For all of recorded history prior to the second half of the twentieth century, there has been but one realm in which the cognitive processes of reasoning and problem solving, learning and discovery, language and mathematics took place. The realm of human intellect no longer has an exclusive claim on these cognitive processes--artificial intelligence represents a parallel claim. Morton Wagman's text compares the two realms, identifies consonant and disparate modes of cognition, and identifies a general theory of human and artificial intelligence.

A general theory of intellect entails the specific components of intellect as conceptualized in the domains of human and artificial intelligence. These specific components include the conceptual areas of reasoning, language, learning, and discovery. Theories of these components of intellect, as well as problem solving, logic, and memory, are systematically examined and compared. Following the introductory chapter, each succeeding chapter focuses on a major cognitive component. Each component is analyzed from the perspectives of both human intellect and artificial intelligence. These dual perspectives are then compared, taking account of basic theory and contemporary research. The technical theory and research is considered against a broad background of intellectual history and psychological implication. "Cognitive Science and Concepts of Mind" is intended for graduate and advanced undergraduate students in cognitive science programs, psychology, philosophy, and artificial intelligence courses. Wagman's book will also be of interest to professionals in these and related disciplines.

This book offers an analysis of experimental psychology that is embedded in a general understanding of human behavior. It provides methodological self-awareness for researchers who study and use the experimental method in psychology. The book critically reviews key research areas (e.g., rule-breaking, sense of agency, free choice, task switching, task sharing, and mind wandering), examining their scope, limits, ambiguities, and implicit theoretical commitments. Topics featured in this text include: Methods of critique in experimental research Goal hierarchies and organization of a task Rule-following and rule-breaking behavior Sense of agency Free-choice tasks Mind wandering Experimental Psychology and Human Agency will be of interest to researchers and undergraduate and graduate students in the fields of experimental psychology, cognitive psychology, theoretical psychology, and critical psychology, as well as various philosophical disciplines.

"The Self in Question" offers a humanistic account of self-consciousness and personal identity, providing a much-needed rapprochement between Analytic and Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness. In Analytic philosophy, a resurgence of interest in the topic of self-consciousness has been inspired by the work of Gareth Evans. Both Evans and his successors make the plausible assumption that self-consciousness is a capacity manifested in the use of "I," or through behaviour which must be described in terms of "I." "The Self in Question" develops this assumption through an analysis of Wittgenstein's insights into "I"-as-subject and self-identification, relating them - as their author did not - to the epistemology of memory and bodily awareness. As a result, it is able to discern the truth in the apparently discredited memory criterion of personal identity. It also draws on Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the body's significance for self-consciousness, to offer a critique of materialism about the body.

Norris presents a series of closely linked chapters on recent developments in epistemology, philosophy of language, cognitive science, literary theory, musicology and other related fields. While to this extent adopting an interdisciplinary approach, Norris also very forcefully challenges the view that the academic "disciplines" as we know them are so many artificial constructs of recent date and with no further role than to prop up existing divisions of intellectual labour. He makes his case through some exceptionally acute revisionist readings of diverse thinkers such as Derrida, Paul de Man, Wittgenstein, Chomsky, Michael Dummett and John McDowell. In each instance Norris stresses the value of bringing various trans-disciplinary perspectives to bear while none-the-less maintaining adequate standards of area-specific relevance and method. Most importantly he asserts the central role of recent developments in cognitive science as pointing a way beyond certain otherwise intractable problems in philosophy of mind and language.

Self and World is an exploration of the nature of self-awareness. Quassim Cassam challenges the widespread and influential view that we cannot be introspectively aware of ourselves as objects in the world. In opposition to the views of many empiricist and idealistic philosophers, including Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein, he argues that the self is not systematically elusive from the perspective of self-consciousness, and that consciousness of our thoughts and experiences requires a sense of our thinking, experiencing selves as shaped, located, and solid physical objects in a world of such objects. Awareness of oneself as a physical object involves forms of bodily self-awareness whose importance has seldom been properly acknowledged in philosophical accounts of the self and self-awareness. The conception of self-awareness defended in this book helps to undermins the idealist thesis that the self does not belong to the world, and also the claim that the existence of subjects or persons is only a derivative feature of reality. In the final part of the book, Cassam argues that the existence of persons is a substantial fact about the world, and that it is not possible to give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist. This clear, original, and challenging treatment of one of the deepest intellectual problems will demand the attention of all philosophers and cognitive scientists who are concerned with the self.

This book represents an outstanding contribution to the field of somatic psychology. It focuses on the relationship between body and emotions, and on the linkages between mindfulness-based emotion studies and neuroscience. The author discusses the awakening of somatic intelligence as a journey through pain and trauma management, the moral dimensions of somatic passions, and the art and practice of embodied mindfulness. Issues such as the emotions and the body in relation to Buddhist contemplative practice, against the background of the most recent findings of current neuroscience, are expanded in the book. A broad review of the Darwinian-Jamesian heritage on emotion studies is a unique contribution to the tradition of the somatogenic strands of emotions, and provides a contrasting focus to the ideogenic emotions in Sigmund Freud. This work provides an invaluable resource for students of psychology and philosophy, psychotherapists and meditation teachers, students, and for anyone with an interest in the field of somatic psychology.

Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind aims to reassess the work of Wittgenstein in terms of its importance to contemporary debates surrounding the philosophy of mind.The first part of this study examines Wittgenstein in the context of current views on the human mind in relation to the body and behavior. The arguments confront the views of Quine and Dennett, as well as functionalism, eliminative materialism, and the current debate about consciousness. The essays that make up the second part focus on a particular psychological concept, thinking, imagining, sensation, knowledge, and reason. This study takes a fresh look at this established thinker and demonstrates both the relevance and power of his arguments in the 21st century.

As usual, the Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Cognitive Science include leading-edge work by outstanding researchers in the field. This volume contains three kinds of papers corresponding to three of the main disciplines in cognitive science: philosophy, psychology, and artificial intelligence. The title - Cognition, Agency and Rationality - captures the main issues addressed by the papers. Of course, all are concerned with cognition, but some are especially centred on the very concept of rationality, while others focus on (multiple) agency. The diversity of their disciplinary origins and standpoints not only reflects the main topics and the range of different positions presented at ICCS-97, as well as demonstrating the richness, fruitfulness and diversity of research in cognitive science today.

This introductory text offers a clear, concise look at the philosophy of love. The author's presentation assumes no previous knowledge of philosophy, providing the humanities student with an insightful introduction to some of the most prominent writers and philosophers, both ancient and modern. From the dialogues of Plato to the writings of feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray, Wagoner presents six major ideas of love: erotic love, Christian love, romantic love, moral love, love as power, and mutual love.

This study asserts that even though we have only one word for love, six fundamentally different meanings can be distinguished: erotic love, Christian love, romantic love, moral love, love as power, and mutual love. Wagoner identifies each of these ideas of love in terms of the special meaning it brings to experience. No one meaning is comprehensive. Each is shown to have a logic and legitimacy of its own. Why each view seems real and compelling is the focus of separate discussions, as well as the price that may be exacted by each idea. The extent to which these ideas throw light on actual experience is striking, but the book is not an empirical or psychological inquiry. How one self finds itself in another is first defined and then explored further to see how this shapes the rational and sexual aspects of life.

According to the dominant theory of meaning, truth-conditional semantics, to explain the meaning of a statement is to specify the conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. Classical truth-conditional semantics is coming under increasing attack, however, from contextualists and inferentialists, who agree that meaning is located in the mind.How to Think about Meaning develops an even more radical mentalist semantics, which it does by shifting the object of semantic inquiry. Whereas for classical semantics the object of analysis is an abstract sentence or utterance such as Grass is green, for attitudinal semantics the object of inquiry is a propositional attitude such as Speaker so-and-so thinks grass is green. Explicit relativization to some speaker S allows for semantic theory then to make contact with psychology, sociology, historical linguistics, and other empirical disciplines.

In Measuring the Immeasurable Mind: Where Contemporary Neuroscience Meets the Aristotelian Tradition, Matthew Owen argues that despite its nonphysical character, it is possible to empirically detect and measure consciousness. Toward the end of the previous century, the neuroscience of consciousness set its roots and sprouted within a materialist milieu that reduced the mind to matter. Several decades later, dualism is being dusted off and reconsidered. Although some may see this revival as a threat to consciousness science aimed at measuring the conscious mind, Owen argues that measuring consciousness, along with the medical benefits of such measurements, is not ruled out by consciousness being nonphysical. Owen proposes the Mind-Body Powers model of neural correlates of consciousness, which is informed by Aristotelian causation and a substance dualist view of human nature inspired by Thomas Aquinas, who often followed Aristotle. In addition to explaining why there are neural correlates of consciousness, the model provides a philosophical foundation for empirically discerning and quantifying consciousness. En route to presenting and applying the Mind-Body Powers model to neurobiology, Owen rebuts longstanding objections to dualism related to the mind-body problem. With scholarly precision and readable clarity, Owen applies an oft forgotten yet richly developed historical vantage point to contemporary cognitive neuroscience.

Expressionism, Deleuze's philosophical commentary on Spinoza, is a critically important work because its conclusions provide the foundations for Deleuze's later metaphysical speculations on the nature of power, the body, difference and singularities. Deleuze and Spinoza is the first book to examine Deleuze's philosophical assessment of Spinoza and appraise his arguments concerning the Absolute, the philosophy of mind, epistemology and moral and political philosophy. The author respects and disagrees with Deleuze the philosopher and suggests that his arguments not only lead to eliminativism and an Hobbesian politics but that they also cast a mystifying spell.

People believe in a great many things; and yet most of us know almost nothing about why other people believe what they do, or indeed about how it feels to believe it. This book presents an objective method for understanding and comparing belief systems - irrespective of whether the investigator happens to agree with them.

The enactive approach replaces the classical computer metaphor of mind with emphasis on embodiment and social interaction as the sources of our goals and concerns. Researchers from a range of disciplines unite to address the challenge of how to account for the more uniquely human aspects of cognition, including the abstract and the nonsensical.

Hans-Christian Schmitz argues that a speaker has to utter a sentence in a way that makes the hearer perceive at least those words that are sufficient for understanding the entire sentence. In spoken language the speaker has to accentuate these words. Semantics effects of accentuation appear as epi-phenomena of their pragmatic function. The author defines a formal model for the interpretation of incompletely recognized sentences and derives a context-sensitive rule of accentuation. The rule of accentuation is experimentally evaluated.

William James's Pluralism: An Antidote for Contemporary Extremism and Absolutism explores extremism and the related problem of absolutism in the context of the psychology and philosophy of William James. Extremist and absolutist views were topical in James's day, especially around the time of the Civil War, but they are no less common in these early years of the 21st century. James argued that the love of singularities such as belief in one God, one method, one political system, or one value system contributes to extremist, even violent mentalities. In this book, James's views on singular versus pluralistic perspectives are explored and then applied to contemporary practical issues such as abortion, birth control, and death with dignity legislation. These perspectives are furthermore applied to more theoretical issues, such as causality, values, and methods or ways of investigating the world. Within William James's Pluralism, these theories are investigated in a comprehensive philosophical and psychological examination of the human experience. Written in a nontechnical manner to appeal to the general public-just as William James hoped for his pluralistic philosophy-this book is additionally of considerable interest to academics and students across many fields such as psychology, philosophy, history, and sociology.

The Intelligent Mind conceives the psychological reality of thought and language, explaining how intelligence develops from intuition to representation and then to linguistic interaction and thinking. Overcoming the prevailing dogmas regarding how discursive reason emerges, this book secures the psychological possibility of the philosophy of mind.

The extent to which language is inseparable from thought has long been a major subject of debate across linguistics, psychology, philosophy and other disciplines. In this study, Wallace Chafe presents a thought-based theory of language that goes beyond traditional views that semantics, syntax, and sounds are sufficient to account for language design. Language begins with thoughts in the mind of a speaker and ends by affecting thoughts in the mind of a listener. This obvious observation is seldom incorporated in descriptions of language design for two major reasons. First, the role of thought is usually usurped by semantics. But semantic structures are imposed on thought by languages and differ from one language to another. Second, thought does not lend itself to familiar methods of linguistic analysis. Chafe suggests ways of describing thoughts, traces the path languages follow from thoughts to sounds, and explores ways in which thoughts are oriented in time, memory, imagination, reality, and emotions.

Conversations on the Edge of Apocalypse is a collection of interviews with some of the leading thinkers of our time about the future of the human race, and the mystery of consciousness, from scientific, philosophical and spiritual perspectives. It explores such topics as the future evolution of technology and consciousness, the relationship between science and religion, ecology and human values, altered states of consciousness, the possibility of intelligent extraterrestrial life, psychic phenomena, life after death, and the fate of the human race. Included are contributions from Noam Chomsky,Deepak Chopra, George Carlin, Ram Dass and Rupert Sheldrake. Part scientific exploration and part philosophical speculation, Conversations on the Edge of Apocalypse is a valuable and entertaining resource for our species' survival.

C. D. Broad's writing on various philosophical issues spans more than half a century. Rather than attempt to trace the development of his thought throughout these fifty years this book considers his most representative work, namely, The Mind and Its Place in Nature. Nor does the scope of this study encompass the whole of that book, but only some of the issues he discusses in it. Specifically, Oaklander considers what Broad has to say about such fundamental issues as substance, universals, relations, space, time, and intentionality in the contexts of perception, memory and introspection. L. Nathan Oaklander studied philosophy at the university of Iowa. He is a student of Gustav Bergmann, one of the most distinguished ontologist in 20th century philosophy.

Do people have free will, or this universal belief an illusion? If free will is more than an illusion, what kind of free will do people have? How can free will influence behavior? Can free will be studied, verified, and understood scientifically? How and why might a sense of free will have evolved? These are a few of the questions this book attempts to answer.
People generally act as though they believe in their own free will: they don't feel like automatons, and they don't treat one another as they might treat robots. While acknowledging many constraints and influences on behavior, people nonetheless act as if they (and their neighbors) are largely in control of many if not most of the decisions they make. Belief in free will also underpins the sense that people are responsible for their actions. Psychological explanations of behavior rarely mention free will as a factor, however. Can psychological science find room for free will? How do leading psychologists conceptualize free will, and what role do they believe free will plays in shaping behavior?
In recent years a number of psychologists have tried to solve one or more of the puzzles surrounding free will. This book looks both at recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to free will and at ways leading psychologists from all branches of psychology deal with the philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will and the importance of consciousness in free will. It also includes commentaries by leading philosophers on what psychologists can contribute to long-running philosophical struggles with this most distinctly human belief.These essays should be of interest not only to social scientists, but to intelligent and thoughtful readers everywhere.

We seem to have private privileged access to our own minds through introspection, but what exactly does this involve? Do we somehow literally perceive our own minds, as the common idea of a 'mind's eye' suggests, or are there other processes at work in our ability to know our own minds? "Rethinking Introspection" offers a new pluralist framework for understanding the nature, scope, and limits of introspection. The book argues that, contrary to common misconceptions, introspection does not consist of a single mechanism but rather a diverse range of mental states and cognitive processes with a broad spectrum of epistemic properties. Building upon this revised conception of introspection, the book illustrates and analyzes the variety of ways in which we introspectively grasp the contents of our own minds, from the immediate phenomenal knowledge generated by conscious experience to the self-deceptive possibilities enabled by certain kinds of inner speech.