This collection offers a critical assessment of transcendentalism, the understanding of consciousness, absolutized as a system of a priori laws of the mind, that was advanced by Kant and Husserl. As these studies show, transcendentalism critically informed 20th Century phenomenological investigation into such issues as temporality, historicity, imagination, objectivity and subjectivity, freedom, ethical judgment, work, praxis. Advances in science have now provoked a questioning of the absolute prerogatives of consciousness. Transcendentalism is challenged by empirical reductionism. And recognition of the role the celestial sphere plays in life on planet earth suggests that a radical shift of philosophy's center of gravity be made away from absolute consciousness and toward the transcendental forces at play in the architectonics of the cosmos.

This pivot focuses on "the concept of edification" in a bid to systematically expound its connotative structure and logical evolution. It is divided into ten chapters, embracing various issues, such as human nature as the foundation of edification, the development of edification and cultivation, the evolution of edification and the resultant life based on ritual and music, the political orientation and ultimate care of edification, and the nurturing of social edification, in an effort to offer a panoramic view of the intellectual features of Confucianism, and consequently a profound reflection on the cultural consciousness of contemporary China. The book is expected to satisfy the needs for a better understanding of edification as a Confucian concept, and the conceptual features of Chinese philosophy, or rather, Confucianism.

This book discusses two of the oldest and hardest problems in both science and philosophy: What is matter?, and What is mind? A reason for tackling both problems in a single book is that two of the most influential views in modern philosophy are that the universe is mental (idealism), and that the everything real is material (materialism). Most of the thinkers who espouse a materialist view of mind have obsolete ideas about matter, whereas those who claim that science supports idealism have not explained how the universe could have existed before humans emerged. Besides, both groups tend to ignore the other levels of existence-chemical, biological, social, and technological. If such levels and the concomitant emergence processes are ignored, the physicalism/spiritualism dilemma remains unsolved, whereas if they are included, the alleged mysteries are shown to be problems that science is treating successfully.

This carefully designed, multi-authored textbook covers a broad range of theoretical issues in cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience. With accessible language, a uniform structure, and many pedagogical features, Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introdution is the best high-level overview of this area for an interdisciplinary readership of students. Written specifically for this volume by experts in their fields who are also experienced teachers, the book's thirty chapters are organized into the following parts: I. Background Knowledge II. Classical Debates III. Consciousness IV. Crossing Boundaries Each chapter starts with relevant key words and definitions and a chapter overview, then presents historical coverage of the topic, explains and analyzes contemporary debates, and ends with a sketch of cutting edge research. A list of suggested readings and helpful discussion topics conclude each chapter. This uniform, student-friendly design makes it possible to teach a cohort of both philosophy and interdisciplinary students without assuming prior understanding of philosophical concepts, cognitive science, or neuroscience. Key Features: Synthesizes the now decades-long explosion of scientifically informed philosophical research in the study of mind. Expands on the offerings of other textbooks by including chapters on language, concepts and non-conceptual content, and animal cognition. Offers the same structure in each chapter, moving the reader through an overview, historical coverage, contemporary debates, and finally cutting-edge research. Packed with pedagogical features, like defined Key Terms, Suggested Readings, and Discussion Questions for each chapter, as well as a General Glossary. Provides readers with clear, chapter-long introductions to Cognitive Neuroscience, Molecular and Cellular Cognition, Experimental Methods in Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysical Issues, and Epistemic Issues.

Responding to the work of previous critics of psychiatry, who have associated its undue dominance with both a modern scientific paradigm and political factors, Jenifer Booth puts forward a theoretical challenge based on MacIntyres work on Aquinas and Aristotle, but adding the museum and assembly as conceptual thinking tools.
MacIntyres work on practices, tradition-constituted enquiry, Marxist ideology and Kuhn are all used in putting forward a pre-modern view of knowledge. The feminist philosophy of Luce Irigaray widens the project to include psychotherapy. Booth puts forward a workable and kind version of psychiatric medicine which sets the work of the mental health service user movement in context.
This book should be of value to anyone who has ever wondered why doctors have so much power or who has thought that spiritual and social factors should have more weight in medicine.
It will be of interest to moral philosophers, theologians and feminist theologians, philosophers of medicine and museums studies professionals alike.

Consciousness has become a major topic of scientific interest, and dozens of books have been written in recent years to explain it, yet it still remains a mystery. Science and the Riddle of Consciousness explains why consciousness is a riddle for science, and demonstrates how this riddle can be solved. The questions examined in the book speak directly to neuroscientists, computer scientists, psychologists, and philosophers.

We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; an avowal such as "I'm feeling so anxious" or "I'm thinking about my next trip to Paris," it is typically supposed, tells it like it is. But why is that? Why should what I say about my present mental states carry so much more weight than what others say about them? Why should avowals be more immune to criticism and correction than other claims we make? And if avowals are not based on any evidence or observation, how could they possibly express our knowledge of our own present mental states?
Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds.
Bar-On proposes a Neo-Expressivist view according to which avowals are expressive acts that have truth-accessible self-ascriptions as their products. When avowing, a person directly expresses, rather than merely reports, the very mental condition that the avowal ascribes. She argues that this expressivist idea, coupled with an adequate characterization of expression and a proper separation of the semantics of avowals from their pragmatics and epistemology, explains the special status we assign to avowals. As against many expressivists and their critics, she maintains that such an expressivist explanation is consistent with a non-deflationary view of self-knowledge and a robust realism about mental states. The view that emerges preserves many insights of the most prominent contributors to the subject, while offering a new perspective on our special relationship to our own minds.

Provides a comprehensive overview of research on Emotion and Cognition for each cognitive function alongside coverage of ow emotion-cognition relations are modulated by individual differences, aging, and psychopathology. Will appeal to anyone interested in the role of emotions, including students and researchers from the cognitive and affective sciences, such as psychology, linguistics, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, computer science, psychiatry, and neuropsychology. Features student-friendly figures and pedagogy, alongside a wealth of up-to-date references throughout.

Knowledge and Reality brings together a selection of Colin McGinn's philosophical essays from the 1970s to the 1990s, whose unifying theme is the relation between the mind and the world. The essays range over a set of prominent topics in contemporary philosophy, including the analysis of knowledge, the a priori, necessity, possible worlds, realism, mental representation, appearance and reality, and colour. McGinn has written a new postscript to each essay, placing it in its philosophical context by sketching the background against which it was written, explaining its relations to other notable work, and offering his current reflections on the topic. The volume thus traces the development of McGinn's ideas and their role in some central philosophical debates. Seen together the essays offer a many-sided defence of realism, while emphasizing the epistemological price that realism exacts.

Panpsychism is the view that consciousness - the most puzzling and strangest phenomenon in the entire universe - is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the world, though in a form very remote from human consciousness. At a very basic level, the world is awake. Panpsychism seems implausible to most, and yet it has experienced a remarkable renaissance of interest over the last quarter century. The reason is the stubbornly intractable problem of consciousness. Despite immense progress in understanding the brain and its relation to states of consciousness, we still really have no idea how consciousness emerges from physical processes which are presumed to be entirely non-conscious. The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism provides a high-level comprehensive examination and assessment of the subject - its history and contemporary development. It offers 28 chapters, appearing in print here for the first time, from the world's leading researchers on panpsychism. The chapters are divided into four sections that integrate panpsychism's relevance with important issues in philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and even ethics: Historical Reflections Forms of Panpsychism Comparative Alternatives How Does Panpsychism Work? The volume will be useful to students and scholars as both an introduction and as cutting-edge philosophical engagement with the subject. For anyone interested in a philosophical approach to panpsychism, the Handbook will supply fascinating and enlightening reading. The topics covered are highly diverse, representing a spectrum of views on the nature of mind and world from various standpoints which take panpsychism seriously.

In Philosophy of Mind: The Metaphysics of Consciousness, Dale Jacquette provides students and professionals with a concise and accessible overview of this fascinating subject. The book covers all the key topics and debates in the philosophy of mind and introduces the full range of choices available in approaching the mind-body problem. Exploring classical and contemporary texts, the book surveys the subject's historical background and current applications. Crucially, Jacquette offers a defence of property dualism as an alternative solution to the mind-body problem, instead of the mainstream eliminativist and reductivist strategies. Clearly structured and featuring useful diagrams, a glossary of key terms, and advice on further reading, the book is ideal for classroom use. Fully revised, updated and expanded to meet the needs of a new generation of philosophy students, this second edition is the ideal companion to the study of the philosophy of mind.

AI (Artificial Intelligence) is predicted to radically change teaching and learning in both schools and industry causing radical disruption of work. AI can support well-being initiatives and lifelong learning but educational institutions and companies need to take the changing technology into account. Moving towards AI supported by digital tools requires a dramatic shift in the concept of learning, expertise and the businesses built off of it. Based on the latest research on AI and how it is changing learning and education, this book will focus on the enormous opportunities to expand educational settings with AI for learning in and beyond the traditional classroom. This open access book also introduces ethical challenges related to learning and education, while connecting human learning and machine learning. This book will be of use to a variety of readers, including researchers, AI users, companies and policy makers.

This collection of papers on issues in the theory of mental representation expresses a diversity of recent reflections on the idea that C. D. Broad so aptly characterized in the title of his book Mind and the World Order. An important impetus in the project of organizing this work were the discussions I had with Keith Lehrer while I was a Visiting Scholar in the department of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. His encouragement and friendship were of great value to me and I wish to express my thanks to him here. A word of thanks too for Mike Harnish who casually suggested the title Rerepresentation. I wish to express my thanks to Hans Schuurmans of the Computer Center at Tilburg University for his patient and cheerful assistance in preparing the manuscript. Professor J. Verster of the University of Groningen kindly provided the plates for the Ames Room figures. Thieu Kuys helped not only with the texts but also relieved me of chores so that I could devote more time to meeting deadlines. Barry Mildner had a major role in the text preparation using his skills and initiative in solving what seemed like endless technical problems. My deepest thanks are reserved for Anti Sax whose contribution to the project amount to a co-editorship of this volume. She participated in every phase of its development with valuable suggestions, prepared the indexes, and worked tirelessly to its completion.

- The first student-focused textbook on Transpersonal Psychology - Introduces students and instructors to contemporary developments of the field and anticipates future advances - Suitable as a core text for Transpersonal Psychology/Humanistic Psychology modules, or as a supplementary text for core Psychology modules

This is an open access book which explores phenomenology as both an exceptionally diverse movement in philosophy as well as an active research method that crosses disciplinary boundaries. The volume brings together lively overviews of major areas and schools of phenomenology, as well as the most recent applications across a range of fields.  The first part reviews the state-of-the-art in various areas of contemporary phenomenology, including several distinct schools of Husserl and Heidegger scholarship, as well as approaches derived from Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir, Fanon, and others. An innovative quantitative analysis of citation networks provides rich visualizations of the field as a whole. The second part showcases phenomenology as a living discipline that can advance research in other areas. While some areas of interaction between phenomenology and other disciplines are by now well established (e.g. cognitive science), this volume sheds light on newer areas of application. The goal is to move beyond discussions of philosophical method and highlight scholars who are actually doing phenomenology in a variety of areas, including:   Embodiment and questions of gender, race, and identity,  The arts (visual art, literature, architecture), and  Archaeology and anthropology.   This volume offers a concise introduction to cutting edge phenomenological research and is suitable for both students and specialists. 

Our digital existence is hurried and fast. We are tied to the present, or perhaps we are not present enough: immersed in digital social media and processes by artificial intelligence, we are hardly present to ourselves and to others, and feel alienated from nature. We are also made to fear climate change and the end of humanity. How can we live a good life and give meaning to our lives under these conditions? How can and should we co-exist today? Using process philosophy, narrative theory, and the concept of technoperformances, this book analyzes how digital technologies shape our relation to time and our existence, and discusses what this means in the light of climate change and new technologies such as AI. In dialogue with contemporary philosophy of technology and media theory and asking original questions about finding common times in what it calls the "Anthropochrone", it proposes a conceptual framework that helps us to understand how we (should) exist and relate to time today.

Psychologist Sharon Lamb and philosopher Jeffrie Murphy argue that forgiveness has been accepted as a therapeutic strategy without serious, critical examination. Chapters by both psychologists and philosophers ask: Why is forgiveness so popular now? What exactly does it entail? When might it be appropriate for a therapist not to advise forgiveness? When is forgiveness in fact harmful?

* Presents Fanon's theories and insights in a manner that is easy to understand for students * Highlights the various ways that multi-disciplinary forms of psychological analysis can be applied to the critique of contemporary forms of racism * Seamlessly ties together critical and contemporary scholarship from and about Fanon that introduces his analyses of racism and racialized subjectivity in an accessible manner

This volume is a collection of essays on a special theme in Aristotelian philosophy of mind: the internal senses. The first part of the volume is devoted to the central question of whether or not any internal senses exist in Aristotle's philosophy of mind and, if so, how many and how they are individuated. The provocative claim of chapter one is that Aristotle recognizes no such internal sense. His medieval Latin interpreters, on the other hand, very much thought that Aristotle did introduce a number of internal senses as shown in the second chapter. The second part of the volume contains a number of case studies demonstrating the philosophical background of some of the most influential topics covered by the internal senses in the Aristotelian tradition and in contemporary philosophy of mind. The focus of the case studies is on memory, imagination and estimation. Chapters introduce the underlying mechanisms of memory and recollection taking its cue from Aristotle but reaching into early modern philosophy as well as studying composite imagination in Avicenna's philosophy of mind. Further topics include the Latin reception of Avicenna's estimative faculty and the development of the internal senses as well as offering an account of the logic of objects of imagination.

This book provides a framework that encompasses both physics and cognitive science - integrating them into a 'theory of everything' to establish a basis for both our scientific and humanistic endeavours. It explores the implications of brain laterality for understanding the emergence of mind and its relation to the physical world - arguing that the analytic vs. holistic cognitive differences of the left and right human cerebral hemispheres are key to understanding not only human self-consciousness and language, but also sociocultural phenomena ranging from the emergence of the scientific method and axes of political orientation to the direction of development of conceptions of God and the fundamental differences between polarizing philosophical traditions. In a further step, the book draws on the Darwinian principle that our cognitive apparatus is shaped by the environment in which it evolved to argue that human bilaterality mirrors the fundamental hylomorphic relation between formal organization and material components that constitutes physical nature itself. The logical division between holistic and analytic categories thereby offers a principled basis for a metaphilosophy.

The context for this interdisciplinary work by a philosopher and a clinician is the psychiatric care provided to those with severe mental disorders. Such a setting makes distinctive moral demands on the very character of the practitioner, it is shown, calling for special virtues and greater virtue than many other practice settings. In a practice so attentive to the patient's self identity, the authors promote a heightened awareness of cultural and particularly gender issues. By elucidating the nature of the moral psychology and character of the good psychiatrist, this work provides a sustained application of virtue theory to clinical practice. With its roots in Aristotelian writing, The Virtuous Psychiatrist presents virtue traits as habits, able to be cultivated and enhanced through training. The book describes these traits, and how they can be habituated in clinical training. A turn towards virtue theory within philosophy during the last several decades has resulted in important research on professional ethics. By approaching the ethics of psychiatric professionals in these virtue terms, Radden and Sadler's work provides an original application of this theorizing to practice. Of interest to both theorists and practitioners, the book explores the tension between the model of enduring character implicit in virtue theory and the segmented personae of role-specific moral responses. Clinical examples are provided, based upon dramaturgical vignettes (caseplays) which illustrate both the interactions of the case participants as well as the inner monologue of the clinician protagonist.

It is commonly held that our thoughts, beliefs, desires and feelings - the mental phenomena that we instantiate - are constituted by states and processes that occur inside our head. The view known as externalism, however, denies that mental phenomena are internal in this sense. The mind is not purely in the head. Mental phenomena are hybrid entities that straddle both internal state and processes and things occurring in the outside world. The development of externalist conceptions of the mind is one of the most controversial, and arguably one of the most important, developments in the philosophy of mind in the second half of the twentieth century. Yet, despite its significance most recent work on externalism has been highly technical, clouding its basic ideas and principles. Moreover, very little work has been done to locate externalism within philosophical developments in both analytic and continental traditions. In this book, Mark Rowlands aims to remedy both these problems and present for the reader a clear and accessible introduction to the subject grounded in wider developments in the history of philosophy. Rowlands shows that externalism has significant and respectable historical roots that make it much more important than a specific eruption that occurred in late twentieth-century analytic philosophy.

In this little but profound volume, Robert Kane and Carolina Sartorio debate a perennial question: Do We Have Free Will? Kane introduces and defends libertarianism about free will: free will is incompatible with determinism; we are free; we are not determined. Sartorio introduces and defends compatibilism about free will: free will is compatible with determinism; we can be free even while our actions are determined through and through. Simplifying tricky terminology and complicated concepts for readers new to the debate, the authors also cover the latest developments on a controversial topic that gets us entangled in questions about blameworthiness and responsibility, coercion and control, and much more. Each author first presents their own side, and then they interact through two rounds of objections and replies. Pedagogical features include standard form arguments, section summaries, bolded key terms and principles, a glossary, and annotated reading lists. Short, lively and accessible, the debate showcases diverse and cutting-edge work on free will. As per Saul Smilansky's foreword, Kane and Sartorio, "present the readers with two things at once: an introduction to the traditional free will problem; and a demonstration of what a great yet very much alive and relevant philosophical problem is like." Key Features: Covers major concepts, views and arguments about free will in an engaging format Accessible style and pedagogical features for students and general readers Cutting-edge contributions by preeminent scholars on free will.

Why ought we concern ourselves with understanding a concept of evil? It is an elusive and politically charged concept which critics argue has no explanatory power and is a relic of a superstitious and primitive religious past. Yet its widespread use persists today: we find it invoked by politicians, judges, journalists, and many others to express the view that certain actions, persons, institutions, or ideologies are not just morally problematic but require a special signifier to mark them out from the ordinary and commonplace. Therefore, the question of what a concept of evil could mean and how it fits into our moral vocabulary remains an important and pressing concern. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evil provides an outstanding overview and exploration of these issues and more, bringing together an international team of scholars working on the concept of evil. Its 27 chapters cover the crucial discussions and arguments, both historical and contemporary, that are needed to properly understand the historical development and complexity of the concept of evil. The Handbook is divided into three parts: Historical explorations of evil Recent secular explorations of evil Evil and other issues. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evil is essential reading for students and researchers in the fields of ethics and philosophy of psychology. It also provides important insights and background for anyone exploring the concept of evil in related subjects such as literature, politics, and religion.