Environmental concerns are at the top of the agenda around the world. Judaism, like the other world religions, only rarely raised issues concerning the environment in the past. This means that modern Judaism, the halakhic tradition no less than others, must build on a slim foundation in its efforts to give guidance. The essays in this volume mark the beginning of a new effort to face questions and formulate answers of vital importance.

Informatics and the Foundations of Legal Reasoning represents a close collaboration between a wide range of disciplines and countries. Fourteen papers, together with a long analytical introduction by the editors, were selected from the contributions of legal theorists, computer scientists, philosophers and logicians who were members of an International Working Group supported by the European Commission. The Group was mandated to work towards determining how far the law is amenable to formal modeling, and in what ways computers might assist legal thinking and practice. The book is the result of discussions held by the Group over two and half years. It will help students and researchers from different backgrounds to focus on a common set of topics of increasing general interest. It embodies the results of work in progress and suggests many issues for further discussion. A stimulating text for undergraduate and graduate courses in law, philosophy and computer science departments, as well as for those interested in the place of computers in legal practice, especially at the international level.

Understanding the Nature of Law explores methodological questions about how best to explain law. Among these questions, one is central: is there something about law which determines how it should be theorized? Michael Giudice presents the problem: several methods suggest themselves as suitable to understanding law; however, each method claims unique importance with no need of others. A solution is offered in two key claims. First, many conceptual theories of law are best understood not as the result of conceptual analysis, but as constructive conceptual explanations, emphasizing a crucial role for revision and expansion of ordinary concepts, in ways responsive to new problems and new phenomena. Second, conceptual theories of law can and ought to identify necessary as well as contingent features in the construction of conceptual explanations of law. This novel book explains the importance of conceptual explanation by situating its methods and goals in relation to, rather than in competition with, social scientific and moral theories of law. The book will be of primary interest to both students and academics in legal, political, and moral philosophy. It will also be of interest to students and academics working in the social sciences who are interested in questions about the distinctive character of law.

The book attempts to describe and criticize four methods used in legal practice, legal dogmatics and legal theory: logic, analysis, argumentation and hermeneutics. Apart from a presentation of basic ideas connected with the above mentioned methods, the essays contained in this book seek to answer questions concerning the assumptions standing behind these methods, the limits of using them and their usefulness in the practice and theory of law. A specific feature of the book is that in one study four different, sometimes competing concepts of legal method are discussed. The panorama, sketched like this, allows one to reflect deeply on the questions concerning the methodological conditioning of legal science and the existence of a unique, specific legal method. The authors argue that there exists no such method. They claim that the methodologies presented in the book may serve as a basis for constructing a coherent and useful conception of legal thinking.

This book highlights and explains consistent differences in both the framing and content of the various pre-first millennium BC law collections of Mesopotamia, Egypt and Hatti. The differences between collections are placed in the broader background of the worldview and political make-up of the societies and individuals that created them, and their historical context.

This centenary volume of essays explores a number of related themes which differentiate and characterize the approach of the LSE. Central to this, is the assumption that law is one of the social sciences and that law should be studied "in context" as a social phenomenon. The contributors have been chosen both for their distinction and for their connection with the LSE, and include such eminent figures as Mrs Justice Arden, Judge Rosalyn Higgins, Sir Stephen Sedley, and Roberto Mangabeira Unger. The essays focus on three main subject areas: Law and Economy; Dimensions of Law; and Courts and Process which are discussed against the broader canvas of the School's approach to Law . Thus, Comaroff, Cohen, Unger and Teubner adopt an interdisciplinary approach to the subject, stressing both legal and social theory, while the contributions of Cranston, Cornish and others stress an internationalist approach. A characteristic LSE focus on the dynamic nature of law runs through the work of Collins, Higgins and Lord Wedderburn, while a reformist tradition (allied with concern for the practical) is explored alongside the introduction of new legal subjects into the curriculum. Fascinating and thought provoking, this volume is an accesible summary of current thought and debate presented by today's leading scholars and practioners. Law, Society and Economy will be of enduring interest to scholars and practioners worldwide, akin to Ginsberg's celebrated and widely cited volume of essays which marked the School's fiftieth anniversary.

THE FREEHOF INSTITUTE OF PROGRESSIVE HALAKHAH The Freehof Institute of Progressive Halakhah is a creative research center devoted to studying and defining the progressive character of the halakhah in accordance with the principles and theology of Reform Judaism. It seeks to establish the ideological basis of Progressive halakhah, and its application to daily life. The Institute fosters serious studies, and helps scholars in various portions of the world to work together for a common cause. It provides an ongoing forum through symposia, and publications including the quarterly newsletter, HalakhaH, published under the editorship of Walter Jacob, in the United States. The foremost halakhic scholars in the Reform, Liberal, and Progressive rabbinate along with some Conservative and Orthodox colleagues as well as university professors serve on our Academic Council.

This is the first major work on the interrelationship between Liberal Judaism and Rabbinic Law (Halachah) ever to have been produced in Britain, and in Europe since the nineteenth century. It represents a plea for a positive yet forthrightly critical approach to Rabbinic Law in general aswell as to a variety of specific topics such as the language of prayer, the status of women, medical confidentiality, euthanasia, Jewish identity, contraception, divorce, and Jewish territorial rights in Palestine/Israel.

This is the first major work on the interrelationship between Liberal Judaism and Rabbinic Law (Halachah) ever to have been produced in Britain, and in Europe since the nineteenth century. It represents a plea for a positive yet forthrightly critical approach to Rabbinic Law in general aswell as to a variety of specific topics such as the language of prayer, the status of women, medical confidentiality, euthanasia, Jewish identity, contraception, divorce, and Jewish territorial rights in Palestine/Israel.

John D. Rayner graduated from Emmanuel College, Cambridge and Hebrew Union College Jewish Institute of Religion, Cincinnati. He is Emeritus Rabbi of the Liberal Jewish Synagogue, London, Hon. Life-President of the Union of Liberal and Progressive Synagogues, and Lecturer in Liturgy at Leo Baeck College, London.

This volume presents articles by an interdisciplinary and international group of scholars spanning the social sciences, humanities, and law. It examines new perspectives on political relationships, politics and legal reform, and law and the family.

Uncertain Risks Regulated compares various models of risk regulation in order to understand how these systems shape the relationship between law and science, and how they attempt to overcome public distrust in science-based decision-making. The book contributes to the ongoing debate relating to uncertainty and risks - and the difficulties faced by the European Union in particular - in regulating theses issues, taking account of both national and international constraints. The term 'uncertain risk' is comparable with notions of hazard and indeterminate risk, as deployed within the social sciences; but it also aims to capture the modern regulatory reality that a non-quantifiable hazard must still be addressed by society, law and its regulators. Decisions must be taken in the face of uncertainty. And, whilst it is not possible to provide clear cut models of risk regulation, in focusing on regulatory practices at a national, EU and international level, the contributors to this volume aim to use fact finding as a core instrument of learning for risk regulation.

This book has two related aims: to investigate the frequently voiced claim that legal argument is nonformal in nature and, within the limits of such an investigation, to ascertain the most general proper ties of law as a rational system. Examination of a number of views of legal argument, selected from recent discussions in Germany, Belgium, and the English-speaking countries, will lead to the follow ing main conclusions. The nonformalistic conceptions of the logic of legal argument are ambiguous and unclear. Moreover, insofar as these conceptions are capable of clarification in the light of recent analytical methodology, they can be seen to be either mistaken or else compatible with the formalistic position. Because law is socially directive and coordinative, it is dependent upon theoretical psycho sociology and calls, in principle, for a deontic and inductive logic. The primary function of legal argument is to provide continuing reinterpretation and confirmation of legal rules, conceived as theo retical prescriptions. On the basis of this conception, the old juris prudential conflict between formalism and rule-scepticism appears substantially resolved. Aristotle, the founder of the theory of argument, conceived it as "the science of establishing conclusions" (bnO'l; fl'YJ &no e "u, ), designed to guide people in rational argumentation. In time, how ever, logic forsook its practical function and developed as a highly abstract and disinterested study, today called "formal logic"; and the theory of practical argument was either neglected or relegated to an appendix to rhetoric."

LEGAL POSITIVISM AND NATURAL LAW Three lectures by the Harvard Law School professor examine legal positivism and natural law. In the course of his analysis Fuller discusses Kelsen's theory as a reactionary theory and Hobbes' theory of sovereignty. He defines legal positivism as the viewpoint that draws a distinction "between the law that is and the law that ought to be" and interprets natural law as that which tolerates a combination of the two. He looks at the effects of positivism's continued influence on American legal thinking and concludes that law is necessary in a democracy as a principle of order. LON L. FULLER 1902-1978] was a professor at Harvard Law School and is remembered for his contributions to the law of contracts. His debate with H.L.A. Hart in the 1958 Harvard Law Review (Vol. 71) is noteworthy because it provided the framework for subsequent debates about legal positivism and natural law.

This book offers a long-overdue intellectual biography of the late Egyptian Shaykh Mohammed al-Ghazali (d.1996). But its main purpose is to shed light on Shari'a, a highly politicized concern of our times. Instead of the standard accounts of Islam emphasizing 'extremists,' 'traditionalists,' 'moderates,' or 'modernists,' the book introduces a multi-layered approach to understanding the contours of Shari'a rulemaking. It highlights the technical and historical trajectory of this rulemaking process, thereby challenging the prevailing academic narrative as well as popular Muslim narratives. In using this contemporary influential Muslim scholar as a reference, the book assesses what so many Sunni Muslims see in Shari'a, at least in this Egyptian context, and how such devotion could hinder or promote genuine reform.

Agricultural Policy in the United States: Evolution and Economics traces U.S. agricultural policy from its colonial roots to the present, using economic concepts to analyze and interpret political and economic consequences. It also examines the processes by which agricultural policies are developed, and the government structure which supports the implementation of legislation passed by Congress. The book includes arguments for and against common tools of U.S. agricultural policy, without influencing the reader in a particular direction. Each chapter contains questions and exercises to support students' learning, and technical economic material is contained in optional appendices. This second edition examines the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 and sets the scene for future policy developments. Additionally, it looks at trade wars and the impact of Black Swan events like the COVID-19 pandemic on agricultural resilience.

Society and individual members thereof who approach the court in conscience desire justice. They place their hope not only in the knowledge but also in the morality of the judges. At a time when the values of the judiciary are under intense scrutiny, Noonan and Winston present an extensive, highly informed collection of readings with commentary and explication. They address the concept and role of "judge," the act of "judging," and the requirements and potential abuses inherent in the system and process of sitting in judgment. This is a reflective, yet eminently realistic consideration of the fundamental issues and questions involved in establishing a reasonable framework for assessing judicial morality. The work first examines qualities of the ideal, corrupt, and over-zealous or political judge. The editors next address the judge's role and response in view of the tensions rising not only from the facts of the case and legal precedents but also from such human qualities as compassion. They also look at the power of social expectations and personal beliefs as possible influences on judicial decisions. Finally, the editors consider the need judges have for independence and study that necessary factor in relationships to accountability and also potential for abuse. This is a learned, inclusive, yet accessible and captivating, work. It will clarify and reinvigorate discussion of critically important issues fundamental to an ethical judiciary.

Unique in its use of literature from Dutch, French, and German sources. No other comparable textbook on legal method/ legal science. Interdisciplinary; useful also for those looking to understand the philosophy of science.

This book seeks to provide answers to everything you ever wanted to know about the law-except what the rules are or ought to be This book seeks to provide answers to everything you ever wanted to know about the law-except what the rules are or ought to be. For centuries, the law has been considered a neutral, objective arena that sets societal standards and in which conflicting forces resolve disputes. More recently, however, the interaction between law and society has been recognized as a two-way street: society clearly exacts a considerable influence on the practice and evolution of law. Further, the discrepancy between what the law mandates and what the social reality is has served as evidence of the chasm between theory and practice, between the abstraction of law and its actual societal effects. Examining such issues as the limits of legal change and the capacity of law to act as a revolutionary agent, the essays in this book offer a well-rounded introduction to the relationship between law and society. By focusing on flashpoint issues in legal studies-equality, consciousness and ideology, social control--and making ample use of engaging case studies, The Law and Society Review provides an invaluable resource for scholars and students alike.

In this colorful and consistently engaging work, law and economics professor Gillian Hadfield picks up where New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman left off in his influential 2005 book, The World is Flat. Friedman was focused on the infrastructure of communications and technology-the new web-based platform that allows business to follow the hunt for lower costs, higher value and greater efficiency around the planet seemingly oblivious to the boundaries of nation states. Hadfield peels back this technological platform to look at the 'structure that lies beneath'-our legal infrastructure, the platform of rules about who can do what, when and how. Often taken for granted, economic growth throughout human history has depended at least as much on the evolution of new systems of rules to support ever-more complex modes of cooperation and trade as it has on technological innovation. When Google rolled out YouTube in over one hundred countries around the globe simultaneously, for example, it faced not only the challenges of technology but also the staggering problem of how to build success in the context of a bewildering and often conflicting patchwork of nation-state-based laws and legal systems affecting every aspect of the business-contract, copyright, encryption, censorship, advertising and more. Google is not alone. A study presented at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2011 found that for global firms, the number one challenge of the modern economy is increasing complexity, and the number one source of complexity is law. Today, even our startups, the engines of economic growth, are global from Day One. Put simply, the law and legal methods on which we currently rely have failed to evolve along with technology. They are increasingly unable to cope with the speed, complexity, and constant border-crossing of our new globally inter-connected environment. Our current legal systems are still rooted in the politics-based nation state platform on which the industrial revolution was built. Hadfield argues that even though these systems supported fantastic growth over the past two centuries, today they are too slow, costly, cumbersome and localized to support the exponential rise in economic complexity they fostered. While everything else in the economy strives to become cheaper, sleeker and faster, our outdated approach to law hampers the invention of new products, the development of new business models, the structuring of global supply chains, the management of the risks posed by complex technologies, the evolution of financial, ecological, and other systems, as well as the protection of people and businesses as they and their products travel around the globe. They also fail to address looming challenges such as global warming and the reduction of poverty and oppression in the developing countries that are the backyard of global business. The answer to our troubles with law, however, is not the one critics usually reach for-to have less of it. Recognizing that law provides critical infrastructure for the cooperation and collaboration on which economic growth is built is the first step, Hadfield argues, to building a legal environment that does more of what we need it to do and less of what we don't. Through a sweeping review of first the invention and then the evolution of law over thousands of years of human development and the ways in which rule systems have consistently adapted to higher levels of complexity, Hadfield stresses that the state-based legal systems governing us today are not the only way to build the planks of a legal platform. Going back to fundamentals, she shows how historically, law's primary purpose has been to help societies to cope with the essential issues of trust, commitment, risk-allocation, and distribution that we face in coordinating cooperative ventures. While nation-state laws will never disappear, the time has come for us to supplement our legal infrastructure with rules developed on the same global platform as our economy. Hadfield offers a model for a more market- and globally-oriented legal system that fosters greater participation of end-users, market actors, and other non-governmental entities. Combining an impressive grasp of the empirical details of economic globalization with an ambitious re-envisioning of our global legal system, Rules for a Flat World promises to be a crucial and influential intervention into the debates surrounding how best to manage the evolving global economy.

Alan Dershowitz is one of America's most famous litigation experts. In the Genesis of Justice he examines the Genesis narratives to bring to the reader an insight into the creation of the ten commandments and much of what is now law.

This work is part of a series focusing on research into law and economics. It discusses a variety of topics in the field.

Habermas' recent work makes a major claim, that is to be able to determine what is the most rational thing to do. Postmodernists, notably Lyotard, have perhaps successfully belittled this claim as too positivistic. However it is difficult to see their work as offering more than sheer irrationality as the supposed alternative to Habermas. This book does not dispute the validity of the postmodern critique but it is concerned to resist the irrationality which, thus far, seems to coincide with anti-positivism. The concept utilized in this book is one of justice, a concept that the author uses to demonstrate the theories of both Habermas and Lyotard.

Carefully structured and supported with a wealth of examples, Elise Muir provides a clear, concise introduction to the EU legal order. Drawing upon her years of teaching experience, Muir outlines the history of the EU, its key actors, modes of action and its daily relevance. Offering students and instructors an up-to-date textbook, Muir pays attention to the latest developments, including the impacts of Brexit and the Covid-19 crisis. Written for students from a range of disciplines and levels of study, this book explains how the EU legal order works. Muir illuminates the complex and technical areas of EU institutional law through explanatory illustrations, schemes, and textboxes. With this engaging and accessible resource, students will be well-equipped to understand the fundamentals and functioning of the EU legal order.