This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Why did such highly abstract ideas as truth, knowledge, or justice become so important to us? What was the point of coming to think in these terms? In The Practical Origins of Ideas Matthieu Queloz presents a philosophical method designed to answer such questions: the method of pragmatic genealogy. Pragmatic genealogies are partly fictional, partly historical narratives exploring what might have driven us to develop certain ideas in order to discover what these do for us. The book uncovers an under-appreciated tradition of pragmatic genealogy which cuts across the analytic-continental divide, running from the state-of-nature stories of David Hume and the early genealogies of Friedrich Nietzsche to recent work in analytic philosophy by Edward Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker. However, these genealogies combine fictionalizing and historicizing in ways that even philosophers sympathetic to the use of state-of-nature fictions or real history have found puzzling. To make sense of why both fictionalizing and historicizing are called for, this book offers a systematic account of pragmatic genealogies as dynamic models serving to reverse-engineer the points of ideas in relation not only to near-universal human needs, but also to socio-historically situated needs. This allows the method to offer us explanation without reduction and to help us understand what led our ideas to shed the traces of their practical origins. Far from being normatively inert, moreover, pragmatic genealogy can affect the space of reasons, guiding attempts to improve our conceptual repertoire by helping us determine whether and when our ideas are worth having.

At the intersection between psychoanalysis (Freudian and Lacanian) and philosophy, this book is a glimpse into the life of patients, into desire and love, and into the fate of the relationship between men and women.

The philosopher Abu Nasr al-Farabi (c. 870-c. 950 CE) is a key Arabic intermediary figure. He knew Aristotle, and in particular Aristotle's logic, through Greek Neoplatonist interpretations translated into Arabic via Syriac and possibly Persian. For example, he revised a general description of Aristotle's logic by the 6th century Paul the Persian, and further influenced famous later philosophers and theologians writing in Arabic in the 11th to 12th centuries: Avicenna, Al-Ghazali, Avempace and Averroes. Averroes' reports on Farabi were subsequently transmitted to the West in Latin translation. This book is an abridgement of Aristotle's Prior Analytics, rather than a commentary on successive passages. In it Farabi discusses Aristotle's invention, the syllogism, and aims to codify the deductively valid arguments in all disciplines. He describes Aristotle's categorical syllogisms in detail; these are syllogisms with premises such as 'Every A is a B' and 'No A is a B'. He adds a discussion of how categorical syllogisms can codify arguments by induction from known examples or by analogy, and also some kinds of theological argument from perceived facts to conclusions lying beyond perception. He also describes post-Aristotelian hypothetical syllogisms, which draw conclusions from premises such as 'If P then Q' and 'Either P or Q'. His treatment of categorical syllogisms is one of the first to recognise logically productive pairs of premises by using 'conditions of productivity', a device that had appeared in the Greek Philoponus in 6th century Alexandria.

Aristotle's discussion of the motivation of the good person is both complicated and cryptic. Depending on which passages are emphasized, he may seem to be presenting a Kantian style view according to which the good person is and ought to be motivated primarily by reason, or a Humean style view according to which desires and feelings are or ought to be in charge. In this book, Paula Gottlieb argues that Aristotle sees the thought, desires and feelings of the good person as interdependent in a way that is sui generis, and she explains how Aristotle's concept of choice (prohairesis) is an innovative and pivotal element in his account. Gottlieb's interpretation casts light on Aristotle's account of moral education, on the psychology of good, bad and half-bad (akratic) people, and on the aesthetic and even musical side to being a good person.

Rear-view mirrors are not normal scientific equipment, nor are philosophers all that keen to recall a partly embarrassing past. But looking back can cure a self-induced narrowing of the modern scientific mind and help us to renew a sense of where, if anywhere, we might feel we belong in the world. Today, a centuries-long belief in the primacy of a first-personal perspective has given way to an opposite view that what passes through the conscious mind has little to do with who we are and what we are doing. A lifelong campaigner for the first-personal perspective, Alastair Hannay presents here a powerful and historically framed case for restoring faith in its status as a provider of important truths about ourselves.