SHORTLISTED FOR THE ORWELL PRIZE 2014 AND THE PADDY POWER POLITICAL BOOK AWARDS INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BOOK OF THE YEAR. Award-winning journalist James Fergusson is among the few to have witnessed at first hand the devastating reality of life in the failed and desperate state of Somalia. This corner of the world has long been seen as the rotting and charred heart of Africa: a melting pot of crime, corruption, poverty, famine and civil war. And in recent years, whilst Somalia's lucrative piracy industry has grabbed the headlines, a darker, much deeper threat has come of age: the Al Qaida-linked militants Al Shabaab, and the dawn of a new phase in the global war on terror. Yet, paradoxically, Somalia's star is brightening, as forms of business, law enforcement and local politics begin to establish themselves, and members of the vast Somali diaspora return to their homeland. Fergusson takes us to the heart of the struggle, meeting everyone from politicians, pirates, extremists and mercenaries to aid workers, civilians and refugees. He gives a unique account of a country ravaged by war, considers what the future might hold for a generation who have grown up knowing little else and exposes the reality of life in this hard, often forgotten land.

Through widespread and relentless surprise attacks and ambushes, Confederate guerrillas drove Union soldiers and their leaders to desperation. Confederate cavalrymen engaged in hit-and-run tactics; autonomous partisan rangers preyed on Federal railroads, telegraph lines, and supply wagons; and civilian bushwhackers waylaid Union pickets. Together, all of these actions persuaded the Union to wage an increasingly punitive war.

Clay Mountcastle presents a new look at the complex nature of guerrilla warfare in the Civil War and the Union Army's calculated response to it. He examines guerrilla attacks and Federal responses in a number of operational theaters to show how the problem grew throughout the South and ultimately convinced the Union to adopt retaliatory measures that challenged the sensibilities of even the most hardened soldiers.

In revealing the impact that Confederate guerrilla activity had on the Union's prosecution of the war, Mountcastle reveals how the character of the war was shaped every bit as much by the troops on the ground as by their Union leaders. He draws on primary sources that vividly convey their reaction to the guerrilla problem and their justification for punitive action-with guerrillas described by one angry soldier as "thieves and murderers by occupation, rebels by pretense, soldiers only in name, and cowards by nature." Showing how much of the impetus for retaliation originated from the bottom up, starting in the western theater in 1861, he describes how it became the most influential factor in convincing Union generals, especially Grant and Sherman, that the war needed to be extended to include civilians and their property. The result was a level of destructiveness that has been downplayed by other scholars-despite the evidence of executions and incidents of entire towns being burned to the ground.

By 1864, punitive action had evolved into such a powerful and decisive force that it produced what has been called "a warfare of frightfulness." And although guerrilla activity deviled the Union until the end, the Union's response ultimately proved a significant factor in persuading leaders like General Lee to call a halt to such actions and, ultimately, to surrender. Mountcastle's book offers the most revealing look yet at this incompletely understood dimension of the Civil War and also raises provocative questions about the relationship between guerrilla and conventional warfare in any conflict.

Osama bin Laden's words carry a great deal of weight in the West. When he speaks, or allegedly speaks, we listen. But what about the words of other key leaders in the Al-Qa'ida terrorist network? We can learn how to conduct the war on terrorism more successfully when we study their own manuals, written for their followers. But few Americans, despite their expertise in intelligence or security, know Arabic. Fortunately Norman Cigar is fluent, and here he presents the first English translation of Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin's"A Practical Course for Guerrilla War." Saudi security forces killed Al-Muqrin, Al-Qa'ida's leader in the Arabian Peninsula, in June 2004. Published posthumously, his Arabic-language manual provides a window into Al-Qaida's strategic thinking and into how these terrorists operate. Accompanying the text's translation is material on al-Muqrin's life and Cigar's cogent and detailed analysis of the key ideas in the jihadist's doctrine and the results of Al-Qa'ida's insurgency efforts on the Arabian Peninsula. This important work provides a primary source for students in the professional military education system who want to read a variety of military thinkers and develop insights into all war fighting philosophies, especially those emanating from non-Western sources. Academics, think tank analysts, and government officials in the United States and abroad will also find the work relevant to their own work on Al-Qa'ida and insurgency theory. With a foreword by Julian Lewis, MP, the Shadow Defence Minister for Great Britain.

What really occurred in Spain's Forgotten War? Years of research were necessary to dig out long-concealed informat ion about that desperate anti-Franco guerrilla conflict. Though the events recounted in this book occurred more than half a century ago, they have never been more relevant than today as Spain struggles to come to terms with its recent history.

The turbulent occupation of Iraq has once again embroiled the United States military in an unconventional war. "Chasing Ghosts" is a study of unconventional warfare in American military history and its implications for the present and future. John J. Tierney examines America's numerous past experiences with this type of warfare from the Revolutionary War, when American irregulars fought the British and Loyalists, through the Vietnam War, which involved the U.S. military in its largest-ever counterinsurgency campaigns. Other cases covered in the book include guerrilla fighting during the American Civil War; wars between the United States and Native Americans; the Philippine Insurrection; the campaign against Mexico's Pancho Villa; U.S. occupations of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua; and other examples from World War II and the Cold War.Most of America's past encounters with this type of warfare have been forgotten, requiring successive generations of military strategists and policy makers to stumble for answers and improvise strategies every time. While each war has its own unique circumstances, Tierney's analytical history will provide the case studies necessary to reduce this continual relearning process in the future. By illuminating this extensive and largely forgotten history, Tierney aims to better inform policy makers, the military, and the public about if, when, and how the United States should fight unconventional wars.

Subcommander Marcos made his debut on the world stage on January 1, 1994, the day the North American Free Trade Agreement took effect. At dawn, from a town-hall balcony he announced that the Zapatista Army of National Liberation had seized several towns in the Mexican state of Chiapas in rebellion against the government; by sunset Marcos was on his way to becoming the most famous guerrilla leader since Che Guevara. Subsequently, through a succession of interviews, communiques, and public spectacles, the Subcommander emerged as a charismatic spokesperson for the indigenous Zapatista uprising and a rallying figure in the international anti-globalization movement.In this, the first English-language biography of Subcommander Marcos, Nick Henck describes the thought, leadership, and personality of this charismatic rebel spokesperson. He traces Marcos's development from his provincial middle-class upbringing, through his academic career and immersion in the clandestine world of armed guerrillas, to his emergence as the iconic Subcommander. Henck reflects on what motivated an urbane university professor to reject a life of comfort in Mexico City in favor of one of hardship as a guerrilla in the mountainous jungles of Chiapas, and he examines how Marcos became a conduit through which impoverished indigenous Mexicans could communicate with the world. Henck fully explores both the rebel leader's renowned media savvy and his equally important flexibility of mind. He shows how Marcos's speeches and extensive writings demonstrate not only the Subcommander's erudition but also his rejection of Marxist dogmatism. Finally, Henck contextualizes Marcos, locating him firmly within the Latin American guerrilla tradition.

The turbulent occupation of Iraq has once again embroiled the United States military in an unconventional war. "Chasing Ghosts" is a study of unconventional warfare in American military history and its implications for the present and future. John J. Tierney examines America's numerous past experiences with this type of warfare from the Revolutionary War, when American irregulars fought the British and Loyalists, through the Vietnam War, which involved the U.S. military in its largest-ever counterinsurgency campaigns. Other cases covered in the book include guerrilla fighting during the American Civil War; wars between the United States and Native Americans; the Philippine Insurrection; the campaign against Mexico's Pancho Villa; U.S. occupations of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua; and other examples from World War II and the Cold War.Most of America's past encounters with this type of warfare have been forgotten, requiring successive generations of military strategists and policy makers to stumble for answers and improvise strategies every time. While each war has its own unique circumstances, Tierney's analytical history will provide the case studies necessary to reduce this continual relearning process in the future. By illuminating this extensive and largely forgotten history, Tierney aims to better inform policy makers, the military, and the public about if, when, and how the United States should fight unconventional wars.

In Resisting Rebellion, Anthony James Joes explores insurgencies ranging across five continents and spanning more than two centuries. Analyzing examples from North and South America, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, he identifies recurrent patterns and offers useful lessons for future policymakers. Insurgencies arise from many sources of discontent, including foreign occupation, fraudulent elections, and religious persecution, but they also stem from ethnic hostilities, the aspirations of would-be elites, and traditions of political violence. Because insurgency is as much a political phenomenon as a military one, effective counterinsurgency requires a thorough understanding of the insurgents' motives and sources of support. Clear political aims must guide military action if a counterinsurgency is to be successful and prepare a lasting reconciliation within a deeply fragmented society. The most successful counterinsurgency campaign undertaken by the United States was the one against Philippine insurgents following the Spanish-American War. But even more instructive than successful counterinsurgencies are the persistent patterns of errors revealed by Joes's comparative study. Instances include the indiscriminate destructiveness displayed by the Japanese in China and the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the torture of suspected Muslim terrorists by members of the French Army in Algeria. Joes's comprehensive twofold approach to counterinsurgency is easily applied to the U.S. The first element, developing the strategic basis for victory, emphasizes creating a peaceful path to the redress of legitimate grievances, committing sufficient troops to the counterinsurgent operation, and isolating the conflict area from outside aid. The second element aims at marginalizing the insurgents and includes fair conduct toward civilians and prisoners, systematic intelligence gathering, depriving insurgents of weapons and food, separating insurgent leaders from their followers, and offering amnesty to all but the most incorrigible. Providing valuable insights into a world of conflict, Resisting Rebellion is a thorough and readable exploration of successes and failures in counterinsurgency's long history and a strategy for the future.

The two volumes of "Understanding Civil War" build upon the World Bank's prior research on conflict and violence, particularly on the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, whose model of civil war onset has sparked much discussion on the relationship between conflict and development in what came to be known as the "greed" versus "grievance" debate. The authors systematically apply the Collier-Hoeffler model to 15 countries in 6 different regions of the world, using a comparative case study methodology to revise and expand upon economic models of civil war. The book concludes that the "greed" versus "grievance" debate should be abandoned for a more complex model that considers greed and grievance as inextricably fused motives for civil war.

The two volumes of 'Understanding Civil War' build upon the World Bank's prior research on conflict and violence, particularly on the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, whose model of civil war onset has sparked much discussion on the relationship between conflict and development in what came to be known as the 'greed' versus 'grievance' debate.The authors systematically apply the Collier-Hoeffler model to 15 countries in 6 different regions of the world, using a comparative case study methodology to revise and expand upon economic models of civil war. The book concludes that the 'greed' versus 'grievance' debate should be abandoned for a more complex model that considers greed and grievance as inextricably fused motives for civil war.

During World War II, Roger Hilsman fought in Burma with the legendary Merrill's Marauders until he was machine-gunned. Then, at age twenty-five, he led a battalion of indigenous troops behind Japanese lines. At the war's end, he headed a POW rescue mission to Manchuria, where the prisoners included his own father. An exciting, unusual coming-of-age story, "American Guerrilla" concludes with reflections on how Hilsman's wartime experiences influenced his involvement in early Vietnam War policymaking when he served in the Kennedy administration.

Since 1983 journalist Bill Berkeley has traveled through Africa's most troubled lands-Rwanda, Liberia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, and Zaire-seeking out the tyrants and military leaders who orchestrate seemingly intractable wars. Shattering the myth that ancient tribal hatred lies at the heart of the continent's troubles, Berkeley instead holds accountable the "Big Men" who came to power during this period, describing the very rational methods behind their apparent madness. A New Republic Book

Behind Japanese Lines has a great deal to say about the relations with the Filipinos and about the problems of dealing with and fighting the Hukbalahaps, the communist guerrillas or, indeed, in opposing the Japanese. This book adds considerable insights into the significance of guerrilla warfare as it relates to modern warfare in general.

As the fiftieth anniversary of the Troubles approaches, Ken Wharton takes a thorough look at the start of the Troubles, the precursors and the explosion of violence in 1969 that would last until the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 and cost 50,000 casualties and nearly 2,000 civilians' lives across Northern Ireland, the Republic and England. Utterly condemnatory of the Provisional IRA and their ilk, Wharton pulls no punches in his assessment of the situation then and seeks to dismiss apologists today. His sympathy lies first with those tasked with keeping order in the province, but also with the innocent civilians caught up in thirty years of immense bloodshed. Based on the powerful testimony of those who were there at the time, The Troubles is written with passion and detailed knowledge of the experience of the squaddie.

Based on unprecedented access to PLO archives and personnel, this groundbreaking new study represents the definitive history of the Palestinian national movement. Spanning the 45 years from the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 to the PLO-Israel accord of 1993, it sheds radical new light on the history of the Middle East in the last half of the twentieth century.

Military analyst Michael O'Hanlon shows how outside forces could successfully intervene to stop an ongoing cycle of warfare in a country whose government has collapsed or come under severe internal challenge. Based largely on recent U.S. experiences in Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere, as well as on U.S. military doctrine and information from the Pentagon's training and simulation centers, the book discusses the steps in an intervention and estimates likely casualties and costs. O'Hanlon shows that modern Western militaries are capable of executing these types of operations with high proficiency. While conditions are unlikely to resemble those of Desert Storm, which allowed the U.S. and allies to take full advantage of modern technology, top-notch militaries have advantages in infantry combat situations--night-vision equipment, attack and transport helicopters, counterartillery radars--that would enable them to establish order and prevail in any firefights. O'Hanlon warns that operations as casualty-free as those in Haiti and, to date, in Bosnia would be unlikely. Moreover, the political framework that outside powers would attempt to employ in establishing a new order would be critical: if intervening forces are seen as taking sides or occupying territory without legitimacy, they could meet protracted guerrilla-style resistance of the types witnessed in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Somalia. Formerly titled Stopping Civil Conflict with Force Part of the Studies in Foreign Affairs series

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in support of a Marxist-Leninist government, and the subsequent nine-year conflict with the indigenous Afghan Mujahedeen was one of the bloodiest conflicts of the Cold War. Key details of the circumstances surrounding the invasion and its ultimate conclusion only months before the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 have long remained unclear; it is a confidential narrative of clandestine correspondence, covert operations and failed intelligence. The Secret War in Afghanistan undertakes a full analysis of recently declassified intelligence archives in order to asses Anglo-American secret intelligence and diplomacy relating to the invasion of Afghanistan and unveil the Cold War realities behind the rhetoric. Rooted at every turn in close examination of the primary evidence, it outlines the secret operations of the CIA, MI6 and the KGB, and the full extent of the aid and intelligence from the West which armed and trained the Afghan fighters. Drawing from US, UK and Russian archives, Panagiotis Dimitrakis analyses the Chinese arms deals with the CIA, the multiple recorded intelligence failures of KGB intelligence and secret letters from the office of Margaret Thatcher to Jimmy Carter. In so doing, this study brings a new scholarly perspective to some of the most controversial events of Cold War history. Dimitrakis also outlines the full extent of China's involvement in arming the Mujahedeen, which led to the PRC effectively fighting the Soviet Union by proxy. This will be essential reading for scholars and students of the Cold War, American History and the Modern Middle East.

The story behind the contrast and their relationship with their CIA sponsors is one of courage, villainy, political intrigue, and general craziness.

Cinematic representations of unconventional warfare have received sporadic attention to date. However, this pattern has now begun to change with the rise of insurgency and counter-insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the growing importance of jihadist terrorism in the wake of 9/11. This ground-breaking study provides a much-needed examination of global unconventional warfare in 20th-century filmmaking, with case studies from the United States, Britain, Ireland, France, Italy and Israel. Paul B. Rich examines Hollywood's treatment of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency in the United States; British post-colonial insurgencies in Malaya and Kenya and British special operations in the Second World War; the Irish conflict before and during the Troubles; French filmmaking and the reluctance to deal with the bitter war in Algeria in the 1950s; Italian neorealism and its impact on films dealing with urban insurgency by Roberto Rossellini, Nanni Loy and Gillo Pontecorvo, and Israel and the upsurge of Palestinian terrorism. Whilst only a small number of films on these conflicts have been able to rise above stereotyping insurgents and terrorists - in some cases due to a pattern of screen orientalism - Cinema and Unconventional Warfare in the Twentieth Century stresses the positive political gains to be derived from humanizing terrorists and terrorists movements, especially in the context of modern jihadist terrorism. This is essential reading for academics, postgraduates and advanced undergraduates interested in 20th-century military history, politics and international relations, and film studies.

In 1940 Japan placed Vietnam under military occupation, restricting the local French administration to a figurehead authority. Seizing the opportunity, the Communists organised a Vietnamese independence league, the Viet Minh, whose armed forces became known as the PAVN (more commonly known to the West as the Vietcong, or NVA) and prepared to launch an uprising against the French at the war's end. This text details the history, organisation and uniforms of the People's Army of Vietnam from its origins in the fight against colonialism, through two separate wars against the US and Khmer Rouge, to its role in the modern era.

Between March 1939 and April 1941, Nazi Germany overran almost the whole of continental Europe in a series of lightning campaigns. Some of the defeated troops managed to evade capture and set up guerilla units in rural areas or escaped to friendly countries. The hard pressed Allies welcomed this source of motivated manpower with open arms and these volunteers were either incorporated into existing units or formed into new ones. These emigre servicemen, fanatically anti-German and with priceless "in country" knowledge were valuable recruits for the various unconventional and clandestine warfare units such as 10th (interallied) commando and the SOE. This volume covers the largely ignored contribution of these volunteer units which served alongside the major combatants to help overthrow Nazi tyranny.

The advent of war with Spain was a glorious opportunity for forceful leadership not to be missed by the hotheaded young Theodore Roosevelt. He resigned his post as assistant-secretary of the Navy in April, 1898, and, despite the strong disapproval of family and friends, he joined the Army as Lt. Colonel of a regiment to be raised in the territories of Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. He ordered a uniform from Brooks Brothers, a dozen pairs of steel spectacles, a couple of good, stout, quiet horses," and he was off to train his volunteers at San Antonio. The Rough Riders were a most unusual regiment. Informal, independent, made up of ex-cowboys, Western bad men, and Ivy League graduates, Roosevelt's troops made a poor impression on Army regulars but provided excellent copy for the nation's newspapers. On July 22, 1898, this motley cavalry regiment waded ashore in Cuba, and before the summer was over the Rough Riders and their impatient, dynamic leader were familiar to virtually every household in the nation. Roosevelt was being considered for nomination to the governorship of New York, and his march to the Presidency had begun. From the time he left Washington to join his regiment for training in Texas to their triumphant return from Cuba, Roosevelt kept daily records of his thoughts and experiences. These jottings formed the basis of this book, by far the best firsthand story of the Spanish-American War. Published in 1899 to instant acclaim, The Rough Riders is written with Roosevelt's typical gusto. His writing is remarkable for his sure sense of personality and the spontaneity and directness of his prose. Reading the book, it is impossible not to sense the exhilaration of battle, or the moral purpose behind it all. The Rough Riders remains one of the great war stories of our time, and offers an invaluable look at one of the most colourful presidents of the United States.

It was the conflict that shocked America and the world, but the struggle for peace is central to the history of the Vietnam War. Rejecting the idea that war between Hanoi and the US was inevitable, the author traces North Vietnam's programs for a peaceful reunification of their nation from the 1954 Geneva negotiations up to the final collapse of the Saigon government in 1975. She also examines the ways that groups and personalities in South Vietnam responded by crafting their own peace proposals, in the hope that the Vietnamese people could solve their disagreements by engaging in talks without outside interference. While most of the writing on peacemaking during the Vietnam War concerns high-level international diplomacy, Sophie Quinn-Judge reminds us of the courageous efforts of southern Vietnamese, including Buddhists, Catholics, students and citizens, to escape the unprecedented destruction that the US war brought to their people. The author contends that US policymakers showed little regard for the attitudes of the South Vietnamese population when they took over the war effort in 1964 and sent in their own troops to fight it in 1965.A unique contribution of this study is the interweaving of developments in South Vietnamese politics with changes in the balance of power in Hanoi; both of the Vietnamese combatants are shown to evolve towards greater rigidity as the war progresses, while the US grows increasingly committed to President Thieu in Saigon, after the election of Richard Nixon. Not even the signing of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement could blunt US support for Thieu and his obstruction of the peace process. The result was a difficult peace in 1975, achieved by military might rather than reconciliation, and a new realization of the limits of American foreign policy.

In 1979 the Soviet Union moved from military `help' to active intervention in Afghanistan. Four-fifths of the Afghan National Army deserted in the first year of the war, which, compounded with the spread and intensification of the rebellion led by the formidable guerrilla fighters of the Mujahideen, forced the Soviets to intensify their involvement. The Soviet army was in generally poor condition when the war started, but the troops of the airborne and air assault units were better trained and equipped. As a result they developed aggressive, sometimes effective tactics against an enemy that refused to behave the way most Soviet commanders wished him to. Featuring specially commissioned artwork, this absorbing study examines the origins, combat role and battlefield performance of the Soviet Union's paratroopers and their Mujahideen adversaries during the long and bloody Soviet involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980s.

Keenie Meenie Services - the most powerful mercenary company you've never heard of - was involved in war crimes around the world from Sri Lanka to Nicaragua for which its shadowy directors have never been held accountable. Like its mysterious name, Keenie Meenie Services escaped definition and to this day has evaded sanctions. Now explosive new evidence - only recently declassified - exposes the extent of these war crimes, and the British government's tacit support for the company's operations. Including testimonies from SAS veterans, spy chiefs and diplomats, we hear from key figures battle-hardened by the Troubles in Northern Ireland and the Iranian Embassy siege. Investigative journalist Phil Miller asks, who were these mercenaries: heroes, terrorists, freedom fighters or war criminals? This book presents the first ever comprehensive case against Keenie Meenie Services, providing long overdue evidence on the crimes of the people who make a killing from killing.