This book explores a new way of applying clinical ethics. Empathy-based ethics is based on the patient-doctor relationship and seeks to encourage a more humane form of medical practice. The author argues that the current emphasis on the biomedical model of medicine and a detached concern form of professionalism have damaged the patient-doctor relationship. He investigates examples of the dehumanization of patients and demonstrates a contrasting view of humane care. The book presents empathy as a relational construct - it provides an in-depth analysis of the process of empathizing. It discusses an empathy-based ethics approach underpinned by clinical examples of the practical application of this new approach. It suggests how empathy-based ethics can be embedded in clinical practice, medical education and research. The book concludes by examining the challenges in implementing such an approach and looks to a future which redresses the current imbalance between biomedical and psychosocial approaches to medicine.

This volume, - is an introspective read on Krishnamurti as a radical philosopher, - discusses the possibilities of change through education, the school and the school culture as catalysts for transformation - will be of great interest to students and researcher of philosophy, education, South Asia studies, and the social sciences.

This insightful book proposes a holistic theory of the development of self, drawing on interdisciplinary literature in existential-phenomenology, neurophenomenology, intracrinology, endocrinology, and naturopathic medicine. The psychoneurointracrine hypothesis bridges the gap between the mind and brain, providing a framework to explain the complex system that facilitates development of one's sense of self and well-being. The book challenges assumptions in present day neuroscience and psychiatry, placing the mind and brain on a continuum of health and growth rather than reducing the study of human consciousness to neurobiological terms and pathological classifications. "In this landmark book, Susan Gordon presents a bold hypothesis, one that underscores the importance of psychoneurointracrine activity and links it to female neurology and the development of one's sense of self. She brilliantly places this activity, which serves as a mind-body bridge, within the frameworks of neurophenomenology and non-linear dynamics. Her psychoneurointracrine hypothesis is a tour de force, one that is holistic, integrating intracrinology with psychology and neurology. This hypothesis undercuts the current assumption that the mind is an epiphenomenon of the brain, creating a paradigm that impacts science's understanding of behavior, experience, consciousness, and human agency." Stanley Krippner, PhD, Affiliated Distinguished Faculty, California Institute of Integral Studies, San Francisco, CA "In her fascinating book, Susan Gordon develops a novel theory about the biological connection between mind, brain, and organism. Drawing on empirical research on the role of the female hormonal system in basal states of self and mood, she shows that the biochemistry of the endocrine system must be viewed as an indispensable foundation for the emergence of embodied self-awareness. The homeostasis and hormonal balance of the organism is integral to the sense of well-being and the development of meaning, but it is also continually modulated and influenced by the subject's experience of his or her world. She makes a decisive contribution to a theory of embodiment that goes far beyond a computational theory of the brain to focus on the biochemical-organismic processes at the root of the mind." Thomas Fuchs, MD, PhD, Karl Jaspers Professor of Philosophy and Psychiatry, University of Heidelberg, DE

The Interactions Between Instinct and Intellect and its Impact on Human Behavior
Length: 208 pages
Mark Abraham was displeased by the phenomenon of politicking, although he studied it for a deeper and more accurate understanding of this fatigued term, "politics," as a major aspect of human affair. For reasons he could not identify as a student, he was never satisfied with the prevailing definitions. Thus, he asked his professors in both undergraduate and graduate school in the political science department to share their understanding of the term with him. Each of them seemed to have an understanding uniquely different from all the rest. Then, he realized that this was a vaguely understood phenomenon even by the professors in the field and he relented his efforts and concluded that, "politics," was one of the most used but the least understood phenomena. As he developed his own theories, he formulated that unlike the commonly perceived concept, politics is not just a profession for the few in each society, but it is a brand of behavior unique to humans that starts in early childhood. Thus, he formulated, "to be instinctive is to be selfish. To be selfish and intelligent is to be political. Because instincts and intellect are permanent human fixtures, politicking that results for their cofunction also becomes a permanent human fixture." This perception justifies Aristotle's claim that, "man is a political animal." The ultimate objective of politicking is to impose and thus, he tries to redefine it. He perceives politicking as a range of complex and manipulative deeds afforded by people to impose their will and interest on others against their will and interest. As such, it erodes innocence and is one of the least desirable of all human attributes.
Yet the selfish nature of all instincts as the driving force behind politics is the sole force that governs the world of animals, thus politicking becomes the refined reflection of animals in man. Where animals use fangs, claws, venom, speed and brute force to subdue and devour their pray, humans apply politics that includes the use of brute force. Misconceiving this term greatly contributes to human conflicts at all levels, which is why most people unconsciously dislike politicking and politics worldwide.

Modern study of the mind is marked by the hegemony of thought, dominance of consciousness, and dictate of deliberation that result in an overwhelming intellectualism. However, it ignores the fundamental fact that by far most of our mental activity is not manifested in explicit reasoning, and is mostly not conscious. What then enables our successful participation in the natural, social, and cultural surroundings without recourse to the 'higher' cognitive processes? The background. It is the implicit and efficacious guide in human coping with the world without the monitoring reason. Yet how rules turn into routines? How conscious efforts convert into unreflective skills? How does the body of knowledge become the knowing body? How can most complex reactions of the human mind turn into 'just doing'? The lesson from the background teaches us that we are capacitated to do more than we explicitly know; the sort of knowledge is skilled and automated competence which is there before the conscious 'self' can report of its emergence.

The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality provides a wide-ranging survey of topics in a rapidly expanding area of interdisciplinary research. It consists of 36 chapters, written exclusively for this volume, by an international team of experts. What is distinctive about the study of collective intentionality within the broader study of social interactions and structures is its focus on the conceptual and psychological features of joint or shared actions and attitudes, and their implications for the nature of social groups and their functioning. This Handbook fully captures this distinctive nature of the field and how it subsumes the study of collective action, responsibility, reasoning, thought, intention, emotion, phenomenology, decision-making, knowledge, trust, rationality, cooperation, competition, and related issues, as well as how these underpin social practices, organizations, conventions, institutions and social ontology. Like the field, the Handbook is interdisciplinary, drawing on research in philosophy, cognitive science, linguistics, legal theory, anthropology, sociology, computer science, psychology, economics, and political science. Finally, the Handbook promotes several specific goals: (1) it provides an important resource for students and researchers interested in collective intentionality; (2) it integrates work across disciplines and areas of research as it helps to define the shape and scope of an emerging area of research; (3) it advances the study of collective intentionality.

A World for Us aims to refute physical realism and establish in its place a form of idealism. Physical realism, in the sense in which John Foster understands it, takes the physical world to be something whose existence is both logically independent of the human mind and metaphysically fundamental. Foster identifies a number of problems for this realist view, but his main objection is that it does not accord the world the requisite empirical immanence. The form of idealism that he tries to establish in its place rejects the realist view in both its aspects. It takes the world to be something whose existence is ultimately constituted by facts about human sensory experience, or by some richer complex of non-physical facts in which such experiential facts centrally feature. Foster calls this phenomenalistic idealism. He tries to establish a specific version of such phenomenalistic idealism, in which the experiential facts that centrally feature in the constitutive creation of the world are ones that concern the organization of human sensory experience. The basic idea of this version is that, in the context of certain other constitutively relevant factors, this sensory organization creates the physical world by disposing things to appear systematically world-wise at the human empirical viewpoint. Chief among these other relevant factors is the role of God as the one who is responsible for the sensory organization and ordains the system of appearance it yields. It is this that gives the idealistically created world its objectivity and allows it to qualify as a real world.

This book centers around a dialogue between Roger Penrose and Emanuele Severino about one of most intriguing topics of our times, the comparison of artificial intelligence and natural intelligence, as well as its extension to the notions of human and machine consciousness. Additional insightful essays by Mauro D'Ariano, Federico Faggin, Ines Testoni, Giuseppe Vitiello and an introduction of Fabio Scardigli complete the book and illuminate different aspects of the debate. Although from completely different points of view, all the authors seem to converge on the idea that it is almost impossible to have real "intelligence" without a form of "consciousness". In fact, consciousness, often conceived as an enigmatic "mirror" of reality (but is it really a mirror?), is a phenomenon under intense investigation by science and technology, particularly in recent decades. Where does this phenomenon originate from (in humans, and perhaps also in animals)? Is it reproducible on some "device"? Do we have a theory of consciousness today? Will we arrive to build thinking or conscious machines, as machine learning, or cognitive computing, seem to promise? These questions and other related issues are discussed in the pages of this work, which provides stimulating reading to both specialists and general readers. The Chapter "Hard Problem and Free Will: An Information-Theoretical Approach" is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com.

One of the main aims of modern mental health care is to understand a person's explicit and implicit ways of thinking and acting. So, it may seem like the ultimate paradox that mental health care services are currently overflowing with brain concepts belonging to the external, visible brain-world and that neuroscientists are poised to become new experts on human conduct. An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Human Mind shows that to create care that is truly innovative, mental health care workers must not only ask questions about how their conceptions of human beings and psychological phenomena came into being, but should also see themselves as co-creators of the mystery they seek to solve. Looking at the human being as a being with a biological body and unique subjective experiences, living in a reciprocal relationship with its sociocultural and historical environment, the book will provide examples and theories that show the necessity of an innovating, interdisciplinary mental health care service that manages to adapt its theory and methods to environmental, biological, and subjective changes. To this end, the book will provide an innovating psychology that offers a broad kaleidoscope of perspectives about the relations between the history of psychology, as a scientific discipline oriented to interpret and explain subject and subjectivity phenomenon, and the social construction of subjectified experience. This unique and timely book should be of great interest to critical and cultural psychologists and theorists; clinical psychologists, therapists, and psychiatrists; sociologists of culture and science; anthropologists; philosophers; historians; and scholars working with social and health theories. It should also be essential reading for lawyers, advocates, and defenders of human rights. The Open Access version of this book, available at https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315309682 has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 licence.

On Folk Epistemology explores how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since knowledge ascriptions are central to how we navigate social life, it is important to understand our basis for making them. A central claim of the book is that factors that have nothing to do with knowledge may lead to systematic mistakes in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. These mistakes are explained by an empirically informed account of how ordinary knowledge ascriptions are the product of cognitive heuristics that are associated with biases. In developing this account, Mikkel Gerken presents work in cognitive psychology and pragmatics, while also contributing to epistemology. For example, Gerken develops positive epistemic norms of action and assertion and moreover, critically assesses contextualism, knowledge-first methodology, pragmatic encroachment theories and more. Many of these approaches are argued to overestimate the epistemological significance of folk epistemology. In contrast, this volume develops an equilibristic methodology according to which intuitive judgments about knowledge cannot straightforwardly play a role as data for epistemological theorizing. Rather, critical epistemological theorizing is required to interpret empirical findings. Consequently, On Folk Epistemology helps to lay the foundation for an emerging sub-field that intersects philosophy and the cognitive sciences: The empirical study of folk epistemology.

"Making the Human Mind" is an attack on the widespread assumption that the mind has parts and that it is the interaction between these parts which accounts for some of the most characteristic human behaviour, the sorts of irrational behaviour displayed in self-deception and weakness of will.;The implications of this attack are considerable: Professor Sharpe contests a realism about the mind, the belief that there is an inventory which an all-seeing deity could compile and which could contain answers to all the questions we could ask about people. With this goes a hermeneutic approach to the understanding of human behaviour: these forms of understanding are markedly different from that suggested by the scientific model and favoured by those who partition the mind.;Finally, the author undermines eliminative materialism and the idea that the way we talk about the mind constitutes a "folk psychology", arguing that what is distinctively human about the human mind has been created by self-consciousness and is self-created.

Looks at the history and origins of celibacy, discusses its role in the priesthood, and considers the psychological aspects of celibacy.

Kant is generally conceived to have offered little attention to the fact that we experience the world in and through our bodies. This book argues that this standard image of the great German philosopher is radically wrong. Not only does Kant - throughout his career and in works published before and after the Critique of pure reason - reflect constantly upon the fact that human life is embodied, but the Critique of pure reason itself may be read as a critical reflection aimed at exploring some significant philosophical implications of this fact. Bringing this aspect of Kant's philosophy into focus is important, not only because it sheds new light on our understanding of Kant's work, but also because it is relevant to contemporary discussions in philosophy about embodiment, learning and practice. By taking his philosophy of embodiment into account, the author makes Kant stand out as a true contemporary in new and unexpected ways.

This open access book presents novel theoretical, empirical and experimental work exploring the nature of mental representations that support natural language production and understanding, and other manifestations of cognition. One fundamental question raised in the text is whether requisite knowledge structures can be adequately modeled by means of a uniform representational format, and if so, what exactly is its nature. Frames are a key topic covered which have had a strong impact on the exploration of knowledge representations in artificial intelligence, psychology and linguistics; cascades are a novel development in frame theory. Other key subject areas explored are: concepts and categorization, the experimental investigation of mental representation, as well as cognitive analysis in semantics. This book is of interest to students, researchers, and professionals working on cognition in the fields of linguistics, philosophy, and psychology.

Enactivist Interventions is an interdisciplinary work that explores how theories of embodied cognition illuminate many aspects of the mind, including intentionality, representation, the affect, perception, action and free will, higher-order cognition, and intersubjectivity. Gallagher argues for a rethinking of the concept of mind, drawing on pragmatism, phenomenology and cognitive science. Enactivism is presented as a philosophy of nature that has significant methodological and theoretical implications for the scientific investigation of the mind. Gallagher argues that, like the basic phenomena of perception and action, sophisticated cognitive phenomena like reflection, imagining, and mathematical reasoning are best explained in terms of an affordance-based skilled coping. He offers an account of the continuity that runs between basic action, affectivity, and a rationality that in every case remains embodied. Gallagher's analysis also addresses recent predictive models of brain function and outlines an alternative, enactivist interpretation that emphasizes the close coupling of brain, body and environment rather than a strong boundary that isolates the brain in its internal processes. The extensive relational dynamics that integrates the brain with the extra-neural body opens into an environment that is physical, social and cultural and that recycles back into the enactive process. Cognitive processes are in-the-world rather than in-the-head; they are situated in affordance spaces defined across evolutionary, developmental and individual histories, and are constrained by affective processes and normative dimensions of social and cultural practices.

This book examines the ways in which a writer's presentation of self can achieve or impede access to power. Conversations about written voice and style have traditionally revolved around the aesthetics of stylistic choice. These choices, while they help establish a writer's presence in a text, too often ignore the needs of written identity as it crosses genres, disciplines, and rhetorical purposes. In contrast to stylistic investigations of a writer's "voice" and its various components-diction, detail, imagery, syntax, and tone, for example-this book focuses on language variation and the linguistic features of a writer's presence in a text, as well as the establishment of a writer's social, cultural, and personal identity in a given text. The author attempts to explain the methods by which writers present themselves to their audiences. This book will be of particular interest to students and teachers of rhetoric and composition studies, as well as writers more broadly.

The main aim of this book is to provide a critical and historical inquiry into Kant's schematism chapter contained in the Critique of Pure Reason. More specifically, the book argues that Kant's schematism chapter is a necessary step within the project of the Critique. It deals with a problem of its own, one which is not the object of the previous chapters: How can categories be applied to intuitions? The author shows that the term 'schema' has an interesting and long tradition of different philosophical uses that finds in the works of Kant a point of no-return. In the philosophical works written before Kant, the notion of schema did not have a specific and distinctive meaning and function of its own but was rather used in different contexts (from rhetoric to logic to psychology). After Kant, all philosophers who speak of schemata refer in one way or another back to Kant's distinctive notion, which possesses a specific, epistemic meaning. Moreover, this book aims to provide a contribution to the understanding of the relation between philosophy and the sciences. It is by means of demonstrating the importance of the schematism chapter not only within the Critique but also from a broader perspective, deriving from the fact that Kant's doctrine of schemata had an impressive influence not only on philosophers but also on psychologists.

Combining Minds is about the idea of minds built up out of other minds, whether this is possible, and what it would mean if it were. Roelofs surveys many areas of philosophy and psychology, analysing and evaluating denials and affirmations of mental combination that have been made in regard to everything from brain structure, to psychological conflict, to social cooperation. In each case, he carefully distinguishes different senses in which subjectivity might be composite, and different arguments for and against them, concluding that composite subjectivity, in various forms, may be much more common than we think. Combining Minds is also the first book-length defence of constitutive panpsychism against all aspects of the 'combination problem'. Constitutive panpsychism is an increasingly prominent theory, holding that consciousness is naturally inherent in matter, with human consciousness built up out of this basic consciousness the same way human bodies are built up out of physical matter. Such a view requires that many very simple conscious minds can compose a single very complex one, and a major objection made against constitutive panpsychism is that they cannot - that minds simply do not combine. This is the combination problem, which Roelofs scrutinizes, dissects, and refutes. It reflects not only contemporary debates but a long philosophical tradition of contrasting the apparently indivisible unity of the mind with the deep and pervasive divisibility of the material world.Combining Mindsdraws together the threads of this problem and develops a powerful and flexible response to it.

Dual-Aspect Monism and the Deep Structure of Meaning investigates the metaphysical position of dual-aspect monism, with particular emphasis on the concept of meaning as a fundamental feature of the fabric of reality. As an alternative to other positions - mainly dualism, physicalism, idealism - that have been proposed to understand consciousness and its place in nature, the decompositional version of dual-aspect monism considers the mental and the physical as two aspects of one underlying undivided reality that is psychophysically neutral. Inspired by analogies with modern physics and driven by its conceptual problems, Wolfgang Pauli, Carl Gustav Jung, Arthur Eddington, John Wheeler, David Bohm, and Basil Hiley are the originators of the approaches studied. A radically novel common theme in their approaches is the constitutive role of meaning and its deep structure, relating the mental and the physical to a psychophysically neutral base.The authors reconstruct the formal structure of these approaches, and compare their conceptual emphases as well as their relative strengths and weaknesses. They also address a number of challenging themes for current and future interdisciplinary research, both theoretical and empirical, that arise from the presented frameworks of thinking. Dual-Aspect Monism and the Deep Structure of Meaning will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in consciousness studies, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, metaphysics, and the history of 20th-century philosophy and physics.

Stephen Neale presents a powerful, original examination of a cornerstone of modern philosophy: the idea that our thoughts and utterances are representations of reality, that accurate or true representations are those that correspond to the facts. Facing Facts will be crucial to future work in metaphysics, logic, and the philosophy of mind and language, and will have profound implications far beyond.

Restoring the Human Context to Literary and Performance Studies argues that much of contemporary literary theory is still predicated, at least implicitly, on outdated linguistic and psychological models such as post-structuralism, psychoanalysis, and behaviorism, which significantly contradict current dominant scientific views. By contrast, this monograph promotes an alternative paradigm for literary studies, namely Contextualism, and in so doing highlights the similarities and differences among the sometimes-conflicting contemporary cognitive approaches to literature and performance, arguing not in favor of one over the other but for Contextualism as their common ground.

This carefully designed, multi-authored textbook covers a broad range of theoretical issues in cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience. With accessible language, a uniform structure, and many pedagogical features, Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introdution is the best high-level overview of this area for an interdisciplinary readership of students. Written specifically for this volume by experts in their fields who are also experienced teachers, the book's thirty chapters are organized into the following parts: I. Background Knowledge II. Classical Debates III. Consciousness IV. Crossing Boundaries Each chapter starts with relevant key words and definitions and a chapter overview, then presents historical coverage of the topic, explains and analyzes contemporary debates, and ends with a sketch of cutting edge research. A list of suggested readings and helpful discussion topics conclude each chapter. This uniform, student-friendly design makes it possible to teach a cohort of both philosophy and interdisciplinary students without assuming prior understanding of philosophical concepts, cognitive science, or neuroscience. Key Features: Synthesizes the now decades-long explosion of scientifically informed philosophical research in the study of mind. Expands on the offerings of other textbooks by including chapters on language, concepts and non-conceptual content, and animal cognition. Offers the same structure in each chapter, moving the reader through an overview, historical coverage, contemporary debates, and finally cutting-edge research. Packed with pedagogical features, like defined Key Terms, Suggested Readings, and Discussion Questions for each chapter, as well as a General Glossary. Provides readers with clear, chapter-long introductions to Cognitive Neuroscience, Molecular and Cellular Cognition, Experimental Methods in Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysical Issues, and Epistemic Issues.

This book is devoted to the last part of Aristotle's collection of short treatises known today as the Parva Naturalia, i.e. the treatise On Youth and Old Age, on Life and Death, on Respiration. In the three main sections of the book, the author offers a translation, a commentary and a thorough analysis of this work. The author argues in favour of the unity of the work and contextualises its ideas within Aristotle's corpus and the medical tradition of his time. After an Introduction to the nature of the work and its significance for the history of natural philosophy and science, a new English translation follows, along with a detailed commentary of Chapters 1-6, which combines philosophical discussion with philological observations. The book includes four interpretive essays, which tackle problems related to the whole treatise on a more philosophical basis, including questions about the structure and unity of the work, the organisation of the material, Aristotle's methodological principles, his aims and target audience as well as the relevance of his selected themes to the thematic agenda of some Hippocratic writings. This book is of interest to students and researchers in Aristotle's psychophysiology, and his views about the embodied mind, as well as to anyone concerned with the history of natural philosophy and science more generally.

Beatrice Longuenesse presents an original exploration of our understanding of ourselves and the way we talk about ourselves. In the first part of the book she discusses contemporary analyses of our use of 'I' in language and thought, and compares them to Kant's account of self-consciousness, especially the type of self-consciousness expressed in the proposition 'I think.' According to many contemporary philosophers, necessarily, any instance of our use of 'I' is backed by our consciousness of our own body. For Kant, in contrast, 'I think' just expresses our consciousness of being engaged in bringing rational unity into the contents of our mental states. In the second part of the book, Longuenesse analyzes the details of Kant's view and argues that contemporary discussions in philosophy and psychology stand to benefit from Kant's insights into self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness. The third and final part of the book outlines similarities between Kant's view of the structure of mental life grounding our uses of 'I' in 'I think' and in the moral 'I ought to,' on the one hand; and Freud's analysis of the organizations of mental processes he calls 'ego' and 'superego' on the other hand. Longuenesse argues that Freudian metapsychology offers a path to a naturalization of Kant's transcendental view of the mind. It offers a developmental account of the normative capacities that ground our uses of 'I,' which Kant thought could not be accounted for without appealing to a world of pure intelligences, distinct from the empirical, natural world of physical entities.