Original papers by leading international authors address the most important problem in the philosophy of language, the question of how to assess the prospects of developing a tenable theory of meaning, given the influential sceptical attacks mounted against the concept of meaning by Willard Van Quine and Saul Kripke and their adherents in particular. Thus the texts attempt to answer the fundamental questions a " of whether there are meanings, and, if there are, of what they are and of the form a serious philosophical theory of meaning should take.

Philosophers across many traditions have long theorized about the relationship between prudence and morality. Few clear answers have emerged, however, in large part because of the inherently speculative nature of traditional philosophical methods. This book aims to forge a bold new path forward, outlining a theory of prudence and morality that unifies a wide variety of findings in neuroscience with philosophically sophisticated normative theorizing. The author summarizes the emerging behavioral neuroscience of prudence and morality, showing how human moral and prudential cognition and motivation are known to involve over a dozen brain regions and capacities. He then outlines a detailed philosophical theory of prudence and morality based on neuroscience and lived human experience. The result demonstrates how this theory coheres with and explains the behavioral neuroscience, showing how each brain region and capacity interact to give rise to prudential and moral behavior. Neurofunctional Prudence and Morality: A Philosophical Theory will be of interest to philosophers and psychologists working in moral psychology, neuroethics, and decision theory. Chapter 3 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

In this volume, internationally acclaimed psychoanalysts, philosophers, and scholars of humanities examine the mind-body problem and provide differing analyses on the nature of mind, unconscious structure, mental properties, qualia, and the contours of consciousness. Given that disciplines from the humanities and the social sciences to neuroscience cannot agree upon the nature of consciousness-from what constitutes psychic reality to mental properties, psychoanalysis has a unique perspective that is largely ignored by mainstream paradigms. This book provides a comprehensive exploration of the mind-body problem in various psychoanalytic schools of thought, including philosophical and metapsychological points of view. Psychoanalysis and the Mind-Body Problem will be of interest to psychoanalysts, philosophers, neuroscientists, evolutionary biologists, academics, and those generally interested in the humanities, cognitive science, and the philosophy of mind.

This book has two main tasks: (1) to call attention to the special challenges presented by our experience of affect-all varieties of pleasure and pain-and (2) to show how these challenges can be overcome by an "enrichment approach" that understands affect as the enrichment or deterioration of conscious activity as a whole. This "enrichment approach" draws from Alfred North Whitehead as well as the pragmatists John Dewey and William James, all of whom thought of affect as a fundamental aspect of experience rather than a special class of feelings. It also draws from recent scientific research that suggests that the dynamic repertoire of consciousness can change, effectively expanding and contracting our capacity to feel. Weaving these perspectives together, the book develops a theory that accounts for the peculiar phenomenology of affect and sheds new light on a diverse range of experiences, from everyday pleasures and pains to the special satisfactions of the arts and religious festivity. At the same time, it presents a fresh and distinctively affect-centered perspective on the nature of consciousness.

Philosophical theories of emotions, and to an extent some theories of scientific psychology, represent attempts to capture the essence of emotions basically as they are conceived in common sense psychology. Although there are problems, the success of explanations of our behavior in terms of believes, desires and emotions creates a presumption that, at some level of abstraction, they reflect important elements in our psychological nature. It is incumbent on a theory of emotions to provide an account of two salient facts about emotions as conceived in common sense psychology. As intentional states, emotions have representational and rational properties: emotions represent states of affairs; and they are rationally related to other mental representations, figure in rational explanations of behavior, and are open to rational assessment. Emotions also have a close relationship to a range of non-intentional phenomena: in typical cases, emotions involve physiological changes, usually associated with the activation of the autonomic nervous system, which are proprioceptively experienced; and they often involve behavioral tendencies, as well.

This book is an effort to bring genetic-phenomenological analyses in contact with empirical psychology, neurology, cognitive science and research in primate cognition. The first part adresses the role of weak but not arbitrary phantasy in perception, and argues that it has a transcendental function with several different aspects. Weak phantasma can be found in all fields of sensibility and at all levels of constitution. Relevant aspects of Charles-Bonnet Syndrome are analyzed in addition to the contributions of empirical psychology to our understanding of hallucinations in normal subjects. The second part is dedicated to the process of self-organization in human and animal perception from the point of view of genetic phenomenology, concentrating on the formation, change and use of the so-called "types" (Typus). The third part investigates whether cognition, thinking and other higher order performances of the mind - both human and animal - can be understood by taking into account the contributions of phantasmatic elements in three important fields: scenic imagination in daydreams, feelings, and co-feeling with others. To this end dual-mode theories of mind and some contributions from neurology are taken into account. The conclusion reached is that most higher-order achievements of our mind - which we tend to identify with the performance of our language-system - might in fact be accomplished without language in the low-level system of phantasmatic imagination. This leads to an "inclusive theory of the subject" which allows us to understand how higher-organized animals like primates can think.

My interest in gathering together a collection of this sort was generated by a fortuitous combination of historical studies under Professor Keith Lehrer and studies in cognitive science under Professor R. Michael Harnish at the University of Arizona. Work on the volume began there while I was an instructor in the Department of Linguistics and was greatly encouraged by participants in the Faculty Seminar on Cognitive Science chaired by Professor Lance J. Rips. I wish to express my appreciation to all of these and to many other individuals with whom I discussed the possibility of contribution to this work. I am especially grateful to the authors of the essays included here, as they showed more patience than I could have hoped for in seeing me through a number of uncertain stages in development of the project. My thanks are also due to my colleague Charles Reid for assistance in reviewing submissions, to Tim McFadden for computer resources, and again, to Keith Lehrer for continuing advice in arrangements for publication. Financial support for manuscript preparation was provided in part under University Research Grant No. 617 from the University Research Council, Youngstown State University.

This book studies the problem of acquaintance against the background of a more general theory of intentionality. Much of the relevant background is laid out in the book I wrote with Ronald McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality (1982). However, since this book is not focussed on HusserI, I shall not assume the reader's familiarity with the prior book or with HusserI's philosophy. (I have sometimes referred to this book-in progress as Acquaintance; I've rounded out the title a bit. ) of The initial inspiration for this work, in the 1970's, was a confluence ideas from the logic of perception and the logic of demonstratives, ideas in which I found phenomenological inspiration. These included Jaakko Hintikka's notion of perceptual individuation, Romane Clark's account of a demonstrative element in perception, David Kaplan's analysis of the meaning (character and content) of demonstratives, and Hector-Neri Castaneda's notion of quasi-indicators. I would later add to the list John Perry's appraisal of belief reports involving indexicals (extending Castaneda's ideas) and Hilary Putnam's Twin Earth thought-experiments (complementing Clark's and Kaplan's ideas of the same vintage). I want to thank Chuck Dement and Ronald McIntyre for their responses to the first draft. For many discussions of issues addressed in the book I thank David Blinder, Hubert Dreyfus, Dagfinn F llesdal, Jaakko Hintikka, David Kaplan, Ronald McIntyre, Izchak Miller, Esa Saarinen, John Searle, and Peter Woodruff. I have benefited also from colleagues and students too numerous to name but deserving my thanks nonetheless. Philosophy is a surprisingly communal affair."

When this book was originally published in 2006, Epistemetrics was not as yet a scholarly discipline. With regard to scientific information there was the discipline of scientometrics, represented by a journal of that very name. Science, however, had a monopoly on knowledge. Although it is one of our most important cognitive resources, it is not our only one. While scientometrics is a centerpiece of epistemetrics, it is not the whole of it. Nicholas Rescher's endeavor to quantify knowledge is not only of interest in itself, but is also instructive in bringing into sharper relief the nature of and the explanatory rationale for the limits that unavoidably confront our efforts to advance the frontiers of knowledge. In particular, his book demonstrates the limitations of human knowledge and will be of great value to scholars working in this area.

This book has been a long time in the making. Other issues have taken me away from it from time to extended time. But I kept coming back to the problem of other minds. It has remained a great issue, it is much contested still, and it is, after all, elose to us all. I like believing that the time taken has deepened my understanding of the problem and how it is to be handled. Other people, some by disagreeing vehemently, have helped greatly. I mention in particular, Brian Ellis, Robert Fox, Graeme Marshali, Tim Oakley, Ray Pinkerton and Robert Young. Robert Pargetter argued with me, and kept insisting that I write this book. John Bigelow, Michael Bradley, Keith Campbell, Frank Jackson, and William Lycan assisted by reading an earlier version and providing valued comments. Frank Jackson has been specially helpful, not just on this topic. He can be blamed for initially causing me to take the analogical inference seriously. Tbe La Trobe Philosophy Department has been a good place to do philosophy. I am grateful to Suzanne Hayster, Sandra Paul, and Betty Pritchard for struggling at various times with various recalcitrant manuscripts. Most particularly I thank Gai Larkin. She has seen the project through, with considerably more than efficiency.

Wittgenstein's aphoristic style holds great charm, but also a great danger: the reader is apt to glean too much from a single fragment and too little from the fragments as a whole. In my first confron tations with the Philosophical Investigations I was such a reader, and so, it turned out, were most of the writers on Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Wittgenstein's remarkable ability to bring together many facets of his thought in one fragment is fully exploited in the critical literature; but hardly any attention is paid to the connection with other fragments, let alone to the many hitherto unpublished manuscripts of which the Philosophical Investigations is the final product. The result of this fragmentary and ahistorical approach to Wittgenstein's later work is a host of contradictory interpretations. What Wittgenstein really wanted to say remains insufficiently clear. Opinions are also strongly divided about the value of his work. Some authors have been encouraged by his aphorisms and rhetorical questions to dismiss the whole Cartesian tradition or to halt new movements in linguistics or psychology; others, exasperated, reject his philo sophy as anti-scientific conceptual conservatism. After consulting unpublished notebooks and manuscripts which Wittgenstein wrote between 1929 and 1951, I became a very different reader. Wittgenstein turned out to be a kind of Leonardo da Vinci, who pursued a form from which every sign of chisel ling, every attempt at improvement, had been effaced."

Twenty-three philosophers examine the doctrine of materialism find it wanting. The case against materialism comprises arguments from conscious experience, from the unity and identity of the person, from intentionality, mental causation, and knowledge. The contributors include leaders in the fields of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology, who respond ably to the most recent versions and defenses of materialism. The modal arguments of Kripke and Chalmers, Jackson's knowledge argument, Kim's exclusion problem, and Burge's anti-individualism all play a part in the building of a powerful cumulative case against the materialist research program. Several papers address the implications of contemporary brain and cognitive research (the psychophysics of color perception, blindsight, and the effects of commissurotomies), adding a posteriori arguments to the classical a priori critique of reductionism. All of the current versions of materialism--reductive and non-reductive, functionalist, eliminativist, and new wave materialism--come under sustained and trenchant attack. In addition, a wide variety of alternatives to the materialist conception of the person receive new and illuminating attention, including anti-materialist versions of naturalism, property dualism, Aristotelian and Thomistic hylomorphism, and non-Cartesian accounts of substance dualism.

The nature of perception has long been a central question in philosophy. It is of central importance not just for the philosophy of mind, but also for epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of science. This volume represents the best of the latest research on perception, with contributions from some of the leading philosophers in the area, including Christopher Peacocke, Brian O'Shaughnessy and Michael Tye. As well as discussing traditional problems, the essays also approach the topic in light of recent research on mental content and representation.

"Lost Works" tells the story a man who once lived and is still alive, seeking to share his poetry, art, stories, creativity, thought, and science with the world.With a strong grounding in physics, Daniel Roberts presents his philosophies for life and living, touching a wide range of topics, from art to virtue to God and religion. "Lost Works" offers a free-form, flowing, prose exploration of many of humanity's most essential questions.v

Symbolism is a primary characteristic of the mind, deployed and displayed in every aspect of our thought and culture. In this important and broad-ranging book, Israel Scheffler explores the various ways in which the mind functions symbolically. This involves considering not only the world of science and the arts, but also such activities as religious ritual and child's play. The book offers an integrated treatment of ambiguity and metaphor, analyses of play and ritual, and an extended discussion of the relations between scientific symbol systems and reality. What emerges is a picture of the basic symbol-forming character of the mind. In addition to philosophers of art and science, likely readers of this book will include students of linguistics, semiotics, anthropology, religion, and psychology.

Thoroughly revised and updated, including three new chapters on race, sex and human nature Second edition is split into thirteen more manageable chapters (instead of eight long ones in the first edition), matching course syllabi more effectively and making it easier for students and teachers to use the book Covers the essential topics, such as selection, adaptation, modularity, genes and the environment, neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, and free will and determinism Additional textbook features include: chapter summaries, annotated further reading and glossary.

Although highly influential, Brentano's doctrines from Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint were taken up and changed by his students and subsequent thinkers. Tassone's study of this important text offers readers a better understanding of PES and outlines its ongoing relevance for contemporary philosophy of mind.

This book enumerates the components of the unconscious domain (or realm), and attempts to uncover the proposed communicational network of its operation - a communicational network that is able to link inherent participating components of this realm. It is often the case that theoreticians and clinical practitioners refer to the unconscious or unconscious material in a way that implies the sense of it all rather than a specific definition, broadly describing it as "material which is out of one's awareness." This volume therefore examines the complex existence of the entire unconscious realm embraced in an evolutionary historical context, defined here as the 'unconscious domain'.

Splendid, spiritual, and subversive, this anthology offers a sampler of just some of the feminisms emerging in academic seminars, street demonstrations for justice, and places where people are reclaiming their ancestral values.
"She Is Everywhere Vol. 2" is comprised of international essays, poems, and works of art from the growing community of women and men who recognize Her and feel Her call to expression in many forms. This unique volume presents a fresh look at women in the Judeo-Christian Bible, in the Koran, and in the kaleidoscopic beauty of the world's women from her signs in caves, cliffs, and forests to her many faces, manifestations, and hidden places.
Celebrate woman's spirituality, her colors, her islands and continents, her rages and blessings in weather, her silences, and her surprising epiphanies. "She Is Everywhere Vol. 2" leads the contemporary cultural and political nonviolent revolution for a radically democratic and harmonious world full of compassion, equality, and transformation

This book examines the role that human subjective experience plays in the creation of reality and introduces a new concept, the Bubble Universe, to describe the universe as it looks from the subjective viewpoint of an individual. Drawing on a range of research, the author questions the extent to which the scientific study of the origins of life, consciousness and subjective experience is itself influenced by scientists' subjective worlds. The author argues that in many respects the Bubble Universe differs from the universe as described by science and religion, and analyzes these differences. The fabric and structure of subjective reality is described, and various aspects of the Bubble Universe are examined, including science, religion, life, morality and history. The differences between the views from inside the subjective universe and from scientific, religious and sociocultural versions of the universe are outlined, and their significance for practical and theoretical problems are highlighted and illustrated with psychological experiments. This book will be of value to all scholars interested in how subjectivity influences research and appeal in particular to those working in developmental and theoretical psychology, consciousness, epistemology, phenomenology, and the philosophy of science and of the mind.

Is there a universal biolinguistic disposition for the development of basic' colour words? This question has been a subject of debate since Brent Berlin and Paul Kay's Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution was published in 1969. Naming the Rainbow is the first extended study of this debate. The author describes and criticizes empirically and conceptually unified models of colour naming that relate basic colour terms directly to perceptual and ultimately to physiological facts, arguing that this strategy has overlooked the cognitive dimension of colour naming. He proposes a psychosemantics for basic colour terms which is sensitive to cultural difference and to the nature and structure of non-linguistic experience. Audience: Contemporary colour naming research is radically interdisciplinary and Naming the Rainbow will be of interest to philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, and cognitive scientists concerned with: biological constraints on cognition and categorization; problems inherent in cross-cultural and in interdisciplinary science; the nature and extent of cultural relativism.

Cognitive science, in Howard Gardner's words, has a relatively short history but a very long past. While its short history has been the subject of quite a few studies published in recent years, the current book focuses instead on its very long past. It explores the emergence of the conceptual framework that was necessary to make the rise of modem cognitive science possible in the first place. Over the long course of the history of the theory of perception and of cognition, various conceptual breakthroughs can be discerned that have contributed significantly to the conception of the mind as a physical symbol system with intricate representational capacities and unimaginably rich computational resources. In historical retrospect such conceptual transitions-seemingly sudden and unannounced-are typically foreshadowed in the course of enduring research programs that serve as slowly developing theoretical con straint structures gradually narrowing down the apparent solution space for the scientific problems at hand. Ultimately the fundamental problem is either resolved to the satisfaction of the majority of researchers in the area of investigation, or else-and much more commonly-one or more of the major theoretical constraints is abandoned or radically modified, giving way to entirely new theoretical vistas. In the history of the theory of perception this process can be witnessed at vari ous important junctures."

Increasingly, the mind is being treated as a fit subject for scientific inquiry. As cognitive science and empirical psychology strive to uncover the mind's secrets, it is fitting to inquire as to what distinctive role is left for philosophy in the study of mind. This collection, which includes contributions by some of the leading scholars in the field, offers a rich variety of perspectives on this issue. Topics addressed include: the place of a priori inquiry in philosophy of mind, moral psychology, consciousness, social dimensions of intentionality, the relation of logic to philosophical psychology, objectivity and the mind, and privileged access.