This book outlines how the protagonists in The Nibelung's Ring, The Lord of the Rings, and Game of Thrones attempt to construct identities and expand their consciousness manifestations. As the characters in the three works face the ends of their respective worlds, they must find answers to their mortality, and to the threat it implies: the loss of identity and consciousness. Moreover, it details how this process is depicted performatively. In a hands-on and interdisciplinary approach, this book seeks to unveil the underlying philosophical concepts of identity and consciousness in the three works as they are represented audio-visually on stage and screen. Through the use of many practical examples, this book offers both academic scholars and any interested readers a completely new perspective on three enduringly popular and interrelated works.

This book provides a framework that encompasses both physics and cognitive science - integrating them into a 'theory of everything' to establish a basis for both our scientific and humanistic endeavours. It explores the implications of brain laterality for understanding the emergence of mind and its relation to the physical world - arguing that the analytic vs. holistic cognitive differences of the left and right human cerebral hemispheres are key to understanding not only human self-consciousness and language, but also sociocultural phenomena ranging from the emergence of the scientific method and axes of political orientation to the direction of development of conceptions of God and the fundamental differences between polarizing philosophical traditions. In a further step, the book draws on the Darwinian principle that our cognitive apparatus is shaped by the environment in which it evolved to argue that human bilaterality mirrors the fundamental hylomorphic relation between formal organization and material components that constitutes physical nature itself. The logical division between holistic and analytic categories thereby offers a principled basis for a metaphilosophy.

The first textbook to integrate standard philosophy of mind approach with developments in psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience Covers all the essential subjects and topics in philosophy of mind,such as dualism, materialism, mental representation, functionalism and mental causation Also discusses many more recent topics, including infant and animal cognition; the embodied or 'extended' mind; and consciousness Includes chapter summaries, further reading, boxes, and notes to help students Clearly explains the ideas and arguments of leading philosophers of mind such as Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam and Jaegwon Kim

For more than 1800 years it has been supposed that Aristotle viewed the soul as the entelechy of the visible body which is 'equipped with organs'. This book argues that in actual fact he saw the soul as the entelechy of a natural body 'that serves as its instrument'. This correction puts paid to W. Jaeger's hypothesis of a three-phase development in Aristotle. The author of this book defends the unity of Aristotle's philosophy of living nature in De anima, in the biological treatises, and in the lost dialogues. Aristotle should therefore be regarded as the author of the notion of the 'vehicle of the soul' and of a 'non-Platonic' dualism. The current understanding of his influence on Hellenistic philosophy needs to change accordingly.

Over the last few years, Raymond Tallis has published widely acclaimed critiques of influential trends in contemporary thought: for example, Not Saussure - described as 'one of the most brilliant and effective of all rebuttals of post-Saussurean theory' - In Defence of Realism and The Explicit Animal, which demonstrated the baselessness of contemporary accounts of consciousness. Enemies of Hope takes the story further, identifying the themes common to anti-humanist twentieth-century thought and challenging the cult of pessimism that pervades our age. Tallis teases out the many strands of the comfortable, self-congratulatory cynicism of modernist and postmodernist cultural critics, exposing their self-contradictions and their wilful blindness to the distinctive mystery of human nature. The 'pathologisers of culture' and 'the marginalisers of consciousness' are shown to be the enemies of hope - the hope of progress based upon the rational, conscious endeavours of humankind. Perceptive, passionate and often controversial, Raymond Tallis's latest debunking of Kulturkritik explores a host of ethical and philosophical issues central to contemporary thought, raising questions we cannot afford to ignore. After reading Enemies of Hope, those minded to misrepresent mankind in ways that are almost routine amongst humanist intellectuals may be inclined to think twice. By clearing away the hysterical anti-humanism of the twentieth century Enemies of Hope frees us to start thinking constructively about the way forward for humanity in the twenty-first.

This Element examines the problem of hospital noise, a problem that has repeatedly been discovered anew, with each new era bringing its own efforts to control and abate unwanted sound in healthcare settings. Why, then, has hospital noise never been resolved? This question is at the heart of Making Noise in the Modern Hospital, which brings together histories of the senses, space, technology, society, medicine and architecture to understand the changing cacophony of the late twentieth-century British hospital. This Element is fundamentally interdisciplinary - despite being historical, it comes up to the present day and brings in scholarship on space, place, atmosphere and the senses that will have relevance to scholars working outside of historical research. The intersection between medical and sensory histories also puts interdisciplinary research at the Element's core.

The Interactions Between Instinct and Intellect and its Impact on Human Behavior
Length: 208 pages
Mark Abraham was displeased by the phenomenon of politicking, although he studied it for a deeper and more accurate understanding of this fatigued term, "politics," as a major aspect of human affair. For reasons he could not identify as a student, he was never satisfied with the prevailing definitions. Thus, he asked his professors in both undergraduate and graduate school in the political science department to share their understanding of the term with him. Each of them seemed to have an understanding uniquely different from all the rest. Then, he realized that this was a vaguely understood phenomenon even by the professors in the field and he relented his efforts and concluded that, "politics," was one of the most used but the least understood phenomena. As he developed his own theories, he formulated that unlike the commonly perceived concept, politics is not just a profession for the few in each society, but it is a brand of behavior unique to humans that starts in early childhood. Thus, he formulated, "to be instinctive is to be selfish. To be selfish and intelligent is to be political. Because instincts and intellect are permanent human fixtures, politicking that results for their cofunction also becomes a permanent human fixture." This perception justifies Aristotle's claim that, "man is a political animal." The ultimate objective of politicking is to impose and thus, he tries to redefine it. He perceives politicking as a range of complex and manipulative deeds afforded by people to impose their will and interest on others against their will and interest. As such, it erodes innocence and is one of the least desirable of all human attributes.
Yet the selfish nature of all instincts as the driving force behind politics is the sole force that governs the world of animals, thus politicking becomes the refined reflection of animals in man. Where animals use fangs, claws, venom, speed and brute force to subdue and devour their pray, humans apply politics that includes the use of brute force. Misconceiving this term greatly contributes to human conflicts at all levels, which is why most people unconsciously dislike politicking and politics worldwide.

Modern study of the mind is marked by the hegemony of thought, dominance of consciousness, and dictate of deliberation that result in an overwhelming intellectualism. However, it ignores the fundamental fact that by far most of our mental activity is not manifested in explicit reasoning, and is mostly not conscious. What then enables our successful participation in the natural, social, and cultural surroundings without recourse to the 'higher' cognitive processes? The background. It is the implicit and efficacious guide in human coping with the world without the monitoring reason. Yet how rules turn into routines? How conscious efforts convert into unreflective skills? How does the body of knowledge become the knowing body? How can most complex reactions of the human mind turn into 'just doing'? The lesson from the background teaches us that we are capacitated to do more than we explicitly know; the sort of knowledge is skilled and automated competence which is there before the conscious 'self' can report of its emergence.

"Making the Human Mind" is an attack on the widespread assumption that the mind has parts and that it is the interaction between these parts which accounts for some of the most characteristic human behaviour, the sorts of irrational behaviour displayed in self-deception and weakness of will.;The implications of this attack are considerable: Professor Sharpe contests a realism about the mind, the belief that there is an inventory which an all-seeing deity could compile and which could contain answers to all the questions we could ask about people. With this goes a hermeneutic approach to the understanding of human behaviour: these forms of understanding are markedly different from that suggested by the scientific model and favoured by those who partition the mind.;Finally, the author undermines eliminative materialism and the idea that the way we talk about the mind constitutes a "folk psychology", arguing that what is distinctively human about the human mind has been created by self-consciousness and is self-created.

Looks at the history and origins of celibacy, discusses its role in the priesthood, and considers the psychological aspects of celibacy.

The concept of affordances is being increasingly used in fields beyond ecological psychology to reveal previously unexplored interdisciplinary relationships. These fields include engineering, robotics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, urban theory, architecture, computer science, and much more. As the concept is adapted for its relational meaning between an agent and the environment, or object, the meaning of the term has changed to fit the customs of the adapting field. This book maps the different shades of the term and brings insights into how it is operationalized by providing short accessible essays regardless of background. Each contribution addresses big questions around this topic such as the application of the concept on ongoing research, how to measure or identify affordances, as well as other reflective questions about the future of affordances in the field. The book is envisioned to be read by non-experts, students, and researchers from several disciplines, and fills the need for summarization across disciplines. As the many adaptations flourished from the same psychological concept, this book also aims to function as a catalyst and motivation for reinterpreting the concepts for new directions. Compared to existing books, this book aims not to span the vertical dimension of field by taking a deep dive into a niche-field-instead, this book aims to have a wide horizontal span highlighting a common concept shared by an increasing number of fields, namely affordances. As such, this book takes a different approach by attempting to summarize the different emerging applications and definitions of the concept, and make them accessible to non-experts, students, and researchers regardless of background and level.

Kant is generally conceived to have offered little attention to the fact that we experience the world in and through our bodies. This book argues that this standard image of the great German philosopher is radically wrong. Not only does Kant - throughout his career and in works published before and after the Critique of pure reason - reflect constantly upon the fact that human life is embodied, but the Critique of pure reason itself may be read as a critical reflection aimed at exploring some significant philosophical implications of this fact. Bringing this aspect of Kant's philosophy into focus is important, not only because it sheds new light on our understanding of Kant's work, but also because it is relevant to contemporary discussions in philosophy about embodiment, learning and practice. By taking his philosophy of embodiment into account, the author makes Kant stand out as a true contemporary in new and unexpected ways.

In this book, Shay Welch expands on the contemporary cognitive thinking-in-movement framework, which has its roots in the work of Maxine Sheets-Johnstone but extends and develops within contemporary embodied cognition theory. Welch believes that dance can be used to ask questions, and this book offers a method of how critical inquiry can be embodied. First, she presents the theoretical underpinnings of what this process is and how it can work; second, she introduces the empirical method as a tool that can be used by movers for the purpose of doing embodied inquiry. Exploring the role of embodied cognition and embodied metaphors in mining the body for questions, Welch demonstrates how to utilize movement to explore embodied practices of knowing. She argues that our creative embodied movements facilitate our ability to bodily engage in critical analysis about the world.

A World for Us aims to refute physical realism and establish in its place a form of idealism. Physical realism, in the sense in which John Foster understands it, takes the physical world to be something whose existence is both logically independent of the human mind and metaphysically fundamental. Foster identifies a number of problems for this realist view, but his main objection is that it does not accord the world the requisite empirical immanence. The form of idealism that he tries to establish in its place rejects the realist view in both its aspects. It takes the world to be something whose existence is ultimately constituted by facts about human sensory experience, or by some richer complex of non-physical facts in which such experiential facts centrally feature. Foster calls this phenomenalistic idealism. He tries to establish a specific version of such phenomenalistic idealism, in which the experiential facts that centrally feature in the constitutive creation of the world are ones that concern the organization of human sensory experience. The basic idea of this version is that, in the context of certain other constitutively relevant factors, this sensory organization creates the physical world by disposing things to appear systematically world-wise at the human empirical viewpoint. Chief among these other relevant factors is the role of God as the one who is responsible for the sensory organization and ordains the system of appearance it yields. It is this that gives the idealistically created world its objectivity and allows it to qualify as a real world.

This book explains that while posthumanism rose in opposition to the biblical contention that 'Man was created in the image of God', transhumanism ascertained the complementary view that 'Man has been assigned dominion over all creatures', further exploring a path that had been opened up by the Enlightenment's notion of human perfectibility. It explains also how posthumanism and transhumanism relate to deconstruction theory, and on a broader level to capitalism, libertarianism, and the fight against human extinction which may involve trespassing the boundary of the skin, achieving individual immortality or dematerialization of the Self and colonisation of distant planets and stars. Two authors debate about truth and reason in today's world, the notion of personhood and the legacy of the Nietzschean Superhuman in the current varieties of anti-humanism.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

Ordering Emotions in Europe, 1100-1800 investigates how emotions were conceptualised and practised in the medieval and early modern period, as they ordered systems of thought and practice-from philosophy and theology, music and literature, to science and medicine. Analysing discursive, psychic and bodily dimensions of emotions as they were experienced, performed and narrated, authors explore how emotions were understood to interact with more abstract intellectual capacities in producing systems of thought, and how these key frameworks of the medieval and early modern period were enacted by individuals as social and emotional practices, acts and experiences of everyday life. Contributors are: Han Baltussen, Susan Broomhall, Louis C. Charland, Louise D'Arcens, Raphaele Garrod, Yasmin Haskell, Danijela Kambaskovic, Clare Monagle, Juanita Feros Ruys, Francois Soyer, Robert Weston, Carol J. Williams, R.S. White, and Spencer E. Young.

Ervin Laszlo's tour de force, What is Reality?, is the product of a half-century of deep contemplation and cutting-edge scholarship. Addressing many of the paradoxes that have confounded modern science over the years, it offers nothing less than a new paradigm of reality, one in which the cosmos is a seamless whole, informed by a single, coherent consciousness manifest in us all. Bringing together science, philosophy, and metaphysics, Laszlo takes aim at accepted wisdom, such as the dichotomies of mind and body, spirit and matter, being and nonbeing, to show how we are all part of an infinite cycle of existence unfolding in spacetime and beyond. Augmented by insightful commentary from a dozen scholars and thinkers, along with a foreword by Deepak Chopra and an introduction by Stanislav Grof, What is Reality? offers a fresh and liberating understanding of the meaning and purpose of existence.

In recent research, dual-process theories of cognition have been the primary model for explaining moral judgment and reasoning. These theories understand moral thinking in terms of two separate domains: one deliberate and analytic, the other quick and instinctive. This book presents a new theory of the philosophy and cognitive science of moral judgment. Hanno Sauer develops and defends an account of "triple-process" moral psychology, arguing that moral thinking and reasoning are only insufficiently understood when described in terms of a quick but intuitive and a slow but rational type of cognition. This approach severely underestimates the importance and impact of dispositions to initiate and engage in critical thinking - the cognitive resource in charge of counteracting my-side bias, closed-mindedness, dogmatism, and breakdowns of self-control. Moral cognition is based, not on emotion and reason, but on an integrated network of intuitive, algorithmic and reflective thinking. Moral Thinking, Fast and Slow will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science.

John Perry offers a rethinking of Gottlob Frege's seminal contributions to philosophy of language. Frege's innovations provided the basis of modern logic, but his influence in other areas should not be understated. For instance, the view that he developed in "On Sense and Reference", the most studied essay in the philosophy of language, dominated twentieth-century work in the field and continues to be very influential. Perry explains and charts the development of Frege's views in this area, and argues that his doctrine of indirect reference directed philosophy of language on a long detour from which only now can we emerge. Perry advocates a move away from indirect reference and presents an alternative framework which does not require the abandoning of circumstances in the references of sentences.