Britain’s best-selling historian writes the first definitive account of the famous televised SAS storming of the Iranian embassy in London in 1980

On April 30, 1980, six heavily armed gunmen burst into the Iranian embassy on Princes Gate, overlooking Hyde Park in London. There they took 26 hostages, including embassy staff, visitors, and three British citizens. A tense six-day siege ensued as millions gathered around screens across the country to witness the longest news flash in British television history, in which police negotiators and psychiatrists sought a bloodless end to the standoff, while the SAS – hitherto an organisation shrouded in secrecy – laid plans for a daring rescue mission: Operation Nimrod.

Drawing on unpublished source material, exclusive interviews with the SAS, and testimony from witnesses including hostages, negotiators, intelligence officers and the on-site psychiatrist, bestselling historian Ben Macintyre takes readers on a gripping journey from the years and weeks of build-up on both sides, to the minute-by-minute account of the siege and rescue.

Recreating the dramatic conversations between negotiators and hostages, the cutting-edge intelligence work happening behind-the-scenes, and the media frenzy around this moment of international significance, The Siege is the remarkable story of what really happened on those fateful six days, and the first full account of a moment that forever changed the way the nation thought about the SAS – and itself.

Intellectual historians generally view the Enlightenment as a pacifist or anti-war movement. Military historians typically consider 18th century military thinkers as backward-looking and inept. Speelman challenges the views of both groups through a consideration of the writings of Henry Lloyd, a soldier and Welsh "philosophe" who combined enlightened thought and military experience to distill a distinct theory of war. Based on previously unused or underutilized primary materials, this is the first biography of this key enlightenment thinker who advanced the general understanding of war as it existed in his day.

Lloyd wrote a multivolume history of the Seven Years' War from which he derived the Principles of War; a treatise on economics that prefigured the liberal theories of Adam Smith; a rhapsody on the invasion and defense of Great Britain; and finally an anonymous critique of the English constitution that he used to demand political and electoral reform. Overall, he argued for the reform of military institutions and practices through breaking from custom and traditional norms. In his works, Lloyd examined warfare within the larger context of secular philosophy and human society; and, thus, he personified the link between the military society and the Enlightenment that historians often ignore or discount.

A much needed reference aid for the academic and national defense communities, this book provides a framework for the historical and comparative study of the military culture of Arab society. In sections considering warfare in Arab traditions, military roles in medieval Islam, and Arab armies in the modern age, each chapter's bibliography is preceded by a background essay, designed to assist researchers who are unfamiliar with the general outline of Arab history or the thematic bent of Arabic historiography. The work also includes a glossary and tables of Islamic dynasties. Written primarily for professors and students of comparative military history, national and service intelligence analysts, and students of Arab-Islamic or Middle Eastern history, this work will also be of use to the generalist historian.

Settler-native conflicts in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa serve as excellent comparative cases as three areas linked to Britain where insurgencies occurred during roughly the same period. Important factors considered are settler parties, settler mythology, the role of native fighters, settler terror, the role of liberal parties, and the conduct of the war by security forces. Settlers and natives in each area share similar attitudes, liberal parties operate in similar fashions, and there are common explanations for the formation of splinter liberation groups. However, according to Mitchell, the key difference between the cases lies in the behavior of British security forces in comparison to South African and Israeli forces. Mitchell's chapter on liberal parties includes an independent account of the Progressive Federal Party of South Africa, the official parliamentary opposition from 1977 to 1987, along with the first major published account of the Alliance Party in Northern Ireland. His study of splinter group formation contains the first major account since 1964 of the Pan-Africanist Party of Azania, including its insurgency campaign in the 1980s and 1990s. Mitchell also contrasts behavior among the Inkatha Party and Labour Party in South Africa with the Social Democrat and Labour Party in Northern Ireland.

In a period that began with Britain controlling a world-wide empire and included two world wars, followed by the Cold War and massive expenditure on nuclear armaments, the relationship between the politicians and the generals has been central to British history. While it is correctly assumed that the Armed Forces have never threatened British political stability in modern times, the relationship between the military and their political masters is a major, if under-emphasised, theme of British history. While in theory the politicians decided strategy and the military implemented it, in practice decisions often depended on the personalities and experience of those involved. Asquith, the epitome of the civilian, left major strategic decisions in the hands of the military; while Churchill, an ex-soldier and ex-First Lord of the Admiralty, rode roughshod over professional military advice. In a period when arms before ever more technologically sophisticated, there was also the problem of how far politicians could decide on strategies proposed by the military other than by the crude yardstick of cost. The essays in Government and the Armed Forces in Britain, 1856--1990 provide a coherent account not only of the major decision-making of warfare but also of the changes in the organisation and control of the Armed Forces.

Canada's most popular military leader since the Second World War tells his own story about our soldiers at war.

In the summer of 2008, General Rick Hillier resigned his command as Chief of the Defence Staff of the Canadian Forces. You could almost hear the sigh of relief in Ottawa as Canada's most popular, and most controversial, leader since the Second World War left a role in which he'd been as frank-speaking, as unpredictable, and as resolutely apolitical as any military leader this country has ever seen.

Born and raised in Newfoundland, Hillier joined the military as a young man and quickly climbed the ranks. He played a significant role in domestic challenges, such as the 1998 ice story that paralyzed much of eastern Ontario and Quebec, and he quickly became a player on the international scene, commanding an American corps in Texas and a multinational NATO task force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But it was his role as General Rick Hillier, Canada's Chief of the Defence Staff, that defined him as a Canadian public figure. In Afghanistan, Canada faced its first combat losses since the Korean War and every casualty suddenly became front-page news. A country formerly ambivalent or even angry about its role in the conflict suddenly became gripped by the drama playing out not only in the war zone of a country half-way around the world, but in the unfriendly conference rooms in the country's capital as Hillier pulled no punches, demanding more funding and more troops and more appreciation for the women and men fighting a war on foreign soil.

A Soldier First is a hard-hitting, frank account of Hillier's role in his own words. The man who never backed down from the Taliban or Canada's top political leaders tells all in what will be one of the most important books to come out of this country this decade.

From Islamic extremism in Algeria to civil war in Iraq, this volume provides in-depth coverage of political and cultural conflict in the Middle East. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, conflict in the Middle East has been increasingly wrought with internal struggles, driven by ethnic, inter-communal, and religious differences. Islamic radicalism has grown as an internal threat, and foreign intervention is now a potential catalyst. Since 1990, the Middle East has twice witnessed the introduction of foreign armies, first to halt Iraqi expansionism, and more recently, to bring about regime change in Iraq. This perfect storm of factors has brought about a heightened level of instability, with numerous conflicts simmering in hot spots throughout the region. Explosive, in-depth chapters explore each conflict or latent conflict, including the history, the nature of the conflict, the factors involved, and any steps toward resolution. Hot spots covered include: The movement for Berber rights in Morocco; Shi'a opposition in Bahrain; Iraqi civil war and internal struggle for power; Iran's interstate conflict with the United States; and Islamic insurgency throughout the region. This volume is a must-have for up-to-the-minute coverage of hot spots in one of the world's most volatile regions. Supplies an introductory chapter that describes the critical factors that have shaped Middle East politics over the past half century, providing a lead-in to the complex discussions for non-expert readers Assesses the potential sources of internal conflicts and division within individual countries or subregions as well as its external conflicts, thereby identifying the links between these internal and external points of contention Specifically addresses Egypt, the Gulf states, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Maghreb, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen in dedicated chapters Recognizes and explains the prominent role of nonstate actors-including national liberation movements, transnational political movements, militant political parties, and terrorist organizations-and of foreign powers in determining Middle East politics