Since World War II "victim consciousness" (higaisha ishiki) has been an essential component of Japanese pacifist national identity. In his meticulously crafted narrative and analysis, James Orr reveals how postwar Japanese elites and American occupying authorities collaborated to structure the parameters of remembrance of the war, including the notion that the emperor and his people had been betrayed and duped by militarists. Fluently written and flawlessly executed, The Victim as Hero will contribute greatly to the discourses on nationalism and war responsibility in Japan.

After spending a year in Germany as a security guard with the 50th Ordnance Company, Curtis Gay went to Viet Nam as a Private First Class. Six months later he was a Sergeant in the 25th Infantry Division and experienced some of the most intense fighting of the war. This book is his story.

Curtis spent a year as a Drill Sergeant at Fort Dix, New Jersey before leaving the Army in 1968. After a long career in the electrical industry, he is retired and lives in Durham, North Carolina with his wife.

Conventional wisdom holds that the US Army in Vietnam, thrust into an unconventional war where occupying terrain was a meaningless measure of success, depended on body counts as its sole measure of military progress. In No Sure Victory, Army officer and historian Gregory Daddis looks far deeper into the Army's techniques for measuring military success and presents a much more complicated-and disturbing-account of the American misadventure in Indochina.
Daddis shows how the US Army, which confronted an unfamiliar enemy and an even more unfamiliar form of warfare, adopted a massive, and eventually unmanageable, system of measurements and formulas to track the progress of military operations that ranged from pacification efforts to search-and-destroy missions. The Army's monthly "Measurement of Progress" reports covered innumerable aspects of the fighting in Vietnam-force ratios, Vietcong/North Vietnamese Army incidents, tactical air sorties, weapons losses, security of base areas and roads, population control, area control, and hamlet defenses. Concentrating more on data collection and less on data analysis, these indiscriminate attempts to gauge success may actually have hindered the army's ability to evaluate the true outcome of the fight at hand--a roadblock that Daddis believes significantly contributed to the many failures that American forces suffered in Vietnam.
Filled with incisive analysis and rich historical detail, No Sure Victory is not only a valuable case study in unconventional warfare, but a cautionary tale that offers important perspectives on how to measure performance in current and future armed conflict. Given America's ongoing counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, No Sure Victory provides valuable historical perspective on how to measure--and mismeasure--military success.

This book contains descriptions of all of the naval and riverine weapons used by both sides during the Vietnam War. It also includes the dates that most major weapons were involved.

Pham Xuan An was a Communist agent whose espionage adventures - under the cover story of a celebrated war correspondent in the Western Media -- were as brilliant for Hanoi as they were shattering for Washington during the tumultuous days of the Vietnam War. He has been dubbed "the perfect spy" and affectionately referred to by some as "the spy who loved us". Not quite. Journalist and Southeast Asian specialist Luke Hunt prises this story open. He knew and interviewed An for many years, along with many friends and colleagues in journalism who knew him best in war, on the journalistic beat and amid the collapse of South Vietnam.

Thirty-five long years and I was still seeking answers. If I could make someone in the government listen to the facts, I knew they'd want to act on them. After all, who wouldn't want to find one of our POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War? IS ANYBODY LISTENING? tells of dignitaries, presidents and those involved with the POW/MIA issue as I've known it since November 1968 when my husband, a Special Forces officer, became missing-in-action. The pages reveal my feelings and torment during my many trips to Southeast Asia in search of answers, and my frustrations while wandering the halls of Washington D.C. for help. The book was written to show the issue's insidious cover-up and my commitment to the truth.

Part I is a compendium of World War II service recollections embracing the unusual, bizarre and humorous, most of which never appeared in the news or any publications. However, I do believe readers will be very interested in the other side of war. Part II is an incisive review of Vietnam, and why we failed or should never have been involved militarily. Part III is a current analysis of terrorism and the Iraq war, including a new proposal to address the global aspects of terrorism and the Palestinian issue.

This book chronicles one man's journey through life, finding happiness among the hardships and amusement amid the danger in Vietnam. This vivid account takes you on an armchair ride through an unpredictable and intriguing life. Set against the backdrop of The War, follow this young civilian engineer, family man and patriot through a war torn land as he strives to secure his young family's future and seek a more meaningful purpose to his own life. He returns home a changed man, only to confront a completely new set of obstacles, not least of which is a country in turmoil.

In the run-up to, during and after the invasion of Iraq a large number of literary texts addressing that context were produced, circulated and viewed as taking a position for or against the invasion, or contributing political insights. This book provides an in-depth survey of such texts to examine what they reveal about the condition of literature.

The Vietnam War has had many long-reaching, traumatic effects, not just on the veterans of the war, but on their children as well. In this book, Weber examines the concept of the war as a social monad, a confusing array of personal stories and public histories that disrupt traditional ways of knowing the social world for the second generation.

The emerging Jewish national consciousness in Europe toward the end of the 19th century claims many spiritual fathers, some of which have been seriously underestimated so far. Zionist intellectuals such as Moses Hess, Leon Pinsker and Isaac Rulf were already committed to the self-liberation of the Jewish people long before Theodor Herzl. Their experiences and observations brought them to believe that the emancipation and integration of Jews were not realistically possible in Europe. Instead, they began to think in national and territorial terms. The author explores the question as to what extent religious messianism influenced the ideas of these men and how this reflects in today's collective Israeli consciousness. In a comprehensive epilogue, Julius H. Schoeps critically correlates ideas of messianic salvation, Zionist pioneer ideals, the settler's movement before and after 1967, and the unsolved conflict between Israelis and Palestinians which has been lasting for over 100 years.

Helsing provides a unique perspective on the escalation of the Vietnam War. He examines what many analysts and former policymakers in the Johnson administration have acknowledged as a crucial factor in the way the United States escalated in Vietnam: Johnson's desire for both guns and butter--his belief that he must stem the advance of communism in Southeast Asia while pursuing a Great Society at home.

He argues that the United States government, the president, and his key advisers in particular engaged in a major pattern of deception in how the United States committed its military force in Vietnam. He then argues that a significant sector of the government was deceived as well. The first half of the book traces and analyzes the pattern of deception from 1964 through July 1965. The second half shows how the military and political decisions to escalate influenced--and were influenced by--the economic advice and policies being given the President. This in-depth analysis will be of particular concern to scholars, students, and researchers involved with U.S. foreign and military policy, the Vietnam War, and Presidential war powers.

The grandson of an Indian immigrant and the first Malay commoner to become prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad turned the Muslim-majority Southeast Asian country into one of the developing world's most successful economies. During his 22 years in power he adopted pragmatic economic policies alongside repressive political measures, and showed that Islam was compatible with representative government and modernization. Abrasive and outspoken, Mahathir emerged as a Third World champion and Islamic spokesman by condemning the West, not least for trying to impose liberal democracy and neo-liberal economics on developing nations. By raising living standards and winning international acclaim, he contributed to a sense of national identity, pride and confidence among ethnically diverse Malaysians. But in mixing business and politics, Mahathir encouraged cronyism and failed to prevent the spread of corruption. Authoritarian and impatient, he jailed opponents, sacked rivals and undermined institutions as he pursued his obsession with development. In retirement, he broke a promise to stay out of politics, falling out with his two successors while using all available means to protect his legacy.

The Vietnam War: An Encyclopedia of Quotations presents the story of this seminal conflict as told through the words of the famous, infamous, and anonymous. All sides of the controversy are presented in chronological resource that starts with a look at Vietnamese history, then traces the events preceding France's war, continues through America's entry into the conflict, and concludes with the war's aftermath. This is the story of the Vietnam War told through quotations in chronological sequence. Starting with the beginnings of Vietnamese history, it traces the events preceding the French war, continues through the American war, and ends with its aftermath. All sides of the controversy are represented. Here are the voices of warriors, presidents, generals, government leaders, civilians, aid workers, pilots, infantrymen, nurses, historians, war correspondents, sociologists, POWs, peasants, draft dodgers, guerillas, and war resisters. They speak from government capitals, hooches, hospital wards, jungle trails, landing zones, aircraft carriers, draft boards, Buddhist temples, and prison cells. They talk of firefights, ambushes in the jungle, bombing raids, coups, assassinations, suicides, demonstrations, atrocities, and teach-ins. Here are Ho Chi Minh, Lyndon Johnson, Giap, Westmoreland, Kennedy, De Gaulle, Eisenhower, Nixon, McNamara, Kissinger, and many people you have never heard of. Meet Hanoi Hannah, who broadcast propaganda from the North Vietnamese capital; John McCain tells you what it was like to be shot down over enemy territory and taken prisoner; John Kerry tells a U.S. Senate committee why he opposes the Vietnam War. You will learn about My Lai, Agent Orange, Kent State, the Pentagon Papers, and the plan to free American POWs that went awry. Features include a chronology, biographical sketches, Medal of Honor winners, bibliography, nineteen photos, and an index.

LTC Mitchell Waite continues his honest and raw perspective on the Iraq War from that of a citizen-soldier in Volume 2 of 400 Days - A Call To Duty. He provides unique insight into this experience for any interested American, and he highlights some of the extraordinary people that fight in such a war and the effect this has upon the families left behind.

SOS and then stopped the ship. Seven Khmer Rouge soldiers boarded the Mayaguez and their leader, Battalion Commander Sa Mean, pointed at a map indicating that the ship should proceed to the east of Poulo Wai. One of the crew members broadcast a Mayday which was picked up by an Australian vessel. The Mayaguez arrived off Poulo Wai at approximately 4pm and a further 20 Khmer Rouge boarded the vessel. At 12:05 EST (21:05 Cambodia), a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) was convened to discuss the situation. The members of the NSC were determined to end the crisis decisively, believing that the fall of South Vietnam less than two weeks before and the forced withdrawal of the United States from Cambodia, (Operation Eagle Pull) and South Vietnam (Operation Frequent Wind) had severely damaged the U.S.'s reputation. They also wished to avoid comparisons to the Pueblo incident of 1968, where the failure to promptly use military force to halt the hijacking of a US intelligence ship by North Korea led to an eleven-month hostage situation.

Includes many full color illustrations and maps.