* Provides evidence, examples, and explanation of the developing tactics-illustrated recently in politics in particular-of embedding internal saboteurs bent on dismantling their own institutions from within * Presents numerous case studies to examine instances of insider compromises, including the circumstances and warning signs that led to events * Outlines solutions on how to train organizations and individuals on recognizing, reporting, mitigating, and deterring insider threats

One of the most serious crises since the end of the Cold War began with Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and subsequent 'secret' war in Eastern Ukraine. As more territory was taken from Eastern Ukraine, Western countries countered with economic sanctions directed against Russia. While the conflict did not escalate to the levels originally feared, over time, it became apparent that President Putin had failed to affect the regime change intended in Ukraine, and Russia's economy had been damaged. In Ukraine and the Art of Strategy, Sir Lawrence Freedman provides an account of the origins and course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict through the lens of the theory and practice of strategy. That is, he explores Putin's near, medium, and long-term strategies when he decided to initiate the conflict. How successful has he been? In contrast to many who see Putin as a master operator who has resuscitated a supine Russia against all odds, Freedman is less impressed with his strategic acumen in terms of the long-term fallout. By exploring concepts such as coercive diplomacy, limited war, escalation and information operations, Freedman brings the story up to the present, where a low-level conflict between Ukrainian and breakaway rebel forces in the east grinds on, and illuminates the external challenges faced by the governments' involved. Freedman's application of his unique strategic perspective to this supremely important conflict has the potential to reshape our understanding of it, and his analysis of the likely outcomes will force readers to reconsider the idea that Vladimir Putin is unmatched as a strategic mastermind.

There are a limited number of intelligence analysis books available on the market. 　Intelligence Analysis Fundamentals is an introductory, accessible text for college level undergraduate and graduate level courses. While the principles outlined in the book largely follow military intelligence terminology and practice, concepts are presented to correlate with intelligence gathering and analysis performed in law enforcement, homeland security, and corporate and business security roles. Most of the existing texts on intelligence gathering and analysis focus on specific types of intelligence such as ‘target centric’ intelligence, and many of these, detail information from a position of prior knowledge. In other words, they are most valuable to the consumer who has a working-level knowledge of the subject.

The book is general enough in nature that a lay student—interested in pursuing a career in intelligence, Homeland Security, or other related areas of law enforcement—will benefit from it. 　No prior knowledge of intelligence analysis, functions, or operations is assumed.　 Chapters illustrate methods and techniques that, over the years, have consistently demonstrate results, superior to those achieved with other means. Chapters describe such analytical methods that are most widely used in the intelligence community and serve as recognized standards and benchmarks in the practice of intelligence analysis. 　All techniques have been selected for inclusion for their specific application to homeland security, criminal investigations, and intelligence operations. 　

Uses numerous hands-on activities—that can easily be modified by instructors to be more or less challenging depending on the course level—to reinforce concepts

As current and active members of the intelligence community, the authors draw on their decades of experience in intelligence to offer real-world examples to illustrate concepts

All methodologies reflect the latest trends in the intelligence communities assessment, analysis, and reporting processes with all presented being open source, non-classified information

As such, the non-sensitive information presented is appropriate—and methods applicable—for use for education and training overseas and internationally

Military-style collection and analysis methods are the primary ones presented, but all are directly correlated intelligence to current concepts, functions and practices within Homeland Security and the law communities

Covers the counterterrorism environment where joint operations and investigative efforts combine military, private sector, and law enforcement action and information sharing

The book will be a welcome addition to the body of literature available and a widely used reference for professionals and students alike.

Table of Contents

1. Defining Intelligence Analysis 2. The Intelligence Cycle 3. Thinking About Thinking 4. Perception and Deception 5. Knowing Your Audience 6. Analytical Communication 7. Defining the Problem 8. Generating the Hypothesis 9. The Collection Process 10. Analytical Tradecraft 11. Cognitive Traps for Intelligence Analysis 12. Probability Estimation 13. Creating an Analytical Plan 14. Preparing and Conducting Intelligence Briefings 15. Best Practices 16. Operations Security OPSEC

Goldberg (finance, U. of Miami) and White (economics, New York U.) present the results of a 1978 conference that brought together representatives from business, government, and academics. Much of the conversation revolves around the Glass- Steagall Act and attempts to remove the dividing line betwee

Between 1994-2014, Israel's security service was transformed, becoming one of the most extreme examples of privatised security in the world. This book is an investigation into this period and the conditions that created 'Occupation Inc.': the institution of a private military-security-industrial complex. State sponsored violence is increasing as a result of this securitisation, but why is it necessary, and what are its implications? In this book, Shir Hever considers the impact of the ongoing Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation, the influence of U.S. military aid and the rise of neoliberalism in Israel, to make sense of this dramatic change in security policy. Through the lens of political economy, this book shows how the Israeli security elites turn violence into a commodity in order to preserve their status and wealth, providing a fresh new perspective on the Israeli occupation.

The concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) has undergone dramatic changes over the last several decades since C. Ray Jeffery coined the term in the early 1970s, and Tim Crowe wrote the first CPTED applications book. The second edition of 21st Century Security and CPTED includes the latest theory, knowledge, and practice of CPTED as it relates to the current security threats facing the modern world: theft, violent crime, terrorism, gang activity, and school and workplace violence. This significantly expanded edition includes the latest coverage of proper lighting, building design-both the interior and exterior-physical security barriers, the usage of fencing, bollards, natural surveillance, landscaping, and landscape design. Such design concepts and security elements can be applied to address a wide variety of threats including crime prevention, blast mitigation, and CBRNE threat protection. Authored by one of the U.S.'s renowned security experts-and a premiere architect and criminologist-the book is the most comprehensive examination of CPTED and CPTED principles available. This edition includes a complete update of all chapters in addition to five new chapters, over 700 figure illustrations and photos, numerous tables and checklists, and a 20-page color plate section. This latest edition: Features five new chapters including green and sustainable buildings, infrastructure protection, and premises liability Presents step-by-step guidelines and real-world applications of CPTED concepts, principles and processes-from risk assessment to construction and post-occupancy evaluation Outlines national building security codes and standards Examines architectural surety from the perspective of risk analysis and premises liability Demonstrates CPTED implementation in high-security environments, such as hospitals, parks, ATMs, schools, and public and private sector buildings A practical resource for architects, urban planners and designers, security managers, law enforcement, CPTED practitioners, building and property managers, homeland security professionals, and students, 21st Century Security and CPTED, Second Edition continues to serve as the most complete and up-to-date reference available on next-generation CPTED practices today.

From the rising significance of non-state actors to the increasing influence of regional powers, the nature and conduct of international politics has arguably changed dramatically since the height of the Cold War. Yet much of the literature on deterrence and compellence continues to draw (whether implicitly or explicitly) upon assumptions and precepts formulated in-and predicated upon-politics in a state-centric, bipolar world. Coercion moves beyond these somewhat hidebound premises and examines the critical issue of coercion in the 21st century, with a particular focus on new actors, strategies and objectives in this very old bargaining game. The chapters in this volume examine intra-state, inter-state, and transnational coercion and deterrence as well as both military and non-military instruments of persuasion, thus expanding our understanding of coercion for conflict in the 21st century. ? Scholars have analyzed the causes, dynamics, and effects of coercion for decades, but previous works have principally focused on a single state employing conventional military means to pressure another state to alter its behavior. In contrast, this volume captures fresh developments, both theoretical and policy relevant. This chapters in this volume focus on tools (terrorism, sanctions, drones, cyber warfare, intelligence, and forced migration), actors (insurgents, social movements, and NGOs) and mechanisms (trilateral coercion, diplomatic and economic isolation, foreign-imposed regime change, coercion of nuclear proliferators, and two-level games) that have become more prominent in recent years, but which have yet to be extensively or systematically addressed in either academic or policy literatures.

It is widely acknowledged that the size of the security industry has increased in virtually every country around the world, often eclipsing conventional police forces in personnel numbers and expenditures. Security providers differ from law enforcement officers in many ways, yet the nature of their crime reduction activities brings them into frequent contact with citizens, drawing to the forefront issues of training, professionalism and accountability. Unlike police officers, whose training and licensing standards are well established, regulations for security providers are often minimalist or entirely absent. This volume brings together research on regulatory regimes and strategies from around the globe, covering both the large private security sector and the expanding area of public sector 'non-police' protective security. It examines the nature and extent of licensing and monitoring, and the minimum standards imposed on the industry by governments across the world. The chapters in this book were originally published in the International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice.

The rise of China will undoubtedly be one of the great spectacles of the twenty-first century. More than a dramatic symbol of the redistribution of global wealth, the event has marked the end of the unipolar international system and the arrival of a new era in world politics. How the security, stability and legitimacy built upon foundations that were suddenly shifting, adapting to this new reality is the subject of Will China's Rise be Peaceful? Bringing together the work of seasoned experts and younger scholars, this volume offers an inclusive examination of the effects of historical patterns-whether interrupted or intact-by the rise of China. The contributors show how strategies among the major powers are guided by existing international rules and expectations as well as by the realities created by an increasingly powerful China. While China has sought to signal its non-revisionist intent its extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy has in a short time span transformed global and East Asian politics. This has caused constant readjustments as the other key actors have responded to the changing incentives provided by Chinese policies. Will China's Rise be Peaceful? explores these continuities and discontinuities in five areas: theory, history, domestic politics, regional politics, and great power politics. Equally grounded in theory and extensive empirical research, this timely volume offers a remarkably lucid description and interpretation of our changing international relations. In both its approach and its conclusions, it will serve as a model for the study of China in a new era.

Privatising Justice takes a broad historical view of the role of the private sector in the British state, from private policing and mercenaries in the eighteenth century to the modern rise of the private security industry in armed conflict, policing and the penal system. The development of the welfare state is seen as central to the decline of what the authors call 'old privatisation'. Its succession by neoliberalism has created the ground for the resurgence of the private sector. The growth of private military, policing and penal systems is located within the broader global changes brought about by neoliberalism and the dystopian future that it portends. The book is a powerful petition for the reversal of the increasing privatisation of the state and the neoliberalism that underlies it.

Some pundits claim cyber weaponry is the most important military innovation in decades, a transformative new technology that promises a paralyzing first-strike advantage difficult for opponents to deter. Yet, what is cyber strategy? How do actors use cyber capabilities to achieve a position of advantage against rival states? This book examines the emerging art of cyber strategy and its integration as part of a larger approach to coercion by states in the international system between 2000 and 2014. To this end, the book establishes a theoretical framework in the coercion literature for evaluating the efficacy of cyber operations. Cyber coercion represents the use of manipulation, denial, and punishment strategies in the digital frontier to achieve some strategic end. As a contemporary form of covert action and political warfare, cyber operations rarely produce concessions and tend to achieve only limited, signaling objectives. When cyber operations do produce concessions between rival states, they tend to be part of a larger integrated coercive strategy that combines network intrusions with other traditional forms of statecraft such as military threats, economic sanctions, and diplomacy. The books finds that cyber operations rarely produce concessions in isolation. They are additive instruments that complement traditional statecraft and coercive diplomacy. The book combines an analysis of cyber exchanges between rival states and broader event data on political, military, and economic interactions with case studies on the leading cyber powers: Russia, China, and the United States. The authors investigate cyber strategies in their integrated and isolated contexts, demonstrating that they are useful for maximizing informational asymmetries and disruptions, and thus are important, but limited coercive tools. This empirical foundation allows the authors to explore how leading actors employ cyber strategy and the implications for international relations in the 21st century. While most military plans involving cyber attributes remain highly classified, the authors piece together strategies based on observations of attacks over time and through the policy discussion in unclassified space. The result will be the first broad evaluation of the efficacy of various strategic options in a digital world.

How has India's foreign policy evolved in the seventy years since Independence? For that matter, what is the country's foreign policy? And what are the aspects that determine and shape it? If you've had questions such as these, Rajendra Abhyankar's Indian Diplomacy is the foreign policy primer you've been looking for. Charting the country's interactions with other countries from the early days of independence to now, Indian Diplomacy reviews the changes in stance. Lucidly written and well argued, the book covers these and other questions comprehensively, without fuss or bombast. A much-needed book in light of the sweeping changes on the global stage-and India's increasing role in them.

In 1960, President Kennedy warned of a dangerous future, rife with nuclear-armed states and a widespread penchant for conflict by the end of the century. Thankfully, his prediction failed to pass; in fact, roughly three times as many countries have since opted to give up their nuclear pursuit or relinquish existing weapons than have maintained their arsenals. Nevertheless, clandestine acquisition of nuclear materials and technology by states such as Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and a nuclear North Korea, has reaffirmed the need for United States' commitment to pursuing aggressive counterproliferation strategies, particularly with rogue states. This book looks at the experiences of countries that ventured down the path of nuclear proliferation but were stopped short, and examines how the international community bargains with proliferators to encourage nuclear reversal. It asks why so many states have relented to pressure to abandon their nuclear weapons programs, and which counterproliferation policies have been successful. Rupal N. Mehta argues that the international community can persuade countries to reverse their weapons programs with rewards and sanctions especially when the threat to use military force remains "on the table". Specifically, nuclear reversal is most likely when states are threatened with sanctions and offered face-saving rewards that help them withstand domestic political opposition. Historically, the United States has relied on a variety of policy levers-including economic and civilian nuclear assistance and, sometimes, security guarantees, as well as economic sanctions-to achieve nuclear reversal. Underlying these negotiations is the possibility of military intervention, which incentivizes states to accept the agreement (often spearheaded by the United States) and end their nuclear pursuit. The book draws on interviews with current and former policymakers, as well as in-depth case studies of India, Iran, and North Korea, to provide policy recommendations on how best to manage nuclear proliferation challenges from rogue states. It also outlines the proliferation horizon, or the set of state and non-state actors that are likely to have interest in acquiring nuclear technology for civilian, military, or unknown purposes. The book concludes with implications and recommendations for U.S. and global nuclear counterproliferation policy.

This book deals with the evolution, current status and potential of U.S.-India strategic cooperation. From very modest beginnings, the U.S.-India strategic partnership has developed significantly over the last decade. In considerable part, this growth has stemmed from overlapping concerns about the rise and assertiveness of the People's Republic of China, as well as the instability of Pakistan. Despite the emergence of this partnership, significant differences remain, some of which stem from Cold War legacies, others from divergent global strategic interests and institutional design. In spite of these areas of discord, the overall trajectory of the relationship appears promising. Increased cooperation and closer policy coordination underscore a deepening of the relationship, while fundamental differences in national approaches to strategic challenges demand flexibility and compromise in the future. -- .

All democracies have had to contend with the challenge of tolerating hidden spy services within otherwise relatively transparent governments. Democracies pride themselves on privacy and liberty, but intelligence organizations have secret budgets, gather information surreptitiously around the world, and plan covert action against foreign regimes. Sometimes, they have even targeted the very citizens they were established to protect, as with the COINTELPRO operations in the 1960s and 1970s, carried out by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) against civil rights and antiwar activists. In this sense, democracy and intelligence have always been a poor match. Yet Americans live in an uncertain and threatening world filled with nuclear warheads, chemical and biological weapons, and terrorists intent on destruction. Without an intelligence apparatus scanning the globe to alert the United States to these threats, the planet would be an even more perilous place. In Spy Watching, Loch K. Johnson explores the United States' travails in its efforts to maintain effective accountability over its spy services. Johnson explores the work of the famous Church Committee, a Senate panel that investigated America's espionage organizations in 1975 and established new protocol for supervising the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the nation's other sixteen secret services. Johnson explores why partisanship has crept into once-neutral intelligence operations, the effect of the 9/11 attacks on the expansion of spying, and the controversies related to CIA rendition and torture programs. He also discusses both the Edward Snowden case and the ongoing investigations into the Russian hack of the 2016 US election. Above all, Spy Watching seeks to find a sensible balance between the twin imperatives in a democracy of liberty and security. Johnson draws on scores of interviews with Directors of Central Intelligence and others in America's secret agencies, making this a uniquely authoritative account.

Maritime security is one of the latest additions to the field of international as well as national security. The concept has received growing attention especially due to the intensification of concerns over maritime terrorism since 2000. The rise of modern piracy, maritime crimes such as human trafficking, and the increasing importance of the 'blue economy' and issues relating to freedom of navigation, maritime environmental protection, and resource management have resulted in the increased significance of maritime security studies. A significant number of states and other international actors such as Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and Transnational Corporations (TNCs) have placed maritime security high in their security agenda. This priority is reflected in several governmental and intergovernmental strategies for maritime security. In addition to that, the regional grouping in the Indian Ocean and Indo - Pacific, such as ASEAN, BIMSTEC, IORA, and IONS have placed maritime security issues high in their agenda.

The Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is charged with preventing loss of life, injury, and property damage in the maritime environment through its SAR mission. It maintains over 200 stations with various assets, such as boats and helicopters (depending on the station), along U.S. coasts and inland waterways to carry out this mission, as well as its other missions such as maritime security. Chapter 1 will review: the status of the Coast Guard's recapitalisation program; new technologies that could assist the Coast Guard; maintenance requirements of its ageing vessels; operating costs for the new vessels; and shoreside infrastructure needs and priorities. The Coast Guard's missions in the Arctic include: defense readiness, ice operations, marine environmental protection, and ports, waterways and coastal security. Chapter 2 discusses the Coast Guard's Arctic capabilities. Chapter 3 addresses the extent to which the Coast Guard has (1) a sound process for analysing the need for its boat stations and (2) taken actions to implement its boat station process results.

No external observer knows more about Myanmar's security and intelligence apparatus than Andrew Selth. In this book he presents an account of the structure and functions of Myanmar's deep state, along with a tale of personal ambition, rivalry and ruthless power politics worthy of John Le Carre. A thoroughly educative, entertaining and intriguing read."" - Professor Michael Wesley, Dean, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University ""Andrew Selth has once again amply illustrated the depth and penetration of his study of Myanmar/Burma and its institutions. This work on the more recent aspects of the country's intelligence apparatus goes beyond a masterful and comprehensive analysis of the Burmese intelligence community, and probes the social and institutional bases of the attitudes giving rise to that critical aspect of power. We are once again in Dr Selth's debt. This is required reading for serious observers of the Burmese scene."" - David I. Steinberg, Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies Emeritus, Georgetown University ""By lifting the lid on a pervasive yet secretive intelligence apparatus, Andrew Selth makes an outstanding contribution to Myanmar Studies. For scholars and practitioners alike, this book provides an essential history of a security state that remains powerful even during the transition away from overt authoritarian rule."" - Professor Ian Holliday, Vice-President (Teaching and Learning), The University of Hong Kong

Now, for the first time, Robert K. DeArment has told the full story of George Scarborough's life, illuminating his activity as a lawman during the final part of the nineteenth century and his controversial killings while wearing the badge-he was tried for murder on three occasions and acquitted each time.

Following terrorist attacks against the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983, the U.S. Department of State began an embassy construction program -- known as the Inman program -- to protect U.S. personnel. However, the U.S. Department of State completed only 24 of the 57 planned construction projects, in part due to poor planning, systemic weaknesses in program management, difficulties acquiring sites, schedule delays, cost increases, and subsequent funding limitations. Following the demise of the Inman program in the early 1990s, very few new construction projects were initiated until after the two 1998 embassy bombings in Africa. Following those attacks, the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 required the U.S. Department of State to maintain a list of diplomatic facilities to be scheduled for replacement based on their vulnerability to attack. The U.S. Department of State determined that diplomatic facilities at over 180 posts -- more than half of U.S. overseas missions -- needed to be replaced to meet security standards. By 2016, over 30,000 staff were moved into more secure facilities. From October 2012 to September 2016, State evacuated overseas post staff and family members from 23 overseas posts in response to various threats, such as terrorism, civil unrest, and natural disasters. Overseas posts undergoing evacuations generally experience authorised departure or ordered departure of specific post staff or family members, potentially leading to suspended operations. On 29 September 2017 the U.S. Department of State ordered the departure of nonemergency personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Havana, Cuba, as well as their families, in order to minimise the risk of their exposure to harm because of a series of unexplained injuries suffered by embassy personnel since November 2016.

In February of 2011, Libyan citizens rebelled against Muammar Qaddafi and quickly unseated him. The speed of the regime's collapse confounded many observers, and the ensuing civil war showed Foreign Policy's index of failed states to be deeply flawed-FP had, in 2010, identified 110 states as being more likely than Libya to descend into chaos. They were spectacularly wrong, but this points to a larger error in conventional foreign policy wisdom: failed, or weak and unstable, states are not anomalies but are instead in the majority. More states resemble Libya than Sweden. Why are most states weak and unstable? Taking as his launching point Charles Tilly's famous dictum that 'war made the state, and the state made war,' Arjun Chowdhury argues that the problem lies in our mistaken equation of democracy and economic power with stability. But major wars are the true source of stability: only the existential crisis that such wars produced could lead citizens to willingly sacrifice the resources that allowed the state to build the capacity it needed for survival. Developing states in the postcolonial era never experienced the demands major interstate war placed on European states, and hence citizens in those nations have been unwilling to sacrifice the resources that would build state capacity. For example, India and Mexico are established democracies with large economies. Despite their indices of stability, both countries are far from stable: there is an active Maoist insurgency in almost a quarter of India's districts, and Mexico is plagued by violence, drug trafficking, and high levels of corruption in local government. Nor are either effective at collecting revenue. As a consequence, they do not have the tax base necessary to perform the most fundamental tasks of modern states: controlling organized violence in a given territory and providing basic services to citizens. By this standard, the majority of states in the world-about two thirds-are weak states. Chowdury maintains that an accurate evaluation of international security requires a normative shift : the language of weakness and failure belies the fact that strong states are exceptions. Chowdhury believes that dismantling this norm is crucial, as it encourages developing states to pursue state-building via war, which is an extremely costly approach-in terms of human lives and capital. Moreover, in our era, such an approach is destined to fail because the total wars of the past are highly unlikely to occur today. Just as importantly, the non-state alternatives on offer are not viable alternatives. For better or worse, we will continue to live in a state-dominated world where most states are weak. Counterintuitive and sweeping in its coverage, The Myth of International Order demands that we fundamentally rethink foundational concepts of international politics like political stability and state failure.

The deaths of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. personnel in Benghazi, Libya, on 11 September 2012, along with attacks on U.S. embassies in Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen, have drawn renewed attention to the challenges facing U.S. diplomats abroad, as well as to the difficulty in balancing concerns for their security against the outreach required of their mission. Congress plays a key role in shaping the response to these challenges, such as by providing resources for diplomatic security and examining security breaches overseas. The inability to provide perfect security, especially against the evident threat of mob violence, has focused particular scrutiny on the deployment of diplomatic personnel in high-threat environments. This book provides background information on the authorities, regulations, and procedures in place at the Department of State regarding diplomatic security with additional discussion on embassy security funding trends.

According to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 (HSPD-10): Biodefense for the 21st Century, a national bioawareness capability providing early warning, detection, or recognition of a biological weapon attack is an essential component of biodefense. To contribute to this national capability, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operates the BioWatch program, which uses routine laboratory testing designed to detect an aerosolised biological attack for five specific biological agents considered high risk for use as biological weapons. The BioWatch program is a federally-managed, locally operated system with collectors deployed primarily in outdoor locations in more than 30 major metropolitan areas. This book provides an overview of the BioWatch Generation-3 Acquisition program with a focus on meeting mission needs for effective biosurveillance.

In seeking to evaluate the efficacy of post-9/11 homeland security expenses--which have risen by more than a trillion dollars, not including war costs--the common query has been, "Are we safer?" This, however, is the wrong question. Of course we are "safer"--the posting of a single security guard at one building's entrance enhances safety. The correct question is, "Are any gains in security worth the funds expended?"
In this engaging, readable book, John Mueller and Mark Stewart apply risk and cost-benefit evaluation techniques to answer this very question. This analytical approach has been used throughout the world for decades by regulators, academics, and businesses--but, as a recent National Academy of Science study suggests, it has never been capably applied by the people administering homeland security funds. Given the limited risk terrorism presents, expenses meant to lower it have for the most part simply not been worth it. For example, to be considered cost-effective, increased American homeland security expenditures would have had each year to have foiled up to 1,667 attacks roughly like the one intended on Times Square in 2010--more than four a day. Cataloging the mistakes that the US has made--and continues to make--in managing homeland security programs, Terror, Security, andMoney has the potential to redirect our efforts toward a more productive and far more cost-effective course.

Conventional wisdom holds that weak and failing states are the source of the world's most pressing security threats. After all, the 9/11 attacks originated in an impoverished, war-ravaged country, and transnational crime appears to flourish in weakly governed states. However, our assumptions about the threats posed by failing states are based on anecdotal arguments, not on a systematic analysis of the connections between state failure and transnational security threats. Analyzing terrorism, transnational crime, WMDs, pandemic diseases, and energy insecurity, Stewart Patrick shows that while some global threats do emerge in fragile states, most of their weaknesses create misery only for their own citizenry. Moreover, many threats originate farther up the chain, in wealthier and more stable countries like Russia and Venezuela. Weak Links will force policymakers to rethink what they assume about state failure and transnational insecurity.