Sanford C. Goldberg argues that a proper account of the communication of knowledge through speech has anti-individualistic implications for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language. In Part I he offers a novel argument for anti-individualism about mind and language, the view that the contents of one's thoughts and the meanings of one's words depend for their individuation on one's social and natural environment. In Part II he discusses the epistemic dimension of knowledge communication, arguing that the epistemic characteristics of communication-based beliefs depend on features of the cognitive and linguistic acts of the subject's social peers. In acknowledging an ineliminable social dimension to mind, language, and the epistemic categories of knowledge, justification, and rationality, his book develops fundamental links between externalism in the philosophy of mind and language, on the one hand, and externalism is epistemology, on the other.

Philosophy of mind is one of the core disciplines in philosophy. The questions that it deals with are profound, vexed and intriguing. This volume of 15 new cutting-edge essays gives young researchers a chance to stir up new ideas. The topics covered include the nature of consciousness, cognition, and action.

In this book, the author provides an account of three central ideas in the philosophy of action: trying to act, acting or doing, and one's action causing further consequences. In all three cases, novel theories of these phenomena are offered: trying to act is not a particular mental or physical act but can be explained using conditionals; that action is not the same as causing something to happen; and in the case of a special but important subset of actions, for example the opening of a window, the action is identical to the event of the window's opening. A result of this last account is that it places actions out in the world, sometimes far removed in time and space from the actor's body. The world is full of action; actions do not just exist in the many little islands of space and time that all of our bodies inhabit. In the final chapter, Ruben describes and discusses a skeptical challenge to the idea that we can ever know whether or not someone else has acted, rather than just passive events having happened to that person.

This book shines a light on the meaning of happiness and how public perceptions of it have changed over time. A question that has engaged philosophers from the days of Aristotle, happiness is a subject of growing academic interest, and its recent integration into government policy is provoking increased debate into its definition and nature. Sandie McHugh and her associates build on the work of social anthropologist Tom Harrison's 'Worktown' Mass Observation study from 1938, repeating the original study today. Together these accounts show how perceptions of happiness have changed over the years for the people of Bolton, UK, and reveal major difference between its definition then and now. This unique study is a useful tool in the understanding and study of happiness, offering invaluable insights for scholars and practitioners working in the fields of social psychology, positive psychology, health psychology and wellbeing. With chapters by Martin Guha and Jerome Carson; John Haworth; Robert Snape; and Matthew Watson and Linda Withey.

This book shows us how rather than abandoning psychology once he liberated phenomenology from the psychologism of the philosophy of arithmetic, Edmund Husserl remained concerned with the ways in which phenomenology held important implications for a radical reform of psychology throughout his intellectual career. The author fleshes out what such a radical reform actually entails, and proposes that it can only be accomplished by following the trail of the transcendental reduction described in Husserl's later works. In order to appreciate the need for the transcendental even for psychology, the book tracks Husserl's thinking on the nature of this relationship between phenomenology as a philosophy and psychology as a positive science as it evolved over time. The text covers Husserl's definition of phenomenology as "descriptive psychology" in the Logical Investigations, rejecting the hybrid form of "phenomenological psychology" described in the lectures by that name, and ends with his proposal for a "fundamental refashioning" of psychology by situating it within the transcendental framework of The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. The Author argues for a re-grounding of psychology by virtue of a "return to positivity" after having performed the reduction to transcendental intersubjectivity. What results is a phenomenological approach to a transcendentally-grounded psychology which, while having returned to the life-world, no longer remains transcendentally naive. A phenomenologically-grounded psychology thus empowers researchers, clinicians, and clients alike to engage in social actions that move the world closer to achieving social justice for all. This text appeals to students and researchers working in phenomenology and psychology.

This book offers new insights into the workings of the human soul and the philosophical conception of the mind in Ancient Greece. It collects essays that deal with different but interconnected aspects of that unified picture of our mental life shared by all Ancient philosophers who thought of the soul as an immaterial substance. The papers present theoretical discussions on moral and psychological issues ranging from Socrates to Aristotle, and beyond, in connection with modern psychology. Coverage includes moral learning and the fruitfulness of punishment, human motivation, emotions as psychic phenomena, and more. Some of these topics directly stemmed from the Socratic dialectical experience and its tragic outcome, whereas others found their way through a complex history of refinements, disputes, and internal critique. The contributors present the gradual unfolding of these central themes through a close inspection of the relevant Ancient texts. They deliver a wide-ranging survey of some central and mutually related topics. In the process, readers will learn new approaches to Platonic and Aristotelian psychology and action theory. This book will appeal to graduate students and researchers in Ancient philosophy. Any scholar with a general interest in the history of ideas will also find it a valuable resource.

This book addresses the contemporary disillusion with truth, manifest in sceptical relativism. Contending that all contemporary theories of truth are too narrow, it argues for a novel conception of truth, by showing how error is implicated in the actions of all living things; and by analyzing uses of 'true' in non-linguistic contexts.

At a recent workshop, Despina Gurlides was the only one out of 40 people who raised her hand when the leaders asked, "Who is happy?" When asked for the recipe for happiness, she replied, "Do not betray yourself."

Like everyone, however, Despina had fallen into the trap of self-betrayal. At one point, she thought she was happy after climbing the corporate ladder to success and marrying a successful man, but then she realized she felt empty inside. It took a lot of maneuvering for her to break out of her material trance, but she did it. Then she fell into a spiritual trance and had to break out of that as well.

Along the way, she learned the answers to some tough questions, including: How can someone feel unhappy even if she is successful? What important message does depression bring? What are the rewards of failure? What is the way Home? Follow Despina as she navigates the murky waters dominated by career, image and money until she finds the way to happiness. If you are feeling trapped and want some answers, it may be time to take some advice from someone who is Not a Guru.

This concise volume presents for the first time a coherent and detailed account of why we experience feelings of being present in the physical world and in computer-mediated environments, why we often don't, and why it matters - for design, psychotherapy, tool use and social creativity amongst other practical applications.

Using the work of Wittgenstein, John Heaton challenges the notion of theoretical expertise on the mind, arguing for a new understanding of therapy as an attempt by patients to express themselves in an effort to see and say what has not been said or seen, and accept that the world is not as fixed as they are constituting it.

Sceptics raise doubts about our ability to have knowledge generally, and naturalists use scientific discoveries to question common-sense thinking about the world, language, and the mind. This book replies to these contentions, using a transcendental argument to show that everyday thought constitutes an interlocking system of concepts presupposed by all types of reasoning, including empirical science. Thus sceptics cannot question ordinary belief, or science challenge everyday thinking, without undermining their own legitimacy. In addition to replying to arguments by scientific naturalists in a number of areas, the book presents common-sense thought in detail about reality and the mind. It also considers the circumstances under which religious belief is justified. The result is a contemporary defense of our over-all conceptual scheme giving everyday thought a central place but also accommodating scientific and other forms of thinking.

This book explores how Wittgenstein's personal life provided more of a reference point for his philosophical work than has been previously thought. Focusing on two key phases in Wittgenstein's life during which he dramatically changed his philosophical orientation and reinvented both his intellectual methods and himself, the author presents and alternative understanding of Wittgenstein and his work. The book firstly addresses the period of his "anthropological turn" (1929-1932), in which Wittgenstein developed one of his central arguments concerning the role of the body in the acquisition of language and the rules of social practice. The second key phase, commencing after the end of the Second World War, was one of introspection, during which Wittgenstein became intensely preoccupied by inner events, sensations, and his own personality. As his work evolved, the anthropological aspects became the primary focus of his work by the end of his life. Providing an accessible and novel insight into Wittgenstein's work and his interest in 'continental' philosophy, this translation will appeal to a wide audience.

There have been two major models of the mind's relation to its environment in Western though, both of which employ the term 'representation', but in quite different ways. The newer one, dominant today in philosophy, takes the mind to have states about its environment. The older concept, originating with Aristotle but still present in every day speech and in the new sciences of the mind, takes the mind to sample its environment. This book clarifies the old notion, solves some serious problems it faces, and explores the implications for philosophy of an awareness of the view of the mind emerging from cognitive neuroscience. Topics covered include concepts, perception, emotions, beliefs and actions.

This book consists of a focused and systematic analysis of Freud's implicit argument for unconscious mental states. The author employs the unique approach of applying contemporary philosophical methods, especially Kripke-Putnam essentialism, in analyzing Freud's argument. The book elaborates how Freud transformed the intentionality theory of his Cartesian teacher Franz Brentano into what is essentially a sophisticated modern view of the mind. Indeed, Freud redirected Brentano's analysis of consciousness as intentionality into a view of consciousness-independent intentionalism about the mental that in effect set the agenda for latter-twentieth-century philosophy of mind.

In the last fifteen years, there has been significant interest in studying the brain structures involved in moral judgments using novel techniques from neuroscience such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Many people, including a number of philosophers, believe that results from neuroscience have the potential to settle seemingly intractable debates concerning the nature, practice, and reliability of moral judgments. This has led to a flurry of scientific and philosophical activities, resulting in the rapid growth of the new field of moral neuroscience. There is now a vast array of ongoing scientific research devoted towards understanding the neural correlates of moral judgments, accompanied by a large philosophical literature aimed at interpreting and examining the methodology and the results of this research. This is the first volume to take stock of fifteen years of research of this fast-growing field of moral neuroscience and to recommend future directions for research. It features the most up-to-date research in this area, and it presents a wide variety of perspectives on this topic.

This book is the examination of Corrington s thought called ecstatic naturalism in juxtaposition to C. S. Peirce s pragmatic and semiotic concept of the self and Karl Jaspers existential elucidation of Existenz. Peirce s and Jaspers anthropocentrism is corrected by Corrington s ecstatic naturalism. Ecstatic naturalism, as a new movement, is both a semiotic theoretical method and a metaphysics that probes deeply into the ontological divide between nature naturing and nature natured. Methodologically, ecstatic naturalism relies on two methods; namely, horizontal hermeneutics and ordinal phenomenology, which are applied to critique Peirce s and Jaspers anthropocentric concepts of the self. This book attempts to achieve three goals: first, to present and elucidate the underlying philosophical concepts of Charles Peirce, Karl Jaspers, and Robert Corrington; second, to critique the anthropocentric self of Peirce s semiotic pragmatism and of Jaspers existential anthropology (periechontology) from the standpoint of ecstatic naturalism; and third, to introduce the concept of nature s primal self, radically grounded in the perspective of ecstatic naturalism, as a judicious, more encompassing, and richer framework compared to Peirce s semiotic construction of the self and Jaspers existential concept of Existenz.

What are we exactly, when we are said to be our brain? This question leads Jan De Vos to examine the different metamorphoses of the brain: the educated brain, the material brain, the iconographic brain, the sexual brain, the celebrated brain and, finally, the political brain. This first, protracted and sustained argument on neurologisation, which lays bare its lineage with psychologisation, should be taken seriously by psychologists, educationalists, sociologists, students of cultural studies, policy makers and, above all, neuroscientists themselves.

Distinguished international scholars discuss the connection between emotion and value in Kant's philosophy, from his ethics to his philosophy of mind, aesthetics, religion and politics. Through a mixture of interpretation and critical discussion, this collection demonstrates the continuing relevance of Kant's work to philosophical debates.

Widely used in philosophy courses, this succinct study explores the problem of determining the relation between the body and mind. In that philosophy seeks to elucidate man's place and action in nature, Campbell asserts that our assessment of the body-mind problem affects our perspectives on metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and the natural sciences. After discussing how the body-mind problem developed, Campbell sets forth four incompatible propositions that serve as the framework for evaluating different philosophical approaches to the problem. Among competing perspectives, he examines dualism, behaviorist theories, the causal theory of mind, and central-state epiphenomenalism. This second edition includes a chapter on functionalism and an expanded bibliography.

Can neuroscience help explain the first-person perspective? The Science of Subjectivity delves into the nature of experience, arguing that unconscious subjectivity is a reality. Neisser identifies the biological roots of the first-person, showing how ancient systems of animal navigation enable creatures like us to cope with our worldly concerns.

This volume draws a balanced picture of the Rationalists by bringing their intellectual contexts, sources and full range of interests into sharper focus, without neglecting their core commitment to the epistemological doctrine that earned them their traditional label. The collection of original essays addresses topics ranging from theodicy and early modern music theory to Spinoza's anti-humanism, often critically revising important aspects of the received picture of the Rationalists. Another important contribution of the volume is that it brings out aspects of Rationalist philosophers and their legacies that are not ordinarily associated with them, such as the project of a Cartesian ethics. Finally, a strong emphasis is placed on the connection of the Rationalists' philosophy to their interests in empirical science, to their engagement in the political life of their era, and to the religious background of many of their philosophical commitments.

We must all make choices about how we want to live. We evaluate our possibilities by relying on historical, moral, personal, political, religious, and scientific modes of evaluations, but the values and reasons that follow from them conflict. Philosophical problems are forced on us when we try to cope with such conflicts. There are reasons for and against all proposed ways of coping with the conflicts, but none of them has been generally accepted by reasonable thinkers. The constructive aim of The Nature of Philosophical Problems is to propose a way of understanding the nature of such philosophical problems, explain why they occur, why they are perennial, and propose a pluralist approach as the most reasonable way of coping with them. This approach is practical, context-dependent, and particular. It follows from it that the recurrence of philosophical problems is not a defect, but a welcome consequence of the richness of our modes of understanding that enlarges the range of possibilities by which we might choose to live. The critical aim of the book is to give reasons against both the absolutist attempt to find an overriding value or principle for resolving philosophical problems and of the relativist claim that reasons unavoidably come to an end and how we want to live is ultimately a matter of personal preference, not of reasons.

This book aims to lay bare the logical foundations of tractable reasoning. It draws on Marvin Minsky's seminal work on frames, which has been highly influential in computer science and, to a lesser extent, in cognitive science. Only very few people have explored ideas about frames in logic, which is why the investigation in this book breaks new ground. The apparent intractability of dynamic, inferential reasoning is an unsolved problem in both cognitive science and logic-oriented artificial intelligence. By means of a logical investigation of frames and frame concepts, Andreas devises a novel logic of tractable reasoning, called frame logic. Moreover, he devises a novel belief revision scheme, which is tractable for frame logic. These tractability results shed new light on our logical and cognitive means to carry out dynamic, inferential reasoning. Modularity remains central for tractability, and so the author sets forth a logical variant of the massive modularity hypothesis in cognitive science. This book conducts a sustained and detailed examination of the structure of tractable and intelligible reasoning in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Working from the perspective of formal epistemology and cognitive science, Andreas uses structuralist notions from Bourbaki and Sneed to provide new foundational analyses of frames, object-oriented programming, belief revision, and truth maintenance. Andreas then builds on these analyses to construct a novel logic of tractable reasoning he calls frame logic, together with a novel belief revision scheme that is tractable for frame logic. Put together, these logical analyses and tractability results provide new understandings of dynamic and inferential reasoning. Jon Doyle, North Carolina State University

New philosophical essays on love by a diverse group of international scholars. Topics include contributions to the ongoing debate on whether love is arational or if there are reasons for love, and if so what kind; the kinds of love there may be (between humans and artificial intelligences, between non-human animals and humans); whether love can explain the difference between nationalism and patriotism; whether love is an necessary component of truly seeing others and the world; whether love, like free will, is "fragile," and may not survive in a deterministic world; and whether or not love is actually a good thing or may instead be a force opposed to morality. Key philosophers discussed include Immanuel Kant, Iris Murdoch, Bernard Williams, Harry Frankfurt, J. David Velleman, Niko Kolodny, Thomas Hurka, Bennett Helm, Alfred Mele and Derk Pereboom. Essays also touch on the treatment of love in literature and popular culture, from Graham Greene's The End of the Affair to Spike Jonze's movie her.

This contribution to Palgrave's 'Advances' series addresses a wide range of issues that have arisen in post-Gricean pragmatic theory, in chapters by distinguished authors. Among the specific topics covered are scalar implicatures, lexical semantics and pragmatics, indexicality, procedural meaning, the semantics and pragmatics of negation. The volume includes both defences and critiques of Relevance Theory and of Neo-Gricean Pragmatics.