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Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Philosophy of mind
This is the first volume to present individual chapters on the full range of developmental and acquired pragmatic disorders in children and adults. In chapters that are accessible to students and researchers as well as clinicians, this volume introduces the reader to the different types of pragmatic disorders found in clinical populations as diverse as autism spectrum disorder, traumatic brain injury and right hemisphere language disorder. The volume also moves beyond these well-established populations to include conditions such as congenital visual impairment and non-Alzheimer dementias, in which there are also pragmatic impairments. Through the use of conversational and linguistic data, the reader can see how pragmatic disorders impact on the communication skills of the clients who have them. The assessment and treatment of pragmatic disorders are examined, and chapters also address recent developments in the neuroanatomical and cognitive bases of these disorders.
This book examines linguistic expressions of emotion in intensional contexts and offers a formally elegant account of the relationship between language and emotion. The author presents a compelling case for the view that there exist, contrary to popular belief, logical universals at the intersection of language and emotive content. This book shows that emotive structures in the mind that are widely assumed to be not only subjectively or socio-culturally variable but also irrelevant to a general theory of cognition offer an unusually suitable ground for a formal theory of emotive representations, allowing for surprising logical and cognitive consequences for a theory of cognition. Challenging mainstream assumptions in cognitive science and in linguistics, this book will appeal to linguists, philosophers of the mind, linguistic anthropologists, psychologists and cognitive scientists of all persuasions.
How is technology changing the way people remember? This book explores the interplay of memory stored in the brain (internal memory) and outside of the brain (external memory), providing a thorough interdisciplinary review of the current literature, including relevant theoretical frameworks from across a variety of disciplines in the sciences, arts, and humanities. It also presents the findings of a rich and novel empirical data set, based on a comprehensive survey on the shifting interplay of internal and external memory in the 21st century. Results reveal a growing symbiosis between the two forms of memory in our everyday lives. The book presents a new theoretical framework for understanding the interplay of internal and external memory, and their complementary strengths. It concludes with a guide to important dimensions, questions, and methods for future research. Memory and Technology will be of interest to researchers, professors, and students across the disciplines of psychology, philosophy, library and information science, human factors, media and cultural studies, anthropology and archaeology, photography, and cognitive rehabilitation, as well as anyone interested in how technology is affecting human memory. _____ "This is a novel book, with interesting and valuable data on an important, meaningful topic, as well as a gathering of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary ideas...The research is accurately represented and inclusive. As a teaching tool, I can envision graduate seminars in different disciplines drawing on the material as the basis for teaching and discussions." Dr. Linda A. Henkel, Fairfield University "This book documents the achievements of a vibrant scientific project - you feel the enthusiasm of the authors for their research. The organization of the manuscript introduces the reader into a comparatively new field the same way as pioneering authors have approached it." Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Schoenpflug, Freie Universitat Berlin
Knowledge in an Uncertain World is an exploration of the relation
between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the
primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in
action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have
and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't
allow for a chance of error, then this result is unsurprising. But
if knowledge does allow for a chance of error - as seems required
if we know much of anything at all - this result entails the denial
of a received position in epistemology. Because any chance of
error, if the stakes are high enough, can make a difference to what
can be relied on, two subjects with the same evidence and generally
the same strength of epistemic position for a proposition can
differ with respect to whether they are in a position to know.
Joshua Gert presents an original and ambitious theory of the
normative. Expressivism and non-reductive realism represent two
very widely separated poles in contemporary discussions of
normativity. But the domain of the normative is both large and
diverse; it includes, for example, the harmful, the fun, the
beautiful, the wrong, and the rational. It would be extremely
surprising if either expressivism or non-reductive realism managed
to capture all--or even the most important--phenomena associated
with all of these notions. Normative Bedrock defends a
response-dependent account of the normative that accommodates the
kind of variation in response that some non-reductive realists
downplay or ignore, but that also allows for the sort of
straightforward talk of normative properties, normative truth, and
substantive normative disagreement that expressivists have had a
hard time respecting.
The nativism controversy is not simply to be identified with the debate over "nature vs. nurture." Instead, it concerns two questions of pressing concern to the cognitive scientist, namely, whether human learning is psychologically explicable at all, and, if it is, whether inborn, task-specific learning mechanisms need be postulated in that explanation. Re-examining the nativisms of Chomsky and Fodor in light of this understanding, What's Within? reveals their strengths -- and weaknesses.
This volume focuses on philosophical problems concerning sense perception in the history of philosophy. It consists of thirteen essays that analyse the philosophical tradition originating in Aristotle's writings. Each essay tackles a particular problem that tests the limits of Aristotle's theory of perception and develops it in new directions. The problems discussed range from simultaneous perception to causality in perception, from the representational nature of sense-objects to the role of conscious attention, and from the physical/mental divide to perception as quasi-rational judgement. The volume gives an equal footing to Greek, Arabic, and Latin philosophical traditions. It makes a substantial contribution not just to the study of the Aristotelian analysis of sense perception, but to its reception in the commentary tradition and beyond. Thus, the papers address developments in Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Avicenna, John of Jandun, Nicole Oresme, and Sayf al-Din al-Amidi, among others. The result of this is a coherent collection that attacks a well-defined topic from a wide range of perspectives and across philosophical traditions.
This book describes and proposes an unusual integrative approach to human perception that qualifies as both an ecological and a phenomenological approach at the same time. Thomas Natsoulas shows us how our consciousness - in three of six senses of the word that the book identifies - is involved in our activity of perceiving the one and only world that exists, which includes oneself as a proper part of it, and that all of us share together with the rest of life on earth. He makes the case that our stream of consciousness - in the original Jamesian sense minus his mental/physical dualism - provides us with firsthand contact with the world, as opposed to our having such contact instead with theorist-posited items such as inner mental representations, internal pictures, or sense-image models, pure figments and virtual objects, none of which can have effects on our sensory receptors.
Marx, the Body, and Human Nature shows that the body and the broader material world played a far more significant role in Marx's theory than previously recognised. It provides a fresh 'take' on Marx's theory, revealing a much more open, dynamic and unstable conception of the body, the self, and human nature.
This work reflects on hypochondria as well as on the global functioning of the human mind and on the place of the patient/physician relationship in the wider organisation of society. First published in 1711, revised and enlarged in 1730, and now edited and published with a critical apparatus for the first time, this is a major work in the history of medical literature as well as a complex literary creation. Composed of three dialogues between a physician and two of his patients, Mandeville's Treatise mirrors the digressive structure of a talking cure. Thanks to the soothing and enlightening effects of this casual conversation, the physician Mandeville demonstrates the healing power of words for a class of patients that he presents as men of learning who need above all to be addressed in their own language. Mandeville's aim was to delineate his own cure for hypochondria and hysteria, which consisted of a talking cure followed by diet and exercise, but also to discuss the practice of medicine in England and continental Europe at a time when physicians were beginning to lose ground to apothecaries. Opposing a purely theoretical approach to medicine, Mandeville takes up the principles presented by Francis Bacon, Thomas Sydenham, and Giorgio Baglivi, and advocates a medical practice based on experience and backed up by time-tested theories.
This book is an edited collection of papers from international experts in philosophy and psychology concerned with time. The collection aims to bridge the gap between these disciplines by focussing on five key themes and providing philosophical and psychological perspectives on each theme. The first theme is the concept of time. The discussion ranges from the folk concept of time to the notion of time in logic, philosophy and psychology. The second theme concerns the notion of present in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and psychology. The third theme relates to continuity and flow of time in mind. One of the key questions in this section is how the apparent temporal continuity of conscious experience relates to the possibly discrete character of underlying neural processes. The fourth theme is the timing of experiences, with a focus on the perception of simultaneity and illusions of temporal order. Such effects are treated as test cases for hypotheses about the relationship between the subjective temporal order of experience and the objective order of neural events. The fifth and the final theme of the volume is time and intersubjectivity. This section examines the role of time in interpersonal coordination and in the development of social skills. The collection will appeal to both psychologists and philosophers, but also to researchers from other disciplines who seek an accessible overview of the research on time in psychology and philosophy.
From an Ontological Point of View is a highly original and accessible exploration of fundamental questions about what there is. John Heil discusses such issues as whether the world includes levels of reality; the nature of objects and properties; the demands of realism; what makes things true; qualities, powers, and the relation these bear to one another. He advances an account of the fundamental constituents of the world around us, and applies this account to problems that have plagued recent work in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics (colour, intentionality, and the nature of consciousness).
This book provides a new argument for the tensed theory of time and emergentism about the self. This argument derives in part from theories which establish our nature as rational and emotional beings whose behavior is responsive to reasons which are facts. It is argued that there must be reasons, hence facts, that can only be captured by tensed and/or first-personal language if our behavior is to be by and large rational and appropriate. This establishes the tensed theory of time and emergentism or dualism about the self, given the physical body can plausibly be fully described non-first-personally. In the course of this discussion the book also clarifies and defends a notion of fact and responds to McTaggart's paradox and Wittgenstein's private language argument.
Several Python programming books feature tools designed for experimental psychologists. What sets this book apart is its focus on eye-tracking. Eye-tracking is a widely used research technique in psychology and neuroscience labs. Research grade eye-trackers are typically faster, more accurate, and of course, more expensive than the ones seen in consumer goods or usability labs. Not surprisingly, a successful eye-tracking study usually requires sophisticated computer programming. Easy syntax and flexibility make Python a perfect choice for this task, especially for psychology researchers with little or no computer programming experience. This book offers detailed coverage of the Pylink library, a Python interface for the gold standard EyeLink (R) eye-trackers, with many step-by-step example scripts. This book is a useful reference for eye-tracking researchers, but you can also use it as a textbook for graduate-level programming courses.
Dana Kay Nelkin presents a simple and natural account of freedom and moral responsibility which responds to the great variety of challenges to the idea that we are free and responsible, before ultimately reaffirming our conception of ourselves as agents. Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility begins with a defense of the rational abilities view, according to which one is responsible for an action if and only if one acts with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. The view is compatibilist - that is, on the view defended, responsibility is compatible with determinism - and one of its striking features is a certain asymmetry: it requires the ability to do otherwise for responsibility when actions are praiseworthy, but not when they are blameworthy. In defending and elaborating the view, Nelkin questions long-held assumptions such as those concerning the relation between fairness and blame and the nature of so-called reactive attitudes such as resentment and forgiveness. Her argument not only fits with a metaphysical picture of causation - agent-causation - often assumed to be available only to incompatibilist accounts, but receives positive support from the intuitively appealing Ought Implies Can Principle, and establishes a new interpretation of freedom and moral responsibility that dovetails with a compelling account of our inescapable commitments as rational agents.
The Bungle Book presents a demythology of six salient concepts central to our modern self-understanding, The "suspects" of the self, the machine, and God, as well as the "senses" of home, love, and freedom are subjected to an intense analytical scrutiny that is back-dropped by the work of Gadamer, Heidegger, Lingis, Midgely, and other critical voices. Book-ended by a detailed introduction that asks us to "unexpect the expected" and a conclusion that suggests that we need to stop compulsively making sense of living on in order to become more sensible about its human ambiguities, The Bungle Book will be of interest to any who take seriously the contemporary challenge of a global and interconnected existence.
Comprising a series of specially commissioned chapters by leading
scholars, this comprehensive volume presents an up-to-date survey
of the central themes in the philosophy of mind. "The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind "leads the reader
through a broad range of topics, including Artificial Intelligence,
Consciousness, Dualism, Emotions, Folk Psychology, Free Will,
Individualism, Personal Identity and The Mind-Body Problem.
Taken as a whole, this timely volume is an important work for
anyone interested in gaining a deeper understanding of the field.
It serves as an accessible introduction for undergraduates, whilst
also providing fresh insights, of interest to graduates, and
researchers. CONTRIBUTORS: Fred Adams, Kenneth Aizawa, John Bickle, David J.
Chalmers, Andy Clark, Randolph Clarke, Paul E. Griffiths, John
Heil, Stephen Laurence, Kirk Ludwig, William G. Lycan, Eric
Margolis, Andrew Melnyk, Shaun Nichols, Eric T. Olson, Howard
Robinson, Stephen P. Stich and Robert A. Wilson.
Sudduth provides a critical exploration of classical empirical arguments for survival arguments that purport to show that data collected from ostensibly paranormal phenomena constitute good evidence for the survival of the self after death. Utilizing the conceptual tools of formal epistemology, he argues that classical arguments are unsuccessful.
The sciences philosophy, psychology and neuroscience share the basis that all refer to the human being. Therefore, an interdisciplinary collaboration would be desirable. The exchange of criticism is an essential requirement for interdisciplinary collaboration. Criticism must be heard and - if possible - considered. Indeed, criticism can be valid or unwarranted. However, whether criticism is unwarranted can only emerge from discussion and conversation. In the discussion of cognitive neuroscience, some criticism can easily be considered (such as the mereological fallacy that represents that talking about the person is substituted with talking bout the brain). Another issue for an interdisciplinary discussion of cognitive neuroscience is the interpretation of the readiness potential including re-considering Benjamin Libet's classic experiments. Additionally, a critical discussion on cognitive neuroscience must address ethical questions, such as the possibility of the abuse of neuroscientific insight.
This book presents a radical and intuitive argument against the notion that intentional action, agency and autonomy are features belonging only to humans. Using evidence from research into the minds of non-human animals, it explores the ways in which animals can be understood as individuals who are aware of themselves, and the consequent basis of our moral obligations towards them. The first part of this book argues for a conception of agency in animals that admits to degrees among individuals and across species. It explores self-awareness and its various levels of complexity which depend on an animals' other mental capacities. The author offers an overview of some established theories in animal ethics including those of Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Bernard Rollin and Lori Gruen, and the ways these theories serve to extend moral consideration towards animals based on various capacities that both animals and humans have in common. The book concludes by challenging traditional Kantian notions of rationality and what it means to be an autonomous individual, and discussing the problems that still remain in the study of animal ethics.
This book presents an analysis of the correlation between the mind and the body, a complex topic of study and discussion by scientists and philosophers. Drawing largely on neuroscience and philosophy, the author utilizes the scientific method and incorporates lessons learned from a vast array of sources. Based on the most recent cutting-edge scientific discoveries on the Mind-Body problem, Tomasi presents a full examination of multiple fields related to neuroscience. The volume offers a scientist-based and student-friendly journey into medicine, psychology, artificial intelligence, embodied cognition, and social, ecological and anthropological models of perception, to discover our truest self.
The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is
for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory
locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth,
content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of
rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply
that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally
independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of
rationalism, generalized to all kinds of content.
Our visual system can process information at both conscious and unconscious levels. Understanding the factors that control whether a stimulus reaches our awareness, and the fate of those stimuli that remain at an unconscious level, are the major challenges of brain science in the new millennium. Since its publication in 1984, Visual Masking has established itself as a classic text in the field of cognitive psychology. In the years since, there have been considerable advances in the cognitive neurosciences, and a growth of interest in the topic of consciousness, and the time is ripe for a new edition of this text. Where most current approaches to the study of visual consciousness adopt a 'steady-state' view, the approach presented in this book explores its dynamic properties. This new edition uses the technique of visual masking to explore temporal aspects of conscious and unconscious processes down to a resolution in the millisecond range. The 'time slices' through conscious and unconscious vision revealed by the visual masking technique can shed light on both normal and abnormal operations in the brain. The main focus of this book is on the microgenesis of visual form and pattern perception - microgenesis referring to the processes occurring in the visual system from the time of stimulus presentation on the retinae to the time, a few hundred milliseconds later, of its registration at conscious or unconscious perceptual and behavioural levels. The book takes a highly integrative approach by presenting microgenesis within a broad context encompassing visuo-temporal phenomena, attention, and consciousness. |
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