Presenting feminist readings of texts from the legal philosophical and jurisprudential canon, the papers collected here offer an interdisciplinary and critical challenge to established modes of reading law. Feminist approaches to law usually take the form of either critical engagements with legal doctrine, legal concepts and ideas, or critical assessments of the effects that specific areas of law have upon the lives of women. This collection, however, although rooted in feminist legal scholarship, takes the established canon of legal texts as the object of inquiry. Taking as their common starting point the fact that legal texts are plural and open to multiple readings, all the contributions in this collection offer subversive, but supplementary, interpretations of the legal canon. In this respect, however, they do not merely sustain an array of feminist styles and theories of reading; revealing and re-appropriating the plural space of legal interpretation, they seek to open a hitherto unexplored arena for a feminist politics of law. Feminist Encounters with Legal Philosophy is a thoroughly researched interdisciplinary collection that will interest students and scholars of Law, Philosophy, and Feminism.

Challenging the usual introductions to the study of law, A Critical Introduction to Law argues that law is inherently political and reflects the interests of the few even while presenting itself as neutral. This fully revised and updated fourth edition provides contemporary examples to demonstrate the relevance of these arguments in the twenty-first century. The book includes an analysis of the common sense of law; the use of anthropological examples to gain external perspectives of our use and understanding of law; a consideration of central legal concepts, such as order, rules, property, dispute resolution, legitimation and the rule of law; an examination of the role of law in women's subordination and finally a critique of the effect of our understanding of law upon the wider world. Clearly written and admirably suited to provoking discussions on the role of law in our contemporary world, this book is ideal for undergraduate and postgraduate students reading law, and will be of interest to those studying legal systems and skills courses, jurisprudence courses, and law and society.

Since it appeared in 1971, John Rawls's "A Theory of Justice" has become a classic. The author has now revised the original edition to clear up a number of difficulties he and others have found in the original book.

Rawls aims to express an essential part of the common core of the democratic tradition--justice as fairness--and to provide an alternative to utilitarianism, which had dominated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political thought since the nineteenth century. Rawls substitutes the ideal of the social contract as a more satisfactory account of the basic rights and liberties of citizens as free and equal persons. "Each person," writes Rawls, "possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override." Advancing the ideas of Rousseau, Kant, Emerson, and Lincoln, Rawls's theory is as powerful today as it was when first published.

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen here poses the question: "Is affirmative action morally (un)justifiable?" As a phrase that frequently surfaces in major headlines, affirmative action is a highly controversial and far-reaching issue, yet most of the recent scholarly literature surrounding the topic tends to focus on defending one side or another in a particular case of affirmative action. Lippert-Rasmussen instead takes a wide-angle view, addressing each of the prevailing contemporary arguments for and against affirmative action. In his introduction, he proposes an amended definition of affirmative action and considers what forms, from quotas to outreach strategies, may fall under this revised definition. He then analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of each position, relative to each other, and applies recent discussions in political philosophy to assess if and how each argument might justify different conclusions given different cases or philosophical frameworks. Each chapter investigates an argument for or against affirmative action. The six arguments for it consist of compensation, anti-discrimination, equality of opportunity, role model, diversity, and integration. The five arguments against it are reverse discrimination, stigma, mismatch, publicity, and merit. Lippert-Rasmussen also expands the discussion to include affirmative action for groups beyond the prototypical examples of African Americans and women, and to consider health and minority languages as possible criteria for inclusion in affirmative action initiatives. Based on the comparative strength of anti-discrimination and equality of opportunity arguments, Making Sense of Affirmative Action ultimately makes a case in favor of affirmative action; however, its originality lies in Lippert-Rasmussen's careful exploration of moral justifiability as a contextual evaluative measure and his insistence that complexity and a comparative focus are inherent to this important issue.

The past twenty years have witnessed a surge in behavioral studies of law and law-related issues. These studies have challenged the application of the rational-choice model to legal analysis and introduced a more accurate and empirically grounded model of human behavior. This integration of economics, psychology, and law is breaking exciting new ground in legal theory and the social sciences, shedding a new light on age-old legal questions as well as cutting edge policy issues.
The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and Law brings together leading scholars of law, psychology, and economics to provide an up-to-date and comprehensive analysis of this field of research, including its strengths and limitations as well as a forecast of its future development. Its 29 chapters organized in four parts. The first part provides a general overview of behavioral economics. The second part comprises four chapters introducing and criticizing the contribution of behavioral economics to legal theory. The third part discusses specific behavioral phenomena, their ramifications for legal policymaking, and their reflection in extant law. Finally, the fourth part analyzes the contribution of behavioral economics to fifteen legal spheres ranging from core doctrinal areas such as contracts, torts and property to areas such as taxation and antitrust policy.

In early modern Europe the law developed as one of the few non-religious orderings of civil life. Its separation from religion was, however, never complete and we see the contest continued today not only in the campaigns of religious fundamentalists of the right, but also in the clains of critical intellectuals to reshape government institutions and the legal apparatus in accordance with moral principle - whether of indivudual autonomy or communitarian self-determination. In Anti-Lawyers, David Saunders traces the story of this unresolved conflict from Hobbes' Leviathan to the American law texts of today, and discusses how we might regard today's moral critics of government and law in the light of the early modern effort to disengage spiritual discipline from secular government and conscience from law. Separate sections look at major figures in English common law in the Early Modern period, French and German absolutism and jurisprudence as it is taught in the American law texts of today.

This volume presents a collection of essays on objectivity in legal discourse. Has law a distinctive type of objectivity? Is there one specific type of legal objectivity or many, depending on the observatory language utilized? Is objectivity fit for law? The analyses in the various contributions show that the Cartesian paradigm of objectivity is not relevant to the current legal discourse, and new forms of legal objectivity are revealed instead. Each essay, in its distinctive way, analyses the strong commitment of law to objectivity, shedding light on the controversies that surround it.

Fifty years before his death in 2013, Nelson Mandela stood before Justice de Wet in Pretoria's Palace of Justice and delivered one of the most spectacular and liberating statements ever made from a dock. In what came to be regarded as "the trial that changed South Africa", Mandela summed up the spirit of the liberation struggle and the moral basis for the post-Apartheid society. In this blistering critique of Apartheid and its perversion of justice, Mandela transforms the law into a sword and shield. He invokes it while undermining it, uses it while subverting it, and claims it while defeating it. Wise and strategic, Mandela skilfully reimagines the courtroom as a site of visibility and hearing, opening up a political space within the legal. This volume returns to the Rivonia courtroom to engage with Mandela's masterful performance of resistance and the dramatic core of that transformative event. Cutting across a wide-range of critical theories and discourses, contributors reflect on the personal, spatial, temporal, performative, and literary dimensions of that constitutive event. By redefining the spaces, institutions and discourses of law, contributors present a fresh perspective that re-sets the margins of what can be thought and said in the courtroom.

The meaning of an expression resides not in the expression itself but in the experience of a person's engagement with it. Meaning will be different not only to different people but also to the same person at different times. This book offers a way of attending to these different meanings. This way (or method) is a version of a trans-cultural activity that Richard Dawson calls attunement. The activity of attunement involves a movement of self-adjustment to a language, which a person transforms in her or his use of it. Consciously performing the activity can enable understanding of the processes by which we constitute ourselves and others when we use a language. This directly connects to the topic justice, which is concerned with constituting appropriate selves and relations. Justice as Attunement engages with a wide range of texts - legal, literary, economic, philosophical, among others - and illuminates many useful and fascinating connections between them. There is a sense in which this book transcends disciplinary boundaries, for, in addition to students and scholars of law, literature, economics, and philosophy, it is written to a general reader who is interested in reflecting on and doing justice to their experiences in life.

Sovereignty marks the boundary between politics and law. Highlighting the legal context of politics and the political context of law, it thus contributes to the internal dynamics of both political and legal systems. This book comprehends the persistence of sovereignty as a political and juridical concept in the post-sovereign social condition. The tension and paradoxical relationship between the semantics and structures of sovereignty and post-sovereignty are addressed by using the conceptual framework of the autopoietic social systems theory. Using a number of contemporary European examples, developments and paradoxes, the author examines topics of immense interest and importance relating to the concept of sovereignty in a globalising world. The study argues that the modern question of sovereignty permanently oscillating between de iure authority and de facto power cannot be discarded by theories of supranational and transnational globalized law and politics. Criticising quasi-theological conceptualizations of political sovereignty and its juridical form, the study reformulates the concept of sovereignty and its persistence as part of the self-referential communication of the systems of positive law and politics. The book will be of considerable interest to academics and researchers in political, legal and social theory and philosophy.

This book identifies and follows a strand in the history of thought ranging from codified statutes to looser social expectations that uses particulars, and more specifically examples, to produce norms. Much intellectual history takes ancient Greece as a point of departure. But the strand of thought followed here finds its home, if not its origin, in Rome. The practice of exemplarity is historically rooted firmly in ancient Roman rhetoric, oratory, literature, and law, genres that also secured its transmission. Their pragmatic approach results in a conceptualization of politics, social organization, philosophy, and the law that is derived from the concrete. And although it is commonly supposed that, with the shift from pre-modern to modern ways of thinking as modern knowledge came to privilege abstraction over exempla, the general over the particular exemplarity lost its way, this book traces the limits of this understanding. Tracing the role of exemplarity from Rome through to its influence on literature, politics, philosophy, psychoanalysis and law, it shows how Roman exemplarity has subsisted, not only as a figure of thought, but also as an alternative way to organize and to transmit knowledge. "

"Drawing on a variety of disciplines, Levit contends that both society generally and some feminists in particular have exaggerated the evidence of difference between males and females and have overlooked the far more prevalent similarities. . . . A readable, thoughtful, and controversial volume."
"--Choice"

"Interesting and important. . . . It should be compulsory reading in preparation for law study to stimulate and inspire individuals aspiring to learn to construct a society more egalitarian than we now know."
"--Judge Norma L. Shapiro, Jurist"

"The Gender Line marks feminism's coming of age. Levit tackles the issue of gender not just as it affects women, but as it constrains everyone. Her book brings new insight into the meaning of masculinity and femininity and their role in society."
"--June Carbone, Santa Clara Law School"

Despite tremendous advances in civil rights, we live in a world where the sexes remain sharply segregated from birth to death: in names, clothing, social groupings, and possessions; in occupations, civic association, and domestic roles. Gender separatism, so pervasive as to be almost invisible, permeates the fabric of our daily social routines. Preferring a notion of gender that is fluid and contextual, and denying that separatism is inevitable, Nancy Levit dismantles the myths of gender essentialism Drawing on a wealth of interdisciplinary data regarding the biological and cultural origins of sex differences, Levit provides a fresh perspective on gendered behaviors and argues the need for careful cultivation of new relations between the sexes.

With its focus particularly on men, The Gender Line offers an insightful overview of theconstruction of gender and the damaging effects of its stereotypes. Levit analyzes the ways in which law legitimizes the social segregation of the sexes through legal decisions regarding custody, employment, education, sexual harassment, and criminal law. In so doing, she illustrates the ways in which men's and women's oppressions are intertwined and how law molds the very definition of masculinity.

Applying feminist methodology to the doctrine of feminism itself, Levit artfully demonstrates that gender separatism infects even our contemporary views of feminism. Levit asks questions that have been too long been unspoken--those that lie at the core of the feminist project, yet threaten its very foundations. Revealing masculinity as both a privileged and a victimized condition, she calls for a step forward, past the bounds of contemporary feminism and its conflicts, toward a more egalitarian and inclusive feminism. This brand of feminism would reshape traditional masculinity, invite men into feminist dialogue, and claim men as political allies.

'I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth' we say in a court of law. 'In a court of law, the truth is precisely what we will not say', says Lacan. 'If God is dead, everything is permitted', writes Dostoyevsky. 'If God is dead, everything is prohibited', responds Lacan. 'I think, therefore I am', reasons Descartes. 'I am where I do not think', concludes Lacan. What are we to make of Lacan's inversions of these mottos? And what are the implications for the legal system if we take them seriously? This book puts the legal subject on the couch and explores the incestuous relationship between law and desire, enjoyment and transgression, freedom and subjection, ethics and atheism. The process of analysis problematizes fundamental tenets of the legal system, leading the patient to rethink long-held beliefs: terms like 'guilt' and 'innocence', 'truth' and 'lies', 'reason' and 'reality', 'freedom' and 'responsibility', 'cause' and 'punishment', acquire new and surprising meanings. By the end of these sessions, the patient is left wondering, along with Freud her analyst, whether 'it is not psychology that deserves the mockery but the procedure of judicial enquiry'. A unique study on the nexus of Law and Psychoanalysis, this book will interest students and scholars of both subjects, as well as general readers looking to explore this perverse and fascinating relationship.

American Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of religious freedom has been, for the most part, predicated upon a form of liberal theory commonly known as "procedural liberalism." Faith on Trial explains how the Court's reliance on this theoretical basis hampers its ability to adequately address the reality of religion as a pluralistic social institution. David E. Guinn provides a detailed critique of procedural liberalism by thinkers such as Charles Taylor and Iris Marion Young-tapping into the idea of "deep diversity" suggested by Taylor-through the development of a new theoretical model that reconceptualizes Supreme Court jurisprudence. This challenging work demonstrates a practical way to resolve the problems inherent in much existing religious freedom jurisprudence and calls for a reformation of Supreme Court thinking on the First Amendment.

Hate speech law can be found throughout the world. But it is also the subject of numerous principled arguments, both for and against. These principles invoke a host of morally relevant features (e.g., liberty, health, autonomy, security, non-subordination, the absence of oppression, human dignity, the discovery of truth, the acquisition of knowledge, self-realization, human excellence, civic dignity, cultural diversity and choice, recognition of cultural identity, intercultural dialogue, participation in democratic self-government, being subject only to legitimate rule) and practical considerations (e.g., efficacy, the least restrictive alternative, chilling effects). The book develops and then critically examines these various principled arguments. It also attempts to de-homogenize hate speech law into different clusters of laws/regulations/codes that constrain uses of hate speech, so as to facilitate a more nuanced examination of the principled arguments. Finally, it argues that it is morally fitting for judicial and legislative judgments about the overall warrant of hate speech law to reflect principled compromise. Principled compromise is characterized not merely by compromise over matters of principled concern but also by compromise which is itself governed by ideals of moral duty or civic virtue (e.g., reciprocity, equality, and mutual respect). The Open Access version of this book, available at https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315714899, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

This incisive book deals with the use of the criminal law to enforce morality, in particular sexual morality, a subject of particular interest and importance since the publication of the Wolfenden Report in 1957. Professor Hart first considers John Stuart Mill's famous declaration: "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community is to prevent harm to others." During the last hundred years this doctrine has twice been sharply challenged by two great lawyers: Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, the great Victorian judge and historian of the common law, and Lord Devlin, who both argue that the use of the criminal law to enforce morality is justified. The author examines their arguments in some detail, and sets out to demonstrate that they fail to recognize distinction of vital importance for legal and political theory, and that they espouse a conception of the function of legal punishment that few would now share.

Against jurisprudential reductions of Spinoza's thinking to a kind of eccentric version of Hobbes, this book argues that Spinoza's theory of natural right contains an important idea of absolute freedom, which would be inconceivable within Hobbes' own schema. Spinoza famously thought that the universe and all of the beings and events within it are fully determined by their causes. This has led jurisprudential commentators to believe that Spinoza has no room for natural right - in the sense that whatever happens by definition has a 'right' to happen. But, although this book demonstrates how Spinoza constructs a system in which right is understood as the work of machines, by fixing right as determinate and invariable, Stephen Connolly argues that Spinoza is not limiting his theory. The universe as a whole is capable of acting only in determinate ways but, he argues, for Spinoza these exist within a field of infinite possibilities. In an analysis that offers much to ongoing attempts to conceive of justice post-foundationally, the argument of this book is that Spinoza opens up right to a future of determinate interventions -as when an engineer, working with already-existing materials, improves a machine. As such, an idea of freedom emerges in Spinoza: as the artful rearrangement of the given into new possibilities. An exciting and original contribution, this book is an invaluable addition, both to the new wave of interest in Spinoza's philosophy, and to contemporary legal and political theory.

In No Place for Ethics, Hill argues that contemporary judicial review by the Supreme Court rests on its mistaken positivist understanding of law-law simply because so ordered-as something separate from ethics. To assert any relation between the two is to contaminate both, either by turning law into an arm of ethics, or making ethics an expression of law. To address this mistake, Hill contends that an understanding of natural law theory provides the basis for a constitutive relation between ethics and law without confusing their distinct role in answering the basic question, how should I behave in society? To secure that relation, the Court has an overriding responsibility when carrying out its review to do so with reference to normative ethics from which the US Constitution is derived and to which it is accountable. While the Constitution confirms, for example, the liberty interests of individuals, it does not originate those interests which have their origin in human rights that long preceded it. Essential to this argument is an appreciation of ethics as objective and normatively based on principles, like that of justice and truth that ought to inform human behavior at its very springs. Applied in an analysis of five major Supreme Court cases, this appreciation of ethics reveals how wrongly decided these cases are.

Advancing legal scholarship in the area of mixed legal systems, as well as comparative law more generally, this book expands the comparative study of the world's legal families to those of jurisdictions containing not only mixtures of common and civil law, but also to those mixing Islamic and/or traditional legal systems with those derived from common and/or civil law traditions. With contributions from leading experts in their fields, the book takes us far beyond the usual focus of comparative law with analysis of a broad range of countries, including relatively neglected and under-researched areas. The discussion is situated within the broader context of the ongoing development and evolution of mixed legal systems against the continuing tides of globalization on the one hand, and on the other hand the emergence of Islamic governments in some parts of the Middle East, the calls for a legal status for Islamic law in some European countries, and the increasing focus on traditional and customary norms of governance in post-colonial contexts. This book will be an invaluable source for students and researchers working in the areas of comparative law, legal pluralism, the evolution of mixed legal systems, and the impact of colonialism on contemporary legal systems. It will also be an important resource for policy-makers and analysts.

This volume presents a new approach to today's tax controversies, reflecting that debates about taxation often turn on the differing worldviews of the debate participants. For instance, a central tension in academic tax literature - which is filtering into everyday discussions of tax law - exists between 'mainstream' and 'critical' tax theorists. This tension results from a clash of perspectives: Is taxation primarily a matter of social science or of social justice? Should tax policy debates be grounded in economics or in critical race, feminist, queer, and other outsider perspectives? To capture and interrogate what often seems like a chasm between the different sides of tax debates, this collection comprises a series of pairs of essays. Each pair approaches a single area of controversy from two different perspectives - with one essay usually taking a 'mainstream' perspective and the other a 'critical' perspective. In writing their contributions, the authors read and incorporated reactions to each other's essays and paid specific attention to the influence of perspective on both the area of controversy and their contribution to the debate. With contributions from leading mainstream and critical tax scholars, this volume takes the first step toward bridging the gap between these differing perspectives on tax law and policy.

This volume investigates advances in the field of legal translation both from a theoretical and practical perspective, with professional and academic insights from leading experts in the field. Part I of the collection focuses on the exploration of legal translatability from a theoretical angle. Covering fundamental issues such as equivalence in legal translation, approaches to legal translation and the interaction between judicial interpretation and legal translation, the authors offer contributions from philosophical, rhetorical, terminological and lexicographical perspectives. Part II focuses on the analysis of legal translation from a practical perspective among different jurisdictions such as China, the EU and Japan, offering multiple and pluralistic viewpoints. This book presents a collection of studies in legal translation which not only provide the latest international research findings among academics and practitioners, but also furnish us with a new approach to, and new insights into, the phenomena and nature of legal translation and legal transfer. The collection provides an invaluable reference for researchers, practitioners, academics and students specialising in law and legal translation, philosophy, sociology, linguistics and semiotics.

The Moral Limits of Law analyses the related debates concerning the moral obligation to obey the law, conscientious citizenship, and state legitimacy. Modern societies are drawn in a tension between the centripetal pull of the local and the centrifugal stress of the global. Boundaries that once appeared permanent are now permeable: transnational legal, economic, and trade institutions increasingly erode the autonomy of states. Nonetheless transnational principles are still typically effected through state law. For law's subjects, this tension brings into focus the interaction of legal and moral obligations and the legitimacy of state authority. This volume incorporates a comprehensive critical analysis of the methodology and substance of the debates in recent legal, political, and moral philosophy, regarding political obligation and the moral obligation to obey the law. The author argues that traditional accounts of political obligation that assume a bounded conception of the polity are no longer tenable. Higgins therefore presents an original theory of the conscientious agent's attitude towards law that accommodates the contemporary social tension between local and global obligations.

Judicial systems are under increasing pressure: from rising litigation costs and decreased accessibility, from escalating accountability and performance evaluation expectations, from shifting burdens of case management and alternative dispute resolution roles, and from emerging technologies. For courts to survive and flourish in a rapidly changing society, it is vital to have a clear understanding of their contemporary role - and a willingness to defend it. This book presents a clear vision of what it is that courts do, how they do it, and how we can make sure that they perform that role well. It argues that courts remain a critical, relevant and supremely well-adjusted institution in the 21st century. The approach of this book is to weave together a range of discourses on surrounding judicial issues into a systemic and coherent whole. It begins by articulating the dual roles at the core of the judicial function: third-party merit-based dispute resolution and social (normative) governance. By expanding upon these discrete yet inter-related aspects, it develops a language and conceptual framework to understand the judicial role more fully. The subsequent chapters demonstrate the explanatory power of this function, examining the judicial decision-making method, reframing principles of judicial independence and impartiality, and re-conceiving systems of accountability and responsibility. The book argues that this function-driven conception provides a useful re-imagining of some familiar issues as part of a coherent framework of foundational, yet interwoven, principles. This approach not only adds clarity to the analysis of those concepts and the concrete mechanisms by which they are manifest, but helps make the case of why courts remain such vital social institutions. Ultimately, the book is an entreaty not to take courts for granted, nor to readily abandon the benefits they bring to society. Instead, by understanding the importance and legitimacy of the judicial role, and its multifaceted social benefits, this books challenge us to refresh our courts in a manner that best advances this underlying function.

The central theme of this impressively argued study is that the mental and physical are identical. Drawing heavily on recent scientific research into the mind-brain relationship, Dr Wilson argues that human mentality, rationality and purposefulness are phenomena which come within the compass of scientifically based explanation. The consequences of this thesis are enormous both in relation to the controversies about reasons and causes as explanations of human behaviour, and, more important, to the problems of free will, moral responsibility, penal philosophy, ethics and the law. The book argues that free will is a misconceived idea and that our notions of moral responsibility need radical revision. The book is of considerable relevance not only to academic philosophy but also to scientists and jurisprudents interested in the implications of this study. Originally published in 1979.

The main question explored by the book is: How can cross-border access to human genetic resources, such as blood or DNA samples, be governed in such a way as to achieve equity for vulnerable populations in developing countries? The book situates the field of genomic and genetic research within global health and research frameworks, describing the concerns that have been raised about the potential unfairness in exchanges during recent decades. Access to and sharing in the benefits of human biological resources are aspects not regulated by any international legal framework such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, which applies only to the exchange of plants, animals and microorganisms, as well as to associated traditional knowledge. Examples of genetic research perceived as exploitative are provided in order to illustrate the legal vacuum concerning the global governance of human genetic resources. The main conclusions drawn from the legal and ethical analysis are: * Benefit sharing is crucial in order to avoid the exploitation of developing countries in human genetic research. * With functioning research ethics committees, undue inducement is less of a concern in genetic research than in other areas of medical research (e.g. clinical trials). * Concerns remain over research involving indigenous populations; accordingly, recommendations are provided. In drawing these conclusions, the book addresses in detail a highly pressing topic in global bioethics and international law. In this regard, it combines bioethical arguments with jurisprudence, in particular with reference to the law of equity and the legal concepts of duress (coercion), unconscionable dealing, and undue inducement.