Knowledge and Reality brings together a selection of Colin McGinn's philosophical essays from the 1970s to the 1990s, whose unifying theme is the relation between the mind and the world. The essays range over a set of prominent topics in contemporary philosophy, including the analysis of knowledge, the a priori, necessity, possible worlds, realism, mental representation, appearance and reality, and colour. McGinn has written a new postscript to each essay, placing it in its philosophical context by sketching the background against which it was written, explaining its relations to other notable work, and offering his current reflections on the topic. The volume thus traces the development of McGinn's ideas and their role in some central philosophical debates. Seen together the essays offer a many-sided defence of realism, while emphasizing the epistemological price that realism exacts.

From the time of Locke, discussions of personal identity have often ignored the question of our basic metaphysical nature: whether we human people are biological organisms, spatial or temporal parts of organisms, bundles of perceptions, or what have you. The result of this neglect has been centuries of wild proposals and clashing intuitions.
What Are We? is the first general study of this important question. It beings by explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, such as questions of personal identity and the mind-body problem. It then examines in some depth the main possible accounts of our metaphysical nature, detailing both their theoretical virtues and the often grave difficulties they face.
The book does not endorse any particular account of what we are, but argues that the matter turns on more general issues in the ontology of material things. If composition is universal--if any material things whatever make up something bigger--then we are temporal parts of organisms. If things never compose anything bigger, so that there are only mereological simples, then we too are simples--perhaps the immaterial substances of Descartes--or else we do not exist at all (a view Olson takes very seriously). The intermediate view that some things compose bigger things and others do not leads almost inevitably to the conclusion that we are organisms. So we can discover what we are by working out when composition occurs.

This collection of papers on issues in the theory of mental representation expresses a diversity of recent reflections on the idea that C. D. Broad so aptly characterized in the title of his book Mind and the World Order. An important impetus in the project of organizing this work were the discussions I had with Keith Lehrer while I was a Visiting Scholar in the department of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. His encouragement and friendship were of great value to me and I wish to express my thanks to him here. A word of thanks too for Mike Harnish who casually suggested the title Rerepresentation. I wish to express my thanks to Hans Schuurmans of the Computer Center at Tilburg University for his patient and cheerful assistance in preparing the manuscript. Professor J. Verster of the University of Groningen kindly provided the plates for the Ames Room figures. Thieu Kuys helped not only with the texts but also relieved me of chores so that I could devote more time to meeting deadlines. Barry Mildner had a major role in the text preparation using his skills and initiative in solving what seemed like endless technical problems. My deepest thanks are reserved for Anti Sax whose contribution to the project amount to a co-editorship of this volume. She participated in every phase of its development with valuable suggestions, prepared the indexes, and worked tirelessly to its completion.

In Philosophy of Mind: The Metaphysics of Consciousness, Dale Jacquette provides students and professionals with a concise and accessible overview of this fascinating subject. The book covers all the key topics and debates in the philosophy of mind and introduces the full range of choices available in approaching the mind-body problem. Exploring classical and contemporary texts, the book surveys the subject's historical background and current applications. Crucially, Jacquette offers a defence of property dualism as an alternative solution to the mind-body problem, instead of the mainstream eliminativist and reductivist strategies. Clearly structured and featuring useful diagrams, a glossary of key terms, and advice on further reading, the book is ideal for classroom use. Fully revised, updated and expanded to meet the needs of a new generation of philosophy students, this second edition is the ideal companion to the study of the philosophy of mind.

Psychologist Sharon Lamb and philosopher Jeffrie Murphy argue that forgiveness has been accepted as a therapeutic strategy without serious, critical examination. Chapters by both psychologists and philosophers ask: Why is forgiveness so popular now? What exactly does it entail? When might it be appropriate for a therapist not to advise forgiveness? When is forgiveness in fact harmful?

It is commonly held that our thoughts, beliefs, desires and feelings - the mental phenomena that we instantiate - are constituted by states and processes that occur inside our head. The view known as externalism, however, denies that mental phenomena are internal in this sense. The mind is not purely in the head. Mental phenomena are hybrid entities that straddle both internal state and processes and things occurring in the outside world. The development of externalist conceptions of the mind is one of the most controversial, and arguably one of the most important, developments in the philosophy of mind in the second half of the twentieth century. Yet, despite its significance most recent work on externalism has been highly technical, clouding its basic ideas and principles. Moreover, very little work has been done to locate externalism within philosophical developments in both analytic and continental traditions. In this book, Mark Rowlands aims to remedy both these problems and present for the reader a clear and accessible introduction to the subject grounded in wider developments in the history of philosophy. Rowlands shows that externalism has significant and respectable historical roots that make it much more important than a specific eruption that occurred in late twentieth-century analytic philosophy.

In this volume, internationally acclaimed psychoanalysts, philosophers, and scholars of humanities examine the mind-body problem and provide differing analyses on the nature of mind, unconscious structure, mental properties, qualia, and the contours of consciousness. Given that disciplines from the humanities and the social sciences to neuroscience cannot agree upon the nature of consciousness-from what constitutes psychic reality to mental properties, psychoanalysis has a unique perspective that is largely ignored by mainstream paradigms. This book provides a comprehensive exploration of the mind-body problem in various psychoanalytic schools of thought, including philosophical and metapsychological points of view. Psychoanalysis and the Mind-Body Problem will be of interest to psychoanalysts, philosophers, neuroscientists, evolutionary biologists, academics, and those generally interested in the humanities, cognitive science, and the philosophy of mind.

The philosophical issues raised by perception make it one of the central topics in the philosophical tradition. Debate about the nature of perceptual knowledge and the objects of perception comprises a thread that runs through the history of philosophy. In some historical periods the major issues have been predominantly epistemological and related to scepticism, but an adequate understanding of perception is important more widely, especially for metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. For this reason Barry Maund provides an account of the major issues in the philosophy of perception that highlights the importance of a good theory of perception in a range of philosophical fields, while also seeking to be sensitive to the historical dimension of the subject. The work presents chapters on forms of natural realism; theories of perceptual experience; representationalism; the argument from illusion; phenomenological senses; types of perceptual content; the representationalist/intentionalist thesis; and adverbialist accounts of perceptual experience. The ideas of, among others, Austin, Dretske, Heidegger, Millikan, Putnam and Robinson are considered and the reader is given a philosophical framework within which to consider the issues.

The philosophical issues raised by perception make it one of the central topics in the philosophical tradition. Debate about the nature of perceptual knowledge and the objects of perception comprises a thread that runs through the history of philosophy. In some historical periods the major issues have been predominantly epistemological and related to scepticism, but an adequate understanding of perception is important more widely, especially for metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. For this reason Barry Maund provides an account of the major issues in the philosophy of perception that highlights the importance of a good theory of perception in a range of philosophical fields, while also seeking to be sensitive to the historical dimension of the subject. The work presents chapters on forms of natural realism; theories of perceptual experience; representationalism; the argument from illusion; phenomenological senses; types of perceptual content; the representationalist/intentionalist thesis; and adverbialist accounts of perceptual experience. The ideas of, among others, Austin, Dretske, Heidegger, Millikan, Putnam and Robinson are considered and the reader is given a philosophical framework within which to consider the issues.

Debates in Psychology tackles some of the major issues and controversies within the field of psychology. The book includes a discussion of the major debates in psychology prescribed by the AQA Specification A-Level syllabus, such as free will and determinism, whether or not psychology can (or indeed should) be a science, reductionism, and the nature-nurture debate. Additionally, the 'mind-body question' is examined as an example of reductionism in psychology. A chapter on behaviourism is also included in order to draw together the debates covered throughout the book.
Each topic covered in Debates in Psychology is presented in a highly readable and accessible manner. The book will be invaluable for students wishing to gain a greater understanding of this exciting area.

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Thoroughly revised and updated, including three new chapters on race, sex and human nature Second edition is split into thirteen more manageable chapters (instead of eight long ones in the first edition), matching course syllabi more effectively and making it easier for students and teachers to use the book Covers the essential topics, such as selection, adaptation, modularity, genes and the environment, neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, and free will and determinism Additional textbook features include: chapter summaries, annotated further reading and glossary.

The big question of how and why mindedness evolved necessitates collaborative, multidisciplinary investigation. Biosemiotics provides a new conceptual space that attracts a multitude of thinkers in the biological and cognitive sciences and the humanities who recognize continuity in the biosphere from the simplest to the most complex organisms, and who are united in the project of trying to account for even language and human consciousness in this comprehensive picture of life. The young interdiscipline of biosemiotics has so far by and large focused on codes, signs and sign processes in the microworld-a fact that reflects the field's strong representation in microbiology and embryology. What philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists can contribute to the growing interdiscipline are insights into how the biosemiotic weltanschauung applies to complex organisms like humans where such signs and sign processes constitute human society and culture.

A study of problems revolving around the subject of intellect in the philosophies of Alfarabi (d. 950), Avicenna (980-1037), and Averroes (1126-1198), this book pays particular attention to the way in which these philosophers addressed the tangle of issues that grew up around the active intellect. Davidson starts by reviewing discussions in Greek and early Arabic philosophy that served as the background for the three Arabic thinkers. He examines the cosmologies and theories of human and active intellect of the three philosophers and covers such subjects as the emanation of the supernal realm from the First Cause, the emanation of the lower world from the transcendent active intellect, stages of human intellect, illumination of the human intellect by the transcendent active intellect, conjunction of the human intellect with the transcendent active intellect, prophecy, and human immortality. Davidson traces the impact of the three philosophers on medieval Jewish philosophy and Latin Scholasticism. He shows that the later medieval Jewish philosophers and the Scholastics had differing perceptions of Averroes because they happened to use works belonging to different periods of his philosophic career. This book will be of interest to the student and scholar in medieval philosophy, the history of philosophy, and medieval culture.

This book grew out of a graduate student paper 261] in which I set down some criticisms of J. R. Lucas' attempt to refute mechanism by means of G6del's theorem. I had made several such abortive attempts myself and had become familiar with their pitfalls, and especially with the double edged nature of incompleteness arguments. My original idea was to model the refutation of mechanism on the almost universally accepted G6delian refutation of Hilbert's formalism, but I kept getting stuck on questions of mathematical philosophy which I found myself having to beg. A thorough study of the foundational works of Hilbert and Bernays finally convinced me that I had all too naively and uncritically bought this refutation of formalism. I did indeed discover points of surprisingly close contact between formalism and mechanism, but also that it was possible to under mine certain strong arguments against these positions precisely by invok ing G6del's and related work. I also began to realize that the Church Turing thesis itself is the principal bastion protecting mechanism, and that G6del's work was perhaps the best thing that ever happened to both mechanism and formalism. I pushed these lines of argument in my dis sertation with the patient help of my readers, Raymond Nelson and Howard Stein. I would especially like to thank the latter for many valuable criticisms of my dissertation as well as some helpful suggestions for reor ganizing it in the direction of the present book."

Foundations of Embodied Learning advances learning, instruction, and the design of educational technologies by rethinking the learner as an integrated system of mind, body, and environment. Body-based processes-direct physical, social, and environmental interactions-are constantly mediating intellectual performance, sensory stimulation, communication abilities, and other conditions of learning. This book's coherent, evidence-based framework articulates principles of grounded and embodied learning for design and its implications for curriculum, classroom instruction, and student formative and summative assessment for scholars and graduate students of educational psychology, instructional design and technology, cognitive science, the learning sciences, and beyond.

This book is a collection of studies on topics related to subjectivity and selfhood in medieval and early modern philosophy. The individual contributions approach the theme from a number of angles varying from cognitive and moral psychology to metaphysics and epistemology. Instead of a complete overview on the historical period, the book provides detailed glimpses into some of the most important figures of the period, such as Augustine, Avicenna, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Hume. The questions addressed include the ethical problems of the location of one's true self and the proper distribution of labour between desire, passion and reason, and the psychological tasks of accounting for subjective experience and self-knowledge and determining different types of self-awareness.

"This translation is an important research tool for all philosophers interested in Aquinas's philosophy of mind and epistemology. . . .Every library of both undergraduate and graduate philosophy programs needs this work, and all of us interested in the history of medieval philosophy of mind should have this new translation on our desks. Highly recommended."-Anthony J. Lisska, The Medieval Review

Phenomenology and analytic philosophy have skirmished often, but seldom in ways conducive to dialectical progress. Generally, the skirmishes seem more "political" than philosophical, as when one side ridicules the methods of the other or criticizes the viability of the other's issues and assump tions. Analytic interest in third person objectivity is often spurned by Continental philosophers as being unduly abstract. Continental interest in first person subjectivity is often criticized by analysts as being muddled and imprecise. Logical analysis confronts the power of metaphor and judges it "too ambiguous" for rigorous philosophical activity. The language of metaphor confronts the power of logical analysis and deems it "too restric tive" for describing the nature and structures of authentic human exper ience. But are the two approaches really incompatible? Perhaps because each side of the "divide" has been working at problems largely uninteresting to the "opposition" it has been easy to ignore or underestimate the importance of this issue. But now each side is being led into a common field of problems associated with the nature of mind, and there is a new urgency to the need for examining carefully the question of conceptual compatibility and the potential for dialogue. Analytic thinkers are typically in the business of concept clarification and objective certi fication. Continental philosophers employ introspection in the interest of a project of description and classification that aims to be true to the full subtlety and complexity of the human condition."

Provides a comprehensive overview of research on Emotion and Cognition for each cognitive function alongside coverage of ow emotion-cognition relations are modulated by individual differences, aging, and psychopathology. Will appeal to anyone interested in the role of emotions, including students and researchers from the cognitive and affective sciences, such as psychology, linguistics, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, computer science, psychiatry, and neuropsychology. Features student-friendly figures and pedagogy, alongside a wealth of up-to-date references throughout.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.