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Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Philosophy of mind
Based upon Ajit Maan's groundbreaking theory of Internarrative Identity, this collection focuses upon redefining self, slave narrative, the black Caribbean diaspora, and cyberspace to explore the interconnection between identity and life experience as expressed through personal narrative.
This book is the third in my series of four books dealing with Intelligence, Instincts, and Consciousness. The simple and truthful realization of what we are, and how we got to where we are within nature's world, is the ultimate truth that any philosophy could ever propose to know. It is ultimately the most powerful state that any human mind can ever attain. It is a true kind of nirvana. It is with this knowing state of mind that we can make ever-new beginnings and provide for a future where our chances are best for surviving whatever random hells that nature will with great certainty rise up against us. The fact that we might have to eventually face up to what we are as completely definable creatures in terms of a very complex organization of billions of very simple structures is not in anyway whatsoever a degradation of the truth of our humanity. Understanding what we are has led us to realize both the miraculous and morally good achievements of our kind, and also to an understanding of the basic nature of our more hidden ugly and evil actions.
Discover fascinating and illuminating contributions to historical and contemporary issues in the philosophy of mind In the newly revised second edition of This Is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, accomplished philosopher Pete Mandik delivers an accessible primer on the core issues animating contemporary and historical discussions in the philosophy of mind. The book is part of the This is Philosophy series that introduces undergraduate students to key concepts and methods in the study of philosophy. This particular edition walks readers through perennial issues like the mind-body problem, artificial intelligence, free will, and the nature of consciousness. This is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction also provides complimentary access to valuable supplemental online resources.
This is the first book-length presentation and defense of a new theory of human and machine cognition, according to which human persons are superminds. Superminds are capable of processing information not only at and below the level of Turing machines (standard computers), but above that level (the "Turing Limit"), as information processing devices that have not yet been (and perhaps can never be) built, but have been mathematically specified; these devices are known as super-Turing machines or hypercomputers. Superminds, as explained herein, also have properties no machine, whether above or below the Turing Limit, can have. The present book is the third and pivotal volume in Bringsjord's supermind quartet; the first two books were What Robots Can and Can't Be (Kluwer) and AI and Literary Creativity (Lawrence Erlbaum). The final chapter of this book offers eight prescriptions for the concrete practice of AI and cognitive science in light of the fact that we are superminds.
The author presents a new philosophical theory according to which we need intuitions and emotions in order to have objective moral knowledge, which is called affectual intuitionism. Affectual Intuitionism combines ethical intuitionism with a cognitive theory of emotions.
This book reassesses Gadamer's hermeneutics by bringing it into a dialogue with John McDowell's minimal empiricism. It employs the resources of McDowell's minimal empiricism to address the transcendental and ontological presuppositions for objective experience and understanding, while retaining Gadamer's emphasis on the historicity of understanding. By means of the dialogue with McDowell, the book develops a hermeneutical conception of objectivity and perceptual experience, which also entails reinterpretations of Gadamer's notions of tradition, practical wisdom and meaning. The book explores the philosophical space beyond the analytic-Continental divide and demonstrates that hermeneutics is not limited to a reflection on understanding as it is practiced in the human sciences, but can be revived as a distinct and cogent philosophical approach with a transcendental and ontological dimension. Thaning's book is a richly detailed, well-argued and coherent presentation of a defensible, and potentially very important, philosophical position. It demonstrates an impressively deep understanding of the literature both from the phenomenological tradition and from the part of the analytical tradition, inspired by Wilfred Sellars, to which John McDowell belongs. Being a substantial philosophical achievement in its own right, the book raises far-reaching questions that will be of interest to a wide audience. Dr. Steven Crowell, Rice University, Houston (USA) Morten Thaning's book is an important contribution to the discourse of philosophical hermeneutics. Thaning extensively discusses a topic, which recent debates have touched upon, but which up to now has not been the subject matter of concentrated scholarly work: the relation between Gadamer's hermeneutics and McDowell's empiricism. With Thaning's interpretation Gadamer' work can be read anew as concerning the problem of hermeneutical objectivity. Prof. Dr. Gunter Figal, University of Freiburg (Germany)
The "theory of mind" framework has been the fastest growing body of empirical research in contemporary psychology. It has given rise to a range of positions on what it takes to relate to others as intentional beings. This book brings together disparate strands of ToM research, lays out historical roots of the idea, and indicates better alternatives.
Psychoanalytic Knowledge and the Nature of Mind presents cutting edge thinking on some fundamental ideas in psychoanalysis by important international scholars in the field of the philosophy of psychoanalysis. It explores the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge in the light of contemporary philosophical views or critiques of a diversity of topics relevant to psychoanalysis: the philosophy of mind; the notion of changing oneself; religion; the notion of interdisciplinary links with psychoanalytic knowledge; post-Freudian psychoanalytic knowledge and challenges to psychoanalytic methodology.
This book compares attitudes to empiricism in language study from mid-twentieth century philosophy of language and from present-day linguistics. It focuses on responses to the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, particularly in the work of British philosopher J. L. Austin and the much less well-known work of Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess.
This volume explores 'unknown time' as a cultural phenomenon, approaching past futures, unknown presents, and future pasts through a broad range of different disciplines, media, and contexts. As a phenomenon that is both elusive and fundamentally inaccessible, time is a key object of fascination. Throughout the ages, different cultures have been deeply engaged in various attempts to fill or make time by developing strategies to familiarize unknown time and to materialize and control past, present, or future time. Arguing for the perennial interest in time, especially in the unknown and unattainable dimension of the future, the contributions explore premodern ideas about eschatology and secular future, historical configurations of the perception of time and acceleration in fin-de-siecle Germany and contemporary Lagos, the formation of 'deep time' and 'timelessness' in paleontology and ethnographic museums, and the representation of time-past, present, and future alike-in music, film, and science fiction.
This book draws on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, psychology, neuroscience and Buddhist philosophy to explicate Merleau-Ponty's unwritten ethics. Daly contends that though Merleau-Ponty never developed an ethics per se, there is significant textual evidence that clearly indicates he had the intention to do so. This book highlights the explicit references to ethics that he offers and proposes that these, allied to his ontological commitments, provide the basis for the development of an ethics. In this work Daly shows how Merleau-Ponty's relational ontology, in which the interdependence of self, other and world is affirmed, offers an entirely new approach to ethics. In contrast to the 'top-down' ethics of norms, obligations and prescriptions, Daly maintains that Merleau-Ponty's ethics is a 'bottom-up' ethics which depends on direct insight into our own intersubjective natures, the 'I' within the 'we' and the 'we' within the 'I'; insight into the real nature of our relation to others and the particularities of the given situation. Merleau-Ponty and the Ethics of Intersubjectivity is an important contribution to the scholarship on the later Merleau-Ponty which will be of interest to graduate students and scholars. Daly offers informed readings of Merleau-Ponty's texts and the overall approach is both scholarly and innovative.
Current debate in cognitive science, from robotics to analysis of vision, deals with problems like the perception of form, the structure and formation of mental images and their modelling, the ecological development of artificial intelligence, and cognitive analysis of natural language. It focuses in particular on the presence of a hierarchy of intellectual constructions in different formats of representation. These diverse approaches, which share a common assumption of the inner nature of representation, call for a new epistemology - even a new psychophysics - based on a theory of reference which is intrinsically cognitive. As a contribution to contemporary research, the reading presents the core of theories developed in Central Europe between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by philosophers, physicists, psychologists and semanticists who shared a dynamic approach and a pronounced concern with problems of interaction and dependence. These theories offer innovative solutions to some of the epistemological and philosophical problems currently at the centre of debate, like part-whole, theory of relations, and conceptual and linguistic categorization.
In "Cognitive Integration: Attacking The Bounds of Cognition"
Richard Menary argues that the real pay-off from
extended-mind-style arguments is not a new form of externalism in
the philosophy of mind, but a view in which the 'internal' and
'external' aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole.
This work covers, in its subsequent parts, ontology, the metaphysics of causation, and the philosophy of mind. It provides a firm theoretical basis for believing that in our all-physical world mental causation is perfectly real, and that it can be understood.
This book is a survey of key issues in the theory of evaluation aimed at exhibiting and clarifying the rational nature of the thought-procedures involved. By means of theoretical analysis and explanatory case studies, this volume shows how evaluation is-or should be-a rational procedure directed at appropriate objectives. Above all, it maintains the objectivity of rational evaluation.
This book describes a novel methodology for studying algorithmic skills, intended as cognitive activities related to rule-based symbolic transformation, and argues that some human computational abilities may be interpreted and analyzed as genuine examples of extended cognition. It shows that the performance of these abilities relies not only on innate neurocognitive systems or language-related skills, but also on external tools and general agent-environment interactions. Further, it asserts that a low-level analysis, based on a set of core neurocognitive systems linking numbers and language, is not sufficient to explain some specific forms of high-level numerical skills, like those involved in algorithm execution. To this end, it reports on the design of a cognitive architecture for modeling all the relevant features involved in the execution of algorithmic strategies, including external tools, such as paper and pencils. The first part of the book discusses the philosophical premises for endorsing and justifying a position in philosophy of mind that links a modified form of computationalism with some recent theoretical and scientific developments, like those introduced by the so-called dynamical approach to cognition. The second part is dedicated to the description of a Turing-machine-inspired cognitive architecture, expressly designed to formalize all kinds of algorithmic strategies.
Value, Reality, and Desire is an extended argument for a robust realism about value. The robust realist affirms the following distinctive theses. There are genuine claims about value which are true or false - there are facts about value. These value-facts are mind-independent - they are not reducible to desires or other mental states, or indeed to any non-mental facts of a non-evaluative kind. And these genuine, mind-independent, irreducible value-facts are causally efficacious. Values, quite literally, affect us. These are not particularly fashionable theses, and taken as a whole they go somewhat against the grain of quite a lot of recent work in the metaphysics of value. Further, against the received view, Oddie argues that we can have knowledge of values by experiential acquaintance, that there are experiences of value which can be both veridical and appropriately responsive to the values themselves. Finally, these value-experiences are not the products of some exotic and implausible faculty of 'intuition'. Rather, they are perfectly mundane and familiar mental states - namely, desires. This view explains how values can be 'intrinsically motivating', without falling foul of the widely accepted 'queerness' objection. There are, of course, other objections to each of the realist's claims. In showing how and why these objections fail, Oddie introduces a wealth of interesting and original insights about issues of wider interest - including the nature of properties, reduction, supervenience, and causation. The result is a novel and interesting account which illuminates what would otherwise be deeply puzzling features of value and desire and the connections between them.
What does it mean to be a social being in the ordinary life-world? This clear and compelling introduction to social phenomenology examines the experiential features of the basic things comprising our life-world, namely me, you, abstract others (enemies, communities, and associations), and attributes of the lived-body (emotions, pain, and pleasure). Each of these entities is phenomenologically described, with the aim of reducing reports of personal experiences and other primary documents to the presumed prototypical experience of the thing in question--its "ideal essence." Another aim of this study is to sociologically account for how the various entities of the life-world have been "accomplished," that is, how the prototypical experiences of the things in question have come to be. By showing the life-world to be our joint project rather than a fixed, unalterable coherency, this volume destabilizes our naive attitude towards the things of the world. Examples are drawn from the author's own research on issues such as violence, religion, health, and race; from classic and contemporary anthropological research; and from the works of some of the most innovative philosophers of the twentieth century. This study actually does phenomenology instead of merely arguing for its necessity and will appeal to both social scientists and philosophers.
Exploring issues ranging from the metaphysical to the moral and legal, a team of esteemed contributors bring together some of the most important and cutting-edge findings in experimental philosophy of the self to address longstanding philosophical questions about personal identity, such as: What makes us today the same person as our childhood and future selves? Can certain changes transform us into a different person? Do our everyday moral practices presuppose a false account of who we are? Chapters offer a survey of recent empirical work and foster dialogue between experimental and traditional philosophical approaches to identity, covering the moral self, dual character concepts, true self, transformative experience and the identity conditions collective entities. With novel experiments and thought-provoking applications to practical concerns including law, immigration, bioethics and politics, this collection highlights the value and implications of empirical work on personal identity.
Exploring some of the most fundamental issues facing religion at the present time, this concise study deals squarely with such problems as the existence of different religions, the relationship between science and religion, and religion versus reason in a pluralist society.
In the 1950s, John Reber convinced many Californians that the best
way to solve the state's water shortage problem was to dam up the
San Francisco Bay. Against massive political pressure, Reber's
opponents persuaded lawmakers that doing so would lead to disaster.
They did this not by empirical measurement alone, but also through
the construction of a model. Simulation and Similarity explains why
this was a good strategy while simultaneously providing an account
of modeling and idealization in modern scientific practice. Michael
Weisberg focuses on concrete, mathematical, and computational
models in his consideration of the nature of models, the practice
of modeling, and nature of the relationship between models and
real-world phenomena. |
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