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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Land forces & warfare > Irregular or guerrilla forces & warfare
Bushwhackers adds to the growing body of literature that examines the various irregular conflicts that took place during the American Civil War. Author Joseph M. Beilein Jr. looks at the ways in which several different bands of guerrillas across Missouri conducted their war in concert with their house- holds and their female kin who provided logistical support in many forms. Whether noted fighters like Frank James, William Clarke Quantrill, and "Bloody Bill" Anderson, or less well-known figures such as Clifton Holtzclaw and Jim Jackson, Beilein provides a close examination of how these warriors imagined themselves as fighters, offering a brand-new interpretation that gets us closer to seeing how the men and women who participated in the war in Missouri must have understood it. Beilein answers some of the tough questions: Why did men fight as guerrillas? Where did their tactics come from? What were their goals? Why were they so successful? Bushwhackers demonstrates that the guerrilla war in Missouri was not just an opportunity to settle antebellum feuds, nor was it some collective plummet by society into a state of chaotic bloodshed. Rather, the guerrilla war was the only logical response by men and women in Missouri, and one that was more in keeping with their worldview than the conventional warfare of the day. As guerrilla conflicts rage around the world and violence remains closely linked with masculine identity here in America, this look into the past offers timely insight into our modern world and several of its current struggles.
'A book to marvel at, learn from, and return to again and again' John le Carre The incredible inside story of a Kurdish sniper in the battle against ISIS As Syria imploded in civil war in 2011, Kurdish volunteers in the north rose up to free their homeland from centuries of repression and create a progressive sanctuary of tolerance and democracy. To the medievalists of ISIS, this was an affront, so they amassed 10,000 men, heavy artillery, tanks, mortars and ranks of suicide bombers to crush the uprising. Against them stood 2,500 volunteer fighters armed with 40-year-old rifles. There was only one way for the Kurds to survive. They would have to kill the invaders one by one. A decade earlier, as a 19-year-old Iranian army conscript, Azad had been forced to fight his own people. Instead he deserted and sought asylum in Britain. Now, as he returned to his homeland to help build a new Kurdistan, he found he would have to pick up a gun once more. In September 2014, Azad became one of 17 snipers deployed when ISIS besieged the northern city of Kobani. In LONG SHOT, Azad tells the inside story of how a group of activists and intellectuals built their own army and team of snipers, and then fought off a ferocious assault in nine months of bitter and bloody street battles. By turns searing, stirring, inspiring and poetic, this is an unique account of modern war and of how, against all odds, a few thousand men and women achieved the impossible and kept their dream of freedom alive.
In 1864 the capture of Brazilian steamer the Marques de Olinda initiated South America's most significant war. Thousands of Brazilian, Argentine, and Uruguayan soldiers engaged in a protracted siege of Paraguay, leaving the Paraguayan economy and population devastated. The suffering defied imagination and left a tradition of bad feelings, changing politics in South America forever. This is the definitive work on the Triple Alliance War. Thomas L. Whigham examines key personalities and military engagements while exploring the effects of the conflict on individuals, Paraguayan society, and the continent as a whole. The Road to Armageddon is the first book utilize a broad range of primary sources and materials, including testimony from the men and women who witnessed the war first-hand.
The remarkable story of the French Foreign Legion, its dramatic rise throughout the nineteenth century, and its most committed champion, General Hubert Lyautey. An aura of mystery, romance, and danger surrounds the French Foreign Legion, the all-volunteer corps of the French Army, founded in 1831. Famous for its physically grueling training in harsh climates, the legion fought in French wars from Mexico to Madagascar, Southeast Asia to North Africa. To this day, despite its reputation for being assigned the riskiest missions in the roughest terrain, the mystique of the legion continues to attract men from every corner of the world. In At the Edge of the World, historian Jean-Vincent Blanchard follows the legion's rise to fame during the nineteenth century--focusing on its campaigns in Indochina and especially in Africa--when the corps played a central role in expanding and protecting the French Empire. As France struggled to be a power capable of rivaling the British, the figure of the legionnaire--deadly, self-sacrificing, uncompromisingly efficient--came to represent the might and morale that would secure a greater, stronger nation. Drawing from rare, archival memoirs and testimonies of legionnaires from the period and tracing the fascinating career of Hubert Lyautey, France's first resident-general in Morocco and a hero to many a legionnaire, At the Edge of the World chronicles the Foreign Legion at the height of its renown, when the corps and its archetypically handsome, moody, and marginalized recruits became both the symbols of a triumphant colonialism and the stuff of legend.
The Vietnam War lasted twenty years, and was the USA's greatest military failure. An attempt to stem the spread of Soviet and Chinese influence, the conflict in practice created a chaotic state torn apart by espionage, terrorism and guerilla warfare. American troops quickly became embroiled in jungle warfare and knowledge of the other side's troop movements, communication lines, fighting techniques and strategy became crucial. Panagiotis Dimitrakis uncovers this battle for intelligence and tells the story of the Vietnam War through the newly available British, American and French sources - including declassified material. In doing so he dissects the limitations of the CIA, the NSA, the MI6 and the French intelligence- the SDECE- in gathering actionable intelligence. Dimitrakis also shows how the Vietminh under Ho Chi Minh established their own secret services; how their high grade moles infiltrated the US and French military echelons and the government of South Vietnam, and how Hanoi's intelligence apparatus eventually suffered seriously from 'spies amongst us' paranoia. In doing so he enhances our understanding of the war that came to define its era.
From the Paris Commune in 1871 to Hue, Cordoba and Detroit in our day, the history of of proletarian insurrections is largely uncharted-particularly in its strictly military and technical aspects. Yet for Marx, Engels or Lenin it was axiomatic that 'insurrection is an art', and that without the most careful preparation and planning for insurrection (as in Hue), the spontaneous revolutionary action of the masses would always be defeated by the organized violence of the ruling class (as in Cordoba or Detroit). This book was produced in 1928 as a practical insurrectionary manual for communists. It discusses the role of armed insurrection in the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution, analyses a number of insurrections-both successful and unsuccessful-with the aim of determining the conditions for victory, and gives detailed information on the tactics of street fighting-ranging from the respective advantages of offensive or defensive action to the best method of building a barricade. Written in Moscow under Comintern auspices, it is a classic Third Period document. Its republication will contribute to the recovery and appraisal of the early years of Soviet and Comintern history which is so essential an ingredient in the forging of all revolutionary theory and practice today. Published under the pseudonym of 'A. Neuberg', the work was in fact written by a group of leading Comintern political and military experts. One of the authors, Erich Wollenberg, military leader of the Bochum rising in North Germany in 1923, has written a new introduction for this edition (the first edition in English) in which he gives his own account of how the book came to be written, analyses the unstated political background to the various insurrections it examines, and identifies such of the authors as were known to him. These include Mikhail Tukhachesvsky, then second-in-command of the Red Army, Ho Chi Minh, Vice-President of the Secretary of the Comintern, and the German Communist and leader of the Hamberg Insurrection, Hans Kippenberger. The work was assembled by the Agitprop section of the Comintern, headed at the time by Palmiro Togliatti.
For both the United States and United Kingdom counterinsurgency was a serious component of security policy during the Cold War and, along with counterterrorism, has been the greatest security challenge after September 11, 2001. In The Soul of Armies Austin Long compares and contrasts counterinsurgency operations during the Cold War and in recent years by three organizations: the US Army, the US Marine Corps, and the British Army.Long argues that the formative experiences of these three organizations as they professionalized in the nineteenth century has produced distinctive organizational cultures that shape operations. Combining archival research on counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam and Kenya with the author's personal experience as a civilian advisor to the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Soul of Armies demonstrates that the US Army has persistently conducted counterinsurgency operations in a very different way from either the US Marine Corps or the British Army. These differences in conduct have serious consequences, affecting the likelihood of success, the potential for civilian casualties and collateral damage, and the ability to effectively support host nation governments. Long concludes counterinsurgency operations are at best only a partial explanation for success or failure.
Little is known about the Tamil liberation cause and struggle, as it has been widely dismissed by global powers of all persuasions - the USA, Russia, China and India - each driven by their own real politik reasons and self-interests. Isolated in their struggle and condemned by world opinion, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) nonetheless proved capable of withstanding all external forces for a period of decades, drawing large numbers of Tamils, both inside Sri Lanka and outside in the Tamil Diaspora, to support its cause. The LTTE created a progressive internal movement that succeeded in breaking down ancient caste barriers that had resisted the political inducements and leadership of figures such as Gandhi, and inculcated a climate of social justice and equality. This book, written by a Diaspora Tamil engaged in human rights work in the Tamil-controlled area of Vanni up until it was overrun by Sri Lankan forces, provides a compelling insider's look at the motivations, issues and complexities of this largely secret civil war. This is what life was like on the ground inside Tamil-controlled territory where the forces of war were held at bay - until 2009 when it was overrun by the Sri Lankan army and the Tamil genocide began.
Militias have proven to be a consistent and enduring challenge to achieving peace in war zones around the world. Whether armed by embattled governments in defence of their territory or fostered by external actors in the interests of greed or grievance, these groups occupy an uncertain and deeply controversial position in the changing landscape of conflict. Linked variously to atrocities against civilians or international criminal elements, part of what distinguishes them from more traditional combatants is their willingness to engage in violent tactics that defy international norms as well as a proclivity to embrace expediency in alliance-making. As such, their diversity of form, unorthodox nature and sheer numbers make achieving short-term stability and an enduring peace a consistently difficult proposition. Bringing together the lessons learned from four intensively researched case studies - the Democratic Republic of Congo, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and Sudan - the book argues that the overly rigid 'cookie-cutter' approach to demilitaristation, developed and commonly implemented presently by the international community, is ineffective at meeting the myriad of challenges involving militias. In doing so, the authors propose a radical new framework for demilitarization that questions conventional models and takes into account on-the-ground realities.
By comparing modern counterinsurgency doctrine and operations to those of 1960s, this paper tests and ultimately disproves the assumption that doctrine as written and operations as conducted are tightly linked. Ingrained organizational concepts and beliefs have a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine, and altering these beliefs will require the U.S. military to reorient itself mentally as well as physically.
British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency, whose base of support is global and whose exploitation of the virtual dimension has outstripped the West's. After analyzing past British COIN experiences and comparing them to the evolving nature of the modern jihadist insurgency, the authors suggest a new framework for future COIN operations.British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency. The authors analyze past British COIN experience, explore the evolving nature of insurgency, and suggest a new COIN framework.
Osama bin Laden’s words carry a great deal of weight in the West. When he speaks, or allegedly speaks, we listen. But what about the words of other key leaders in the Al-Qa'ida terrorist network? We can learn how to conduct the war on terrorism more successfully when we study their own manuals, written for their followers. But few Americans, despite their expertise in intelligence or security, know Arabic. Fortunately Norman Cigar is fluent, and here he presents the first English translation of Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin’s“A Practical Course for Guerrilla War.” Saudi security forces killed Al-Muqrin, Al-Qa'ida’s leader in the Arabian Peninsula, in June 2004. Published posthumously, his Arabic-language manual provides a window into Al-Qa’ida’s strategic thinking and into how these terrorists operate. Accompanying the text’s translation is material on Al-Muqrin’s life and Cigar’s cogent and detailed analysis of the key ideas in the jihadist’s doctrine and the results of Al-Qa'ida’s insurgency efforts on the Arabian Peninsula. This important work provides a primary source for students in the professional military education system who want to read a variety of military thinkers and develop insights into all war fighting philosophies, especially those emanating from non-Western sources. Academics, think tank analysts, and government officials in the United States and abroad will also find the work relevant to their own work on Al-Qa'ida and insurgency theory. With a foreword by Julian Lewis, MP, the Shadow Defence Minister for Great Britain.
The military intervention by NATO in Kosovo was portrayed in American media as a necessary step to prevent the Serbian armed forces from repeating the ethnic cleansing that had so deeply damaged the former Yugoslavia. Serbia trained its military on Kosovo because of an ongoing armed struggle by ethnic Albanians to wrest independence from Serbia. Warfare in the Balkans seemed to threaten the stability of Europe, as well as the peace and security of Kosovars, and yet armed resistance seemed to offer the only possibility of future stability. Leading the struggle against Serbia was the Kosovo Liberation Army, also known as the KLA. "Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency" provides a historical background for the KLA and describes its activities up to and including the NATO intervention. Henry H. Perritt Jr. offers firsthand insight into the motives and organization of a popular insurgency, detailing the strategies of recruitment, training, and financing that made the KLA one of the most successful insurgencies of the post-cold war era. This volume also tells the personal stories of young people who took up guns in response to repeated humiliation by "foreign occupiers," as they perceived the Serb police and intelligence personnel. Perritt illuminates the factors that led to the KLA's success, including its convergence with political developments in eastern Europe, its campaign for popular support both at home and abroad, and its participation in international negotiations and a peace settlement that helped pave the long road from war to peace.
This study examines how terrorist groups transition to insurgencies and identifies ways to combat proto-insurgents. It describes the steps groups must take to gain the size and capabilities of insurgencies, the role of outside state support, and actions governments can take to prevent potential insurgencies from blossoming. The most effective U.S. counterinsurgency action would be to anticipate the possibility of insurgencies developing; it could then provide training and advisory programs and inhibit outsides support.
Six historic counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to failure. The Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu and Kashmir, and Colombia were chosen for their varied characteristics relating to geography, historical era, outcome, type of insurgency faced, and level of U.S. involvement. Future U.S. COIN operations can learn from these past lessons.
Three parallel wars were fought in the latter half of the twentieth century in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. These wars were long and brutal, dividing international opinion sharply between US support for dictatorial regimes and the USSR's sponsorship of guerrilla fighters. This fascinating study of the 'guerrilla generation' is based on in-depth interviews with both guerrilla comandantes and political and military leaders of the time. Dirk Kruijt analyses the dreams and achievements, the successes and failures, the utopias and dystopias of an entire Central American generation and its leaders. Guerrillas ranges widely, from the guerrilla movement's origins in poverty, oppression and exclusion; its tactics in warfare; the ill-fated experiment with Sandinista government in Nicaragua; to the subsequent 'normalization' of guerrilla movements within democratic societies. The story told here is vital for understanding contemporary social movements in Latin America.
Originally hired by wealthy Italian city states to protect their
assets during a time of ceaseless warring, the Condottiere of the
Italian peninsula became famous for his wealth, venality and
amorality during the 14th century.
This analysis describes in counterinsurgency terms where the United States has gone wrong in Iraq; what unique challenges the conflict presents to coalition military forces; and what light both shed on future counterinsurgency planning, operations, and requirements. 450-character abstract: For 50 years, the United States has had ill-fated experiences in effectively fighting insurgencies. In counterinsurgency terms, Vietnam and Iraq form two legs of a historically fraught triangle-with El Salvador providing the connecting leg. In light of this history, the author analyzes where the United States has gone wrong in Iraq; what unique challenges the conflict presents to coalition forces deployed there; and what light both shed on future counterinsurgency planning, operations, and requirements.
Immediately after the Allied invasion of Italy in September 1943, Mussolini was deposed and the new Italian government switched sides. The German occupying forces swiftly freed Il Duce and ruthlessly disarmed the Italian Army; and from then until the end of the war in April 1945 Italian troops fought on both sides - with the forces of the new Fascist 'Salo Republic', in the Allied 'Co-Belligerent Forces', and in the Partisan movement. This period of bitter struggle saw the appearance of many new units and a wide range of interesting uniforms, described and illustrated in this final part of Philip Jowett's comprehensive three-volume series.
Since 1983 journalist Bill Berkeley has traveled through Africa's most troubled lands-Rwanda, Liberia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, and Zaire-seeking out the tyrants and military leaders who orchestrate seemingly intractable wars. Shattering the myth that ancient tribal hatred lies at the heart of the continent's troubles, Berkeley instead holds accountable the "Big Men" who came to power during this period, describing the very rational methods behind their apparent madness. A New Republic Book
"Here we go, I said to myself as my system electrified with the familiar rush of adrenaline."
Carlos Fuentes writes, "John Womack has an uncanny feeling for the infinitely complex strains of Mexico." Here, Woack examines the conflict in Chiapas in light of 500 years of struggle and uneasy accomodation between the region's Maya population and the Spanish conquerors and ladino landowners. Rebellion in Chiapas opens with a major new essay examining the Zapatista revolt and chronicling the attempts at a negotiated peace. It goes on to reveal the roots of the rebellion through a range of primary source materials and other key documents from the time of the conquest through the present.
The Fall of Che Guevara tells the story of Guevara's last campaign,
in the backwoods of Bolivia, where he hoped to ignite a revolution
that would spread throughout South America. For the first time,
this book shows in detail the strategy of the U.S. and Bolivian
governments to foil his efforts. Based on numerous interviews and
on secret documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act
from the CIA, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the National
Security Archive, this work casts new light on the roles of a Green
Beret detachment sent to train the Bolivians and of the CIA and
other U.S. agencies in bringing Guevara down.
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