In 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released the report Warfighter Support: Independent Expert Assessment of Army Body Armor Test Results and Procedures Needed Before Fielding, which commented on the conduct of the test procedures governing acceptance of body armor vest-plate inserts worn by military service members. This GAO report, as well as other observations, led the Department of Defense Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, to request that the National Research Council (NRC) Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences conduct a three-phase study to investigate issues related to the testing of body armor materials for use by the U.S. Army and other military departments. Phase I and II resulted in two NRC letter reports: one in 2009 and one in 2010. This report is Phase III in the study.
Testing of Body Armor Materials: Phase III provides a roadmap to reduce the variability of clay processes and shows how to migrate from clay to future solutions, as well as considers the use of statistics to permit a more scientific determination of sample sizes to be used in body armor testing. This report also develops ideas for revising or replacing the Prather study methodology, as well as reviews comments on methodologies and technical approaches to military helmet testing. Testing of Body Armor Materials: Phase III also considers the possibility of combining various national body armor testing standards.

This report reviews and updates the 2002 National Research Council report, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This report also assesses various topics, including: the plans to maintain the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile without nuclear-explosion testing; the U.S. capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions; commitments necessary to sustain the stockpile and the U.S. and international monitoring systems; and potential technical advances countries could achieve through evasive testing and unconstrained testing. Sustaining these technical capabilities will require action by the National Nuclear Security Administration, with the support of others, on a strong scientific and engineering base maintained through a continuing dynamic of experiments linked with analysis, a vigorous surveillance program, adequate ratio of performance margins to uncertainties. This report also emphasizes the use of modernized production facilities and a competent and capable workforce with a broad base of nuclear security expertise. Table of Contents Front Matter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SUMMARY 1 SAFETY, SECURITY, AND RELIABILITY OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE 2 TECHNICAL MONITORING CAPABILITIES AND CHALLENGES 3 SUSTAINING U.S. TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES UNDER THE CTBT 4 POTENTIAL TECHNICAL ADVANCES FROM NUCLEAR-EXPLOSION TESTING 5 COMPLETE LIST OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS APPENDIX A Committee on Reviewing and Updating "Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty" (CTBT) APPENDIX B List of CTBT Committee and Seismology Subcommittee Meetings APPENDIX C The U.S. National Capability to Monitor for Nuclear Explosions APPENDIX D Monitoring Areas of High Interest APPENDIX E Dealing with Evasive Underground Nuclear Testing APPENDIX F Issues Related to Containment of Radioactivity APPENDIX G U.S. Satellite Nuclear Detonation Detection Capability: Options and Impacts APPENDIX H Satellite-Based Challenges and Solutions APPENDIX I References APPENDIX J List of Acronyms APPENDIX K Glossary of Key Terms from the 2010 CTBT NIE

International efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons-rest upon foundations provided by global treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Over time, however, states have created a number of other mechanisms for organizing international cooperation to promote nonproliferation. Examples range from regional efforts to various worldwide export-control regimes and nuclear security summit meetings initiated by U.S. president Barack Obama. Many of these additional nonproliferation arrangements are less formal and have fewer members than the global treaties. International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation calls attention to the emergence of international cooperation beyond the core global nonproliferation treaties. The contributors examine why these other cooperative nonproliferation mechanisms have emerged, assess their effectiveness, and ask how well the different pieces of the global nonproliferation regime complex fit together. Collectively, the essayists show that states have added new forms of international cooperation to combat WMD proliferation for multiple reasons, including the need to address new problems and the entrepreneurial activities of key state leaders. Despite the complications created by the existence of so many different cooperative arrangements, this collection shows the world is witnessing a process of building cooperation that is leading to greater levels of activity in support of norms against WMD and terrorism.

The debate over cyber technology has resulted in new considerations for national security operations. States find themselves in an increasingly interconnected world with a diverse threat spectrum and little understanding of how decisions are made within this amorphous domain. With The Decision to Attack, Aaron Franklin Brantly investigates how states decide to employ cyber in military and intelligence operations against other states and how rational those decisions are. In his examination, Brantly contextualizes broader cyber decision-making processes into a systematic expected utility-rational choice approach to provide a mathematical understanding of the use of cyber weapons at the state level.

In this new paperback editon of German Automatic Weapons of World War II, the seven classic automatic weapons of the World War II German Wehrmacht are described and illustrated in color photographs. Detailed sequences show them in close-up; during step-by-step field stripping; and during handling, loading, and live-firing trials in outdoor settings, by gunners wearing authentic period uniforms. The illustrations are accompanied by concise accounts of each weapon's historical and technical background, and by accessible non-technical descriptions of its firing characteristics. Guns covered are: Mauser Schellfeuer machine pistol; Erma MP40 sub-machine gun; MG34 machine gun; MG42 machine gun; FG42/1 & II paratroop assault weapons; Sturmgewehr 44 assault rifle.