Since the pioneering work of Donald Davidson on action, many philosophers have taken critical stances on his causal account. This book criticizes Davidson's event-causal view of action, and offers instead an agent causal view both to describe what an action is and to set a framework for how actions are explained.

This volume collects recent essays and reviews by Thomas Nagel in three subject areas. The first section, including the title essay, is concerned with religious belief and some of the philosophical questions connected with it, such as the relation between religion and evolutionary theory, the question of why there is something rather than nothing, and the significance for human life of our place in the cosmos. It includes a defense of the relevance of religion to science education. The second section concerns the interpretation of liberal political theory, especially in an international context. A substantial essay argues that the principles of distributive justice that apply within individual nation-states do not apply to the world as a whole. The third section discusses the distinctive contributions of four philosophers to our understanding of what it is to be human--the form of human consciousness and the source of human values.

This book is the third in my series of four books dealing with Intelligence, Instincts, and Consciousness. The simple and truthful realization of what we are, and how we got to where we are within nature's world, is the ultimate truth that any philosophy could ever propose to know. It is ultimately the most powerful state that any human mind can ever attain. It is a true kind of nirvana. It is with this knowing state of mind that we can make ever-new beginnings and provide for a future where our chances are best for surviving whatever random hells that nature will with great certainty rise up against us. The fact that we might have to eventually face up to what we are as completely definable creatures in terms of a very complex organization of billions of very simple structures is not in anyway whatsoever a degradation of the truth of our humanity. Understanding what we are has led us to realize both the miraculous and morally good achievements of our kind, and also to an understanding of the basic nature of our more hidden ugly and evil actions.

When in 1823 Sigmund Freud published his structural id/ego/superego concept of the mind, he predicted that future scientific study would show that all mental experiences originate in the brain. Indeed, the extraordinary advances in neuroscience and brain-imaging technologies during the last three decades have indisputably established that the brain is involved in every mental activity.
However, we have yet to discover how electro-chemical activities in the brain produce or convert into mental events. Most theories have centered on Freud's claim that mental functions are ego functions. In this ambitious and deeply thoughtful work, psychiatrist Christiaan D. van der Velde presents the results of a different approach: the analysis of the origin, nature, and functionality of the common denominators of all mental events - our mental representations. While Freud conceived these to be products of the mind, Van der Velde's analysis disputes Freud's claim. Mental representations are actually autochthonously occurring phenomena, which originate as activated cerebral imprints of previously experienced visual percepts whose gestalts - or patterns - determine cognitive content. Each gestalt is accompanied by a sense of having experienced it previously. This sense of "knowing" cannot be explained by any physical process or function of the brain. By applying a new interpretation of the philosophical concept of dialectics the author describes cognition as an empirical - that is, purely experiential - epiphenomenon, which reflects the specific differences between internal images and actual visual percepts. Van der Velde concludes that mental representations (1) are not the products but the constituents of the mind and (2) enable us to explain the psychodynamics of all mental functions.
This cogent, incisive analysis by a leading psychotherapist and researcher in cognition provides much to ponder and many insights into the nature of the mind.

Many of our endeavors - be it personal or communal, technological or artistic - aim at eradicating all traces of dissatisfaction from our daily lives. They seek to cure us of our discontent in order to deliver us a fuller and flourishing existence. But what if ubiquitous pleasure and instant fulfilment make our lives worse, not better? What if discontent isn't an obstacle to the good life but one of its essential ingredients? In Propelled, Andreas Elpidorou makes a lively case for the value of discontent and illustrates how boredom, frustration, and anticipation are good for us. Weaving together stories from sources as wide-ranging as classical literature, social and cognitive psychology, philosophy, art, and video games, Elpidorou shows that these psychological states aren't unpleasant accidents of our lives. Rather, they illuminate our desires and expectations, inform us when we find ourselves stuck in unpleasant and unfulfilling situations, and motivate us to furnish our lives with meaning, interest, and value. Boredom, frustration, and anticipation aren't obstacles to our goals-they are our guides, propelling us into lives that are truly our own.

While much has been written on Descartes' theory of mind and ideas, no systematic study of his theory of sensory representation and misrepresentation is currently available in the literature. Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Misrepresentation is an ambitious attempt to fill this gap. It argues against the established view that Cartesian sensations are mere qualia by defending the view that they are representational; it offers a descriptivist-causal account of their representationality that is critical of, and differs from, all other extant accounts (such as, for example, causal, teleofunctional and purely internalist accounts); and it has the advantage of providing an adequate solution to the problem of sensory misrepresentation within Descartes' internalist theory of ideas. In sum, the book offers a novel account of the representationality of Cartesian sensations; provides a panoramic overview, and critical assessment, of the scholarly literature on this issue; and places Descartes' theory of sensation in the central position it deserves among the philosophical and scientific investigations of the workings of the human mind.

The "theory of mind" framework has been the fastest growing body of empirical research in contemporary psychology. It has given rise to a range of positions on what it takes to relate to others as intentional beings. This book brings together disparate strands of ToM research, lays out historical roots of the idea, and indicates better alternatives.

In "Cognitive Integration: Attacking The Bounds of Cognition" Richard Menary argues that the real pay-off from extended-mind-style arguments is not a new form of externalism in the philosophy of mind, but a view in which the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole.
Menary argues that the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes cognitive processes and that cognition is hybrid: internal and external processes and vehicles complement one another in the completion of cognitive tasks. However, we cannot make good on these claims without understanding the cognitive norms by which we manipulate bodily external vehicles of cognition.

This is the first book-length presentation and defense of a new theory of human and machine cognition, according to which human persons are superminds. Superminds are capable of processing information not only at and below the level of Turing machines (standard computers), but above that level (the "Turing Limit"), as information processing devices that have not yet been (and perhaps can never be) built, but have been mathematically specified; these devices are known as super-Turing machines or hypercomputers. Superminds, as explained herein, also have properties no machine, whether above or below the Turing Limit, can have. The present book is the third and pivotal volume in Bringsjord's supermind quartet; the first two books were What Robots Can and Can't Be (Kluwer) and AI and Literary Creativity (Lawrence Erlbaum). The final chapter of this book offers eight prescriptions for the concrete practice of AI and cognitive science in light of the fact that we are superminds.

Psychoanalytic Knowledge and the Nature of Mind presents cutting edge thinking on some fundamental ideas in psychoanalysis by important international scholars in the field of the philosophy of psychoanalysis. It explores the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge in the light of contemporary philosophical views or critiques of a diversity of topics relevant to psychoanalysis: the philosophy of mind; the notion of changing oneself; religion; the notion of interdisciplinary links with psychoanalytic knowledge; post-Freudian psychoanalytic knowledge and challenges to psychoanalytic methodology.

Do you get upset easily, even about small things, or have trouble getting along with others? Do you feel down most of the time? Are you plagued by loneliness, grief, guilt, or a gnawing feeling of life's futility? Does fear, anxiety, or worry often overwhelm you? In this uplifting, user-friendly guide, philosopher Elliot D. Cohen offers an uncommonly commonsense approach to these and many other problems of living. Cohen, one of the principal founders of "philosophical counseling" in the United States, reveals how you can attain genuine insight into the common confusions of everyday life by harnessing your own native powers of reason. "Early on in my work with clients," writes Cohen, "I became aware that the utility of philosophy for ordinary life was in the rigors of its rational, commonsense approach." Through engaging case studies drawn from his practice, and candid discussion of his own personal life ("stories of the road"), Cohen vividly illustrates how, by making unrealistic assumptions about life, you may be undermining your own personal and interpersonal happiness without even realizing it. Step by step, the author shows you how to use your native reason to expose, refute, correct, and overcome these sometimes dangerous, irrational assumptions hidden in your thinking. This realistic, no-nonsense, and drug-free approach to "rational medicine," in the tradition of Aristotle, walks you through some of the most injurious and offending fallacies of life, and arms you with many commonsense prescriptions for attaining greater freedom and control over your life.

"A magisterial work (that) culminates twenty-five years of thinking about the problems of free will. For those who believe both that robust free will cannot survive in a deterministic climate and that a viable free will need be scientifically respectable, Kane's work may prove salvific." -- Mark Bernstein, University of Texas at San Antonio. In the past quarter-century, there has been a resurgence of interest in philosophical questions about free will. After a clear and broad-reaching survey of these recent debates, Robert Kane presents his own controversial view. Arguing persuasively for a traditional incompatibilist or libertarian conception of free will, Kane demonstrates that such a conception can be made intelligible without appeals to obscure or mysterious forms of agency and thus can be reconciled with a contemporary scientific picture of the world.

Based upon Ajit Maan's groundbreaking theory of Internarrative Identity, this collection focuses upon redefining self, slave narrative, the black Caribbean diaspora, and cyberspace to explore the interconnection between identity and life experience as expressed through personal narrative.

Current debate in cognitive science, from robotics to analysis of vision, deals with problems like the perception of form, the structure and formation of mental images and their modelling, the ecological development of artificial intelligence, and cognitive analysis of natural language. It focuses in particular on the presence of a hierarchy of intellectual constructions in different formats of representation. These diverse approaches, which share a common assumption of the inner nature of representation, call for a new epistemology - even a new psychophysics - based on a theory of reference which is intrinsically cognitive. As a contribution to contemporary research, the reading presents the core of theories developed in Central Europe between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by philosophers, physicists, psychologists and semanticists who shared a dynamic approach and a pronounced concern with problems of interaction and dependence. These theories offer innovative solutions to some of the epistemological and philosophical problems currently at the centre of debate, like part-whole, theory of relations, and conceptual and linguistic categorization.

The author presents a new philosophical theory according to which we need intuitions and emotions in order to have objective moral knowledge, which is called affectual intuitionism. Affectual Intuitionism combines ethical intuitionism with a cognitive theory of emotions.

In Physical Realization, Sydney Shoemaker considers the question of how physicalism can be true: how can all facts about the world, including mental ones, be constituted by facts about the distribution in the world of physical properties? Physicalism requires that the mental properties of a person are 'realized in' the physical properties of that person, and that all instantiations of properties in macroscopic objects are realized in microphysical states of affairs. Shoemaker offers an account of both these sorts of realization, one which allows the realized properties to be causally efficacious. He also explores the implications of this account for a wide range of metaphysical issues, including the nature of persistence through time, the problem of material constitution, the possibility of emergent properties, and the nature of phenomenal consciousness.

This work covers, in its subsequent parts, ontology, the metaphysics of causation, and the philosophy of mind. It provides a firm theoretical basis for believing that in our all-physical world mental causation is perfectly real, and that it can be understood.

This book compares attitudes to empiricism in language study from mid-twentieth century philosophy of language and from present-day linguistics. It focuses on responses to the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, particularly in the work of British philosopher J. L. Austin and the much less well-known work of Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess.

If humans are purely physical, and if it is the brain that does the work formerly assigned to the mind or soul, then how can it fail to be the case that all of our thoughts and actions are determined by the laws of neurobiology? If this is the case, then free will, moral responsibility, and, indeed, reason itself would appear to be in jeopardy. Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown here defend a non-reductive version of physicalism whereby humans are (sometimes) the authors of their own thoughts and actions.
Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? brings together insights from both philosophy and the cognitive neurosciences to defeat neurobiological reductionism. One resource is a "post-Cartesian" account of mind as essentially embodied and constituted by action-feedback-evaluation-action loops in the environment, and "scaffolded" by cultural resources. Another is a non-mysterious account of downward (mental) causation explained in terms of a complex, higher-order system exercising constraints on lower-level causal processes. These resources are intrinsically related: the embeddedness of brain events in action-feedback loops is the key to their mentality, and those broader systems have causal effects on the brain itself.
With these resources Murphy and Brown take on two problems in philosophy of mind: a response to the charges that physicalists cannot account for the meaningfulness of language nor the causal efficacy of the mental qua mental. Solutions to these problems are a prerequisite to addressing the central problem of the book: how can biological organisms be free and morally responsible? The authors argue that the free-will problem is badly framed if it is put in terms ofneurobiological determinism; the real issue is neurobiological reductionism. If it is indeed possible to make sense of the notion of downward causation, then the relevant question is whether humans exert downward causation over some of their own parts and processes. If all organisms do this to some extent, what needs to be added to this animalian flexibility to constitute free and responsible action? The keys are sophisticated language and hierarchically ordered cognitive processes allowing (mature) humans to evaluate their own actions, motives, goals, and rational and moral principles.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience is a state-of-the-art collection of interdisciplinary research spanning philosophy (of science, mind, and ethics) and current neuroscience. Containing chapters written by some of the most prominent philosophers working in this area, and in some cases co-authored with neuroscientists, this volume reflects both the breadth and depth of current work in this exciting field. Topics include the nature of explanation in neuroscience; whether and how current neuroscience is reductionistic; consequences of current research on the neurobiology of learning and memory, perception and sensation, neurocomputational modeling, and neuroanatomy; the burgeoning field of neuroethics and the neurobiology of motivation that increasingly informs it; implications from neurology and clinical neuropsychology, especially in light of some bizarre symptoms involving misrepresentations of self; the extent and consequences of multiple realization in actual neuroscience; the new field of neuroeudamonia; and the neurophilosophy of subjectivity.
This volume will interest philosophers working in numerous fields who wish to see how current neuroscience is being brought to bear directly on philosophical issues. It will also be of interest to neuroscientists who wish to learn how the research programs of some of their colleagues are being enriched by interaction with philosophers, and finally to those working in any interdisciplinary field who wish to see how two seemingly disparate disciplines--one traditional and humanistic, the other new and scientific--are being brought together to both disciplines' mutual benefit.

Value, Reality, and Desire is an extended argument for a robust realism about value. The robust realist affirms the following distinctive theses. There are genuine claims about value which are true or false - there are facts about value. These value-facts are mind-independent - they are not reducible to desires or other mental states, or indeed to any non-mental facts of a non-evaluative kind. And these genuine, mind-independent, irreducible value-facts are causally efficacious. Values, quite literally, affect us. These are not particularly fashionable theses, and taken as a whole they go somewhat against the grain of quite a lot of recent work in the metaphysics of value. Further, against the received view, Oddie argues that we can have knowledge of values by experiential acquaintance, that there are experiences of value which can be both veridical and appropriately responsive to the values themselves. Finally, these value-experiences are not the products of some exotic and implausible faculty of 'intuition'. Rather, they are perfectly mundane and familiar mental states - namely, desires. This view explains how values can be 'intrinsically motivating', without falling foul of the widely accepted 'queerness' objection. There are, of course, other objections to each of the realist's claims. In showing how and why these objections fail, Oddie introduces a wealth of interesting and original insights about issues of wider interest - including the nature of properties, reduction, supervenience, and causation. The result is a novel and interesting account which illuminates what would otherwise be deeply puzzling features of value and desire and the connections between them.