The Bush administration was remarkably successful in dominating the debate over why we had to go to war with Iraq, but it would soon be faced with the more daunting task of winning the monumental rhetorical struggle over how to write the script of the Iraq War endgame. We examine the twists and turns of the discursive battle over the war's denouement as it played out against the backdrop of the war on terror, and we conclude that while Bush failed to win the argument that Iraq was one with our fight against terrorism, his underlying worldview that we must confront terrorist evil through global military engagement remains an important component of Obama adminstration rhetoric.

Behind-enemy-lines stories of elite Marines in Vietnam Force Recon companies were the eyes and ears of the Marine Corps in Vietnam. Classified as special operations capable, Force Recon Marines ventured into the enemy's backyard to conduct reconnaissance and launched deliberate strikes against the enemy. Lanning and Stubbe blend analysis and you-are-there stories of Force Recon in action to create the definitive account of Recon Marines.

This controversial and timely book about the American experience in Vietnam provides the first full exploration of the perspectives of the North Vietnamese leadership before, during, and after the war. Herbert Y. Schandler offers unique insights into the mindsets of the North Vietnamese and their response to diplomatic and military actions of the Americans, laying out the full scale of the disastrous U.S. political and military misunderstandings of Vietnamese history and motivations. Including frank quotes from Vietnamese leaders, the book offers important new knowledge that allows us to learn invaluable lessons from the perspective of a victorious enemy. Unlike most military officers who served in Vietnam, Schandler is convinced the war was unwinnable, no matter how long America stayed the course or how many resources were devoted to it. He is remarkably qualified to make these judgments as an infantry commander during the Vietnam War, a Pentagon policymaker, and a scholar who taught at West Point and National Defense University. His extensive personal interviews with North Vietnamese are drawn from his many trips to Hanoi after the war. Schandler provides not only a definitive analysis of the American failure in Vietnam but a crucial foundation for exploring the potential for success in the current guerrilla wars the United States is fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Since World War II "victim consciousness" (higaisha ishiki) has been an essential component of Japanese pacifist national identity. In his meticulously crafted narrative and analysis, James Orr reveals how postwar Japanese elites and American occupying authorities collaborated to structure the parameters of remembrance of the war, including the notion that the emperor and his people had been betrayed and duped by militarists. Fluently written and flawlessly executed, The Victim as Hero will contribute greatly to the discourses on nationalism and war responsibility in Japan.

This book contains descriptions of all of the naval and riverine weapons used by both sides during the Vietnam War. It also includes the dates that most major weapons were involved.

Conventional wisdom holds that the US Army in Vietnam, thrust into an unconventional war where occupying terrain was a meaningless measure of success, depended on body counts as its sole measure of military progress. In No Sure Victory, Army officer and historian Gregory Daddis looks far deeper into the Army's techniques for measuring military success and presents a much more complicated-and disturbing-account of the American misadventure in Indochina.
Daddis shows how the US Army, which confronted an unfamiliar enemy and an even more unfamiliar form of warfare, adopted a massive, and eventually unmanageable, system of measurements and formulas to track the progress of military operations that ranged from pacification efforts to search-and-destroy missions. The Army's monthly "Measurement of Progress" reports covered innumerable aspects of the fighting in Vietnam-force ratios, Vietcong/North Vietnamese Army incidents, tactical air sorties, weapons losses, security of base areas and roads, population control, area control, and hamlet defenses. Concentrating more on data collection and less on data analysis, these indiscriminate attempts to gauge success may actually have hindered the army's ability to evaluate the true outcome of the fight at hand--a roadblock that Daddis believes significantly contributed to the many failures that American forces suffered in Vietnam.
Filled with incisive analysis and rich historical detail, No Sure Victory is not only a valuable case study in unconventional warfare, but a cautionary tale that offers important perspectives on how to measure performance in current and future armed conflict. Given America's ongoing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, No Sure Victory provides valuable historical perspective on how to measure--and mismeasure--military success.

After spending a year in Germany as a security guard with the 50th Ordnance Company, Curtis Gay went to Viet Nam as a Private First Class. Six months later he was a Sergeant in the 25th Infantry Division and experienced some of the most intense fighting of the war. This book is his story.

Curtis spent a year as a Drill Sergeant at Fort Dix, New Jersey before leaving the Army in 1968. After a long career in the electrical industry, he is retired and lives in Durham, North Carolina with his wife.

Part I is a compendium of World War II service recollections embracing the unusual, bizarre and humorous, most of which never appeared in the news or any publications. However, I do believe readers will be very interested in the other side of war. Part II is an incisive review of Vietnam, and why we failed or should never have been involved militarily. Part III is a current analysis of terrorism and the Iraq war, including a new proposal to address the global aspects of terrorism and the Palestinian issue.

Thirty-five long years and I was still seeking answers. If I could make someone in the government listen to the facts, I knew they'd want to act on them. After all, who wouldn't want to find one of our POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War? IS ANYBODY LISTENING? tells of dignitaries, presidents and those involved with the POW/MIA issue as I've known it since November 1968 when my husband, a Special Forces officer, became missing-in-action. The pages reveal my feelings and torment during my many trips to Southeast Asia in search of answers, and my frustrations while wandering the halls of Washington D.C. for help. The book was written to show the issue's insidious cover-up and my commitment to the truth.

This book chronicles one man's journey through life, finding happiness among the hardships and amusement amid the danger in Vietnam. This vivid account takes you on an armchair ride through an unpredictable and intriguing life. Set against the backdrop of The War, follow this young civilian engineer, family man and patriot through a war torn land as he strives to secure his young family's future and seek a more meaningful purpose to his own life. He returns home a changed man, only to confront a completely new set of obstacles, not least of which is a country in turmoil.

In the run-up to, during and after the invasion of Iraq a large number of literary texts addressing that context were produced, circulated and viewed as taking a position for or against the invasion, or contributing political insights. This book provides an in-depth survey of such texts to examine what they reveal about the condition of literature.

Brian, on his way back to base after mid-tour leave, was wounded by a roadside bomb that sent shrapnel through his brain. Kayla waited anxiously for news and, on returning home, sought out Brian. The two began a tentative romance and later married, but neither anticipated the consequences of Brian s injury on their lives. Lacking essential support for returning veterans from the military and the VA, Kayla and Brian suffered through posttraumatic stress amplified by his violent mood swings, her struggles to reintegrate into a country still oblivious to women veterans, and what seemed the callous, consumerist indifference of civilian society at large.

Kayla persevered. So did Brian. They fought for their marriage, drawing on remarkable reservoirs of courage and commitment. They confronted their demons head-on, impatient with phoniness of any sort. Inspired by an unwavering ethos of service, they continued to stand on common ground. Finally, they found their own paths to healing and wholeness, both as individuals and as a family, in dedication to a larger community."

Helsing provides a unique perspective on the escalation of the Vietnam War. He examines what many analysts and former policymakers in the Johnson administration have acknowledged as a crucial factor in the way the United States escalated in Vietnam: Johnson's desire for both guns and butter--his belief that he must stem the advance of communism in Southeast Asia while pursuing a Great Society at home.

He argues that the United States government, the president, and his key advisers in particular engaged in a major pattern of deception in how the United States committed its military force in Vietnam. He then argues that a significant sector of the government was deceived as well. The first half of the book traces and analyzes the pattern of deception from 1964 through July 1965. The second half shows how the military and political decisions to escalate influenced--and were influenced by--the economic advice and policies being given the President. This in-depth analysis will be of particular concern to scholars, students, and researchers involved with U.S. foreign and military policy, the Vietnam War, and Presidential war powers.

The grandson of an Indian immigrant and the first Malay commoner to become prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad turned the Muslim-majority Southeast Asian country into one of the developing world's most successful economies. During his 22 years in power he adopted pragmatic economic policies alongside repressive political measures, and showed that Islam was compatible with representative government and modernization. Abrasive and outspoken, Mahathir emerged as a Third World champion and Islamic spokesman by condemning the West, not least for trying to impose liberal democracy and neo-liberal economics on developing nations. By raising living standards and winning international acclaim, he contributed to a sense of national identity, pride and confidence among ethnically diverse Malaysians. But in mixing business and politics, Mahathir encouraged cronyism and failed to prevent the spread of corruption. Authoritarian and impatient, he jailed opponents, sacked rivals and undermined institutions as he pursued his obsession with development. In retirement, he broke a promise to stay out of politics, falling out with his two successors while using all available means to protect his legacy.

The emerging Jewish national consciousness in Europe toward the end of the 19th century claims many spiritual fathers, some of which have been seriously underestimated so far. Zionist intellectuals such as Moses Hess, Leon Pinsker and Isaac Rulf were already committed to the self-liberation of the Jewish people long before Theodor Herzl. Their experiences and observations brought them to believe that the emancipation and integration of Jews were not realistically possible in Europe. Instead, they began to think in national and territorial terms. The author explores the question as to what extent religious messianism influenced the ideas of these men and how this reflects in today's collective Israeli consciousness. In a comprehensive epilogue, Julius H. Schoeps critically correlates ideas of messianic salvation, Zionist pioneer ideals, the settler's movement before and after 1967, and the unsolved conflict between Israelis and Palestinians which has been lasting for over 100 years.