Consciousness has become a major topic of scientific interest, and dozens of books have been written in recent years to explain it, yet it still remains a mystery. Science and the Riddle of Consciousness explains why consciousness is a riddle for science, and demonstrates how this riddle can be solved. The questions examined in the book speak directly to neuroscientists, computer scientists, psychologists, and philosophers.

This work examines thoughtlessness and seeks to illuminate the necessity and extent that reflection is involved in becoming practically wise within an Aristotelian virtue ethical framework. Derived from an Arendtian reading of Kantian aesthetic judgment, an account of thinking and judging is offered to supplement traditional accounts of practical wisdom.

This book examines the role that human subjective experience plays in the creation of reality and introduces a new concept, the Bubble Universe, to describe the universe as it looks from the subjective viewpoint of an individual. Drawing on a range of research, the author questions the extent to which the scientific study of the origins of life, consciousness and subjective experience is itself influenced by scientists' subjective worlds. The author argues that in many respects the Bubble Universe differs from the universe as described by science and religion, and analyzes these differences. The fabric and structure of subjective reality is described, and various aspects of the Bubble Universe are examined, including science, religion, life, morality and history. The differences between the views from inside the subjective universe and from scientific, religious and sociocultural versions of the universe are outlined, and their significance for practical and theoretical problems are highlighted and illustrated with psychological experiments. This book will be of value to all scholars interested in how subjectivity influences research and appeal in particular to those working in developmental and theoretical psychology, consciousness, epistemology, phenomenology, and the philosophy of science and of the mind.

We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; an avowal such as "I'm feeling so anxious" or "I'm thinking about my next trip to Paris," it is typically supposed, tells it like it is. But why is that? Why should what I say about my present mental states carry so much more weight than what others say about them? Why should avowals be more immune to criticism and correction than other claims we make? And if avowals are not based on any evidence or observation, how could they possibly express our knowledge of our own present mental states?
Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds.
Bar-On proposes a Neo-Expressivist view according to which avowals are expressive acts that have truth-accessible self-ascriptions as their products. When avowing, a person directly expresses, rather than merely reports, the very mental condition that the avowal ascribes. She argues that this expressivist idea, coupled with an adequate characterization of expression and a proper separation of the semantics of avowals from their pragmatics and epistemology, explains the special status we assign to avowals. As against many expressivists and their critics, she maintains that such an expressivist explanation is consistent with a non-deflationary view of self-knowledge and a robust realism about mental states. The view that emerges preserves many insights of the most prominent contributors to the subject, while offering a new perspective on our special relationship to our own minds.

In this volume, internationally acclaimed psychoanalysts, philosophers, and scholars of humanities examine the mind-body problem and provide differing analyses on the nature of mind, unconscious structure, mental properties, qualia, and the contours of consciousness. Given that disciplines from the humanities and the social sciences to neuroscience cannot agree upon the nature of consciousness-from what constitutes psychic reality to mental properties, psychoanalysis has a unique perspective that is largely ignored by mainstream paradigms. This book provides a comprehensive exploration of the mind-body problem in various psychoanalytic schools of thought, including philosophical and metapsychological points of view. Psychoanalysis and the Mind-Body Problem will be of interest to psychoanalysts, philosophers, neuroscientists, evolutionary biologists, academics, and those generally interested in the humanities, cognitive science, and the philosophy of mind.

Responding to the work of previous critics of psychiatry, who have associated its undue dominance with both a modern scientific paradigm and political factors, Jenifer Booth puts forward a theoretical challenge based on MacIntyres work on Aquinas and Aristotle, but adding the museum and assembly as conceptual thinking tools.
MacIntyres work on practices, tradition-constituted enquiry, Marxist ideology and Kuhn are all used in putting forward a pre-modern view of knowledge. The feminist philosophy of Luce Irigaray widens the project to include psychotherapy. Booth puts forward a workable and kind version of psychiatric medicine which sets the work of the mental health service user movement in context.
This book should be of value to anyone who has ever wondered why doctors have so much power or who has thought that spiritual and social factors should have more weight in medicine.
It will be of interest to moral philosophers, theologians and feminist theologians, philosophers of medicine and museums studies professionals alike.

This book has two main tasks: (1) to call attention to the special challenges presented by our experience of affect-all varieties of pleasure and pain-and (2) to show how these challenges can be overcome by an "enrichment approach" that understands affect as the enrichment or deterioration of conscious activity as a whole. This "enrichment approach" draws from Alfred North Whitehead as well as the pragmatists John Dewey and William James, all of whom thought of affect as a fundamental aspect of experience rather than a special class of feelings. It also draws from recent scientific research that suggests that the dynamic repertoire of consciousness can change, effectively expanding and contracting our capacity to feel. Weaving these perspectives together, the book develops a theory that accounts for the peculiar phenomenology of affect and sheds new light on a diverse range of experiences, from everyday pleasures and pains to the special satisfactions of the arts and religious festivity. At the same time, it presents a fresh and distinctively affect-centered perspective on the nature of consciousness.

Knowledge and Reality brings together a selection of Colin McGinn's philosophical essays from the 1970s to the 1990s, whose unifying theme is the relation between the mind and the world. The essays range over a set of prominent topics in contemporary philosophy, including the analysis of knowledge, the a priori, necessity, possible worlds, realism, mental representation, appearance and reality, and colour. McGinn has written a new postscript to each essay, placing it in its philosophical context by sketching the background against which it was written, explaining its relations to other notable work, and offering his current reflections on the topic. The volume thus traces the development of McGinn's ideas and their role in some central philosophical debates. Seen together the essays offer a many-sided defence of realism, while emphasizing the epistemological price that realism exacts.

This collection of papers on issues in the theory of mental representation expresses a diversity of recent reflections on the idea that C. D. Broad so aptly characterized in the title of his book Mind and the World Order. An important impetus in the project of organizing this work were the discussions I had with Keith Lehrer while I was a Visiting Scholar in the department of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. His encouragement and friendship were of great value to me and I wish to express my thanks to him here. A word of thanks too for Mike Harnish who casually suggested the title Rerepresentation. I wish to express my thanks to Hans Schuurmans of the Computer Center at Tilburg University for his patient and cheerful assistance in preparing the manuscript. Professor J. Verster of the University of Groningen kindly provided the plates for the Ames Room figures. Thieu Kuys helped not only with the texts but also relieved me of chores so that I could devote more time to meeting deadlines. Barry Mildner had a major role in the text preparation using his skills and initiative in solving what seemed like endless technical problems. My deepest thanks are reserved for Anti Sax whose contribution to the project amount to a co-editorship of this volume. She participated in every phase of its development with valuable suggestions, prepared the indexes, and worked tirelessly to its completion.

In Philosophy of Mind: The Metaphysics of Consciousness, Dale Jacquette provides students and professionals with a concise and accessible overview of this fascinating subject. The book covers all the key topics and debates in the philosophy of mind and introduces the full range of choices available in approaching the mind-body problem. Exploring classical and contemporary texts, the book surveys the subject's historical background and current applications. Crucially, Jacquette offers a defence of property dualism as an alternative solution to the mind-body problem, instead of the mainstream eliminativist and reductivist strategies. Clearly structured and featuring useful diagrams, a glossary of key terms, and advice on further reading, the book is ideal for classroom use. Fully revised, updated and expanded to meet the needs of a new generation of philosophy students, this second edition is the ideal companion to the study of the philosophy of mind.

Psychologist Sharon Lamb and philosopher Jeffrie Murphy argue that forgiveness has been accepted as a therapeutic strategy without serious, critical examination. Chapters by both psychologists and philosophers ask: Why is forgiveness so popular now? What exactly does it entail? When might it be appropriate for a therapist not to advise forgiveness? When is forgiveness in fact harmful?

The context for this interdisciplinary work by a philosopher and a clinician is the psychiatric care provided to those with severe mental disorders. Such a setting makes distinctive moral demands on the very character of the practitioner, it is shown, calling for special virtues and greater virtue than many other practice settings. In a practice so attentive to the patient's self identity, the authors promote a heightened awareness of cultural and particularly gender issues. By elucidating the nature of the moral psychology and character of the good psychiatrist, this work provides a sustained application of virtue theory to clinical practice. With its roots in Aristotelian writing, The Virtuous Psychiatrist presents virtue traits as habits, able to be cultivated and enhanced through training. The book describes these traits, and how they can be habituated in clinical training. A turn towards virtue theory within philosophy during the last several decades has resulted in important research on professional ethics. By approaching the ethics of psychiatric professionals in these virtue terms, Radden and Sadler's work provides an original application of this theorizing to practice. Of interest to both theorists and practitioners, the book explores the tension between the model of enduring character implicit in virtue theory and the segmented personae of role-specific moral responses. Clinical examples are provided, based upon dramaturgical vignettes (caseplays) which illustrate both the interactions of the case participants as well as the inner monologue of the clinician protagonist.

This volume is a collection of essays on a special theme in Aristotelian philosophy of mind: the internal senses. The first part of the volume is devoted to the central question of whether or not any internal senses exist in Aristotle's philosophy of mind and, if so, how many and how they are individuated. The provocative claim of chapter one is that Aristotle recognizes no such internal sense. His medieval Latin interpreters, on the other hand, very much thought that Aristotle did introduce a number of internal senses as shown in the second chapter. The second part of the volume contains a number of case studies demonstrating the philosophical background of some of the most influential topics covered by the internal senses in the Aristotelian tradition and in contemporary philosophy of mind. The focus of the case studies is on memory, imagination and estimation. Chapters introduce the underlying mechanisms of memory and recollection taking its cue from Aristotle but reaching into early modern philosophy as well as studying composite imagination in Avicenna's philosophy of mind. Further topics include the Latin reception of Avicenna's estimative faculty and the development of the internal senses as well as offering an account of the logic of objects of imagination.

It is commonly held that our thoughts, beliefs, desires and feelings - the mental phenomena that we instantiate - are constituted by states and processes that occur inside our head. The view known as externalism, however, denies that mental phenomena are internal in this sense. The mind is not purely in the head. Mental phenomena are hybrid entities that straddle both internal state and processes and things occurring in the outside world. The development of externalist conceptions of the mind is one of the most controversial, and arguably one of the most important, developments in the philosophy of mind in the second half of the twentieth century. Yet, despite its significance most recent work on externalism has been highly technical, clouding its basic ideas and principles. Moreover, very little work has been done to locate externalism within philosophical developments in both analytic and continental traditions. In this book, Mark Rowlands aims to remedy both these problems and present for the reader a clear and accessible introduction to the subject grounded in wider developments in the history of philosophy. Rowlands shows that externalism has significant and respectable historical roots that make it much more important than a specific eruption that occurred in late twentieth-century analytic philosophy.

Thoroughly revised and updated, including three new chapters on race, sex and human nature Second edition is split into thirteen more manageable chapters (instead of eight long ones in the first edition), matching course syllabi more effectively and making it easier for students and teachers to use the book Covers the essential topics, such as selection, adaptation, modularity, genes and the environment, neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, and free will and determinism Additional textbook features include: chapter summaries, annotated further reading and glossary.

The big question of how and why mindedness evolved necessitates collaborative, multidisciplinary investigation. Biosemiotics provides a new conceptual space that attracts a multitude of thinkers in the biological and cognitive sciences and the humanities who recognize continuity in the biosphere from the simplest to the most complex organisms, and who are united in the project of trying to account for even language and human consciousness in this comprehensive picture of life. The young interdiscipline of biosemiotics has so far by and large focused on codes, signs and sign processes in the microworld-a fact that reflects the field's strong representation in microbiology and embryology. What philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists can contribute to the growing interdiscipline are insights into how the biosemiotic weltanschauung applies to complex organisms like humans where such signs and sign processes constitute human society and culture.

Provides a comprehensive overview of research on Emotion and Cognition for each cognitive function alongside coverage of ow emotion-cognition relations are modulated by individual differences, aging, and psychopathology. Will appeal to anyone interested in the role of emotions, including students and researchers from the cognitive and affective sciences, such as psychology, linguistics, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, computer science, psychiatry, and neuropsychology. Features student-friendly figures and pedagogy, alongside a wealth of up-to-date references throughout.

The philosophical issues raised by perception make it one of the central topics in the philosophical tradition. Debate about the nature of perceptual knowledge and the objects of perception comprises a thread that runs through the history of philosophy. In some historical periods the major issues have been predominantly epistemological and related to scepticism, but an adequate understanding of perception is important more widely, especially for metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. For this reason Barry Maund provides an account of the major issues in the philosophy of perception that highlights the importance of a good theory of perception in a range of philosophical fields, while also seeking to be sensitive to the historical dimension of the subject. The work presents chapters on forms of natural realism; theories of perceptual experience; representationalism; the argument from illusion; phenomenological senses; types of perceptual content; the representationalist/intentionalist thesis; and adverbialist accounts of perceptual experience. The ideas of, among others, Austin, Dretske, Heidegger, Millikan, Putnam and Robinson are considered and the reader is given a philosophical framework within which to consider the issues.

The philosophical issues raised by perception make it one of the central topics in the philosophical tradition. Debate about the nature of perceptual knowledge and the objects of perception comprises a thread that runs through the history of philosophy. In some historical periods the major issues have been predominantly epistemological and related to scepticism, but an adequate understanding of perception is important more widely, especially for metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. For this reason Barry Maund provides an account of the major issues in the philosophy of perception that highlights the importance of a good theory of perception in a range of philosophical fields, while also seeking to be sensitive to the historical dimension of the subject. The work presents chapters on forms of natural realism; theories of perceptual experience; representationalism; the argument from illusion; phenomenological senses; types of perceptual content; the representationalist/intentionalist thesis; and adverbialist accounts of perceptual experience. The ideas of, among others, Austin, Dretske, Heidegger, Millikan, Putnam and Robinson are considered and the reader is given a philosophical framework within which to consider the issues.

This is an open access book which explores phenomenology as both an exceptionally diverse movement in philosophy as well as an active research method that crosses disciplinary boundaries. The volume brings together lively overviews of major areas and schools of phenomenology, as well as the most recent applications across a range of fields.  The first part reviews the state-of-the-art in various areas of contemporary phenomenology, including several distinct schools of Husserl and Heidegger scholarship, as well as approaches derived from Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir, Fanon, and others. An innovative quantitative analysis of citation networks provides rich visualizations of the field as a whole. The second part showcases phenomenology as a living discipline that can advance research in other areas. While some areas of interaction between phenomenology and other disciplines are by now well established (e.g. cognitive science), this volume sheds light on newer areas of application. The goal is to move beyond discussions of philosophical method and highlight scholars who are actually doing phenomenology in a variety of areas, including:   Embodiment and questions of gender, race, and identity,  The arts (visual art, literature, architecture), and  Archaeology and anthropology.   This volume offers a concise introduction to cutting edge phenomenological research and is suitable for both students and specialists. 

Debates in Psychology tackles some of the major issues and controversies within the field of psychology. The book includes a discussion of the major debates in psychology prescribed by the AQA Specification A-Level syllabus, such as free will and determinism, whether or not psychology can (or indeed should) be a science, reductionism, and the nature-nurture debate. Additionally, the 'mind-body question' is examined as an example of reductionism in psychology. A chapter on behaviourism is also included in order to draw together the debates covered throughout the book.
Each topic covered in Debates in Psychology is presented in a highly readable and accessible manner. The book will be invaluable for students wishing to gain a greater understanding of this exciting area.

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First published in 2002. This is Volume VI of seventeen in the Philosophy of Mind and Psychology series. Written in 1970, this work is an exercise in constructive philosophy, looking at the subject of consciousness and a theory offered as an explanation of self-awareness.