How might epistemology build upon its past and present, so_ as to be better in the future? Epistemology Futures _ takes bold steps towards answering that question. What _ methods will best serve epistemology? Which phenomena and _ concepts deserve more attention from it? Are there _ approaches and assumptions that have impeded its progress _ until now? This volume contains provocative essays by _ prominent epistemologists, presenting many new ideas for _ possible improvements in how to do epistemology. Doubt is _ cast upon the powers of conceptual analysis and of _ epistemological intuition. Surprising aspects of knowledge_ are noticed. What is it? What is it not? Scepticism's limits are traced. What threatens us as potential knowers? What _ does not? The nature and special significance of inquiry, of normative virtues, of understanding, and of disagreement are elucidated, all with an eye on sharpening epistemology's _ future focus. There is definite insight and potential _ foresight. How might real epistemological progress occur in the future? Epistemology Futures offers some intriguing clues.

Normativity and the Will collects fourteen important _ papers on moral psychology and practical reason by R. Jay _ Wallace, one of the leading philosophers currently working_ in these areas. The papers explore the interpenetration of normative and _ psychological issues in a series of debates that lie at the heart of moral philosophy. Part I, Reason, Desire, and the_ Will, discusses the nexus linking normativity to motivation, including the relations between desire and reasons, the role of normative considerations in explanations of action, and_ the normative commitments involved in willing an end (such_ as the requirement to adopt the necessary means). Part II,_ Responsibility, Identification, and Emotion, looks at _ questions about the rational capacities presupposed by _ accountable agency and the psychic factors that both inhibit and enable identification with what we do. It includes an interpretation of the Nietzschean claim that ressentiment is among the sources of modern moral consciousness. Part III,_ Morality and Other Normative Domains, addresses the _ structure of moral reasons and moral motivation, and the _ relations between moral demands and other normative domains (including especially the requirements of living a _ meaningful human life). _ _ Wallace's treatments of these topics are at once _ sophisticated and engaging. Taken together, they constitute an advertisement for a distinctive way of pursuing issues in moral psychology and the theory of practical reason. The _ book articulates and defends a unified framework for _ thinking about those issues, while offering sustained _ critical discussions of other influential approaches (by _ philosophers such as Korsgaard, McDowell, Nietzsche, Raz, Scanlon, and Williams). It should be of interest to every _ serious student of moral philosophy. _

How does mind fit into nature? Philosophy has long been concerned with this question. No contemporary philosopher has done more to clarify it than Jaegwon Kim, a distinguished analytic philosopher specializing in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. With new contributions from an outstanding line-up of eminent scholars, this volume focuses on issues raised in Kim's work. The chapters cluster around two themes: first, exclusion, supervenience, and reduction, with attention to the causal exclusion argument for which Kim is widely celebrated; and second, phenomenal consciousness and qualia, with attention to the prospects for a functionalist account of the mental. This volume is sure to become a major focus of attention and research in the disciplines of metaphysics and philosophy of mind.

Consciousness is a state of being aware - of our self, of our surroundings, of our place in those surroundings. Yet what makes us conscious? What neural processes drive our awareness, and how do these processes relate to what we think of as our mind? Consciousness: Philosophical, Psychological, and Neural Theories seeks to respond to some of these questions, offering a wealth of information from which the reader can develop their own views of the subject. Taking a critical, thought-provoking approach, the book integrates studies from philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience to capture the major themes on which our current understanding of consciousness is based. Opening with a series of chapters that introduce us to thinking about mind, the book goes on to explore function and brain, examining such topics as functionalism, representation, and brain dynamics. Understanding consciousness remains one of today's greatest challenges. Consciousness: Philosophical, Psychological, and Neural Theories demystifies what is known about the interface of brain and mind, and offers intriguing insights into what remains to be discovered. Online Resource Centre The Online Resource Centre features figures from the book available to download to facilitate lecture preparation.

Humour is a funny thing - everyone knows it but no-one knows what it is. This book addresses the question 'What is humour?' by first untangling the definitions of humour, amusement and funniness before then providing a new theory of humour which draws upon recent research in philosophy, psychology, linguistics and neuroscience. The theory is built up without assuming any prior knowledge and illustrated through humorous examples which are both entertaining and educational for anyone curious about what makes things funny. The book is then an accessible illumination of joking matters from dinner tables to online platforms to comedy clubs.

This important book investigates the emergence and development of a distinct concept of self-awareness in post-classical, pre-modern Islamic philosophy. Jari Kaukua presents the first extended analysis of Avicenna's arguments on self-awareness - including the flying man, the argument from the unity of experience, the argument against reflection models of self-awareness and the argument from personal identity - arguing that all these arguments hinge on a clearly definable concept of self-awareness as pure first-personality. He substantiates his interpretation with an analysis of Suhrawardi's use of Avicenna's concept and Mulla Sadra's revision of the underlying concept of selfhood. The study explores evidence for a sustained, pre-modern and non-Western discussion of selfhood and self-awareness, challenging the idea that these concepts are distinctly modern, European concerns. The book will be of interest to a range of readers in history of philosophy, history of ideas, Islamic studies and philosophy of mind.

This volume brings together contributions that explore the philosophy of Franz Brentano. It looks at his work both critically and in the context of contemporary philosophy. For instance, Brentano influenced the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, the theory of objects of Alexius Meinong, the early development of the Gestalt theory, the philosophy of language of Anton Marty, the works of Carl Stumpf in the psychology of tone, and many others. Readers will also learn the contributions of Brentano's work to much debated contemporary issues in philosophy of mind, ontology, and the theory of emotions. The first section deals with Brentano's conception of the history of philosophy. The next approaches his conception of empirical psychology from an empirical standpoint and in relation with competing views on psychology from the period. The third section discusses Brentano's later programme of a descriptive psychology or "descriptive phenomenology" and some of his most innovative developments, for instance in the theory of emotions. The final section examines metaphysical issues and applications of his mereology. His reism takes here an important place. The intended readership of this book comprises phenomenologists, analytic philosophers, philosophers of mind and value, as well as metaphysicians. It will appeal to both graduate and undergraduate students, professors, and researchers in philosophy and psychology.

It is hard to interpret quantum mechanics. The most surprising, but also most parsimonious, interpretation is the many-worlds, or quantum-multiverse interpretation, implying a permanent coexistence of parallel realities. Could this perhaps be the appropriate interpretation of quantum mechanics? This book collects evidence for this interpretation, both from physics and from other fields, and proposes a subjectivist version of it, the clustered-minds multiverse. The author explores its implications through the lens of decision making and derives consequences for free will and consciousness. For example, free will can be implemented in the form of vectorial choices, as introduced in the book. He furthermore derives consequences for research in the social sciences, especially in psychology and economics.

This book offers a new look at emergence in terms of a hierarchical emergent ontology. Emergence is recognised as a universal principle, as universal as the principle of evolution. This is achieved by setting out the ontological criteria of emergence and such criteria's various roles. The traditional dichotomies are overcome, e.g., the synchronic and diachronic perspectives are unified, allowing a single, universal principle of emergence to be applied across various fields of science. As exemplars of its practical utility in both explanation and prediction, this new approach is applied to three different scientific areas: cellular automata, quantum Hall effects, and the neural network of the mind. It proves that the resulting metaphysics of hierarchical emergent ontology plays a fundamental role in unifying science, an impossible task under classical reductionism.

This book highlights the importance of Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings on psychology and psychological phenomena for the historical development of contemporary psychology. It presents an insightful assessment of the philosopher's work, particularly his later writings, which draws on key interpretations that have informed our understanding of metapsychological and psychological issues. Wittgenstein's Philosophy in Psychology engages with both critics and followers of the philosopher's work to demonstrate its enduring relevance to psychology today. Sullivan presents a novel examination of Wittgenstein's later writings by providing historical detail about the uptake, understanding and use of Wittgenstein's remarks and method in psychology and related areas of social science, examining persistent sources of conceptual confusion and showing how to apply his insights in investigations of collectives, social life, emotions, subjectivity, and development. In doing so, he reveals the value for psychologists in adopting a philosophical method of conceptual investigation to work through and become more reflexive about prominent theories, methods, therapies and practices in their respective, multiple fields and thereby create a resource for future theoretical, empirical and applied psychologists. This work will be of particular relevance to students and academics engaged in the history of psychology and to practitioners interested in understanding the continued importance of Wittgenstein's work within the practices of psychology.

This book provides an in-depth analysis of of the logotherapy of Viktor Frankl and delves into the spiritual depths of an inherent search for meaning in life. Written by a highly experienced and competent logotherapist trained by Frankl himself, this book is excitingly new and unique in that it takes the reader, in the role of a client accompanied by the author in the role of the therapist, through the unfolding phase-by-phase process of logotherapy. Logotherapy is explored as a depth and as a height psychology. From a provoked will to meaning out of the depths of a spiritual unconscious, the author takes the search for meaning to the ultimate heights in the achievement of human greatness. This book brings Frankl's own profound life's orientation back to life and, in its reader-friendly style, has the freshness of Frankl's own way of writing. It is written in a refreshingly simple and straightforward style for easy accessibility to a wide readership. It includes cases studies and exercises for readers and is meant for use in logotherapy courses worldwide. Additionally, it will appeal to laypersons seeking a deeper meaning to their lives, psychology students and mental health professionals alike.

How can we better understand and treat those suffering from schizophrenia and manic-depressive illnesses? This important new book takes us into the world of those suffering from such disorders. Using self-descriptions, its emphasis is not on how mental health professional's view sufferers, but on how the patients themselves experience their disorder. Central to the book is the idea that schizophrenic persons live like disembodies spirits or deanimated bodies. As disembodies spirits, they feel like abstract entities that contemplate their own existence and the world from outside. As deanimated bodies, schizophrenic people feel deprived of the possibility of living personal experiences - perceptions, thoughts, emotions - as their own. A new volume in the International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry series, this book will be of great interest to all those working with sufferers from such disorders - helping them to better understand their mental lives and providing important insights into how best to treat them.

This book explores a central question in the study of depth perception - 'does the visual system rely upon objective knowledge and subjective meaning to specify visual depth?' Linton advances an alternative interpretation to the generally accepted affirmative answer, according to which many of the apparent contributions of knowledge and meaning to depth perception are better understood as contributions to our post-perceptual cognition of depth. In order to defend this position a new account of visual cognition is required, as well as a better understanding of the optical and physiological cues to depth. This book will appeal to students and researchers in psychology, vision science, and philosophy, as well as technologists and content creators working in virtual and augmented reality.

This interdisciplinary book ties the historical work of Descartes to his successors through current research and critical overviews on the neuroscience of consciousness, the brain, and cognition. This text is the first historical survey to focus on the cohesions and discontinuities between historical and contemporary thinkers working in philosophy, physiology, psychology, and neuroscience. The book introduces and analyzes early discussions of consciousness, such as: metaphysical alternatives to scientific explanations of consciousness and its connection to brain activity; claims about the possibilities and limits of neuroscientific accounts of consciousness and cognition; and the proposition of a "non-reductive naturalism" concerning phenomenal consciousness and rationality. The author assesses the contributions of early philosophers and scientists on brain, consciousness and cognition, among them: Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Newton, Haller, Kant, Fechner, Helmholtz and du Bois-Reymond. The work of these pioneers is related to that of modern researchers in physiology, psychology, neuroscience and philosophy of mind, including: Freud, Hilary Putnam, Herbert Feigl, Gerald Edelman, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, amongst others. This text appeals to researchers and advanced students in the field.

This book is the first volume featuring the work of American women philosophers in the first half of the twentieth century. It provides selected papers authored by Mary Whiton Calkins, Grace Andrus de Laguna, Grace Neal Dolson, Marjorie Glicksman Grene, Marjorie Silliman Harris, Thelma Zemo Lavine, Marie Collins Swabey, Ellen Bliss Talbot, Dorothy Walsh and Margaret Floy Washburn. The book also provides the historical and philosophical background to their work. The papers focus on the nature of philosophy, knowledge, the philosophy of science, the mind-matter nexus, the nature of time, and the question of freedom and the individual. The material is suitable for scholars, researchers and advanced philosophy students interested in (history of) philosophy; theories of knowledge; philosophy of science; mind, and reality.

This book explores the transition from the mind to the Supermind within the scope of an evolutionary metaphysics. The idea of Supermind has not been discussed so far in the mainstream philosophy of mind and consciousness. This book will give a new approach to the study of consciousness from the Indian vedantic perspective which has introduced the idea of Supermind, especially in the works of Sri Aurobindo. The book also undertakes a sustained critique of the contemporary theories of mind which have promoted mostly a mechanistic and naturalistic theory of mind and consciousness. The book is meant for the researchers who are engaged in the study of consciousness and for those who are interested in the philosophy of mind in general. This book will serve the purpose of the much-needed counter perspective to the contemporary theories of mind working broadly within the materialist traditions.

Drawing connections between madness, philosophy and autobiography, this book addresses the question of how Nietzsche's madness might have affected his later works. It also explores why continental philosophy after Nietzsche is so fascinated with madness, and how it (re)considers, (re)evaluates and (re)valorizes madness. To answer these questions, the book analyzes the work of three major figures in twentieth-century French philosophy who were significantly influenced by Nietzsche: Bataille, Foucault and Derrida, examining the ways in which their responses to Nietzsche's madness determine how they understand philosophy as well as philosophy's relation to madness. For these philosophers, posing the question about madness renders the philosophical subject vulnerable and implicates it in a state of responsibility towards that about which it asks. Out of this analysis of their engagement with the question of madness emerges a new conception of 'autobiographical philosophy', which entails the insertion of this vulnerable subject into the philosophical work, to which each of these philosophers adheres or resists in different ways.

This book explores how philosophical realisms relate to psychoanalytical conceptions of the Real, and in turn how the Lacanian framework challenges basic philosophical notions of object and reality. The author examines how contemporary psychoanalysis might respond to the question of ontology by taking advantage of the recent revitalization of realism in its speculative form. While the philosophical side of the debate makes a plea for an independent ontological consistency of the Real, this book proposes a Lacanian reassessment of the definition of the Real as 'what is foreign to subjectivity itself'. In doing so, it reframes the question of the Real in terms of what is already there beneath the supposedly linguistic constitution of subjectivity. The book then goes on to engage the problem of cognition in the realm of Nature qua materiality, focusing on the centrality of the body as a linguistic-material hybrid. It argues that it is possible to re-establish the theoretical dignity of Ricoeur's notion of 'suspicion', by building a dialogue between Lacanian psychoanalysis and three main domains of inquiry: desire, objects and bodily enjoyment. Borrowing from Piera Aulagnier's theory of the Other as a word-bearer, it considers the genesis of desire and sense of reality both explainable through a hybrid framework which comprises psychoanalytical insights and material dynamics in a comprehensive account. This created theoretical space is an opportunity for both philosophers and psychoanalysts to rethink key Lacanian insights in light of the problem of the Real.

Simple seeing. Plain talking. Language in use and persons in action. These are among the themes of Virgil Aldrich's writings, from the 1930's onward. Throughout these years, he has been an explorer of conceptual geography: not as a foreign visitor studying an alien land, but close up 'in the language in which we live, move, and have our being'. This is his work. It is clear to those who know him best that he also has fun at it. Yet, in the terms of his oft-cited distinction, it is equally clear that he is to be counted not among the funsters of philosophy, but among its most committed workers. Funsters are those who attempt to do epistemology, metaphysics, or analysis by appealing to examples which are purely imaginary, totally fictional, as unrealistic as you like, 'completely unheard of'. Such imaginative wilfullness takes philosophers away from, not nearer to, 'the rough ground' (Wittgenstein) where our concepts have their origin and working place. In the funsters' imagined, 'barely possible' (but actually impossible) world, simple seeing becomes transformed into the sensing of sense-data; plain talk is rejected as imprecise, vague, and misleading; and per sons in action show up as ensouled physical objects in motion. Then the fly is in the bottle, buzzing out its tedious tunes: the problem of perception of the external world; the problem of meaning and what it is; the mind-body problem. Image-mongering has got the best of image-management."

By the end of the twentieth century, it had been almost forgotten that the Freudian account of the unconscious was only one of many to have emerged from the intellectual ferment of the second half of the 19th century. The philosophical roots of the concept of the unconscious in Leibniz, Kant, Schelling and Schopenhauer had also been occluded from view by the dominance of Freudianism. From his earliest work of the 1940s, until his final writings of the 1990s, Gilles Deleuze stood at odds with this dominant current, rejecting Freud as sole source for ideas about the unconscious. This most 'contemporary' of French philosophers acted as custodian of all the ideas that had been rejected by the proponents of the psychoanalytic model, carefully preserving them and, when possible, injecting them with new life. In 1950s and 60s Deleuze turned to Henri Bergson's theories of memory and instinct and to Carl Jung's theory of archetypes. In "Difference and Repetition (1968)" he conceived of a 'differential unconscious' based on Leibnizian principles. He was also immersed from the beginning in esoteric and occult ideas about the nature of the mind. "Deleuze and the Unconscious" shows how these tendencies combine in Deleuze's work to engender a wholly new approach to the unconscious, for which active relations to the unconscious are just as important as the better known pathologies of neurosis and psychosis.

What do you do when you're not asleep and when you're not eating? You're most likely waiting-to finish work, to get home, or maybe even to be seen by your doctor. Hold On is less about how to manage all that "staying where one is until a particular time or event" (OED) than it is about describing how we experience waiting. Waiting can embrace things like hesitation and curiosity, dithering and procrastination, hunting and being hunted, fearing and being feared, dread and illness, courting and parenting, anticipation and excitement, curiosity, listening to and even performing music, being religious, being happy or unhappy, being bored and being boring. They're all explored here. Waiting is also characterized by brain chemicals such as serotonin and dopamine. They can radically alter the way we register the passing of time. Waiting is also the experience that may characterize most interpersonal relations-mismanage it at your own risk. Hold On contains advice on how to cope with waiting-how to live better-but its main aim is to show how important the experience of waiting is, in popular and highbrow culture, and, sometimes, in history. Detouring into psychology, neurology, ethology, philosophy, film, literature, and especially art, Peter Toohey's illuminates in unexpected ways one of the most common of human experiences. After reading his book, you'll never wait the same way again.

"Here, at last, is a book about what happiness really means, and why it often eludes us in our stressed-out, always-on lives." -Arianna Huffington, Founder and CEO, Thrive A young philosopher and Guinness World Record holder in pull-ups argues that the key to happiness is not goal-driven striving but forging a life that integrates self-possession, friendship, and engagement with nature. What is the meaning of the good life? In this strikingly original book, Adam Adatto Sandel draws on ancient and modern thinkers and on two seemingly disparate pursuits of his own, philosophy and fitness, to offer a surprising answer to this age-old human question. Sandel argues that finding fulfillment is not about attaining happiness, conceived as a state of mind, or even about accomplishing one's greatest goals. Instead, true happiness comes from immersing oneself in activity that is intrinsically rewarding. The source of meaning, he suggests, derives from the integrity or "wholeness" of self that we forge throughout the journey of life. At the heart of Sandel's account of life as a journey are three virtues that get displaced and distorted by our goal-oriented striving: self-possession, friendship, and engagement with nature. Sandel offers illuminating and counterintuitive accounts of these virtues, revealing how they are essential to a happiness that lasts. To illustrate the struggle of living up to these virtues, Sandel looks to literature, film, and television, and also to his own commitments and adventures. A focal point of his personal narrative is a passion that, at first glance, is as narrow a goal-oriented pursuit as one can imagine: training to set the Guinness World Record for Most Pull-Ups in One Minute. Drawing on his own experiences, Sandel makes philosophy accessible for readers who, in their own infinitely various ways, struggle with the tension between goal-oriented striving and the embrace of life as a journey.

This reconstruction of the work of 'dialectical memory' in Hegel raises the fundamental question of the principle that presides on the articulation of history and indicates in Hegel's philosophy two alternative models of conceiving history: one that grounds history on 'ethical memory,' the other that sees justice as the moving principle of history.

Noam Chomsky's claim that ordinary speakers possess complex structures of linguistic knowledge was a trigger for the cognitive revolution in the mid-20th century. This and an associated claim, that linguistics is essentially in the business of rendering such knowledge explicit, have been the target of an evolving series of sceptical objections ever since.

What goes on in creative writers' heads when they write? What can cognitive psychology, neuroscience, literary studies and previous research in creative writing studies tell creative writers about the processes of their writing mind? Creative writers have for centuries undertaken cognitive research. Some described cognition in vivid exegetical essays, but most investigated the mind in creative writing itself, in descriptions of the thinking of characters in fiction, poetry and plays. The inner voicings and inner visualising revealed in Greek choruses, in soliloquies, in stream-of-consciousness narratives are creative writers' 'research results' from studying their own cognition, and the thinking of others. The Creative Writer's Mind is a book for creative writers: it sets out to cross the gap between creative writing and science, between the creative arts and cognitive research.