The principle in law that the rules are not changed in the middle of game, is embodied in the notion that legislation should apply prospectively. This study analyzes the legal constraints on retroactive legislation and the presumption of prospectivity and constitutional limits on such lawmaking.

Robson tackles controversial legal questions, including the treatment of lesbian criminal defendants; lesbianism and violence; the courts' tendency to resort to stereotypes, such as "the good lesbian" and "the bad lesbian"; the numerous debates enveloping same-sex marriage; and the outcome of child custody cases involving lesbians. She also repudiates the recent habit of legal theorists to address lesbians as "alternative family."

In a landmark decision in 1984, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that the Crown is bound by fiduciary, or trust-like, obligations to Canada's aboriginal peoples. By holding the Crown's duty to be legal, rather than merely political or moral, the Supreme Court blazed a new path in Canadian aboriginal rights jurisprudence. Yet, more than a decade later, many of the outstanding issues arising from that decision have yet to be answered or adequately addressed. This is, in part, because the Supreme Court provided little guidance as to the nature and extent of the Crown's duty. Leonard Rotman explores the unanswered questions that plague the Crown-Native fiduciary relationship. He begins by looking at the politics underlying Crown-Native relations and the effects of colonialism on Native peoples. Legislation and case law are then surveyed to reveal the historical and current status of fiduciary doctrine. By examining its fundamental characteristics and principles, Rotman formulates a functional rather than a categorical interpretation of fiduciary law. Finally, he discusses the effects of applying fiduciary law to the Crown-Native relationship. Considering the present status of aboriginal rights issues in Canada, it is striking that the Crown-Native fiduciary relationship remains the subject of so much confusion and uncertainty. With this principled treatment of fiduciary doctrine and its impact upon Crown-aboriginal relations in Canada, Rotman bridges a significant gap in legal.

The law is full of stories, ranging from the competing narratives presented at trials to the Olympian historical narratives set forth in Supreme Court opinions. How those stories are told and listened to makes a crucial difference to those whose lives are reworked in legal storytelling. The public at large has increasingly been drawn to law as an area where vivid human stories are played out with distinctively high stakes. And scholars in several fields have recently come to recognize that law's stories need to be studied critically. This notable volume-inspired by a symposium held at Yale Law School-brings together an exceptional group of well-known figures in law and literary studies to take a probing look at how and why stories are told in the law and how they are constructed and made effective. Why is it that some stories-confessions, victim impact statements-can be excluded from decisionmakers' hearing? How do judges claim the authority by which they impose certain stories on reality? Law's Stories opens new perspectives on the law, as narrative exchange, performance, explanation. It provides a compelling encounter of law and literature, seen as two wary but necessary interlocutors. Contributors J. M. Balkin Peter Brooks Harlon L. Dalton Alan M. Dershowitz Daniel A. Farber Robert A. Ferguson Paul Gewirtz John Hollander Anthony Kronman Pierre N. Leval Sanford Levinson Catharine MacKinnon Janet Malcolm Martha Minow David N. Rosen Elaine Scarry Louis Michael Seidman Suzanna Sherry Reva B. Siegel Robert Weisberg

In a new preface, Mark Strasser discusses recent developments in the legal battle over same-sex marriages in Hawaii. He anticipates the likely state and nationwide impact of the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision. Mark Strasser examines the issue of same-sex marriage in light of contemporary constitutional and domestic relations law, showing why the usual arguments against recognizing such unions are either weak or irrelevant. The Supreme Court has articulated numerous interests promoted by marriage, all of which apply to same-sex as well as opposite-sex couples. According to Strasser, the argument made most frequently to deny recognition to same-sex unions-that marriage exists to provide a setting for the production and raising of children-is in fact a reason to acknowledge such unions. The claim that marriage is for children biologically related to both parents is refuted in the case law, which treats biological and adopted children as legally indistinguishable. Strasser explains Baehr v. Lewin, the precedent setting case in Hawaii, and addresses the implications of state-by-state decisions to ban or recognize same-sex unions. He analyzes what it would mean to say that a policy violates the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Constitution, and compares biased polices that target gays and lesbians with those that victimize racial minorities. Strasser argues that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is both unconstitutional and a public policy disaster. It does not give states additional rights with respect to which marriages they need not recognize, Strasser explains, but only with respect which divorces they need not recognize. For example, DOMA seems to allow an individual to avoid a court-imposed duty to support an ex-spouse of the same sex simply by changing his or her domicile. Moreover, Strasser argues, DOMA is an open invitation for states to demand exceptions that will wreak havoc in domestic relations law. In a recent response to conservative arguments about marriage, Legally Wed explicates established and involving legal principles, and shows how invidiously these have been applied to the issues of gay rights in general and same-sex unions in particular.

Judith Wagner DeCew provides a solid philosophical foundation for legal discussions of privacy by articulating and unifying diverse arguments on the right to privacy and on how it should be guaranteed in various contemporary contexts. Philosophers and legal theorists tend either to define privacy narrowly or to abandon privacy as conceptually incoherent, she claims. In order to assess how far privacy should extend, and determine how the wide range of specific cases can be reconciled, DeCew surveys the history of the notion of privacy as it first evolved in American tort law and constitutional law and then analyzes current characterizations. In different contexts, privacy has been defined on the basis of information, autonomy, property, and intimacy. DeCew's broader claim is that privacy has fundamental value because it allows us to create ourselves as individuals, offering us freedom from judgment, scrutiny, and the pressure to conform. Feminist theorists often view privacy as a tool for shielding abuses. DeCew responds to this feminist critique of privacy, as well as addressing the issues of abortion and of gay and lesbian sexuality in the context of specific landmark legal cases. In discussions of Roe v. Wade, Bowers v. Hardwick, and the Hart/Devlin debates on decriminalization of homosexuality and prostitution, DeCew applies her broad theory to sexual and reproductive privacy, anti-sodomy laws, and the legislation and enforcement of morals. She finally discusses the intersection of privacy with public safety concerns, such as drug testing, and in light of new communication technologies, such as caller ID.

Ronald Dworkin argues that Americans have been systematically misled about what their Constitution is, and how judges decide what it means. The Constitution, he observes, grants individual rights in extremely abstract terms. The First Amendment prohibits the passing of laws that "abridge the freedom of speech"; the Fifth Amendment insists on "due process of law"; and the Fourteenth Amendment demands "equal protection of the laws" for all persons. What does that abstract language mean when it is applied to the political controversies that divide Americans-about affirmative action and racial justice, abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, censorship, pornography, and homosexuality, for example? Judges, and ultimately the justices of the Supreme Court, must decide for everyone, and that gives them great power. How should they decide? Dworkin defends a particular answer to that question, which he calls the "moral reading" of the Constitution. He argues that the Bill of Rights must be understood as setting out general moral principles about liberty and equality and dignity, and that private citizens, lawyers, and finally judges must interpret and apply those general principles by posing and trying to answer more concrete moral questions. Is freedom to choose abortion really a basic moral right and would curtailing that right be a deep injustice, for example? Why? In the detailed discussions of individual constitutional issues that form the bulk of the book, Dworkin shows that our judges do decide hard constitutional cases by posing and answering such concrete moral questions. Indeed he shows that that is the only way they can decide those cases. But most judges-and most politicians and most law professors-pretend otherwise. They say that judges must never treat constitutional issues as moral issues because that would be "undemocratic"-it would mean that judges were substituting their own moral convictions for those of Congressmen and state legislators who had been elected by the people. So they insist that judges can, and should, decide in some more mechanical way which involves no fresh moral judgment on their part. The result, Dworkin shows, has been great constitutional confusion. Is the premise at the core of this confusion really sound? Is the moral reading-the only reading of the American Constitution that makes sense-really undemocratic? In spirited and illuminating discussions both of the great constitutional cases of recent years, and of general constitutional principles, Dworkin argues, to the contrary, that the distinctly American version of government under principle, based on the moral reading of the Constitution, is in fact the best account of what democracy really is.

This sixth volume in the Osgoode Society's distinguished series on the history of Canadian law turns to the a central theme in the history of British Columbia and the Yukon - law and order. In the early days of British sovereignty, the frenzied activity of the fur trade and the gold rush, along with clashes between settlers and Natives, made law enforcement a difficult business. Later, although law and order were more firmly established, tensions continued between the dominant populations committed to the practice and rhetoric of British justice and those groups owing allegiance to other value systems (such as Native peoples, Asian immigrants, and Doukhobors) or those resisting authority (criminals and the criminally insane). These essays look at key social, economic, and political issues of the times and show how they influenced the developing legal system.

The essays cover a wide range of topics, and explore the human as well as the legal dimensions of their subjects, relating specific cases to broader theory. They demonstrate that English law has been flexible enough to accommodate diversity and is, therefore, pragmatic. The volume also proves that there is no single Canadian legal culture: geography, demography, politics, economics, and military considerations have had an impact on the shape of our legal culture. The introduction by John McLaren and Hamar Foster pulls together the many regional themes to provide a clear overview of the legal complexities of the period.

This book is a worthy contribution to Caribbean business and professional literature. The work falls into that unique category of published works which not only deals with the topic from a theoretical perspective but also focuses the reader's attention on the practical application of the theory. This book is intended for and should prove invaluable to those persons who are required to play an active role in the affairs of corporate entities. Chairmen, directors and company secretaries, all of whom must understand the proper process and procedures through which corporate decisions are made will find the text to be a practitioner's handbook. Accountants, lawyers and other professionals who are required to advise clients on various aspects of corporate procedure will find it an indispensable source of reference. Shareholders who seek a better understanding of corporate procedure and the process through which their rights may be exercised will find the book user friendly. For students pursuing a career in corporate law, The Administration and Conduct of Corporate Meeting is required reading. Although this book primarily deals with the conduct of company meetings, its contents are equally applicable to others types of corporate meetings. Persons concerned with the administration and conduct of business will find it useful. Included in this work are a table of comparative references to other selected regional company legislation and the Caribbean Law Institute draft model Company Bill in order to enhance the usefulness of the text to the wider Caribbean community.

By the end of the eighth century A.D., imperial China had established a system of administrative and penal law, the main institutions of which lasted until the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911. The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law studies the views held throughout the centuries by the educated elite on the role of law in government, the relationship between law and morality, and the purpose of punishment. Geoffrey MacCormack's introduction offers a brief history of legal development in China, describes the principal contributions to the law of the Confucian and Legalist schools, and identifies several other attributes that might be said to constitute the "spirit" of the law. Subsequent chapters consider these attributes, which include conservatism, symbolism, the value attached to human life, the technical construction of the codes, the rationality of the legal process, and the purposes of punishment. A study of the "spirit" of the law in imperial China is particularly appropriate, says MacCormack, for a number of laws in the penal codes on family relationships, property ownership, and commercial transactions were probably never meant to be enforced. Rather, such laws were more symbolic and expressed an ideal toward which people should strive. In many cases even the laws that were enforced, such as those directed at the suppression of theft or killing, were also regarded as an emphatic expression of the right way to behave. Throughout his study, MacCormack distinguishes between "official," or penal and administrative, law, which emanated from the emperor to his officials, and "unofficial," or customary, law, which developed in certain localities or among associations of merchants and traders. In addition, MacCormack pays particular attention to the law's emphasis on the hierarchical ordering of relationships between individuals such as ruler and minister, ruler and subject, parent and child, and husband and wife. He also seeks to explain why, over nearly thirteen centuries, there was little change in the main moral and legal prescriptions, despite enormous social and economic changes.

Mary Ann Glendon's A Nation Under Lawyers is a guided tour through the maze of the late-twentieth-century legal world, in which even lawyers themselves can lose their bearings. Glendon depicts the legal profession as a system in turbulence, where a variety of beliefs and ideals are vying for dominance. Dramatizing issues and events through stories of lawyers and laypersons caught up in the currents of change, she provides a frank assessment of the people and ideas that are transforming our law-dependent culture.

In January 1949 a thirty-two-year-old white woman in Martinsville, Virginia, accused seven young black men of raping her. Within two days state and local police had rounded up all the suspects and extracted confessions from them. In a series of trials that lasted eleven days, all were found guilty and sentenced to death - a sentence that was carried out, amid a storm of protest from civil-rights advocates and death-penalty opponents, in February 1951. Here is the first comprehensive treatment of the Martinsville case. Covering every aspect of the proceedings, from the commission of the crime through two sets of appeals, Eric Rise reexamines common assumptions about the administration of justice in the South. Although racial prejudice undeniably contributed to the outcome of the case, so did concerns for due process, crime control, community stability, judicial restraint, and domestic security. The success of the due process campaign by groups such as the NAACP helped curb the most egregious abuses of authority, but it did little to help defendants who conceded their guilt but protested unusually severe sentences. The author focuses on the efforts of the attorneys for the Martinsville Seven, who, rather than citing procedural errors, directly attacked the discriminatory application of the death penalty. It was the first case in which statistical evidence was used to substantiate systematic discrimination against blacks in capital cases.

Referred to as the "bible of American lawyers," Blackstone's "Commentaries" on the Laws of England shaped the principles of law in both England and America when its first volume appeared in 1765. For the next century that law remained what Blackstone made of it. Daniel J. Boorstin examines why "Commentaries" became the knowledge that any lawyer needed to acquire. Set against the intellectual values of the 18th century and the notions of reason, nature, and the sublime, "Commentaries" is fitted into its social setting. Boorstin has provided an intellectual history of the time, illustrating the elegance, social values and internal contradictions of the Age of Reason.

This volume of essays celebrates 21 years of research by the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies in Oxford. Socio-legal studies in the United Kingdom was pioneered by the Oxford Centre, with the support of the Economic and Social Research Council and the University of Oxford. Over the course of 21 years, the Centre has produced major and innovative studies in a number of areas including: regulation, family policy, law and psychology, law and economics, and business and the law. While the face of socio-legal studies has changed over 21 years, the Oxford Centre remains at the heart of the field and will continue to provide leadership and inspiration to others working within it.This book brings together the reflections of leading scholars from around the world on the life and work of the Oxford Centre. They record how the pioneering studies carried out by the Centre have become a bench-mark for researchers, and how the discipline of socio-legal research has developed. The scholars writing in this volume pay tribute to the achievements of the Oxford Centre and its role in developing the subject of Socio-Legal Studies. The contributors are Paul Rock, Anthony Ogus, William Twining, Robert Cooter, Maureen Cain, Shari Diamond, Volkmar Gessner, Andras Sajo, Peter Fitzpatrick, Richard Abel, Michael Faure, Geoffrey Stephenson, Robert Kagan, and Stewart Macaulay.

In this New York Times bestseller, David Brock, a leading investigative journalist in America, presents an argument of the fact and fiction that made up the Hill-Thomas hearings of 1991. Presenting a thorough investigation of the evidence in the Thomas-Hill hearings, Brock argues that there was no reason to believe Anita Hill's accusations of sexual harassment against Clarence Thomas. "The Real Anita Hill is well written, carefully reasoned, and powerful in its logic. It is must reading for anyone who feels remotely touched by this case. ...The questions [Brock] leaves the reader pondering are ancient but vital: how do you keep separate the bad means and the good ends; how do you keep the bad means from rotting the entire system?" - Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, The New York Times

Challenging the long-cherished notion of legal objectivity in the United States, this book argues that Chicano history has been consistently shaped by racially biased, combative legal interactions. The book is an insightful and provocative exploration of the ways Chicano and Chicana artists, writers, musicians and filmmakers engage this history in order to resist the disenfranchising effects of legal institutions, including the prison and the court. Gutierrez-Jones examines the process by which Chicanos have become associated with criminality in both legal institutions and mainstream popular culture in America and thereby offers a new way of understanding minority social experience. Drawing on gender studies and psychoanalysis, as well as critical legal and critical race studies, Gutierrez-Jones's approach to the law and legal discourse reveals the high stakes involved when concepts of social justice are fought out in the home, in the workplace and in the streets.

How do "no-fault," "gender-neutral" divorce reforms actually harm the lives of women and children they are designed to protect? Focusing on the language and symbols of reform, Martha Fineman argues that by advocating measures based on equality of "treatment" rather than of "outcome, " liberal feminists disregarded the socioeconomic factors that simultaneously place women at a disadvantage in the market and favor their taking on primary domestic responsibilities. She traces in persuasive detail the detrimental effects of equality rhetoric in shaping divorce law -- such as the legal separation of parents' and children's interests; equality replacing need as the prime criterion for settlements; and the increase of state intervention into family life. More than a critique, this book is an incisive argument for adopting outcome-oriented measures and a valuable overview of the pitfalls of uncritically implementing any rhetoric as social policy.

Who is responsible for juvenile delinquency? Mark D. Jacobs uses ethnographic, statistical, and literary methods to uncover the many levels of disorganization in American juvenile justice. By analyzing the continuities betwen normal casework and exceptional cases, he reveals that probation officers must commonly contrive informal measures to circumvent a system which routinely obstructs the delivery of services to their clients. Jacobs defines the concept of the "no-fault society" to describe the larger context of societal disorder and interpersonal manipulation that the juvenile justice system at once reflects and exacerbates.

Here is the new, completely updated and expanded edition of the indispensable handbook used throughout the hospitality industry since The Laws of Innkeepers first appeared in 1972. Containing all the legal information essential to the successful operation of modern hotels, motels, inns, bed-and-breakfasts, clubs, restaurants, and resorts, the book has been extensively revised by John E. H. Sherry to accomodate the far-reaching changes that have occured since the publication of the revised edition in 1981. Sherry, a practicing lawyer and professor of hotel administration, carries over from the highly praised earlier editions detailed information on the rights and responsibilities of host and guest alike. He cites actual cases-ranging from the amusing and the bizarre to the tragic-as examples, and spells out in precise and readily understandable terms exactly what state and federal law says. Broadening the scope of the book to keep up with recent legal developments, the author includes many new case decisions and sumamries from various jurisdictions. Three chapters devoted to employment law, environmental law and land use, and catastrophic risk liability are among the highlights of the new material. These new sections present recent rulings and case law on such timely topics as age, disability, and AIDS discrimination, as well as sexual harassment; government regulation of toxic and hazardous substances and hotel and resort development; and acts of God and the Public Enemy and terrorism.

In this title, stories of trails form the Vancouver courts, based on lawyer David Nuttal's 30 years of experiences working there.

Based upon the text of a seminar devised by the author which has been widely acclaimed as a breakthrough in the teaching and learning of advocacy. It is based on the personal experience of the author and has been described as invaluable as a review for the experienced advocate.;Keith Evans is a member of the English and California Bars and a former head of London Chambers./