This book deals with two significant issues: the peculiar and paradoxical question of why regular armies, better suited to fighting conventional high-intensity wars, adopt inappropriate measures when fighting guerilla wars; and the evolution of the Indian army's counterinsurgency doctrine over the last decade. In addition, the book also includes the first detailed analysis of the trajectory of the army's counterinsurgency doctrine, arguing that while it was consolidated only over the last decade, the essential elements of the doctrine may in fact be traced back to the army's first confrontation with the Naga guerillas in the 1950s. It outlines the three essential elements that make up the Indian army's counterinsurgency doctrine: that there are no military solutions to an insurgency; that military force can only help to reduce levels of violence to enable political solutions; and that there should be limited use of military force. Rajagopalan argues that international circumstances - particularly the need to counter conventional military threats from Pakistan and China - led to a counterinsurgency doctrine that had a strong conventional war bias. This bias also conditioned the organisational culture of the Indian army.

This book explores the contributions of Italian Americans employed by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. Italian Americans fluent in Italian language and customs became integral parts of intelligence operations working behind enemy lines. These units obtained priceless military information that significantly helped defeat the Axis. They parachuted into frozen mountains tops to link up with Italian guerilla units in northern Italy or hovered in small patrol torpedo boats and row boats across the Mediterranean Sea in pitch black darkness to destroy railroad junctions.

Some rebel groups abuse noncombatant populations, while others exhibit restraint. Insurgent leaders in some countries transform local structures of government, while others simply extract resources for their own benefit. In some contexts, groups kill their victims selectively, while in other environments violence appears indiscriminate, even random. This book presents a theory that accounts for the different strategies pursued by rebel groups in civil war, explaining why patterns of insurgent violence vary so much across conflicts. It does so by examining the membership, structure, and behavior of four insurgent movements in Uganda, Mozambique, and Peru. Drawing on interviews with nearly two hundred combatants and civilians who experienced violence firsthand, it shows that rebels' strategies depend in important ways on how difficult it is to launch a rebellion. The book thus demonstrates how characteristics of the environment in which rebellions emerge constrain rebel organization and shape the patterns of violence that civilians experience.

""Revolution"" is a word that causes fear in some, exhilaration in others, and confusion in most. Originally used to describe a restoration, it eventually came to mean a sweeping, sudden attack on an existing order. Human history has borne witness to a variety of national and social revolutions population revolution, revolution of ideas, technological revolution, and revolution in education. Simultaneously, there has been a proliferation of literature on revolution, armed struggle, and violence aimed at unseating policies and leadership of governments and societies.

Revolutionary struggles are more than simply armed internal conflict; they involve the essence of the political system. The desire to make such phenomena understandable often leads to oversimplification. Attempts to encompass their multi-dimensional nature, on the other hand, can become immersed in complexities, ambiguities, and misinterpretations. The perspective of this classic volume, available in paperback for the first time, is that revolution is here to stay. Guerrilla warfare, according to Sarkesian, is a particularly useful strategy for the weak, the frustrated, the alienated, and seekers of power against existing regimes. The collected works in this volume examine thei1/2social roots of revolution, development of strategy and tactics, practice in city and countryside, dilemmas of attackers and defenders. The actors and thinkers collected and analyzed here range from leading political analysts, anthropologists, sociologists, historians, and officials as well as practitioners of guerrilla warfare. This core text with primary sources in the area of war, revolution, and insurgence develops an understanding of revolution, traces the growth of guerilla doctrine, and studies the specifics of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary guerilla warfare.

How do rebel groups decide how to recruit members? To answer this question, Obayashi classifies recruitment techniques of rebel groups into two types, coercion and inducement, and develops a theory of rebel recruitment that simultaneously addresses agency problems inside rebel groups and the rebel-state contest over information. Important themes such as desertion, counterinsurgency strategies including amnesties and civil war termination are also examined to further understand the dynamics of rebellion and violent disorder. The theory is applied to examine the changes in conflicts involving the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka and the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda.

The Vietnam War lasted twenty years and resulted in the deaths of over 58,000 American soldiers, with many more Vietnamese victims. But the roots of the American-led conflict lay in the complex colonial history of Vietnam itself. Here, Pablo de Orellana uses recently declassified material to provide a new interpretation of the diplomatic failures and processes that lead to the outbreak and continuation of the conflict. Through a focus on the first Vietnam War, de Orellana shows how and why a Southeast Asian French colony already devastated by two wars came to be seen as an existential threat by policymakers in the United States, and how an attempt to stem the influence of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China spiraled out of control. The Road to Vietnam features new archival documents, including diplomatic notes and briefing material, to construct a new history of America's descent into conflict. This will be an essential resource for scholars and students of the Vietnam War and 20th Century diplomatic history.

Since 1945, mercenaries have earned an especially bad name for themselves in the Third World. From Colombia to the Congo, Angola to Papua New Guinea they have followed their dubious calling, hiring themselves out for blood money, training the war bands of drug barons, or assisting civil wars. They have gained a reputation for greed, racialism and brutality. Now, a phenomenon is emerging in the form of independent corporations with names such as "Executive Outcomes" or "Sandline" offering to sell every kind of military expertise and threatening to become powers in their own right. This book looks at the subject.

Winston Churchill authorised the creation of a new wartime secret service, the Special Operations Executive(SOE), with the order "And now set Europe ablaze". On behalf of the Secret WW2 Network, an educational charity dedicated to revealing hitherto-secret operations to the current generation, Paul McCue tells a main story of four Brighton and Hove-born agents honoured with blue plaques. He details the organisation's creation and post-war demise, its training methods and the missions of the four chief subjects. He also covers three other agents, a special duties RAF pilot and the inspiration for 'Q', the inspired 'boffin' of the James Bond books and films - all of whom had links with the city.Some enjoyed great success, others were doomed to failure and death, but all displayed the volunteer spirit and courage that saw Britain through the darkest days of the Second World War. Their stories, largely little known,deserve to be told.

At the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, thousands of pro-democracy rebel groups spontaneously formed to fight the Assad regime. Years later, the revolution was unrecognizable as rebel opposition forces had merged into three major groups: Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al Sham, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Why did these three groups rapidly increase in size and military strength while others simply disappeared? What is it about their organizational structure and their Islamist ideology that helped group manage their fighters so successfully? With these questions at the forefront, this book examines the internal organization of armed groups and, in particular, their human resources. Analyzing the growth of these groups through the prism of a labor market theory, this book shows that extreme Islamist groups were able to attract fighters away from more moderate groups because they had better internal organization, took better care of fighters both physically and monetarily, experienced less internal corruption, and effectively used their Islamist ideology to control recruits. With unparalleled access and extensive ethnographic research drawn from her interviews and her year embedded with Iraqi Special Operation forces, Mironova delves deep into the ideological and practical nexus of some of the most radical groups in the Middle East. This book brings together more than 600 survey-interviews with local civilians and fighters on the frontline in Syria and a dataset of human resource policies from 40 armed groups; it is an invaluable resource for anyone who wants insight into the on the ground functioning of rebel organizations.

This study of firearms analyzes the employment of such weaponry, dated more than 40 years after use in Europe, towards the close of the 1360s.

Ranging from war journalism to crime stories to profiles on influential leaders to pieces on sports, gambling and the impending impact of supercomputers on the practice of medicine, this collection is Bowden at his best. Pieces that will appear in the collection include, "The Three Battles of Wanat", which tells the story of a bloody engagement in Afghanistan and the extraordinary years-long fallout within the US military, "The Drone Warrior," in which Bowden examines the strategic, legal and moral issues surrounding armed drones, and "The Case of the Vanishing Blonde," which first appeared in Vanity Fair and recounts the chilling story of a woman who went missing from a Florida hotel only to turn up near the Everglades, brutally beaten, raped and still alive. Also included are profiles on a diverse range of notable and influential people such as Joe Biden, Kim Jong-un, Judy Clarke who is well known for defending America's worst serial killers and David Simon, the creator of the successful HBO series The Wire.

Black Ops is a skirmish wargame of tactical espionage combat that recreates the tension and excitement of modern action-thrillers such as the Bond and Bourne films. The fast-play rules keep all the players in the thick of the action, while the mission generator provides a wide range of options for scenarios - from stealthy extraction or surveillance missions to more overt raids and assaults. Stealth, combat, and technical expertise all have a role to play, and players may recruit a number of different operative types - spies, mercenaries, criminals, hackers, special forces, and many more - to recruit the best possible team for the job. Players may also choose to join a faction - powerful organizations, intelligence agencies, criminal syndicates, militaries, or rebel groups, each with a stake in international affairs. By doing so, their team may receive certain benefits, but may also find itself limited at a crucial time. With the variety offered by the characters, factions, and scenarios, no two games of Black Ops should ever be the same!

The Fall of Che Guevara tells the story of Guevara's last campaign, in the backwoods of Bolivia, where he hoped to ignite a revolution that would spread throughout South America. For the first time, this book shows in detail the strategy of the U.S. and Bolivian governments to foil his efforts. Based on numerous interviews and on secret documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act from the CIA, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the National Security Archive, this work casts new light on the roles of a Green Beret detachment sent to train the Bolivians and of the CIA and other U.S. agencies in bringing Guevara down.
Ryan's shows that Guevara was an agent of Cuban foreign policy from the time he met Fidel Castro in 1955 until his death--not a mere independent revolutionary, as many scholars have claimed. Guevara's attempted insurgency in Bolivia was in reality a Cuban attempt to achieve another badly-needed revolutionary success.
This dramatic account of the last days of Che Guevara will appeal to scholars and students of United States foreign policy and Latin American history, and to all those interested in this revolutionary's remarkable life.

This volume explores the nature of civil war in the modern world and in historical perspective.

Civil wars represent the principal form of armed conflict since the end of the Second World War, and certainly in the contemporary era. The nature and impact of civil wars suggests that these conflicts reflect and are also a driving force for major societal change. In this sense, "Understanding Civil Wars: Continuity and change in intrastate conflict" argues that the nature of civil war is not fundamentally changing in nature.

The book includes a thorough consideration of patterns and types of intrastate conflict and debates relating to the causes, impact, and changing nature of war. A key focus is on the political and social driving forces of such conflict and its societal meanings, significance and consequences. The author also explores methodological and epistemological challenges related to studying and understanding intrastate war. A range of questions and debates are addressed. What is the current knowledge regarding the causes and nature of armed intrastate conflict? Is it possible to produce general, cross-national theories on civil war which have broad explanatory relevance? Is the concept of civil wars empirically meaningful in an era of globalization and transnational war? Has intrastate conflict fundamentally changed in nature? Are there historical patterns in different types of intrastate conflict? What are the most interesting methodological trends and debates in the study of armed intrastate conflict? How are narratives about the causes and nature of civil wars constructed around ideas such as ethnic conflict, separatist conflict and resource conflict?

This book will be of much interest to students of civil wars, intrastate conflict, security studies and international relations in general."

This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of British military experiences in the post-war era and endeavours to unpack their performance. During the twentieth century counter-insurgency assumed the status of one of the British military's fortes. A wealth of asymmetric warfare experience was accumulated after the Second World War as the small wars of decolonisation offered the army of a fading imperial power many opportunities to deploy against an irregular enemy. However, this quantity of experience does not translate into quality. This book argues that the British, far from being exemplars of counter-insurgency, have in fact consistently proved to be slow learners in counter-insurgency warfare. This book presents an analysis of the most significant British counter-insurgency campaigns of the past 60 years: Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), South Arabia (1962-67), the first decade of the Northern Irish 'Troubles' (1969-79), and the recent British counter-insurgency campaign in southern Iraq (2003-09). Colonial history is used to contextualise the contemporary performance in Iraq and undermine the commonly held confidence in British counter-insurgency. Blending historical research with critical analysis, this book seeks to establish a new paradigm through which to interpret and analyse the British approach to counter-insurgency, as well as considering the mythology of inherent British competence in the realm of irregular warfare. It will be of interest to students of counter-insurgency, military history, strategic studies, security studies, and IR in general.

This book is a thorough study of all known guerrilla operations in Civil War Missouri between September 1864-and June 1865. It explores different tactics each side attempted during this time period to gain advantage over each other with regional differences as influenced by the differing personalities of local commanders. The author utilises both well-known and obscure sources (including military and government records, private accounts, county and other local histories, period and later newspapers, and secondary sources published after the war) to identify which Southern partisan leaders and groups operated in which areas of Missouri, and describe how they operated and how their kinds of warfare evolved. This work presents the actions of Southern guerrilla forces and Confederate behind-Union-lines recruiters chronologically by region so that readers may see the relationship of seemingly isolated events to other events over a period of time in a given area. The book also studies the counteractions of an array of different types of Union troops fighting guerrillas in Missouri to show how differences in training, leadership and experience affected behaviours and actions in the field.

This book is a thorough study of all known guerrilla operations in Civil War Missouri between January and August 1864. It explores different tactics each side attempted during this time period to gain advantage over each other with regional differences as influenced by the differing personalities of local commanders. The author utilises both well-known and obscure sources (including military and government records, private accounts, county and other local histories, period and later newspapers, and secondary sources published after the war) to identify which Southern partisan leaders and groups operated in which areas of Missouri, and describe how they operated and how their kinds of warfare evolved. This work presents the actions of Southern guerrilla forces and Confederate behind-Union-lines recruiters chronologically by region so that readers may see the relationship of seemingly isolated events to other events over a period of time in a given area. The book also studies the counteractions of an array of different types of Union troops fighting guerrillas in Missouri to show how differences in training, leadership and experience affected behaviours and actions in the field.

"Italian Resistance Writing" is a collection of famous and rare archive texts about one of the more controversial periods in modern Italian history. The extracts are from a wide variety of different genres, including novels, memoirs, short stories, historical works and songs. Taking into account the significant changes in approach to, and interpretations of, the resistance movement, that have emerged since the early 1990s, Italian resistance writing includes works by, among others, Claudio Pauone, Italo Calvino, Gian Enrico Rusconi, Renata Vigano and Pietro Scoppola. Cooke places each work in context and stresses the contemporary significance of the Italian resistance. This is a vibrant, multifaceted volume which sheds light on the past while illuminating the present in Italian history, cultural studies and current affairs.

Tracing the development of the Irish Republican Army following Ireland's Declaration of Independence, this book focuses on the recruitment, training, and arming of Ireland's military volunteers and the Army's subsequent guerrilla campaign against British rule. Beginning with a brief account of the failed Easter Rising, it continues through the resulting military and political re-organizations, the campaign's various battles, and the eventual truce agreements and signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Other topics include: the significance of Irish intelligence and the British counter-intelligence efforts; urban warfare and the fight for Dublin; and the role of female soldiers, suffragettes, and other women in waging the IRA's campaign.

Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to "re-learn" counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures?

In "The New Counterinsurgency Era," David Ucko examines DoD's institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance -- all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations. After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, Ucko focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process.

Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. Ucko clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.

This book deals with two significant issues: the peculiar and paradoxical question of why regular armies, better suited to fighting conventional high-intensity wars, adopt inappropriate measures when fighting guerilla wars; and the evolution of the Indian army's counterinsurgency doctrine over the last decade. In addition, the book also includes the first detailed analysis of the trajectory of the army's counterinsurgency doctrine, arguing that while it was consolidated only over the last decade, the essential elements of the doctrine may in fact be traced back to the army's first confrontation with the Naga guerillas in the 1950s. It outlines the three essential elements that make up the Indian army's counterinsurgency doctrine: that there are no military solutions to an insurgency; that military force can only help to reduce levels of violence to enable political solutions; and that there should be limited use of military force. Rajagopalan argues that international circumstances - particularly the need to counter conventional military threats from Pakistan and China - led to a counterinsurgency doctrine that had a strong conventional war bias. This bias also conditioned the organisational culture of the Indian army.

This work details the state of British counterinsurgency knowledge by 1945, and shows how wartime special forces and unconventional warfare affected many postwar counterinsurgencies. The vital role of the Special Air Service (SAS) is revealed here for the first time.

By their nature, democracies clearly have greater constraints than autocratic regimes on their freedom of action as they have to meet constitutional, legal and moral criteria in their use of force, and particularly so regarding the management of small wars. The relatively slower decision-making processes reduces the amount of flexibility required for waging small wars. Democratic political processes, including engaging in war, also require a certain amount of transparency, which is invariably at the expense of the military operational needs for secrecy. Unquestionably, democracies pay a certain price in combat effectiveness for maintaining their values. This collection brings together a number of case studies showing how democracies have won small wars.

Far from being an anachronism, much less a kit-bag of techniques, people's war raises what has always been present in military history, irregular warfare, and fuses it symbiotically with what has likewise always been present politically, rebellion and the effort to seize power. The result is a strategic approach for waging revolutionary warfare, the effort "to make a revolution." Voluntarism is wedded to the exploitation of structural contradiction through the building of a new world to challenge the existing world, through formation of a counterstate within the state in order ultimately to destroy and supplant the latter. This is a process of far greater moment than implied by the label "guerrilla warfare" so often applied to what Mao and others were about. This volume deals with the continuing importance of Maoist and post-Maoist concepts of people's war. Drawing on a range of examples that include Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan, the collection shows that the study of people's war is not just an historical curiosity but vital to the understanding of contemporary insurgent and terrorist movements. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Small Wars & Insurgencies.

Three parallel wars were fought in the latter half of the twentieth century in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. These wars were long and brutal, dividing international opinion sharply between US support for dictatorial regimes and the USSR's sponsorship of guerrilla fighters. This fascinating study of the 'guerrilla generation' is based on in-depth interviews with both guerrilla comandantes and political and military leaders of the time. Dirk Kruijt analyses the dreams and achievements, the successes and failures, the utopias and dystopias of an entire Central American generation and its leaders. Guerrillas ranges widely, from the guerrilla movement's origins in poverty, oppression and exclusion; its tactics in warfare; the ill-fated experiment with Sandinista government in Nicaragua; to the subsequent 'normalization' of guerrilla movements within democratic societies. The story told here is vital for understanding contemporary social movements in Latin America.