The quality of working life has been central to the sociological agenda for several decades, and has also been increasingly salient as a policy issue, and for companies. This book breaks new ground in the study of the quality of work by providing the first rigorous comparative assessment of the way it has been affected by the economic crisis. It examines the implications of the crisis on developments in skills and training, employees' control over their jobs, and the pressure of work and job security. It also assesses how changing experiences at work affect people's lives outside of work: the risks of work-life conflict, the motivation to work, personal well-being, and attitudes towards society. The book draws on a rich new source of evidence-the European Social Survey-to provide a comparative view over the period 2004 to 2010. The survey provides evidence for countries across the different regions of Europe and allows for a detailed assessment of the view that institutional differences between European societies-in terms of styles of management, social partnership practices, and government policies-lead to very different levels of work quality and different experiences of the crisis. This comparative aspect will thus forward our understanding of how institutional differences between European societies affect work experiences and their implications for non-work life.

This book investigates cases in which national and international activities have gone massively wrong, entailing seriously negative consequences, and in which the sophisticated analytical models of social science have ceased to be helpful. Illustrations range from the global financial crisis to the failure to achieve speedy systemic change in the former Soviet Union and the failure to achieve development in the Third World. The analysis uses as a backdrop long-term Russian history and short-term Russian encounters with unrestrained capitalism to develop a framework that is based in the so-called new institutionalism. Understanding the causes of systemic failure is shown to require an approach that spans across the increasingly specialized subdisciplines of modern social science. Demonstrating that increasing theoretical sophistication has been bought at the price of a loss of perspective and the need for sensitivity to the role of cultural and historical specificity, the book pleads the case for a new departure in seeking to model the motives for human action.

"We live in paradoxical times. Traditionally, the West has led the world in theory and practice. Yet, recent developments, from COVID-19 to the storming of the US Capitol, show how lost the West has become. This loss of direction has deep roots. In their usual thoughtful and incisive fashion, Lim Mah-Hui and Michael Heng Siam-Heng, draw out the deeper origins of our current crises and show us a new way forward. A must-read for anyone who wants to understand our strange times." -- Kishore Mahbubani, founding Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, is the author of Has China Won? "A powerful and compelling critique of neoliberal globalization and its potentially devastating, but long underestimated, consequences for financial stability, the environment, social equity and democracy. COVID-19 has laid bare these dysfunctions and stresses. But this is not a pessimistic book. The authors argue, correctly, that we may be on the cusp of another Great Transformation. The choices we make today to make markets more resilient, improve social protection, and preserve our freedoms could lay the foundations for a sustainable globalization that works for future generations." -- Donald Low, Professor of Practice in Public Policy and Director of the Institute for Emerging Market Studies, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology "This fascinating book highlights the interplay between financial and health crises that the COVID-19 pandemic exposed. Financialized capitalism is bad for the planet, bad for human health, and creates more unequal and insecure societies. The authors make a strong and convincing case for re-embedding markets into society and finance into the real economy." --Jayati Ghosh, Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA "Lim and Heng's ambitious volume argues that 2020 was the year of the global 'perfect storm' of multiple crises, with the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbating financial, economic, socio-political and environmental breakdowns. They extend Karl Polanyi's original insights to appeal for a sustainable global New Deal. While the reader may not agree with all their theses, the scope of their coverage and ambition will set the stage for debates over the annus horribilis." -- Jomo K.S., Founder-chair, IDEAS www.network.ideas; former United Nations Assistant Secretary General "This book provides plenty of food for thought for many pondering if the COVID-19 crisis could lead to a major transformation of the global economic system shaped by unfettered market forces and policies of governments in their service."-- Yilmaz Akyuz, former Director, UNCTAD, Geneva

The US economy today is confronted with the prospect of extended stagnation. This book explores why. Thomas I. Palley argues that the Great Recession and destruction of shared prosperity is due to flawed economic policy over the past thirty years. One flaw was the growth model adopted after 1980 that relied on debt and asset price inflation to fuel growth instead of wages. A second flaw was the model of globalization that created an economic gash. Third, financial deregulation and the house price bubble kept the economy going by making ever more credit available. As the economy cannibalized itself by undercutting income distribution and accumulating debt, it needed larger speculative bubbles to grow. That process ended when the housing bubble burst. The earlier post-World War II economic model based on rising middle-class incomes has been dismantled, while the new neoliberal model has imploded. Absent a change of policy paradigm, the logical next step is stagnation. The political challenge we face now is how to achieve paradigm change.

Syriza's victory in the recent Greek general election shook the foundations of the Western political establishment and gave hope to the millions suffering the austerity measures imposed by the European Troika. Millions asked, how did this happen and what is it about Greece that created such a centre of radicalism? This insider's account, from Syriza's Finance Minister Euclid Tsakalotos and economist Christos Laskos, shows that that the narrative of Greek exceptionalism is a myth. The blame game that has been played by the EU powers is an ideological tool used to shift attention from the disillusionment and anger at the European and global capitalist economic order. By alienating an entire nation of people, the Troika has revealed the internal contradictions of the modern neoliberal establishment, as well as the inadequacies of the earlier social-democratic Keynesian regime. Tsakalotos and Laskos suggest that there is very little that differentiates Greece from other countries struggling under austerity, and that parties such as Syriza could usher in a new, democratic and socialist era across the continent.

Since 2007, many fundamental aspects of the economy and the labor market have changed dramatically. With the exception of Medicaid, subsidies flowing to the unemployed and financially distressed households in the forms of loan forgiveness and government transfers almost tripled. The generosity of mean-tested subsidies like food stamps, and employment-tested subsidies like unemployment insurance have steadily increased. Congress considered legislation that would raise marginal income tax rates, and would present Americans with new health benefits that would be phased out as a function of income. Also, a large number of homeowners owed more on their mortgages than their houses were worth, and many in both the private and public sectors renegotiated their mortgage contracts. And many others renegotiated business debts, consumer loans, student loans, and tax debts. Labor economist Casey B. Mulligan argues that because the way these trends have affected the labor market, they deepened, if not caused, the recession. He explains how progressive tax rates and binding minimum-wage laws reduce labor usage, consumption, and investment, and how they increase labor productivity. This means that while a small part of the population actually works more, overall hours worked in the whole economy are less. He explains and examines the pratical ways that for many people during a recession it costs more to earn more, and how people are working less because of it. One newly discovered aspect of the costs on earning is the large portion of the labor force renegotiating debt. Mulligan quantifies how borrowers can expect their earnings to affect the amount that lenders will forgive in debt renegotiation, and how this has acted as a massive implicit tax on earning. He also measures the changes in market tax rates that resulted directly from "social safety net" programs, and quantifies these changes' effects on the labor market and the economy. Mulligan argues that much of the decline in labor usage since 2007 was a reaction to the combination of higher marginal tax rates and a higher federal minimum wage, and that it is important to understand why labor market distortions like these suddenly increased, and to what degree those increases were caused by the various measures enacted to boost the labor market. The Redistribution Recession is a controversial, clear-cut, and thoroughly researched analysis of the effects of various government policies on the labor market during the recent recession.

The severity of the Great Recession and the subsequent stagnation caught many economists by surprise. But a group of Keynesian scholars warned for some years that strong forces were leading the US toward a deep, persistent downturn. This book collects essays about these events from prominent macroeconomists who developed a perspective that predicted the broad outline and many specific aspects of the crisis. From this point of view, the recovery of employment and revival of strong growth requires more than short-term monetary easing and temporary fiscal stimulus. Economists and policy makers need to explore how the process of demand formation failed after 2007 and where demand will come from going forward. Successive chapters address the sources and dynamics of demand, the distribution and growth of wages, the structure of finance and challenges from globalization, and inform recommendations for monetary and fiscal policies to achieve a more efficient and equitable society.

This book aims to identify and analyze the impact of the 2007-09 global financial crisis on Asian economies and to assess the short-term and longer-term policy responses to the crisis in terms of their effectiveness and sustainability. It draws lessons on how best to avoid and/or mitigate future crises and to identify structural policy recommendations that can help guide Asian policymakers to expand the growth potential of domestic and regional demand in coming years, and thereby create a basis for sustainable and inclusive long-term growth. Organized into four parts, it offers an accessible explanation of the causes, consequences, and contagion mechanisms of the crisis. Part 1 provides an overview of the major issues and presents policy recommendations. Part 2 reviews the crisis in the US and its transmission to Europe. Part 3 focuses on the impact on Asia. And Part 4 concludes lessons of the crisis for Asian countries. The volume highlights that Asian economies have already recovered strongly from the global financial crisis, reflecting their aggressive moves to ease monetary and fiscal policy as well as the underlying fundamental strength of their economies. However, the biggest challenge lies ahead. It asserts that, given that it is unlikely that the US and Europe will be engines of global growth, Asian economies should contribute to global economic adjustment by creating their own growth engines.

When States Go Broke collects insights and analysis from leading academics and practitioners that discuss the ongoing fiscal crisis among the American states. No one disagrees with the idea that the states face enormous political and fiscal challenges. There is, however, little consensus on how to fix the perennial problems associated with these challenges. This volume fills an important gap in the dialogue by offering an academic analysis of the many issues broached by these debates. Leading scholars in bankruptcy, constitutional law, labor law, history, political science and economics have individually contributed their assessments of the origins, context and potential solutions for the states in crisis. It presents readers - academics, policy makers and concerned citizens alike - with the resources to begin and continue that important, solution-oriented conversation.

Faced with a systemic financial sector crisis, policymakers need to make difficult choices under pressure. Based on the experience of many countries in recent years, few have been able to achieve a speedy, lasting and low-cost resolution. This volume considers the strengths and weaknesses of the various policy options, covering both microeconomic (including recapitalization of banks, bank closures, subsidies for distressed borrowers, capital adequacy rules and corporate governance and bankruptcy law requirements) and macroeconomic (including monetary and fiscal policy) dimensions. The contributors explore the important but little understood trade-offs that are involved, such as between policies which take effect quickly, those which minimize long-term fiscal and economic costs, and those which create favorable incentives for future stability. Successfully implementing crisis management and crisis resolution policy required attention to detail and a good flow of information.

Why did some firms weather the financial crisis and others not? This book builds on the author's interviews and access to internal documents from over a dozen major financial companies, investigates their workings, reveals what went wrong and discovers a remedy. A critical difference between successful and unsuccessful firms is a culture that encourages respectful challenge, what the book calls "constructive dialogue. " At successful firms top management engaged in constructive dialogue with the board, a strong management team, and the chief risk officer, among others, in making a decision; firms that failed often featured overbearing (or distracted) CEOs or unit heads, supine boards, incapable management, ineffective risk officers, and poor communications both across silos and up the hierarchy. They often lacked ability to manage the firm as an integrated organization. Companies need good management, and not only good risk management, to stay out of trouble. Successful companies operated with strong information systems and a culture of good communications that brought issues promptly to top management so the company could adjust its operations accordingly. Successful managers had discipline to ask simple questions and pursue answers until they understood the risk-reward tradeoffs in their activities. Regulators too made mistakes. They didn't feel empowered to rein in companies that - at least before the crisis - seemed so profitable. Instead of waiting for a company to take losses, the book recommends that they use "constructive dialogue " as a test of good management and that supervisors require evidence that major business decisions result from a robust process rather than merely the will of a powerful CEO or heads of revenue-producing units. Companies in turn should use their regulator as a potential source of useful feedback. The book concludes by looking at major firms in other industries and finds that its conclusions apply to these companies too.

The world economy is caught in a money trap. Existing monetary arrangements meet the needs neither of the ageing societies of the West nor of younger emerging economies. This in-depth analysis explains how the world got into the grip of global finance - and how it can escape, with a growing demand for reform.

The financial crisis is destroying wealth but is also a remarkable opportunity to uncover the ways by which debt can be used to regulate the economic system. This book uses four case studies of cooperatives to give an in-depth analysis on how they have braved the crisis and continued to generate wealth.

The crisis of global capitalism that has unfolded since 2008 is more than an economic crisis. It is structural and multidimensional. The sequence of events that have taken place in its aftermath show that we are entering a world that is very different from the social and economic conditions that characterized the rise of global, informational capitalism in the preceding three decades. The policies and strategies that intended to manage the crisis-with mixed results depending on the country-may usher in a distinctly different economic and institutional system, as the New Deal, the construction of the European Welfare State, and the Bretton Woods global financial architecture all gave rise to a new form of capitalism in the aftermath of the 1930s Depression, and World War II.
This volume examines the cultures and institutions at the root of the crisis, as well as the conflicts and debates that lead to a new social landscape, including the rise of alternative economic cultures expressed in the social movements occupying Wall Street. The book presents the results of a shared project of reflection by an interdisciplinary group of researchers from around the world. It contends that there is no quick fix to the current financial and political system. Life beyond the crisis requires a transformation of the mindset that led to bankruptcy and despair, and to economies and societies based on an unsustainable model of speculative finance and political irresponsibility. The book explains why and explores the contours of the world emerging in the aftermath of the crisis.

The global financial and economic crisis has brought about many effects that are still difficult to interpret univocally. This book studies the consequences of the crisis on Europe by examining the effects on the European institutional setup, governance and architecture and by studying in detail the different member countries.

Walter Bagehot (1826-77), the influential political and economic essayist, wrote a number of books that became standards in their respective fields. He attended University College, London, where he studied mathematics and gained a master's degree in intellectual and moral philosophy. He was called to the bar, but instead chose a career in his father's banking business. He wrote widely on literature, economics and politics, co-founding the National Review in 1855. He became editor-in-chief of The Economist in 1860 and remained in that post until his death. This work, published originally in 1873 and described by J. M. Keynes as 'an undying classic', is a masterpiece of economics. It explains the world of finance and banking, concentrating on crisis management, and its ideas are as relevant today as ever, especially in the face of the global financial crisis that emerged in 2007.

This volume critically re-examines the profession's understanding of asset bubbles in light of the global financial crisis of 2007-09. It is well known that bubbles have occurred in the past, with the October 1929 crash as the most demonstrative example. However, the remarkably well-behaved performance of the US economy from 1945 to 2006, and, in particular during the Great Moderation period of 1984 to 2006, assured the economics profession and monetary policymakers that asset bubbles could be effectively managed with little or no real economic impact. The recent financial crisis has now triggered a debate about the emergence of a sequence of repeated bubbles in the Nasdaq market, housing market, credit market, and commodity markets. The realities of the crisis have intensified theoretical modeling, empirical methodologies, and debate on policy issues surrounding asset price bubbles and their potentially adverse economic impact if poorly managed. Taking a novel approach, the editors of this book present five classic papers that represent accepted thinking about asset bubbles prior to the financial crisis. They also include original papers challenging orthodox thinking and presenting new insights. A summary essay highlights the lessons learned and experiences gained since the crisis.

If the financial crisis has taught us anything, it is that Americans save too little, spend too much, and borrow excessively. What can we learn from East Asian and European countries that have fostered enduring cultures of thrift over the past two centuries? "Beyond Our Means" tells for the first time how other nations aggressively encouraged their citizens to save by means of special savings institutions and savings campaigns. The U.S. government, meanwhile, promoted mass consumption and reliance on credit, culminating in the global financial meltdown.

Many economists believe people save according to universally rational calculations, saving the most in their middle years as they plan for retirement, and saving the least in welfare states. In reality, Europeans save at high rates despite generous welfare programs and aging populations. Americans save little, despite weaker social safety nets and a younger population. Tracing the development of such behaviors across three continents from the nineteenth century to today, this book highlights the role of institutions and moral suasion in shaping habits of saving and spending. It shows how the encouragement of thrift was not a relic of indigenous traditions but a modern movement to confront rising consumption. Around the world, messages to save and spend wisely confronted citizens everywhere--in schools, magazines, and novels. At the same time, in America, businesses and government normalized practices of living beyond one's means.

Transnational history at its most compelling, "Beyond Our Means" reveals why some nations save so much and others so little.

The financial crisis of 2007 2010 has presented a number of key policy challenges for those concerned with the long-term stability of the euro area. It has shown that price stability as provided by the European Central Bank is not enough to guarantee financial stability, and exposed fault lines in governance and deficiencies in the architecture of the financial supervisory and regulatory framework. This book addresses these and other issues, including why the crisis affected some countries more than others, whether the euro is still attractive for new EU states, and what policy changes and structural reforms, both macro and micro, should be undertaken to ensure its future viability. Written by a team of leading academic and central bank economists, the book also includes chapters on the cross-country incidence of the crisis, the Irish crisis and ECB monetary policy during the crisis, and studies on Spain, the Baltics, Slovakia and Slovenia.

Over the last two decades there has been a notable increase in the number of corporate governance codes and principles, as well as a range of improvements in structures and mechanisms. Despite this, corporate governance failed to prevent a widespread default of fiduciary duties of corporate boards and managerial responsibilities in the finance industry, which contributed to the 2007 2010 global financial crisis. This book brings together leading scholars from North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Middle East to provide fresh and critical analytical insights on the systemic failures of corporate governance linked to the global financial crisis. Contributors draw from a range of disciplines to demonstrate the severe limitations of the dominant corporate governance framework and its associated market-oriented approach. They provide suggestions on how the governance problems could be tackled to prevent or mitigate any future financial crisis and explore new directions for post-crisis corporate governance research and reforms.

Building on Green and Janmaat's previous work on education, equality and social cohesion, this book, now in paperback, analyses the various mechanisms that hold different societies together and how these are withstanding the strains of the current economic crisis. In an original, and highly interdisciplinary, mixed method approach, drawing on evidence from historical sociology, political science and political economy, Green and Janmaat identify four major traditions of social cohesion in developed western and east Asian societies, each with specific institutional and cultural foundations. An extensive statistical analysis of contemporary administrative and attitudinal data for over 30 countries demonstrates that there are still distinctive 'regimes of social cohesion' in 'liberal, ' 'social market' and 'social democratic' countries and that they achieve social bonding in quite different ways. As the crisis of globalization unfolds in the wake of the global financial crisis, social cohesion in each regime is vulnerable at different points.

This book investigates cases in which national and international activities have gone massively wrong, entailing seriously negative consequences, and in which the sophisticated analytical models of social science have ceased to be helpful. Illustrations range from the global financial crisis to the failure to achieve speedy systemic change in the Former Soviet Union and the failure to achieve development in the Third World. The analysis uses as a backdrop long-term Russian history and short-term Russian encounters with unrestrained capitalism to develop a framework that is based in the so-called new institutionalism. Understanding the causes of systemic failure is shown to require an approach that spans across the increasingly specialized subdisciplines of modern social science. Demonstrating that increasing theoretical sophistication has been bought at the price of a loss of perspective and the need for sensitivity to the role of cultural and historical specificity, the book pleads the case for a new departure in seeking to model the motives for human action.

Prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, economists thought that no such crisis could or would ever happen again in the United States, that financial events of such magnitude were a thing of the distant past. In fact, observers of that distant past-the period from the half century prior to the Civil War up to the passage of deposit insurance during the Great Depression, which was marked by repeated financial crises-note that while legislation immediately after crises reacted to their effects, economists and policymakers continually failed to grasp the true lessons to be learned. Gary Gorton, considered by many to be the authority on the financial crisis of our time, holds that economists fundamentally misunderstand financial crises-what they are, why they occur, and why there were none in the U.S. between 1934 and 2007. In Misunderstanding Financial Crises, he illustrates that financial crises are inherent to the production of bank debt, which is used to conduct transactions, and that unless the government designs intelligent regulation, crises will continue. Economists, he writes, looked from a certain point of view and missed everything that was important: the evolution of capital markets and the banking system, the existence of new financial instruments, and the size of certain money markets like the sale and repurchase market. Delving into how such a massive intellectual failure could have happened, Gorton offers a back-to-basics elucidation of financial crises, and shows how they are not rare, idiosyncratic, unfortunate events caused by a coincidence of unconnected factors. By looking back to the "Quiet Period " from 1934 to 2007 when there were no systemic crises, and to the "Panic of 2007-2008, " he brings together such issues as bank debt and liquidity, credit booms and manias, and moral hazard and too-big-too-fail, to illustrate the costs of bank failure and the true causes of financial crises. He argues that the successful regulation that prevented crises did not adequately keep pace with innovation in the financial sector, due in large part to economists' misunderstandings. He then looks forward to offer both a better way for economists to conceive of markets, as well as a description of the regulation necessary to address the historical threat of financial crises.

Financial crises have been pervasive for many years. Their frequency in recent decades has been double that of the Bretton Woods Period (1945-1971) and the Gold Standard Era (1880-1993), comparable only to the period during the Great Depression. Nevertheless, the financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 came as a great surprise to most people. What initially was seen as difficulties in the U.S. subprime mortgage market, rapidly escalated and spilled over first to financial markets and then to the real economy. The crisis changed the financial landscape worldwide and its full costs are yet to be evaluated. One important reason for the global impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis was massive illiquidity in combination with an extreme exposure of many financial institutions to liquidity needs and market conditions. As a consequence, many financial instruments could not be traded anymore, investors ran on a variety of financial institutions particularly in wholesale markets, financial institutions and industrial firms started to sell assets at fire sale prices to raise cash, and central banks all over the world injected huge amounts of liquidity into financial systems. But what is liquidity and why is it so important for firms and financial institutions to command enough liquidity? This book brings together classic articles and recent contributions to this important field of research. It is divided into five parts. These are (i) liquidity and interbank markets; (ii) the public provision of liquidity and regulation; (iii) money, liquidity and asset prices; (iv) contagion effects; (v) financial crises and currency crises. The aim is to provide a comprehensive coverage of role of liquidity in financial crises.