It is hard to interpret quantum mechanics. The most surprising, but also most parsimonious, interpretation is the many-worlds, or quantum-multiverse interpretation, implying a permanent coexistence of parallel realities. Could this perhaps be the appropriate interpretation of quantum mechanics? This book collects evidence for this interpretation, both from physics and from other fields, and proposes a subjectivist version of it, the clustered-minds multiverse. The author explores its implications through the lens of decision making and derives consequences for free will and consciousness. For example, free will can be implemented in the form of vectorial choices, as introduced in the book. He furthermore derives consequences for research in the social sciences, especially in psychology and economics.

Key Updates to the Second Edition Includes a new opening section on human nature, borrowing material from elsewhere in the book Adds a new chapter on evolutionary and developmental arguments for the innateness of morality Expands coverage of the challenges to psychological research, including the replication crisis and the WEIRDness challenge Provides a new section on implicit bias and moral responsibility Offers enhanced clarity and accessibility throughout Includes up-to-date Further Reading sections and Bibliography

The world has a causal structure, in the sense that some events make other events happen. Although understanding causal structure is essential for predicting and controlling the environment, causal structure is, at least usually, not obvious from superficial, perceptual cues. How then do our minds infer this structure? In the last few years, questions about causal inference and learning have become an important focus of investigation in many different disciplines - developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, ethology, philosophy, and computer science. As is common in scientific research, there has been relatively little interaction on the topic between these disciplines. However, in spite of the minimal interaction, a general review of the research shows the beginning of a formal way of determining how, in principle, the problem of causal inference and learning can be solved, and a wealth of methods for determining how it is, in fact, solved by children, adults, and animals. This volume brings together this research and provides a more sophisticated understanding of causal inference and learning.

"Soul, Psyche, Brain" is a collection of essays that address the relationships between neuroscience, religion and human nature. The book highlights some startling new developments in neuroscience that have many people rethinking spirituality, the mind-body connection, and cognition in general. "Soul, Psyche, Brain" explores questions like: What are the neurological effects of meditation and prayer? How does the mind develop psychological and spiritual self-awareness? And what are the practical implications of brain-mind science for religious faith and moral reasoning?

This interdisciplinary book ties the historical work of Descartes to his successors through current research and critical overviews on the neuroscience of consciousness, the brain, and cognition. This text is the first historical survey to focus on the cohesions and discontinuities between historical and contemporary thinkers working in philosophy, physiology, psychology, and neuroscience. The book introduces and analyzes early discussions of consciousness, such as: metaphysical alternatives to scientific explanations of consciousness and its connection to brain activity; claims about the possibilities and limits of neuroscientific accounts of consciousness and cognition; and the proposition of a "non-reductive naturalism" concerning phenomenal consciousness and rationality. The author assesses the contributions of early philosophers and scientists on brain, consciousness and cognition, among them: Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Newton, Haller, Kant, Fechner, Helmholtz and du Bois-Reymond. The work of these pioneers is related to that of modern researchers in physiology, psychology, neuroscience and philosophy of mind, including: Freud, Hilary Putnam, Herbert Feigl, Gerald Edelman, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, amongst others. This text appeals to researchers and advanced students in the field.

Are people rational? This question was central to Greek thought; and has been at the heart of psychology and philosophy for millennia. This book provides a radical and controversial reappraisal of conventional wisdom in the psychology of reasoning, proposing that the Western conception of the mind as a logical system is flawed at the very outset. It argues that cognition should be understood in terms of probability theory, the calculus of uncertain reasoning, rather than in terms of logic, the calculus of certain reasoning.

What are the processes, from conception to adulthood, that enable a single cell to grow into a sentient adult? The processes that occur along the way are so complex that any attempt to understand development necessitates a multi-disciplinary approach, integrating data from cognitive studies, computational work, and neuroimaging - an approach till now seldom taken in the study of child development. Neuroconstructivism is a major new 2 volume publication that seeks to redress this balance, presenting an integrative new framework for considering development. In the first volume, the authors review up-to-to date findings from neurobiology, brain imaging, child development, computer and robotic modelling to consider why children's thinking develops the way it does. They propose a new synthesis of development that is based on 5 key principles found to operate at many levels of descriptions. They use these principles to explain what causes a number of key developmental phenomena, including infants' interacting with objects, early social cognitive interactions, and the causes of dyslexia. The "neuroconstructivist" framework also shows how developmental disorders do not arise from selective damage to the normal cognitive system, but instead arise from developmental processes that operate under atypical constraints. How these principles work is illustrated in several case studies ranging from perceptual to social and reading development. Finally, the authors use neuroimaging, behavioural analyses, computational simulations and robotic models to provide a way of understanding the mechanisms and processes that cause development to occur.

Foundations of Mind collects the essays which established Tyler Burge as a leading philosopher of mind. This second volume of his papers offers nineteen pieces published between 1975 and 2003, including the influential series that develops anti-individualism. Burge contributes three essay-length postscripts, a substantial new paper on consciousness, and an introduction which surveys his work in this area. The foundations that Burge reflects on are conditions in the individual or the wider world that determine the natures of mental kinds. The conditions include causal, social, psychological conditions, and conditions of phenomenal consciousness. Some of these are basic conditions under which minds are possible. The book is essential reading for philosophers of mind, and should engage a wider public interested in basic philosophical issues.

As philosophy departments attempt to define their unique value amid program closures in the humanities and the rise of interdisciplinary research, metaphilosophy has become an increasingly important area of inquiry. Richard Fumerton here lays out a cogent answer to the question asked in the book's title, What is Philosophy?. Against those who argue that philosophy is not sharply distinguishable from the sciences, Fumerton makes a case for philosophy as an autonomous discipline with its own distinct methodology. Over the course of nine engaging and accessible chapters, he shows that answering fundamental philosophical questions requires one to take a radical first-person perspective that divorces the truth conditions of philosophical claims from the kind of contingent truths investigated by the empirical sciences. Along the way, Fumerton briefly discusses the historical controversies that have surrounded the nature of philosophy, situating his own argument within the larger conversation. Key Features Illuminates the unique role of thought experiments and especially the "paradox of analysis" in understanding the purpose and value of philosophy. Shows that philosophy asks fundamental questions, unanswerable by the sciences, that are critical to thinking clearly and rationally about the world. Highlights the distinct character of philosophical questions in specific subject areas: philosophy of language, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. Concludes by making a unique case for philosophy's contribution to cross-disciplinary work in ethics, politics, mathematics, and the empirical sciences. Written in a way to be engaging and accessible for advanced undergraduate readers.

This is the first collection of essays exclusively devoted to knowledge from non-knowledge and related issues. It features original contributions from some of the most prominent and up-and-coming scholars working in contemporary epistemology. There is a nascent literature in epistemology about the possibility of inferential knowledge based on premises that are, for one reason or another, not known. The essays in this book explore if and how epistemology can accommodate cases where knowledge is generated from something other than knowledge. Can reasoning from false beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from unjustified beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from gettiered beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from propositions one does not even believe generate knowledge? The contributors to this book tackle these and other questions head-on. Together, they advance the debate about knowledge from non-knowledge in novel and interesting directions. Illuminating Errors will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind.

What are the processes, from conception to adulthood, that enable a single cell to grow into a sentient adult? They are so complex that any attempt to understand development necessitates a multi-disciplinary approach, integrating data from cognitive studies, computational modeling, and neuroimagingan approach until now seldom taken when considering child development. Neuroconstructivism is a major two-volume work that seeks to redress this balance, presenting an integrative new framework for considering development. In Volume One, the authors review up-to-date findings from neurobiology, brain imaging, child development, as well computer and robotic modeling to consider why children's thinking develops the way it does, and propose a new synthesis of development that is based on five key principles found to operate at many different levels of description. Their Neuroconstructivist framework also shows how developmental disorders, such as dyslexia, can arise from typical developmental processes operating under atypical constraints. Of central importance to Neuroconstructivism is the idea that computer and robotic models are vital tools for investigating the processes and mechanisms involved in learning and development. Volume Two illustrates the principles of Neuroconstructivist development through contributions from nine different labs across the world. This volume complements Volume One by providing concrete examples of how the Neuroconstructivist principles can be grounded in a diverse range of domains, and thereby shape the research agenda in each.

This book explores the transition from the mind to the Supermind within the scope of an evolutionary metaphysics. The idea of Supermind has not been discussed so far in the mainstream philosophy of mind and consciousness. This book will give a new approach to the study of consciousness from the Indian vedantic perspective which has introduced the idea of Supermind, especially in the works of Sri Aurobindo. The book also undertakes a sustained critique of the contemporary theories of mind which have promoted mostly a mechanistic and naturalistic theory of mind and consciousness. The book is meant for the researchers who are engaged in the study of consciousness and for those who are interested in the philosophy of mind in general. This book will serve the purpose of the much-needed counter perspective to the contemporary theories of mind working broadly within the materialist traditions.

How does conscious experience arise out of the functioning of the human brain? How is it related to the behaviour that it accompanies? How does the perceived world relate to the real world? Between them, these three questions constitute what is commonly known as the Hard Problem of consciousness. Despite vast knowledge of the relationship between brain and behaviour, and rapid advances in our knowledge of how brain activity correlates with conscious experience, the answers to all three questions remain controversial, even mysterious. This important book analyses these core issues and reviews the evidence from both introspection and experiment. To many its conclusions will be surprising and even unsettling: * The entire perceived world is constructed by the brain. The relationship between the world we perceive and the underlying physical reality is not as close as we might think * Much of our behaviour is accomplished with little or no participation from conscious experience. * Our conscious experience of our behaviour lags the behaviour itself by around a fifth of a second - we become aware of what we do only after we have done it. * The lag in conscious experience applies also to the decision to act - we only become aware of our decisions after they have been formed. * The self is as much a creation of the brain as is the rest of the perceived world. Written by a leading scientist, this accessible and compelling analysis of how conscious experience relates to brain and behaviour will have major implications for our understanding of human nature.

Teleosemantics seeks to explain meaning and other intentional phenomena in terms of their function in the life of the species. This volume of new essays from an impressive line-up of well-known contributors offers a valuable summary of the current state of the teleosemantics debate.

This volume brings together specially written essays by leading researchers on the propositional imagination. This is the mental capacity we exploit when we imagine that Holmes has a bad habit or that there are zombies. It plays an essential role in philosophical theorizing, engaging with
fiction, and indeed in everyday life. The Architecture of the Imagination capitalizes on recent attempts to give a cognitive account of this capacity, extending the theoretical picture and exploring the philosophical implications.

Drawing on classical antiquity and Western and Eastern philosophy, Richard Sorabji tackles in" Self" the question of whether there is such a thing as the individual self or only a stream of consciousness. According to Sorabji, the self is not an undetectable soul or ego, but an embodied individual whose existence is plain to see. Unlike a mere stream of consciousness, it is something that owns not only a consciousness but also a body.
Sorabji traces historically the retreat from a positive idea of self and draws out the implications of these ideas of self on the concepts of life and death, asking: Should we fear death? How should our individuality affect the way we live? Through an astute reading of a huge array of traditions, he helps us come to terms with our uneasiness about the subject of self in an account that will be at the forefront of philosophical debates for years to come. "There has never been a book remotely like this one in its profusion of ancient references on ideas about human identity and selfhood . . . . Readers unfamiliar with the subject also need to know that Sorabji breaks new ground in giving special attention to philosophers such as Epictetus and other Stoics, Plotinus and later Neoplatonists, and the ancient commentators on Aristotle (on the last of whom he is the world's leading authority)."--Anthony A. Long, "Times Literary Supplement"

This book highlights the importance of Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings on psychology and psychological phenomena for the historical development of contemporary psychology. It presents an insightful assessment of the philosopher's work, particularly his later writings, which draws on key interpretations that have informed our understanding of metapsychological and psychological issues. Wittgenstein's Philosophy in Psychology engages with both critics and followers of the philosopher's work to demonstrate its enduring relevance to psychology today. Sullivan presents a novel examination of Wittgenstein's later writings by providing historical detail about the uptake, understanding and use of Wittgenstein's remarks and method in psychology and related areas of social science, examining persistent sources of conceptual confusion and showing how to apply his insights in investigations of collectives, social life, emotions, subjectivity, and development. In doing so, he reveals the value for psychologists in adopting a philosophical method of conceptual investigation to work through and become more reflexive about prominent theories, methods, therapies and practices in their respective, multiple fields and thereby create a resource for future theoretical, empirical and applied psychologists. This work will be of particular relevance to students and academics engaged in the history of psychology and to practitioners interested in understanding the continued importance of Wittgenstein's work within the practices of psychology.

Whether it was the demands of life, leisure, or a combination of both that forced our hands, we have developed a myriad of artefacts--maps, notes, descriptions, diagrams, flow-charts, photographs, paintings, and prints--that stand for other things. Most agree that images and their close relatives are special because, in some sense, they look like what they are about. This simple claim is the starting point for most philosophical investigations into the nature of depiction. On Images argues that this starting point is fundamentally misguided. Whether a representation is an image depends not on how it is perceived but on how it relates to others within a system. This kind of approach, first championed by Nelson Goodman in his Languages of Art, has not found many supporters, in part because of weaknesses with Goodman's account. On Images shows that a properly crafted structural account of pictures has many advantages over the perceptual accounts that dominate the literature on this topic. In particular, it explains the close relationship between pictures, diagrams, graphs and other kinds of non-linguistic representation. It undermines the claim that pictures are essentially visual by showing that audio recordings, tactile line drawings, and other non-visual representations are pictorial. Also, by avoiding explaining images in terms of how we perceive them, this account sheds new light on why pictures seem so perceptually special in the first place. This discussion of picture perception recasts some old debates on the topic, suggests further lines of philosophical and empirical research, and ultimately leads to a new perspective on pictorial realism.

Gabriele Taylor presents a philosophical investigation of the 'ordinary' vices traditionally seen as 'death to the soul': sloth, envy, avarice, pride, anger, lust, and gluttony. This complements recent work by moral philosophers on virtue, and opens up the neglected topic of the vices for further study. Whilst in a mild form the vices may be ordinary and common failings, Deadly Vices makes the case that for those wholly in their grip they are fatally destructive, preventing the flourishing of the self and of a worthwhile life. An agent therefore has a powerful reason to avoid such states and dispositions and rather to cultivate those virtues that counteract a deadly vice. In dealing with individual vices, their impact on the self, and their interrelation, Deadly Vices offers a unified account of the vices that not only encompasses the healing virtues but also engages with issues in the philosophy of mind as well as in moral philosophy, and shows the connection between them. Literary examples are used to highlight central features of individual vices and set them in context.

What do philosophy and computer science have in common? It turns out, quite a lot! In providing an introduction to computer science (using Python), Daniel Lim presents in this book key philosophical issues, ranging from external world skepticism to the existence of God to the problem of induction. These issues, and others, are introduced through the use of critical computational concepts, ranging from image manipulation to recursive programming to elementary machine learning techniques. In illuminating some of the overlapping conceptual spaces of computer science and philosophy, Lim teaches the reader fundamental programming skills and also allows her to develop the critical thinking skills essential for examining some of the enduring questions of philosophy. Key Features Teaches readers actual computer programming, not merely ideas about computers Includes fun programming projects (like digital image manipulation and Game of Life simulation), allowing the reader to develop the ability to write larger computer programs that require decomposition, abstraction, and algorithmic thinking Uses computational concepts to introduce, clarify, and develop a variety of philosophical issues Covers various aspects of machine learning and relates them to philosophical issues involving science and induction as well as to ethical issues Provides a framework to critically analyze arguments in classic and contemporary philosophical debates

This book attempts to advance Donald Griffin's vision of the "final, crowning chapter of the Darwinian revolution" by developing a philosophy for the science of animal consciousness. It advocates a Darwinian bottom-up approach that treats consciousness as a complex, evolved, and multi-dimensional phenomenon in nature, rather than a mysterious all-or-nothing property immune to the tools of science and restricted to a single species. The so-called emergence of a science of consciousness in the 1990s has at best been a science of human consciousness. This book aims to advance a true Darwinian science of consciousness in which its evolutionary origin, function, and phylogenetic diversity are moved from the field's periphery to its very centre; thus enabling us to integrate consciousness into an evolutionary view of life. Accordingly, this book has two objectives: (i) to argue for the need and possibility of an evolutionary bottom-up approach that addresses the problem of consciousness in terms of the evolutionary origins of a new ecological lifestyle that made consciousness worth having, and (ii) to articulate a thesis and beginnings of a theory of the place of consciousness as a complex evolved phenomenon in nature that can help us to answer the question of what it is like to be a bat, an octopus, or a crow. A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness will appeal to researchers and advanced students interested in advancing our understanding of animal minds, as well as anyone with a keen interest in how we can develop a science of animal consciousness.

This book explores how philosophical realisms relate to psychoanalytical conceptions of the Real, and in turn how the Lacanian framework challenges basic philosophical notions of object and reality. The author examines how contemporary psychoanalysis might respond to the question of ontology by taking advantage of the recent revitalization of realism in its speculative form. While the philosophical side of the debate makes a plea for an independent ontological consistency of the Real, this book proposes a Lacanian reassessment of the definition of the Real as 'what is foreign to subjectivity itself'. In doing so, it reframes the question of the Real in terms of what is already there beneath the supposedly linguistic constitution of subjectivity. The book then goes on to engage the problem of cognition in the realm of Nature qua materiality, focusing on the centrality of the body as a linguistic-material hybrid. It argues that it is possible to re-establish the theoretical dignity of Ricoeur's notion of 'suspicion', by building a dialogue between Lacanian psychoanalysis and three main domains of inquiry: desire, objects and bodily enjoyment. Borrowing from Piera Aulagnier's theory of the Other as a word-bearer, it considers the genesis of desire and sense of reality both explainable through a hybrid framework which comprises psychoanalytical insights and material dynamics in a comprehensive account. This created theoretical space is an opportunity for both philosophers and psychoanalysts to rethink key Lacanian insights in light of the problem of the Real.

What do you do when you're not asleep and when you're not eating? You're most likely waiting-to finish work, to get home, or maybe even to be seen by your doctor. Hold On is less about how to manage all that "staying where one is until a particular time or event" (OED) than it is about describing how we experience waiting. Waiting can embrace things like hesitation and curiosity, dithering and procrastination, hunting and being hunted, fearing and being feared, dread and illness, courting and parenting, anticipation and excitement, curiosity, listening to and even performing music, being religious, being happy or unhappy, being bored and being boring. They're all explored here. Waiting is also characterized by brain chemicals such as serotonin and dopamine. They can radically alter the way we register the passing of time. Waiting is also the experience that may characterize most interpersonal relations-mismanage it at your own risk. Hold On contains advice on how to cope with waiting-how to live better-but its main aim is to show how important the experience of waiting is, in popular and highbrow culture, and, sometimes, in history. Detouring into psychology, neurology, ethology, philosophy, film, literature, and especially art, Peter Toohey's illuminates in unexpected ways one of the most common of human experiences. After reading his book, you'll never wait the same way again.

This book provides an in-depth analysis of of the logotherapy of Viktor Frankl and delves into the spiritual depths of an inherent search for meaning in life. Written by a highly experienced and competent logotherapist trained by Frankl himself, this book is excitingly new and unique in that it takes the reader, in the role of a client accompanied by the author in the role of the therapist, through the unfolding phase-by-phase process of logotherapy. Logotherapy is explored as a depth and as a height psychology. From a provoked will to meaning out of the depths of a spiritual unconscious, the author takes the search for meaning to the ultimate heights in the achievement of human greatness. This book brings Frankl's own profound life's orientation back to life and, in its reader-friendly style, has the freshness of Frankl's own way of writing. It is written in a refreshingly simple and straightforward style for easy accessibility to a wide readership. It includes cases studies and exercises for readers and is meant for use in logotherapy courses worldwide. Additionally, it will appeal to laypersons seeking a deeper meaning to their lives, psychology students and mental health professionals alike.

Normativity and the Will collects fourteen important _ papers on moral psychology and practical reason by R. Jay _ Wallace, one of the leading philosophers currently working_ in these areas. The papers explore the interpenetration of normative and _ psychological issues in a series of debates that lie at the heart of moral philosophy. Part I, Reason, Desire, and the_ Will, discusses the nexus linking normativity to motivation, including the relations between desire and reasons, the role of normative considerations in explanations of action, and_ the normative commitments involved in willing an end (such_ as the requirement to adopt the necessary means). Part II,_ Responsibility, Identification, and Emotion, looks at _ questions about the rational capacities presupposed by _ accountable agency and the psychic factors that both inhibit and enable identification with what we do. It includes an interpretation of the Nietzschean claim that ressentiment is among the sources of modern moral consciousness. Part III,_ Morality and Other Normative Domains, addresses the _ structure of moral reasons and moral motivation, and the _ relations between moral demands and other normative domains (including especially the requirements of living a _ meaningful human life). _ _ Wallace's treatments of these topics are at once _ sophisticated and engaging. Taken together, they constitute an advertisement for a distinctive way of pursuing issues in moral psychology and the theory of practical reason. The _ book articulates and defends a unified framework for _ thinking about those issues, while offering sustained _ critical discussions of other influential approaches (by _ philosophers such as Korsgaard, McDowell, Nietzsche, Raz, Scanlon, and Williams). It should be of interest to every _ serious student of moral philosophy. _