How are causal judgements such as 'The ice on the road caused the traffic accident' connected with counterfactual judgements such as 'If there had not been any ice on the road, the traffic accident would not have happened'? This volume throws new light on this question by uniting, for the first time, psychological and philosophical approaches to causation and counterfactuals. Traditionally, philosophers have primarily been interested in connections between causal and counterfactual claims on the level of meaning or truth-conditions. More recently, however, they have also increasingly turned their attention to psychological connections between causal and counterfactual understanding or reasoning. At the same time, there has been a surge in interest in empirical work on causal and counterfactual cognition amongst developmental, cognitive, and social psychologists--much of it inspired by work in philosophy. In this volume, twelve original contributions from leading philosophers and psychologists explore in detail what bearing empirical findings might have on philosophical concerns about counterfactuals and causation, and how, in turn, work in philosophy might help clarify the issues at stake in empirical work on the cognitive underpinnings of, and relationships between, causal and counterfactual thought.

In this seminal contribution to Kant studies, originally published in 1982, Karl Ameriks presented the first thorough survey and evaluation of Kant's theory of mind. It is now brought up to date with a substantial new Preface and Postscript, as well as additional notes and references; this expanded edition will enhance the book's continued value for today's Kantians and philosophers of mind.

'splendid ... not only the best commentary we have in English on Kant's philosophy of mind, but one of the most stimulating perspectives on Kant's whole philosophy to appear for some time.'|s Times Literary Supplement

Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present cognitive science is Turing's suggestion that cognitive processes are not associations but computations; and computation requires a language of thought.
So the latest on the Language of Thought hypothesis, from its progenitor, promises to be a landmark in the study of the mind. LOT 2 offers a more cogent presentation and a fuller explication of Fodor's distinctive account of the mind, with various intriguing new features. The central role of compositionality in the representational theory of mind is revealed: most of what we know about concepts follows from the compositionality of thoughts. Fodor shows the necessity of a referentialist account of the content of intentional states, and of an atomistic account of the individuation of concepts. Not least among the new developments is Fodor's identification and persecution of pragmatism as the leading source of error in the study of the mind today.
LOT 2 sees Fodor advance undaunted towards the ultimate goal of a theory of the cognitive mind, and in particular a theory of the intentionality of cognition. No one who works on the mind can ignore Fodor's views, expressed in the coruscating and provocative style which has delighted and disconcerted countless readers over the years.

David-Hillel Ruben mounts a defence of some unusual and original positions in the philosophy of action. Written from a point of view out of sympathy with the assumptions of much of contemporary philosophical action theory, his book draws its inspiration from philosophers as diverse as Aristotle, Berkeley, and Marx. Ruben's work is located in the tradition of the metaphysics of action, and will attract much attention from his peers and from students in the field.

Eleven distinguished philosophers have contributed specially written essays on a set of topics much debated in recent years, including physicalism, qualia, semantic competence, conditionals, presuppositions, two-dimensional semantics, and the relation between logic and metaphysics. All these topics are prominent in the work of Robert Stalnaker, a major presence in contemporary philosophy, in honour of whom the volume is published. It also contains a substantial new essay in which Stalnaker replies to his critics, and sets out his current views on the topics discussed. Contributors: Richard Heck, Frank Jackson, William Lycan, Vann McGee, John Perry, Paul Pietroski, Sydney Shoemaker, Scott Soames, Daniel Stoljar, Timothy Williamson, and Stephen Yablo.

The capacity to represent things to ourselves as possible plays a crucial role both in everyday thinking and in philosophical reasoning; this volume offers much-needed philosophical illumination of conceivability, possibility, and the relations between them.

This volume aims to inspire a return to the energetics of Nietzsche's prose and the critical intensity of his approach to nihilism and to give back to the future its rightful futurity. The book states that for too long contemporary thought has been dominated by a depressed what is to be done?. All is regarded to be in vain, nothing is deemed real, there is nothing new seen under the sun. Such a postmodern lament is easily confounded with an apathetic reluctance to think engagedly. Hence the contributors draw on the variety of topical issues - the future of life, the nature of life forms, the techno sciences, the body, religion - as a way of tackling the question of nihilism's pertinence to us now.

A team of leading experts investigate a range of philosophical issues to do with the self and self-knowledge. Self and Self-Knowledge focuses on two main problems: how to account for I-thoughts and the consequences that doing so would have for our notion of the self; and how to explain subjects' ability to know the kind of psychological states they enjoy, which characteristically issues in psychological self-ascriptions. The first section of the volume consists of essays that, by appealing to different considerations which range from the normative to the phenomenological, offer an assessment of the animalist conception of the self. The second section presents an examination as well as a defence of the new epistemic paradigm, largely associated with recent work by Christopher Peacocke, according to which knowledge of our own mental states and actions should be based on an awareness of them and of our attempts to bring them about. The last section explores a range of different perspectives-from neo-expressivism to constitutivism-in order to assess the view that self-knowledge is more robust than any other form of knowledge. While the contributors differ in their specific philosophical positions, they all share the view that careful philosophical analysis is needed before scientific research can be fruitfully brought to bear on the issues at hand. These thought-provoking essays provide such an analysis and greatly deepen our understanding of these central aspects of our mentality.

At one time the causal theory of perception was regarded as our last best hope of reliably connecting the subjective contents of perception to external reality. With the decline of the view that perception consists of subjective contents, thinkers have had to reconceive the options for explaining perception/world relations. In this break-through study, Gerald Vision proposes a new causal theory, one that engages provocatively with a species of direct realism and makes no use of the now discredited subjectivism. Both providing a powerful survey of debate in the philosophy of perception and taking the field in a brilliant new direction, Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of Perception makes invigorating reading for those trying to understand perception - philosophers, students of philosophy, and cognitive psychologists.

Experience and Possibility concerns the modal ontology of experience. It investigates the detailed metaphysics of the colors, shapes, and other concrete properties present in our experience of ordinary concrete objects, and also of their spatial and temporal relations. It examines their experienced particularity, and the nature of their locations and material bits. This detailed concern with specific cases reveals many inadequacies of traditional ontology. But the central novelty of the book is an intense focus on the modal aspects of such experienced entities, and what it reveals about modality in general. The reality of such things would involve in surprising ways not merely what would hence be actual but also what would be merely possible. This supports a general conception of modality, of the possible and the necessary, according to which the actual and the possible are locally entwined and involve different types of being. The particulars, properties, and relations we experience involve distinctive forms of modal structure, characteristic of specific sorts of universals and irreducible particularities. When this experience is not veridical, when for instance the color we experience is somewhat misleading about reality, it is a puzzle how we have such experience nonetheless. Exploration of these forms of modal structure is groundwork for a new account of how our neurophysiology explains such misleading experience, how our physical structure delivers such qualia. This is sketched for the case of experienced color. Its core idea is that the apparent modal structure of things we experience is sometimes due to the actual modal structure of the neurophysiology that constitutes that experience.

To what extent are meaning, on the one hand, and knowledge, on the other, determined by aspects of the 'outside world'? Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology presents twelve specially written essays exploring these debates in metaphysics and epistemology and the connections between them. In so doing, it examines how issues connected with the nature of mind and language bear on issues about the nature of knowledge and justification (and vice versa). Topics discussed include the compatibility of semantic externalism and epistemic internalism, the variety of internalist and externalist positions (both semantic and epistemic), semantic externalism's implications for the epistemology of reasoning and reflection, and the possibility of arguments from the theory of mental content to the theory of epistemic justification (and vice versa).

In the massive literature on the idea of the self, the Augustinian influence has often played a central role. The volume Augustine Our Contemporary, starting from the compelling first essay by David W. Tracy, addresses this influence from the Middle Ages to modernity and from a rich variety of perspectives, including theology, philosophy, history, and literary studies.The collected essays in this volume all engage Augustine and the Augustinian legacy on notions of selfhood, interiority, and personal identity. Written by prominent scholars, the essays demonstrate a connecting thread: Augustine is a thinker who has proven his contemporaneity in Western thought time and time again. He has been "the contemporary" of thinkers ranging from Eriugena to Luther to Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida. His influence has been dominant in certain eras, and in others he has left traces and fragments that, when stitched together, create a unique impression of the "presentness" of Christian selfhood. As a whole, Augustine Our Contemporary sheds relevant new light on the continuity of the Western Christian tradition.This volume will interest academics and students of philosophy, political theory, and religion, as well as scholars of postmodernism and Augustine.Contributors: Susan E. Schreiner, David W. Tracy, Bernard McGinn, Vincent Carraud, Willemien Otten, Adriaan T. Peperzak, David C. Steinmetz, Jean-Luc Marion, W. Clark Gilpin, William Schweiker, Franklin I. Gamwell, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Fred Lawrence, and Francoise Meltzer.

Descartes held that only ideas are immediately perceived, and that all ideas are really identical to mental states. Yet certain passages in the Meditations seem to assert that some extramental individuals -- the sun, for example, or a piece of wax -- can be immediately perceived (not by the senses, but by the intellect). If so then Descartes was committed to the seemingly absurd claim that extramental things can be really identical to mental states. But the claim is not absurd; as this book shows, it is based on a coherent doctrine of intentional representation that was taught at the Jesuit college of La Fleche that Descartes attended as a youth. On this doctrine, an individual that is outside the mind with one sort of being can be inside it with another. This book brings a fresh perspective to the currently deadlocked debate over whether Descartes was a representationalist or a direct realist, and sheds new light on his difficult notions of material falsity and the self-representational character of thought.

What difference is there between the visual experience of watching the moon in the sky and the visual experience of seeing a snake slither by your foot? It is easy to believe our interpretation of the world is split into a binary mode, between the bodily self and everything outside it. There is, however, a buffer zone in the immediate surrounding of the body, known as peripersonal space, in which boundaries are blurred. The notion of peripersonal space calls into question not only our entrenched theories of perception, but also has major implications on the way we perceive personal and social awareness. Research has yielded a vast array of exciting discoveries on peripersonal space, across a variety of disciplines: ethology, social psychology, anthropology, neurology, psychiatry, and cognitive neuroscience. The World at Our Fingertips: A Multidisciplinary Exploration of Peripersonal Space brings these perspectives together for the first time, as well as introducing a philosophical dialogue to the questions. Edited by a team of leading psychologists and philosophers in the fields of peripersonal space and bodily awareness, this comprehensive volume presents the reader with a fresh, accessible dialogue between authorities from vastly different areas of thought.

The two sections of this volume present theoretical developments and practical applicative papers respectively. Theoretical papers cover topics such as intercultural pragmatics, evolutionism, argumentation theory, pragmatics and law, the semantics/pragmatics debate, slurs, and more. The applied papers focus on topics such as pragmatic disorders, mapping places of origin, stance-taking, societal pragmatics, and cultural linguistics. This is the second volume of invited papers that were presented at the inaugural Pragmasofia conference in Palermo in 2016, and like its predecessor presents papers by well-known philosophers, linguists, and a semiotician. The papers present a wide variety of perspectives independent from any one school of thought.

Robert Kilwardby on the Human Soul is the first in-depth study on Kilwardby s contribution to the thirteenth-century philosophical and theological debate on the nature of the soul and its relation with the body. The book examines his innovative approach to the plurality of substantial forms in the human person and argues against the traditional interpretation of the Prohibitions of 1277 in Oxford as being directed to Thomas Aquinas. The investigation into Kilwardby s theory of knowledge provides new insight on his project to integrate Aristotelian and Augustinian doctrines. The originality of his account of the active nature of perception and his role in shaping standard views on truth, universals and intentions bespeaks of his relevance for understanding later medieval philosophical thought.

Decartes' maxim Cogito, Ergo Sum (from his Meditations) is perhaps the most famous philosophical expression ever coined. Joseph Almog is a Descartes analyst whose last book WHAT AM I? focused on the second half of this expression, Sum--who is the "I" who is existing-and-thinking and how does this entity somehow incorporate both body and mind? This volume looks at the first half of the proposition--cogito. Almog calls this the "thinking man's paradox": how can there be, in the the natural world and as part and parcel of it, a creature that... thinks? Descartes' proposition declares that such a fact obtains and he maintains that it is self-evident; but as Almog points out, from the point of view of Descartes' own skepticism, it is far from obvious that there could be a thinking-man. How can it be that a thinking human be both part of the natural world and yet somehow distinct and separate from it? How did "thinking" arise in an otherwise "thoughtless" universe and what does it mean for beings like us to be thinkers? Almog goes back to the Meditations, and using Descartes' own aposteriori cognitive methodology--his naturalistic, scientific, approach to the study of man--tries to answer the question.

"The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century" traces the Latin scholastics' attempt to deal with two essentially incompatible notions of the human soul: the scientific view of Aristotle which considers it to be a form, and the Augustinian view of the soul as a substance in its own right, from Gundissalinus to the Parisian condemnation of 1277. It traces the growing disarray of Latin notions of the soul, the growth of the monopsychism controversy, the solutions of Bonaventure and Aquinas, through the variety of responses to Aquinas's "De unitate intellectus," Among its conclusions are that the traditional dualism diminished with time, that there was little agreement among the "heterodox Aristotelians," and that, with two exceptions, no one in the thirteenth century taught the present position of the Catholic Church, that the rational soul is infused at conception.