetoric helped shape Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, an educator and close friend of Emerson and Thoreau, and two prominent philanthropists. Edward J. Renehan, Jr., recounts how these pillars of Northern society came to believe that armed conflict was necessary to purge the United States of a government-sanctioned evil, how the messianic Brown enlisted their support, and how they sought to cover up their association with him--even perjuring themselves before a congressional investigation--after his bloody debacle.

The CIA and its World War II predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), were for many years largely populated by members of Ivy League colleges, particularly Yale. In this highly acclaimed book, Robin Winks explores the underlying bonds between the university and the intelligence communities, introducing a fascinating cast of characters that include safe-crackers and experts in Azerbaijani as well as such social luminaries as Paul Mellon, David Bruce, John P. Marquand, Jr., and William Vanderbilt. This edition of the book includes a new preface by Winks. Reviews of the first edition: "One of the best studies of intelligence in recent years."-Edward Jay Epstein, Los Angeles Times Book Review "The most original book yet written on the interpenetration of counter-intelligence and campus."-Andrew Sinclair, Sunday Times (London) "Winks writes a lively compound of analysis and anecdote to illuminate the bonds between academe and the intelligence community. His book is a towering achievement."-Robert W. Smith, Chicago Sun-Times "Among the more important contributions to the history of Anglo-American espionage to appear this or any other year. . . . Moves with an unfolding pace that any thriller writer might envy."-Tom Dowling, San Francisco Examiner "A brilliant book."-Sallie Pisani, Journal of American History

The names, we sometimes say, have been changed "to protect the innocent". As regards those agents in KGB networks in the U.S. during and following World War II, their presence and their deeds (or misdeeds) were known, but their names were not. The FBI-KGB War is the exciting, true (which often really is stranger than fiction), and authentic story of how those names became known and how the not-so-innocent persons to whom those names belonged were finally called to account. Following World War II, FBI Special Agent Robert J. Lamphere set out to uncover the extensive American networks of the KGB. Lamphere used a large file of secret Russian messages intercepted during the war. The FBI-KGB War is the detailed (but never boring) story of how those messages were finally decoded and made to reveal their secrets, secrets that led to persons with such now-infamous names as Judith Coplon, Klaus Fuchs, Harry Gold, and Ethel and Julius Rosenberg.

Donald Maclean was a star diplomat, an establishment insider and a keeper of some of the West's greatest secrets. He was also a Russian spy... Codenamed 'Orphan' by his Russian recruiter, Maclean was Britain's most gifted traitor. But as he leaked huge amounts of top-secret intelligence, an international code-breaking operation was rapidly closing in on him. Moments before he was unmasked, Maclean escaped to Moscow. Drawing on a wealth of previously classified material, A Spy Named Orphan now tells this story for the first time in full, revealing the character and devastating impact of perhaps the most dangerous Soviet agent of the twentieth century. 'Superb' William Boyd 'Fascinating... An exceptional story of espionage and betrayal, thrillingly told' Philippe Sands 'A cracking story... Impressively researched' Sunday Times 'Philipps makes the story and the slow uncovering of [Maclean's] treachery a gripping narrative' Alan Bennett

Not since Joseph Wambaugh's best-selling "The Onion Field" has there been a true police story as fascinating, as totally gripping as . . . "Lines And Shadows." The media hailed them as heroes. Others denounced them as lawless renegades. A squad of tough cops called the Border Crime Task Force. A commando team sent to patrol the snake-infested no-man's-land south of San Diego. Not to apprehend the thousands of illegal aliens slipping into the U.S., but to stop the ruthless bandits who preyed on them nightly--relentlessly robbing, raping and murdering defenseless men, women and children. The task force plan was simple. They would disguise themselves as illegal aliens. They would confront the murderous shadows of the night. Yet each time they walked into the violent blackness along the border, they came closer to another boundary line--a fragile line within each man. and crossing it meant destroying their sanity and their lives.

"With each book, it seems, Mr. Wambaugh's skill as a writer increases . . . . In "Lines And Shadows" he gives an off-trail, action-packed true account of police work and the intimate lives of policemen that, for my money, is his best book yet."-- "The New York Times Book Review."

"A saga of courage, craziness, brutality and humor . . . . One of his best books, comparable to "The Onion Field" for storytelling and revelatory power."-- "Chicago Sun-Times"

Packed with case histories and profiles of history's most infamous secret agents, plus a comprehensive glossary, "The Guinness Book of Espionage" will appeal to armchair spies everywhere. "The Guinness Book of Espionage" looks at the real world of spies and spying--military, political, and commercial--and charts the story of subterfuge throughout history. It contains fascinating details on: The People: famous spies such as Christopher Marlowe, Mata Hari, John Walker, and Kim Philby Their Methods: recruiting and running an agent, and the development of codes and ciphers The Equipment and Technology: from the early use of radios for communication through to today's hi-tech electronic surveillance and photographic techniques, as employed by advanced spy planes and satellites The Famous Incidents: such as the Zimmermann Telegram, the Venlo incident--one of the greatest mistakes in British intelligence history, which wiped out virtually all British agents on the Continent at the start of the last war; the shooting down of Francis Gary Pawers's U-2 spyplane in 1960, and the destruction of the Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 over Kamtchatka with the loss of 269 innocent lives in the '80s In England Defeat Shakes the Foundations of Monarchy Services and Operations: including the KGB, CIA, MI5, Mossad and Britain's wartime Special Operations Executive Secrets in the Office: telephone tapping and the ins and outs of computer hacking

Uncertainty surrounds every major decision in international politics. Yet there is almost always room for reasonable people to disagree about what that uncertainty entails. No one can reliably predict the outbreak of armed conflict, forecast economic recessions, anticipate terrorist attacks, or estimate the countless other risks that shape foreign policy choices. Many scholars and practitioners therefore believe that it is better to keep foreign policy debates focused on the facts - that it is, at best, a waste of time to debate uncertain judgments that will often prove to be wrong. In War and Chance, Jeffrey A. Friedman explains how avoiding the challenge of assessing uncertainty undermines foreign policy analysis and decision making. Drawing on an innovative combination of historical and experimental evidence, he shows that foreign policy analysts can assess uncertainty in a manner that is theoretically coherent, empirically meaningful, politically defensible, practically useful, and sometimes logically necessary for making sound choices. Each of these claims contradicts widespread skepticism about the value of probabilistic reasoning in international affairs, and shows that placing greater emphasis on assessing uncertainty can improve nearly any foreign policy debate. A clear-eyed examination of the logic, psychology, and politics of assessing uncertainty, War and Chance provides scholars and practitioners with new foundations for understanding one of the most controversial elements of foreign policy discourse.

A look at what Americans remember (and what they have forgotten) about one of the most traumatic domestic political event in the America's post-war history.

In this new biography, published to coincide with the 100th anniversary of her execution, Mata Hari is revealed in all of her flawed eccentricity; a woman whose adult life was a fantastical web of lies, half-truths and magnetic sexuality that captivated men. Following the death of a young son and a bitter divorce, Mata Hari reinvented herself as an exotic dancer in Paris, before finally taking up the life of a courtesan. She could have remained a half-forgotten member of France's grande horizontale were it not for the First World War and her disastrous decision to become embroiled in espionage. What happened next was part farce and part tragedy that ended in her execution in October 1917. Recruited by both the Germans and the French as a spy, Mata Hari - codenamed H-21 - was also almost recruited by the Russians. But the harmless fantasies and lies she had told on stage had become part of the deadly game of double agents during wartime. Struggling with the huge cost of war, the French authorities needed to catch a spy. Mata Hari, the dancer, the courtesan, the fantasist, became the prize catch.

In the annals of espionage, one name towers above all others: that of H. A. R. "Kim" Philby, the ringleader of the legendary Cambridge spies. A member of the British establishment, Philby joined the Secret Intelligence Service in 1940, rose to the head of Soviet counterintelligence, and, as M16's liaison with the CIA and the FBI, betrayed every secret of Allied operations to the Russians, fatally compromising covert actions to roll back the Iron Curtain in the early years of the Cold War. Written from Moscow in 1967, My Silent War shook the world and introduced a new archetype in fiction: the unrepentant spy. It inspired John Le Carre's Smiley novels and the later espionage novels of Graham Greene. Kim Philby was history's most successful spy. He was also an exceptional writer who gave us the great iconic story of the Cold War and revolutionized, in the process, the art of espionage writing.

In November 1792, an iron wall-safe, or armoire de fer, was discovered hidden within a wall in the Tulieries palace. It contained secret correspondence which Louis XVI had kept from the outbreak of the Revolution until he overthrew on 10 August. The discovery of the armoire de fer gravely compromised the cause of the King, who was awaiting trial, and who would be executed on 21 January 1793. Much cited by historians of every viewpoint writing on the Revolution, the actual contents of the armoire are often misrepresented and remain surprisingly little-known.In this fresh and innovatory study, Andrew Freeman provides a cool and dispassionate survey of the contents of the armoire de fer, and finds contents which throw new light on the mentality of Louis XVI. The King emerges as a more thoughtful and perspective critic of the discovery of the armoire in the political context of 1792, and shows that the secrecy which the existence of such a cache of documents represented was perhaps more damaging than their actual content. The volume contains a representative sample of documents culled directly from the contents of the armoire. Many of these have never been published before and all are available in English translation for the first time.

The essays in this volume assess the influence of intelligence on the Second World War and open up a number of other important areas for research. Studies of the growth of the imperial intellignece network cast new light on subjects ranging from Canadian surveillance of Vancouver Sikhs to signals intelligence in the Middle East. Studies of Japanese intelligence indicate the significance of Asian intelligence systems as a factor in modern international relations.

A number of contributors emphasize the slowness with which governments and high commands learned to assess and use the intelligence they received.

Contributions by
Anthony Adamthwaite, Christopher Andrew, Patrick Beesly, Ralph Bennett, Dr John W. M. Chapman, Sir Harry Hinsley, Dr Keith Jeffery, Dr Peter Morris, Ian Nish, Jeremy Noakes, Richard Popplewell, Professor Jürgen Rohwer, Dr Alan Sharp, Jean Stengers, E. E. Thomas and Dr Bernd Wegner

THE PORTLAND SPY RING was one of the most infamous espionage cases from the Cold War. People the world over were shocked when its exposure revealed the shadowy world of deep cover KGB 'illegals' - spies operating under false identities stolen from the dead. The CIA's revelation to MI5 in 1960 that a KGB agent was stealing crucial secrets from the world-leading submarine research base at Portland in Dorset looked initially like a dangerous but contained lapse of security by a British man and his mistress. But the couple were tailed by MI5 'watchers' to a covert meeting with a Canadian businessman, Gordon Lonsdale. The unsuspecting Lonsdale in turn led MI5's spycatchers to an innocent-looking couple in suburban Ruislip called the Krogers. But within weeks the CIA rang the alarm - their critical source of intelligence was to defect within hours - and MI5 was forced to act immediately. The Krogers were exposed as two of the most important Russian 'illegals' ever, whom the Americans had been hunting for years. And Lonsdale was no Canadian, but a senior KGB controller. This astonishing but true story of MI5's spyhunt is straight from the world of John le Carre and is told here for the first time using hitherto secret MI5 and FBI files, private family archives and original interviews. Its tentacles stretch around the world - from America, to the USSR, Canada, New Zealand, Europe and the UK. DEAD DOUBLES is a gripping episode of Cold War history, and a case that fully justified the West's paranoia about infiltration and treachery.

As John le Carre's fictional intelligence men admit, it was the case histories - constructed narratives serving shifting agendas - that shaped the British intelligence machine, rather than their personal experience of secret operations. Secret History demonstrates that a critical scrutiny of internal "after action" assessments of intelligence prepared by British officials provides an invaluable and original perspective on the emergence of British intelligence culture over a period stretching from the First World War to the early Cold War. The historical record reflects personal value judgments about what qualified as effective techniques and organization, and even who could rightfully be called an intelligence officer. The history of intelligence thus became a powerful form of self-reinforcing cultural capital. Shining an intense light on the history of Britain's intelligence organizations, Secret History excavates how contemporary myths, misperceptions, and misunderstandings were captured and how they affected the development of British intelligence and the state.

The Central Intelligence Agency was established by Harry S. Truman after World War II and it soon provided covert political and paramilitary support to further US foreign policy. Strengthened by President Eisenhower and under the command of Allen Dulles, by the early 1950s, the CIA was actively overthrowing governments, notably Prime Minister Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 and President Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in 1954. The Agency was less effective in Eastern Europe, however, where the Soviet Union had established control, despite opportunities for US interference such as the East German riots in 1953 and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Stephen Long challenges the accepted view that the US believed in a post-World War II ordering of Europe which placed the East outside an American 'sphere of influence'. He argues instead that 'disorder prevailed over design' in the planning and organization of intelligence operations during the early stages of the Cold War, and that the period represents a missed opportunity for the US during the Cold War. Featuring new archival material and a new approach which seeks to unpick the relationship between the CIA, the US government and the Soviet Union, The CIA and the Soviet Bloc sheds new light on espionage, the Cold War, US diplomatic history and the history of twentieth-century Europe.

It was the conflict that shocked America and the world, but the struggle for peace is central to the history of the Vietnam War. Rejecting the idea that war between Hanoi and the US was inevitable, the author traces North Vietnam's programs for a peaceful reunification of their nation from the 1954 Geneva negotiations up to the final collapse of the Saigon government in 1975. She also examines the ways that groups and personalities in South Vietnam responded by crafting their own peace proposals, in the hope that the Vietnamese people could solve their disagreements by engaging in talks without outside interference. While most of the writing on peacemaking during the Vietnam War concerns high-level international diplomacy, Sophie Quinn-Judge reminds us of the courageous efforts of southern Vietnamese, including Buddhists, Catholics, students and citizens, to escape the unprecedented destruction that the US war brought to their people. The author contends that US policymakers showed little regard for the attitudes of the South Vietnamese population when they took over the war effort in 1964 and sent in their own troops to fight it in 1965.A unique contribution of this study is the interweaving of developments in South Vietnamese politics with changes in the balance of power in Hanoi; both of the Vietnamese combatants are shown to evolve towards greater rigidity as the war progresses, while the US grows increasingly committed to President Thieu in Saigon, after the election of Richard Nixon. Not even the signing of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement could blunt US support for Thieu and his obstruction of the peace process. The result was a difficult peace in 1975, achieved by military might rather than reconciliation, and a new realization of the limits of American foreign policy.

The Vietnam War lasted twenty years, and was the USA's greatest military failure. An attempt to stem the spread of Soviet and Chinese influence, the conflict in practice created a chaotic state torn apart by espionage, terrorism and guerilla warfare. American troops quickly became embroiled in jungle warfare and knowledge of the other side's troop movements, communication lines, fighting techniques and strategy became crucial. Panagiotis Dimitrakis uncovers this battle for intelligence and tells the story of the Vietnam War through the newly available British, American and French sources - including declassified material. In doing so he dissects the limitations of the CIA, the NSA, the MI6 and the French intelligence- the SDECE- in gathering actionable intelligence. Dimitrakis also shows how the Vietminh under Ho Chi Minh established their own secret services; how their high grade moles infiltrated the US and French military echelons and the government of South Vietnam, and how Hanoi's intelligence apparatus eventually suffered seriously from 'spies amongst us' paranoia. In doing so he enhances our understanding of the war that came to define its era.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in support of a Marxist-Leninist government, and the subsequent nine-year conflict with the indigenous Afghan Mujahedeen was one of the bloodiest conflicts of the Cold War. Key details of the circumstances surrounding the invasion and its ultimate conclusion only months before the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 have long remained unclear; it is a confidential narrative of clandestine correspondence, covert operations and failed intelligence. The Secret War in Afghanistan undertakes a full analysis of recently declassified intelligence archives in order to asses Anglo-American secret intelligence and diplomacy relating to the invasion of Afghanistan and unveil the Cold War realities behind the rhetoric. Rooted at every turn in close examination of the primary evidence, it outlines the secret operations of the CIA, MI6 and the KGB, and the full extent of the aid and intelligence from the West which armed and trained the Afghan fighters. Drawing from US, UK and Russian archives, Panagiotis Dimitrakis analyses the Chinese arms deals with the CIA, the multiple recorded intelligence failures of KGB intelligence and secret letters from the office of Margaret Thatcher to Jimmy Carter. In so doing, this study brings a new scholarly perspective to some of the most controversial events of Cold War history. Dimitrakis also outlines the full extent of China's involvement in arming the Mujahedeen, which led to the PRC effectively fighting the Soviet Union by proxy. This will be essential reading for scholars and students of the Cold War, American History and the Modern Middle East.

During the long years of civil strife in China the Nationalist authorities amassed extensive materials on their Communist adversaries. Now stored in government institutions on Taiwan, these materials are an excellent source for the study of the Chinese Communist movement. Among them is the Bureau of Investigation Collection (BIC), which holds over 300,000 volumes of primary documents on the Chinese Communist movement.The purpose of Chinese Communist Materials is, without any attempt at comprehensive listing of the Bureau's holdings, to give scholars a representative description of the collection, to point out its implications for research, and suggest new areas for research at the Bureau in the fields of political science and history [1, 4].