The metaphysical part of this book is largely concerned with realism issues. Michael Devitt starts with realism about universals, dismissing Plato's notorious 'one over many' problem. Several chapters argue for a fairly uncompromisingly realist view of the external physical world of commonsense and science. Both the nonfactualism of moral noncognitivism and positivistic instrumentalism, and defl ationism about truth, are found to rest on an antirealism that is hard to characterize. A case is presented for moral realism. Various biological realisms are considered. Finally, an argument is presented for an unfashionable biological essentialism.
The second part of the book is epistemological. Devitt argues against the a priori and for a Quinean naturalism. The intuitions that so dominate "armchair philosophy" are empirical not a priori.
Throughout the book there is an emphasis on distinguishing metaphysical issues about what there is and what it's like from semantic issues about meaning, truth, and reference. Another central theme, captured in the title, is that we should "put metaphysics first." We should approach epistemology and semantics from a metaphysical perspective rather than vice versa. The epistemological turn in modern philosophy, and the linguistic turn in contemporary philosophy, were something of disasters.

Presenting ten diverse and original moral paradoxes, this cutting edge work of philosophical ethics makes a focused, concrete case for the centrality of paradoxes within morality.* Explores what these paradoxes can teach us about morality and the human condition* Considers a broad range of subjects, from familiar topics to rarely posed questions, among them "Fortunate Misfortune", "Beneficial Retirement" and "Preferring Not To Have Been Born"* Asks whether the existence of moral paradox is a good or a bad thing* Presents analytic moral philosophy in a provocative, engaging and entertaining way; posing new questions, proposing possible solutions, and challenging the reader to wrestle with the paradoxes themselves

What is to be done about the damaging impact of economic activity on the environment? In recent years, there has been growing debate over this question. This book, by an economist, urges Christians to support strong governmental and intergovernmental action to improve the workings of existing global economic systems so as to provide adequate environmental protection. As such, it draws on the tradition of mainstream environmental economics and on recent developments in "ecological economics." But it acknowledges that environmental policy raises important ethical and theological issues often briefly or inadequately covered within economic literature: ethically responsible attitudes to uncertainty, inequality within and between generations, the rights of traditional communities, and the obligation to respect nonhuman elements within creation. This book tries to develop sound ethical foundations for environmental policy, while providing concrete perspective on economic realities.

This is a collaborative volume on the concept of modern vegetarianism and the relationships between people's beliefs and food practices.What are the links between people's beliefs and the foods they choose to eat? In the modern Western world, dietary choices are a topic of ethical and political debate, but how can centuries of Christian thought and practice also inform them? And how do reasons for abstaining from particular foods in the modern world compare with earlier ones? This book will shed new light on modern vegetarianism and related forms of dietary choice by situating them in the context of historic Christian practice. It will show how the theological significance of embodied practice may be retrieved and reconceived in the present day.Food and diet is a neglected area of Christian theology, and Christianity is conspicuous among the modern world's religions in having few dietary rules or customs. Yet historically, food and the practices surrounding it have significantly shaped Christian lives and identities. This collection, prepared collaboratively, includes contributions on the relationship between Christian beliefs and food practices in specific historical contexts. It considers the relationship between eating and believing from non-Christian perspectives that have in turn shaped Christian attitudes and practices. It also examines ethical arguments about vegetarianism and their significance for emerging Christian theologies of food.

Does morality still matter in the Western world today?
What is the basis of claims to human rights?
How are local loyalties - to family or nation - to be reconciled with our global responsibilities?
Are there limits on the rights of groups?
Does law need a moral basis?

In this timely book, Roger Trigg examines and defends the role of morality in our social and political lives. Rather than limiting the scope of morality to private choices, Trigg argues that we need to acknowledge the moral foundations of our political way of life in the West, in order that we are better able to live and flourish nationally and internationally.

This volume of new essays provides a comprehensive and structured examination of Kantian accounts of practical justification. This examination serves as a starting point for a focused investigation of the Kantian approach to justification in practical disciplines (ethics, legal and political philosophy or philosophy of religion). The recent growth of literature on this subject is not surprising given that Kant's approach seems so promising: he claims to be able to justify unconditional normative claims without recourse to assumptions, views or doctrines, which are not in their turn justifiable. Within the context of modern pluralism, this is exactly what the field needs: an approach which can demonstrably show why certain normative claims are valid, and why the grounds of these claims are valid in their turn, and why the freedom to question them should not be stifled. Although this has been a growth area in philosophy, no systematic and sustained study of the topic of practical justification in Kantian philosophy has been undertaken so far.
With fourteen original chapters and an introduction from leading researchers in the field, this volume addresses this neglected topic. The starting point is the still-dominant view that a successful account of justification of normative claims has to be non-metaphysical. The essays engage with this dominant view and pursue further implications in ethics, legal and political philosophy, as well as philosophy of religion. Throughout the essays, the contributors bring into contact with contemporary debates key interpretive questions about Kant's views on practical justification.

By bringing together the insights of ecclesial ethics, an approach that emphasizes the distinctive nature of the church as the community that forms its mind and character after its reading of Scripture, with the theory and practice of restorative justice, a way of conceiving justice-making that emerged from the Mennonite-Anabaptist tradition, this book shows why a theological account of the theory and practice of restorative justice is fruitful for articulating and clarifying the witness of the church, especially when faced with conflict or wrongdoing. This can help extend the church's imagination as to how it might better become God's community of restoration as it reflects on the ways in which the justice of God is taking shape in its own community. "How does an ecclesial context shape the theological apprehension and praxis of justice?" This question orientates the book. In particular, it asks how, in view of its members having been admitted into God's restoring justice in Christ, the church might embody in the world this same justice of restoring right relationships. While Christian reflection on the nature of justice has tended to favour a judicial and retributive conception of justice, it will be argued that the biblical understanding of the justice of God is best understood as a saving, liberating, and restorative justice. It is this restorative conception that ought to guide the community that reads Scripture so that it might be embodied in life.

Thinking about Reasons is a collection of fourteen new essays on topics in ethics and the philosophy of action, inspired in one way or another by the work of Jonathan Dancy-one of his generation's most influential moral philosophers. Many of the most influential living thinkers in the area are contributors to this collection, which also contains an autobiographical afterword by Dancy himself. Topics discussed in this volume include: * the idea that the facts that explain action are non-psychological ones * buck passing theories of goodness and rightness * the idea that some moral reasons justify action without requiring it * the particularist idea that there are no true informative moral principles * the idea that egoism and impartial consequentialism are self-defeating * the idea that moral reasons are dependent on either impersonal value, or benefits to oneself, or benefits to those with whom one has some special connection, but not on deontological constraints * the idea that we must distinguish between reasons and enablers, disablers, intensifiers, and attenuators of reasons * the idea that, although the lived ethical life is shaped by standing commitments, uncodifable judgement is at least sometimes needed to resolve what to do when these commitments conflict * the idea that the value of a whole need not be a mathematical function of the values of the parts of that whole * the idea that practical reasoning is based on inference the idea that there cannot be irreducibly normative properties.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only periodical publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work on the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the
intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. OSME provides an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well
to start here.

Christine M. Korsgaard presents an account of the foundation of practical reason and moral obligation. Moral philosophy aspires to understand the fact that human actions, unlike the actions of the other animals, can be morally good or bad, right or wrong. Few moral philosophers, however, have exploited the idea that actions might be morally good or bad in virtue of being good or bad of their kind - good or bad as actions. Just as we need to know that it is the function of the heart to pump blood to know that a good heart is one that pumps blood successfully, so we need to know what the function of an action is in order to know what counts as a good or bad action. Drawing on the work of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, Korsgaard proposes that the function of an action is to constitute the agency and therefore the identity of the person who does it. As rational beings, we are aware of, and therefore in control of, the principles that govern our actions. A good action is one that constitutes its agent as the autonomous and efficacious cause of her own movements. These properties correspond, respectively, to Kant's two imperatives of practical reason. Conformity to the categorical imperative renders us autonomous, and conformity to the hypothetical imperative renders us efficacious. And in determining what effects we will have in the world, we are at the same time determining our own identities. Korsgaard develops a theory of action and of interaction, and of the form interaction must take if we are to have the integrity that, she argues, is essential for agency. On the basis of that theory, she argues that only morally good action can serve the function of action, which is self-constitution.

This timely anthology brings into sharp relief the extent of violence against women. Its range is global and far reaching in terms of the number of victims. There are deeply entrenched values that need to be rooted out and laid bare. This text offers a philosophical analysis of the problem, with important insights from the various contributors. Topics range from sexual assault to media violence, prostitution and pornography, domestic violence, and sexual harassment. Each of the four parts include essays which tackle these issues and provide us with tools for bringing about change. The philosophical approaches to the topic give readers insight into the harms of interpersonal violence and its impact on the lives of its victims. Analyzing Violence Against Women calls us to examine public policies and work for systemic change. In the process, we are reminded that the concerns of the discipline of Philosophy encompasses issues with a wider scope. Students will especially benefit from seeing how the various authors grapple with this pressing issue and clarify why we need to bring about change.

This is an original investigation of the structure of human morality, that aims to identify the place and significance of moral deeds. "Kantian Deeds" revokes and renews the tradition of Kant's moral philosophy. Through a novel reading of contemporary approaches to Kant, Henrik Bjerre draws a new map of the human capacity for morality. Morality consists of two different abilities that are rarely appreciated at the same time. Human beings are brought up and initiated into a moral culture, which gives them the cognitive mapping necessary to act morally and responsibly. They also, however, acquire an ability to reach beyond that which is considered moral and thus develop an ability to reinterpret or break 'normal' morality. By drawing on two very different resources in contemporary philosophy - more conservative trends in analytic philosophy and more radical sources in recent works of psychoanalytically informed philosophy - and claiming that they must be read together, "Kantian Deeds" provides a new understanding of what is termed 'the structure of moral revolutions'. Essentially, deeds are revolutionary changes of moral character that can only be performed by such creatures that have acquired one. "Continuum Studies in Philosophy" presents cutting-edge scholarship in all the major areas of research and study. The wholly original arguments, perspectives and research findings in titles in this series make it an important and stimulating resource for students and academics from a range of disciplines across the humanities and social sciences.

Hans Jonas (1903-1993) was one of the most important German-Jewish philosophers of the 20th century. A student of Martin Heidegger and close friend of Hannah Arendt, Jonas advanced the fields of phenomenology and practical ethics in ways that are just beginning to be appreciated in the English-speaking world. Drawing here on unpublished and newly translated material, Lewis Coyne brings together for the first time in English Jonas's philosophy of life, ethic of responsibility, political theory, philosophy of technology and bioethics. In Hans Jonas: Life, Technology and the Horizons of Responsibility, Coyne argues that the aim of Jonas's philosophy is to confront three critical issues inherent to modernity: nihilism, the ecological crisis and the transhumanist drive to biotechnologically enhance human beings. While these might at first appear disparate, for Jonas all follow from the materialist turn taken by Western thought from the 17th century onwards, and he therefore seeks to tackle all three issues at their collective point of origin. This book explores how Jonas develops a new categorical imperative of responsibility on the basis of an ontology that does justice to the purposefulness and dignity of life: to act in a way that does not compromise the future of humanity on earth. Reflecting on this, as we face a potential future of ecological and societal collapse, Coyne forcefully demonstrates the urgency of Jonas's demand that humanity accept its newfound responsibility as the 'shepherd of beings'.

Sound Sentiments seeks to open a new path in the philosophy of emotion. The focus of most recent work on the philosophy of emotion has been on the nature of emotion, with some attention also to the relation of emotion to ethics. This book explores the idea that emotions admit of valuation, of degrees of adequacy. We cannot just decide what to think, or to desire, or to feel, as we can decide to act, and these attitudes are integral to emotions. Nonetheless, emotions can have normative characteristics that resemble virtues. Philosophers are familiar with the notion that emotions are valuational. But how well they serve that function determines the value they themselves have. The book opens with an account of the theory of emotion, reflecting recent work on that, and considers the way in which emotions are valuational (with reference to the contributions of writers such as de Sousa, Gibbard, and McDowell). The worth of an emotional experience depends on the quality of the valuation it itself achieves. Most of the book is then devoted to a set of interconnected themes. Some of these concern properties that emotions can have which can variously enhance or detract from them: profundity, social leverage, narcissism, and sentimentality. Others are attitudes with characteristic emotional loadings, and sometimes motivations, that raise similar questions: cynicism, ambivalence, and sophistication. David Pugmire's general approach is indirect and negative: to analyse emotional foibles, which tend to elude us as we succumb to them, and thereby to point to what soundness in emotion would be. He also elicits connections amongst these aspects of the emotional life. The most pervasive is the dimension of profundity, which opens the discussion: each of the subsequent problems amounts to a way in which emotion can be shallow and slight and so amount to less than it seems; and accordingly, each identifies a form of integrity in the emotions.