When Joint Special Operations Command deployed Task Force 714 to Iraq in 2003, it faced an adversary unlike any it had previously encountered: al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI's organization into multiple, independent networks and its application of Information Age technologies allowed it to wage war across a vast landscape. To meet this unique threat, TF 714 developed the intelligence capacity to operate inside those networks, and in the words of commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal, USA (Ret.) "claw the guts out of AQI." In Transforming US Intelligence for Irregular War, Richard H. Shultz Jr. provides a broad discussion of the role of intelligence in combatting nonstate militants and revisits this moment of innovation during the Iraq War, showing how the defense and intelligence communities can adapt to new and evolving foes. Shultz tells the story of how TF 714 partnered with US intelligence agencies to dismantle AQI's secret networks by eliminating many of its key leaders. He also reveals how TF 714 altered its methods and practices of intelligence collection, intelligence analysis, and covert paramilitary operations to suppress AQI's growing insurgency and, ultimately, destroy its networked infrastructure. TF 714 remains an exemplar of successful organizational learning and adaptation in the midst of modern warfare. By examining its innovations, Shultz makes a compelling case for intelligence leading the way in future campaigns against nonstate armed groups.

When the Civil War began in 1861, the men of the Cumberland Mountain districts of Tennessee and Kentucky chose sides and pursued a private war with each other. Often motivated by vengeance and vendetta, their armed bands had only irregular connections with either the Union or Confederate armies. Their fighting was deadly, with little regard for rules of engagement and with little quarter given.

The most infamous of their number was Champ Ferguson, whose guerilla exploits were interspersed with periods of service as a scout for Morgan's Men and as a member of Joe Wheeler's cavalry. By the end of the Civil War, Ferguson was accused of personally killing fifty-three people, including children, the elderly and wounded soldiers in their hospital beds. In this classic study, first published in 1942, Thurman Sensing provides the only available book-length account of Champ Ferguson's brutal deeds, his capture, his trial and his execution (or according to one version, the ruse by which he escaped hanging) at the end of the war.

Though there is little that is admirable in Champ Ferguson's story, this fascinating account of his life, long regarded as a collector's item by Civil War buffs, adds a unique dimension to our understanding of the horrors of America's Civil War.

For both the United States and United Kingdom counterinsurgency was a serious component of security policy during the Cold War and, along with counterterrorism, has been the greatest security challenge after September 11, 2001. In The Soul of Armies Austin Long compares and contrasts counterinsurgency operations during the Cold War and in recent years by three organizations: the US Army, the US Marine Corps, and the British Army.Long argues that the formative experiences of these three organizations as they professionalized in the nineteenth century has produced distinctive organizational cultures that shape operations. Combining archival research on counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam and Kenya with the author's personal experience as a civilian advisor to the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Soul of Armies demonstrates that the US Army has persistently conducted counterinsurgency operations in a very different way from either the US Marine Corps or the British Army. These differences in conduct have serious consequences, affecting the likelihood of success, the potential for civilian casualties and collateral damage, and the ability to effectively support host nation governments. Long concludes counterinsurgency operations are at best only a partial explanation for success or failure.

America's wars after the 9/11 attacks were marked by a political obsession with terrorist 'sanctuaries' and 'safe havens'. From mountain redoubts in Afghanistan to the deserts of Iraq, Washington's policy-makers maintained an unwavering focus on finding and destroying the refuges, bases and citadels of modern guerrilla movements, and holding their sponsors to account. This was a preoccupation embedded in nearly every official speech and document of the time, a corpus of material that offered a new logic for thinking about the world. As an exercise in political communication, it was a spectacular success. From 2001 to 2009, President George W. Bush and his closest advisors set terms of reference that cascaded down from the White House, through government and into the hearts and minds of Americans. 'Sanctuary' was the red thread running through all of it, permeating the decisions and discourses of the day. Where did this obsession come from? How did it become such an important feature of American political life? In this new political history, Michael A.K.G. Innes explores precedents, from Saigon to Baghdad, and traces how decision-makers and their advisors used ideas of sanctuary to redefine American foreign policy, national security, and enemies real and imagined.

In 1864 the capture of Brazilian steamer the Marques de Olinda initiated South America's most significant war. Thousands of Brazilian, Argentine, and Uruguayan soldiers engaged in a protracted siege of Paraguay, leaving the Paraguayan economy and population devastated. The suffering defied imagination and left a tradition of bad feelings, changing politics in South America forever. This is the definitive work on the Triple Alliance War. Thomas L. Whigham examines key personalities and military engagements while exploring the effects of the conflict on individuals, Paraguayan society, and the continent as a whole. The Road to Armageddon is the first book utilize a broad range of primary sources and materials, including testimony from the men and women who witnessed the war first-hand.

Warlords are individuals who control small territories within weak states, using a combination of force and patronage. In this book, Kimberly Marten shows why and how warlords undermine state sovereignty. Unlike the feudal lords of a previous era, warlords today are not state-builders. Instead they collude with cost-conscious, corrupt, or frightened state officials to flout and undermine state capacity. They thrive on illegality, relying on private militias for support, and often provoke violent resentment from those who are cut out of their networks. Some act as middlemen for competing states, helping to hollow out their own states from within. Countries ranging from the United States to Russia have repeatedly chosen to ally with warlords, but Marten argues that to do so is a dangerous proposition. Drawing on interviews, documents, local press reports, and in-depth historical analysis, Marten examines warlordism in the Pakistani tribal areas during the twentieth century, in post-Soviet Georgia and the Russian republic of Chechnya, and among Sunni militias in the U.S.-supported Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq programs. In each case state leaders (some domestic and others foreign) created, tolerated, actively supported, undermined, or overthrew warlords and their militias. Marten draws lessons from these experiences to generate new arguments about the relationship between states, sovereignty, "local power brokers," and stability and security in the modern world.

Over the past twenty-five years, significant changes in the conduct of wars have increasingly placed civilians in traditional military roles - employing civilians to execute drone strikes, the 'targeted killing' of suspected terrorists, the use of private security contractors in combat zones, and the spread of cyber attacks. Under the laws of armed conflict, civilians cannot be targeted unless they take direct part in hostilities. Once civilians take action, they become targets. This book analyses the complex question of how to identify just who those civilians are. Identifying the Enemy examines the history of civilian participation in armed conflict and how the law has responded to such action. It asks the crucial question: what is 'direct participation in hostilities'? The book slices through the attempts to untie this Gordian knot, and shows that the changing nature of warfare has called into question the very foundation of the civilian/military dichotomy that is at the heart of the law of armed conflict.

In the bleakest years of the Second World War when it appeared that nothing could slow the advance of the German army, Hitler set his sights on the Mediterranean island of Crete, the ideal staging ground for domination of the Middle East. But German command had not counted on the strength of the Cretan resistance or the eccentric band of British intelligence officers who would stand in their way, conducting audacious sabotage operations in the very shadow of the Nazi occupation force. The Ariadne Objective tells the remarkable story of the secret war on Crete from the perspective of these amateur soldiers who found themselves serving because, as one of them put it, they had made 'the obsolete choice of Greek at school'. John Pendlebury, a swashbuckling archaeologist with a glass eye and a swordstick; Xan Fielding, a writer who would later produce the English translations of books like Bridge on the River Kwai and Planet of the Apes; Sandy Rendel, a future Times reporter, who prided himself on a disguise that left him looking more ragged and fierce than the Cretans he fought alongside; and Patrick Leigh Fermor, the future travel-writing luminary who, as a teenager in the early 1930s, walked across Europe, a continent already beginning to feel the effects of Hitler's rise to power. Having infiltrated occupied Crete, these British gentleman spies teamed with Cretan partisans to carry out a cunning plan to disrupt Nazi manoeuvres, culminating in a daring, high-risk plot to abduct the island's German commander. In this thrilling and little known episode of Second World War history, Wes Davis paints a brilliant portrait of some extraordinary characters and tells a story of triumph against all the odds.

Here is a unique anthology of writings on revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency, covering almost all the major struggles of the modern world. The editor, who has had firsthand experience with guerrilla movements in Asia (most recently in Afghanistan), Africa, and Latin America, provides a concise yet panoramic overview of political and military strategies in revolutionary warfare, noting their strengths, limitations, and the reasons for their success or failure.

Civil War in many areas of Southern Africa has caused human disaster on a huge scale. While Zimbabwe alone has largely escaped this, Mozambique has been reduced to the status of the poorest, most aid-dependent state in Africa and UNITA's war in Angola continues. Abiodun Alao's account of the deep-rooted ethnic and ideological divisions in all three territories explores the ways in which this state of almost permanent instability and conflict emerged during and after the struggle for independence, and the extent to which existing tensions within the region were internationalized and exacerbated during the Cold War. While the most significant element in the conflict was the dominant role of the South African state in its pursuit of proxy wars to advance its own regional interests, Alao argues that South Africa did not on its own create the dissident movements or the conditions of conflict. Pretoria had only to fine-tune some of the existing movements to suit its own purposes. Based on much original research, this book adds a new perspective to our understanding of the formation of the main rebel movements, of their support bases and their transformation into political parties, as well as providing an important account of their relationship with the South African state.

The remarkable story of the French Foreign Legion, its dramatic rise throughout the nineteenth century, and its most committed champion, General Hubert Lyautey. An aura of mystery, romance, and danger surrounds the French Foreign Legion, the all-volunteer corps of the French Army, founded in 1831. Famous for its physically grueling training in harsh climates, the legion fought in French wars from Mexico to Madagascar, Southeast Asia to North Africa. To this day, despite its reputation for being assigned the riskiest missions in the roughest terrain, the mystique of the legion continues to attract men from every corner of the world. In At the Edge of the World, historian Jean-Vincent Blanchard follows the legion's rise to fame during the nineteenth century--focusing on its campaigns in Indochina and especially in Africa--when the corps played a central role in expanding and protecting the French Empire. As France struggled to be a power capable of rivaling the British, the figure of the legionnaire--deadly, self-sacrificing, uncompromisingly efficient--came to represent the might and morale that would secure a greater, stronger nation. Drawing from rare, archival memoirs and testimonies of legionnaires from the period and tracing the fascinating career of Hubert Lyautey, France's first resident-general in Morocco and a hero to many a legionnaire, At the Edge of the World chronicles the Foreign Legion at the height of its renown, when the corps and its archetypically handsome, moody, and marginalized recruits became both the symbols of a triumphant colonialism and the stuff of legend.

From the Paris Commune in 1871 to Hue, Cordoba and Detroit in our day, the history of of proletarian insurrections is largely uncharted-particularly in its strictly military and technical aspects. Yet for Marx, Engels or Lenin it was axiomatic that 'insurrection is an art', and that without the most careful preparation and planning for insurrection (as in Hue), the spontaneous revolutionary action of the masses would always be defeated by the organized violence of the ruling class (as in Cordoba or Detroit). This book was produced in 1928 as a practical insurrectionary manual for communists. It discusses the role of armed insurrection in the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution, analyses a number of insurrections-both successful and unsuccessful-with the aim of determining the conditions for victory, and gives detailed information on the tactics of street fighting-ranging from the respective advantages of offensive or defensive action to the best method of building a barricade. Written in Moscow under Comintern auspices, it is a classic Third Period document. Its republication will contribute to the recovery and appraisal of the early years of Soviet and Comintern history which is so essential an ingredient in the forging of all revolutionary theory and practice today. Published under the pseudonym of 'A. Neuberg', the work was in fact written by a group of leading Comintern political and military experts. One of the authors, Erich Wollenberg, military leader of the Bochum rising in North Germany in 1923, has written a new introduction for this edition (the first edition in English) in which he gives his own account of how the book came to be written, analyses the unstated political background to the various insurrections it examines, and identifies such of the authors as were known to him. These include Mikhail Tukhachesvsky, then second-in-command of the Red Army, Ho Chi Minh, Vice-President of the Secretary of the Comintern, and the German Communist and leader of the Hamberg Insurrection, Hans Kippenberger. The work was assembled by the Agitprop section of the Comintern, headed at the time by Palmiro Togliatti.

The Vietnam War lasted twenty years, and was the USA's greatest military failure. An attempt to stem the spread of Soviet and Chinese influence, the conflict in practice created a chaotic state torn apart by espionage, terrorism and guerilla warfare. American troops quickly became embroiled in jungle warfare and knowledge of the other side's troop movements, communication lines, fighting techniques and strategy became crucial. Panagiotis Dimitrakis uncovers this battle for intelligence and tells the story of the Vietnam War through the newly available British, American and French sources - including declassified material. In doing so he dissects the limitations of the CIA, the NSA, the MI6 and the French intelligence- the SDECE- in gathering actionable intelligence. Dimitrakis also shows how the Vietminh under Ho Chi Minh established their own secret services; how their high grade moles infiltrated the US and French military echelons and the government of South Vietnam, and how Hanoi's intelligence apparatus eventually suffered seriously from 'spies amongst us' paranoia. In doing so he enhances our understanding of the war that came to define its era.

Here is the firsthand account of a member of one of the United States Army's three-man Tactical Psychological Operations Teams, groups of men tasked with winning the hearts and minds of Iraq's civilian population through leaflets, loudspeakers, conversation, and bribery. Transcribed from and inspired by Russell Snyder's personal wartime journal, it is a story of introspection, relating how the feelings of eagerness and uncertainty in a young man unfamiliar with war were replaced with the dread knowledge that, buried within his soul, beneath a facade of goodwill and morality, lurked the capacity to kill his fellow men. There are scenes of battle retold within the pages of Hearts and Mines, descriptions of the feelings of seeing once-familiar human bodies destroyed beyond recognition. Some days are described as being full of hope and appreciation for the beauty of the world, others with despair for the omnipresent cruelty and destruction which has a habit of consuming men when they feel unaccountable for their actions. It captures the sensory experience of living in a singular environment full of strange plants and animals, friends true and false, and determined enemies, encapsulating the existential fear of mortar and rocket attacks, as well as the ridiculousness of military bureaucracy, such as was demonstrated by a sergeant major's decision to punish graffiti artists by removing the doors of all the camp's toilets.

Militias have proven to be a consistent and enduring challenge to achieving peace in war zones around the world. Whether armed by embattled governments in defence of their territory or fostered by external actors in the interests of greed or grievance, these groups occupy an uncertain and deeply controversial position in the changing landscape of conflict. Linked variously to atrocities against civilians or international criminal elements, part of what distinguishes them from more traditional combatants is their willingness to engage in violent tactics that defy international norms as well as a proclivity to embrace expediency in alliance-making. As such, their diversity of form, unorthodox nature and sheer numbers make achieving short-term stability and an enduring peace a consistently difficult proposition. Bringing together the lessons learned from four intensively researched case studies - the Democratic Republic of Congo, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and Sudan - the book argues that the overly rigid 'cookie-cutter' approach to demilitaristation, developed and commonly implemented presently by the international community, is ineffective at meeting the myriad of challenges involving militias. In doing so, the authors propose a radical new framework for demilitarization that questions conventional models and takes into account on-the-ground realities.

By comparing modern counterinsurgency doctrine and operations to those of 1960s, this paper tests and ultimately disproves the assumption that doctrine as written and operations as conducted are tightly linked. Ingrained organizational concepts and beliefs have a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine, and altering these beliefs will require the U.S. military to reorient itself mentally as well as physically.

British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency, whose base of support is global and whose exploitation of the virtual dimension has outstripped the West's. After analyzing past British COIN experiences and comparing them to the evolving nature of the modern jihadist insurgency, the authors suggest a new framework for future COIN operations.British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency. The authors analyze past British COIN experience, explore the evolving nature of insurgency, and suggest a new COIN framework.

Osama bin Laden’s words carry a great deal of weight in the West. When he speaks, or allegedly speaks, we listen. But what about the words of other key leaders in the Al-Qa'ida terrorist network? We can learn how to conduct the war on terrorism more successfully when we study their own manuals, written for their followers. But few Americans, despite their expertise in intelligence or security, know Arabic. Fortunately Norman Cigar is fluent, and here he presents the first English translation of Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin’s“A Practical Course for Guerrilla War.” Saudi security forces killed Al-Muqrin, Al-Qa'ida’s leader in the Arabian Peninsula, in June 2004. Published posthumously, his Arabic-language manual provides a window into Al-Qa’ida’s strategic thinking and into how these terrorists operate. Accompanying the text’s translation is material on Al-Muqrin’s life and Cigar’s cogent and detailed analysis of the key ideas in the jihadist’s doctrine and the results of Al-Qa'ida’s insurgency efforts on the Arabian Peninsula. This important work provides a primary source for students in the professional military education system who want to read a variety of military thinkers and develop insights into all war fighting philosophies, especially those emanating from non-Western sources. Academics, think tank analysts, and government officials in the United States and abroad will also find the work relevant to their own work on Al-Qa'ida and insurgency theory. With a foreword by Julian Lewis, MP, the Shadow Defence Minister for Great Britain.

This study examines how terrorist groups transition to insurgencies and identifies ways to combat proto-insurgents. It describes the steps groups must take to gain the size and capabilities of insurgencies, the role of outside state support, and actions governments can take to prevent potential insurgencies from blossoming. The most effective U.S. counterinsurgency action would be to anticipate the possibility of insurgencies developing; it could then provide training and advisory programs and inhibit outsides support.

The military intervention by NATO in Kosovo was portrayed in American media as a necessary step to prevent the Serbian armed forces from repeating the ethnic cleansing that had so deeply damaged the former Yugoslavia. Serbia trained its military on Kosovo because of an ongoing armed struggle by ethnic Albanians to wrest independence from Serbia. Warfare in the Balkans seemed to threaten the stability of Europe, as well as the peace and security of Kosovars, and yet armed resistance seemed to offer the only possibility of future stability. Leading the struggle against Serbia was the Kosovo Liberation Army, also known as the KLA.

"Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency" provides a historical background for the KLA and describes its activities up to and including the NATO intervention. Henry H. Perritt Jr. offers firsthand insight into the motives and organization of a popular insurgency, detailing the strategies of recruitment, training, and financing that made the KLA one of the most successful insurgencies of the post-cold war era. This volume also tells the personal stories of young people who took up guns in response to repeated humiliation by "foreign occupiers," as they perceived the Serb police and intelligence personnel. Perritt illuminates the factors that led to the KLA's success, including its convergence with political developments in eastern Europe, its campaign for popular support both at home and abroad, and its participation in international negotiations and a peace settlement that helped pave the long road from war to peace.

Three parallel wars were fought in the latter half of the twentieth century in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. These wars were long and brutal, dividing international opinion sharply between US support for dictatorial regimes and the USSR's sponsorship of guerrilla fighters. This fascinating study of the 'guerrilla generation' is based on in-depth interviews with both guerrilla comandantes and political and military leaders of the time. Dirk Kruijt analyses the dreams and achievements, the successes and failures, the utopias and dystopias of an entire Central American generation and its leaders. Guerrillas ranges widely, from the guerrilla movement's origins in poverty, oppression and exclusion; its tactics in warfare; the ill-fated experiment with Sandinista government in Nicaragua; to the subsequent 'normalization' of guerrilla movements within democratic societies. The story told here is vital for understanding contemporary social movements in Latin America.

Six historic counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to failure. The Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu and Kashmir, and Colombia were chosen for their varied characteristics relating to geography, historical era, outcome, type of insurgency faced, and level of U.S. involvement. Future U.S. COIN operations can learn from these past lessons.

This analysis describes in counterinsurgency terms where the United States has gone wrong in Iraq; what unique challenges the conflict presents to coalition military forces; and what light both shed on future counterinsurgency planning, operations, and requirements. 450-character abstract: For 50 years, the United States has had ill-fated experiences in effectively fighting insurgencies. In counterinsurgency terms, Vietnam and Iraq form two legs of a historically fraught triangle-with El Salvador providing the connecting leg. In light of this history, the author analyzes where the United States has gone wrong in Iraq; what unique challenges the conflict presents to coalition forces deployed there; and what light both shed on future counterinsurgency planning, operations, and requirements.

"Here we go, I said to myself as my system electrified with the familiar rush of adrenaline."

An elite unit armed to the teeth, the Mobile Guerrilla Force was America's only real guerrilla force in Vietnam. These men operated for weeks at a time--springing ambushes, destroying base camps, and gathering vital intelligence--in steamy, triple-canopied jungles ruled by the VC and NVA.

On July 18, 1967, Special Forces medic James Donahue and his platoon were on a mission, code-named Blackjack-34, to locate enemy units for the 1st Infantry to destroy. But instead a crack enemy battalion found them.

Now Donahue bears witness to the bloody events of that day and the exceptional grit and determination of his teammates. BLACKJACK-34 is a magnificent tribute to the warriors of Mobile Guerrilla Force--their courage, heroism, and willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice.