The philosophical thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein continues to have a profound influence that transcends barriers between philosophical disciplines and reaches beyond philosophy itself. Less than one hundred years after their publication, his early masterpiece 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and the posthumously published 'Philosophical Investigations' have emerged as two classic philosophical texts, each of which has elicited widely divergent readings and spawned contesting schools of interpretation. This collection of original essays by leading experts offers deep insights into the forces that shaped and influenced Wittgenstein's thought on a broad variety of topics. It also contains the text - in both the original German and an English translation by Juliet Floyd and Burton Dreben - of letters and cards sent to Wittgenstein by the philosopher and logician Gottlob Frege, which shed light on their interaction during the crucial period when Wittgenstein completed work on the 'Tractatus'. This important record of a philosophical friendship is complemented by a scholarly apparatus and an introduction. Other essays featured in this volume document and discuss Wittgenstein's thinking on music and religion as well as issues that take center stage in the 'Investigations' such as Wittgenstein's account of rule-following. The volume provides an invaluable research tool not only for students of the history of philosophy and for scholars of both Wittgenstein and Frege but also for anyone interested in the intellectual history of the first half of the twentieth century.

Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a nonCartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us persons is irreducibly personal. After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentary first-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account of personal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in which first-person perspectives contribute to reality.

Although Mozart's Don Giovanni (1787) is the most analysed of all operas, Lorenzo Da Ponte's libretto has rarely been studied as a work of poetry in its own right. The author argues that the libretto, rather than perpetuating the conservative religious morality implicit in the story of Don Juan, subjects our culture's myth of human sexuality to a critical rewriting. Combining poetic close reading with approaches drawn from linguistics, psychoanalysis, anthropology, political theory, legal history, intellectual history, literary history, art history and theatrical performance analysis, she studies the Don Giovanni libretto as a radical political text of the Late Enlightenment, which has lost none of its ability to provoke. The questions it raises concerning the nature of compassion, seduction and violence, and the autonomy and responsibility of the individual, are still highly relevant for us today.

This text explores how self-consciousness and self-understanding differ phenomenologically from the experience and comprehension of others, and the extent to which such relations are constitutively interdependent. Jardine argues that Husserl's analyses of selfhood and intersubjectivity are animated by the question of what's at stake in recognising an agent's engagement as the situated response of a person, rather than simply as the comportment of an animal or living body. Drawing centrally from the freshly excavated Ideas II drafts and manuscripts, the author develops Husserl's often fragmentary investigations of attention, habit, emotion, freedom, the common world, and action, and considers their implications for subjectivity and the experience of others. Empathy, Embodiment, and the Person also brings Husserlian phenomenology into dialogue with twenty-first century philosophical concerns, from accounts of selfhood and agency from analytic philosophy to the treatment of social experience in critical theory. The book shows the reader that transcendental phenomenology can be rejuvenated by engaging with a broader philosophical landscape and will appeal to researchers, students, and instructors in the field.

Francois Recanati presents his theory of mental files, a new way of understanding reference in language and thought. He aims to recast the 'nondescriptivist' approach to reference that has dominated the philosophy of language and mind in the late twentieth century. According to Recanati, we refer through mental files, which play the role of so-called 'modes of presentation'. The reference of linguistic expressions is inherited from that of the files we associate with them. The reference of a file is determined relationally, not satisfactionally: so a file is not to be equated to the body of (mis)information it contains. Files are like singular terms in the language of thought, with a nondescriptivist semantics. In contrast to other philosophers, Recanati offers an indexical model according to which files are typed by their function, which is to store information derived through certain types of relation to objects in the environment. The type of the file corresponds to the type of contextual relation it exploits. Even detached files or 'encyclopedia entries' are based on epistemically rewarding relations to their referent, on Recanati's account. Among the topics discussed in this wide-ranging book are: acquaintance relations and singular thought; cognitive significance; the vehicle/content distinction; the nature of indexical concepts; co-reference de jure and judgments of identity; cognitive dynamics; recognitional and perceptual concepts; confused thought and the transparency requirement on modes of presentation; descriptive names and 'acquaintanceless' singular thought; the communication of indexical thoughts; two-dimensional defences of Descriptivism; the Generality Constraint; attitude ascriptions and the 'vicarious' use of mental files; first-person thinking; token-reflexivity in language and thought.

This edited collection provides the first comprehensive volume on A. J. Ayer's 1936 masterpiece, Language, Truth and Logic. With eleven original chapters the volume reconsiders the historical and philosophical significance of Ayer's work, examining its place in the history of analytic philosophy and its subsequent legacy. Making use of pioneering research in logical empiricism, the contributors explore a wide variety of topics, from ethics, values and religion, to truth, epistemology and philosophy of language. Among the questions discussed are: How did Ayer preserve or distort the views and conceptions of logical empiricists? How are Ayer's arguments different from the ones he aimed at reconstructing? And which aspects of the book were responsible for its immense impact? The volume expertly places Language, Truth and Logic in the intellectual and socio-cultural history of twentieth-century philosophical thought, providing both introductory and contextual chapters, as well as specific explorations of a variety of topics covering the main themes of the book. Providing important insights of both historical and contemporary significance, this collection is an essential resource for scholars interested in the legacy of the Vienna Circle and its effect on ethics and philosophy of mind.

Denis McManus presents a new interpretation of Heideggers early vision of our subjectivity and of the world we inhabit. Heideggers fundamental ontology allows us to understand the creature that thinks as also one which acts, moves, even touches the world around it, a creature at home in the same ordinary world in which we too live our lives when outside of the philosophical closet; it also promises to free us from seemingly intractable philosophical problems, such as scepticism about the external world and other minds. But many of the concepts central to that vision are elusive; and some of the most widely accepted interpretations of Heideggers vision harbour within themselves deep and important unclarities, while others foist upon us hopeless species of idealism. Drawing on an examination of Heideggers work throughout the 1920s, Heidegger and the Measure of Truth offers a new way of understanding that vision. Central is the proposal that propositional thought presupposes what might be called a measure, a mastery of which only a recognizably worldly subject can possess. McManus shows how these ideas emerge through Heidegger's engagement with the history of philosophy and theology, and sets out a novel reading of key elements in the fundamental ontology, including Heidegger's concept of Being-in-the-world, his critique of scepticism, his claim to disavow both realism and idealism, and his difficult reflections on the nature of truth, science, authenticity, and philosophy itself. According to this reading, Heideggers central claims identify genuine demands that we must meet if we are to achieve the feat of thinking determinate thoughts about the world around us.

Perception is one of the most pervasive and puzzling problems in philosophy, generating a great deal of attention and controversy in philosophy of mind, psychology and metaphysics. If perceptual illusion and hallucination are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? How can perception be both internally dependent and externally directed? Perception is an outstanding introduction to this fundamental topic, covering both the perennial and recent work on the problem. Adam Pautz examines four of the most important theories of perception: the sense datum view; the internal physical state view; the representational view; and naive realism, assessing each in turn. He also discusses the relationship between perception and the physical world and the issue of whether reality is as it appears. Useful examples are included throughout the book to illustrate the puzzles of perception, including hallucinations, illusions, the laws of appearance, blindsight, and neuroscientific explanations of our experience of pain, smell and color. The book covers both traditional philosophical arguments and more recent empirical arguments deriving from research in psychophysics and neuroscience. The addition of chapter summaries, suggestions for further reading and a glossary of terms make Perception essential reading for anyone studying the topic in detail, as well as for students of philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and metaphysics.

Imagination in Inquiry: A Philosophical Model and Its Applications investigates the nature, kinds, component elements, functions, scope, and uses of the imagination involved in inquiry. It further discusses how these kinds and functions vary and interact depending on the context of inquiries carried out in philosophy and its branches-from the philosophy of science and the philosophy of technology to ethics, sociopolitical philosophy, and aesthetics-and institutions like science, technology, art, and education. Using a homeostatic model, A. Pablo Iannone advances a conception of the imagination as a disposition to search for answers to various types of problems, abstract or concrete, theoretical or practical faced in inquiry. The book treats this as a working characterization, though it develops progressively clearer, more precise, and less ambiguous meanings. All along, the primary concern of the author-as well as of contributors Alejandra Iannone and Rocci Luppicini-is with the moral, aesthetic, logical, communicative, scientific, technological, artistic, literary, and philosophical uses and roles of the imagination. The book's primary focus is not just on such things as the capacity to generate mental images, but especially on the ability to discover and create, anticipate and envision, entertain and manage.

Is it an Art Book? Yes, because it assembles the art works of Yair Meshoulam and serves as an illustrated catalogue of his work to date. No, because it is an interface between art and text, where text is both language and image. In Yair Meshoulam's "Time is a Texture of Consciousness", the text is texture. No, because it includes poems by Ruth Fainlight and texts written by friends where consciousness is explored in all its facets, from the intense subjectivity of the "Locked-in Syndrome" to its absence in "Thoughts without a Thinker". So what is it? It is a texture of consciousness.

In Happiness for Humans, Daniel C. Russell takes a fresh look at happiness from a practical perspective: the perspective of someone trying to solve the wonderful problem of how to give himself a good life. From this perspective, 'happiness' is the name of a solution to that problem for practical deliberation. Russell's approach to happiness falls within a tradition that reaches back to ancient Greek and Roman philosophers-a tradition now called 'eudaimonism.' Beginning with Aristotle's seminal discussion of the role of happiness in practical reasoning, Russell asks what sort of good happiness would have to be in order to play the role in our practical economies that it actually does play. Looking at happiness from this perspective, Russell argues that happiness is a life of activity, with three main features: it is acting for the sake of ends we can live for, and living for them wisely; it is fulfilling for us, both as humans and as unique individuals; and it is inextricable from our connections with the particular persons, pursuits, and places that make us who we are. By returning to this ancient perspective on happiness, Russell finds new directions for contemporary thought about the good lives we want for ourselves.

In Self, Value, and Narrative, Anthony Rudd defends a series of interrelated claims about the nature of the self. He argues that the self is not simply a given entity, but a being that constitutes or shapes itself. But it can only do this non-arbitrarily if it has a sense of the good by which it can be guided as it chooses to endorse some of its desires or dispositions and repudiate others. This means that there is an essentially ethical or evaluative dimension to selfhood, and one which has an essentially teleological character. Such self-constitution takes place in narrative terms, through one's telling-and, more importantly, living-one's own story. Versions of some or all of these ideas have been developed by various influential writers (including Frankfurt, Korsgaard, MacIntyre, Ricoeur, and Taylor) but Rudd develops these ideas in a way that is importantly different from others familiar in the literature. He takes his main inspiration from Kierkegaard's account of the self, and argues (controversially) that this account belongs in the Platonic rather than the Aristotelian tradition of teleological thinking. Through close engagement with much contemporary philosophical work, Rudd presents a convincing case for an ancient and currently unfashionable view: that the polarities and tensions that are constitutive of selfhood can only be reconciled through an orientation of the self as a whole to an objective Good.

Philosophical questions about the mind preoccupied much of Wittgenstein's later writing, and his contribution to them is deep and wide-ranging, bearing upon philosophical issues concerning sense-experience, concept formation, perception, introspection, the science of psychology, aspect perception, the self, the understanding of rules, the relation between mind and brain, artificial intelligence, and many other subjects of current concern. According to a growing number of eminent philosophers, however, many of Wittgenstein's most important insights have still not been properly absorbed by contemporary philosophical debates on these topics. If anything, work on these subjects is less informed by Wittgenstein's examples and discussions than ever before. In this volume, philosophers from inside and outside of Wittgensteinian circles explore Wittgenstein's treatment of philosophical questions about the mind or issues in contemporary philosophy of mind upon which Wittgenstein's philosophy may have significance. Bringing to bear their broad range of perspectives on his philosophy, these philosophers collectively demonstrate how Wittgenstein revolutionized the philosophy of mind.

Metacognition refers to the awareness an individual has of their own mental processes (also referred to as ' thinking about thinking'). In the past thirty years metacognition research has become a rapidly growing field of interdisciplinary research within the cognitive sciences. Just recently, there have been major changes in this field, stimulated by the controversial issues of metacognition in nonhuman animals and in early infancy. Consequently the question what defines a metacognitive process has become a matter of debate: how should one distinguish between simple minds that are not yet capable of any metacognitive processing, and minds with a more advanced architecture that exhibit such a capacity? Do nonhuman animals process the ability to monitor their own mental actions? If metacognition is unique to humans, then at what stage in development does it occur, and how can we distinguish between cognitive and metacognitive processes?
The Foundations of Metacognition brings together leading cognitive scientists to consider these questions. It explores them from three different perspectives: from an evolutionary point of view the authors ask whether there is sufficient evidence that some non-human primates or other animals monitor their mental states and thereby exhibit a form of metacognition. From a developmental perspective the authors ask when children start to monitor, evaluate und control their own minds. And from a philosophical point of view the main issue is how to draw the line between cognitive and metacognitive processes, and how to integrate the different functions in which metacognition is involved into a single coherent picture of the mind. The foundations of metacognition - whatever they will turn out to be - have to be as complex as this pattern of connections we discover in its effects.
Bringing together researchers from across the cognitive sciences, the book is valuable for philosophers of mind, developmental and comparative psychologists, and neuroscientists.

Mind, Meaning, and Reality contains fifteen philosophical papers by D. H. Mellor, including a new defense of "success semantics," and an introduction arguing that metaphysics can and need only be justified by doing it and not by a "meta-metaphysics," which it needs no more than physics needs metaphysics. The papers are grouped into three parts. Part I is about how the ways we are disposed to act fixes both what we believe and what we use language to mean. Part II is about what there is: the reality of dispositions; what makes beliefs and sentences true; why there is only one universe; and how social groups, and other things composed of parts, are related to the people and other things that constitute them. Part III is about time, and includes discussions of twentieth century developments in the philosophy of time; why Kant was right about tense, even though he was wrong about time; why forward time travel is trivial and backward time travel impossible; and what gives time its direction.

Synthesizing decades of research, The Conscious Brain advances a theory of the psychological and neurophysiological correlates of conscious experience. In the first part of the book, Prinz argues that consciousness always arises at a particular stage of perceptual processing, the intermediate level, and that consciousness depends on attention. Attention changes the flow of information and that gives rise to experience. The resulting account is called the AIR Theory, for attended intermediate-level representations. Objections to the theory are addressed. In the second part of the book, Prinz argues that all consciousness is perceptual: there is no cognitive phenomenology, no experience of motor commands, and no experience of a conscious self. This conclusions challenge popular theories in consciousness studies: the view that we can directly experience our thoughts, the view that consciousness essentially involves action, and the view that every experience includes awareness of the subject having that experience. In the third part of the book, Prinz explores the neural correlates of consciousness. He argues attention-hence consciousness-arises when populations of neurons fire in synchrony, and he responds to those who deny that consciousness could be a process in the brain. Along the way, Prinz also advances novel theories of qualia, the function of consciousness, the unity of consciousness, and the mind-body relation, defending a view called neurofunctionism. Each chapter in The Conscious Brain brings neuroscientific evidence to bear on enduring philosophical questions. Major philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness are surveyed, challenged, and extended.

This unique collection focuses on Hegel's "Philosophy of Action" as it relates to current concerns. Including key papers by Taylor, MacIntyre, and McDowell as well as eleven especially commissioned contributions, it aims to readdress the dialogue between Hegel and contemporary philosophy of action.

This book helps quench the quest of knowledge of academicians, researchers, and others interested in developing a complete and critical understanding of consumer happiness. The relentless search of happiness by humans is sought in different ways. Scientific discussion on happiness for long was considered a forte of Philosophers. Other disciplines seldom delved into this. But today not only science but neuroscience, marketing, and other varied fields have started delving into it and have developed a keen interest. The book has been conceptualized on this line of thinking and thus divided into two parts. The first part is customized towards understanding various perspectives of happiness and the relative importance of knowing the same. The first chapter of this section is on the biological perspective of happiness. The second is titled 'Behavioural perspective'. The third chapter is an attempt to elucidate the cultural perspective of the concept of happiness. The fourth is on the role of technology in inducing happiness. Fifth and sixth are on theories of happiness and measuring happiness, respectively. Knowledge about the different perspective and theories has a wide range of benefits. It informs us about how the brain works, interprets, and reacts. This theoretical understanding helps us to move beyond the trial and error methods towards a more scientific underpinning of adoption of measures that would generate long-lasting happiness in consumers. The second part of the book is dedicated toward understanding consumer happiness from a neuroscience perspective, i.e. keeping consumer happy. This segment has ten chapters. The first is on differentiating the concept of happiness from satisfaction. The second is on sensory marketing and happiness. The third deals with the store design and shelving of products to generate happiness. Fourth and fifth chapters relate to persuading the consumers. While the fourth chapter is on developing persuasive messages and the fifth is on subliminal messaging sixth chapter is on pricing and seventh on advertising. The eighth chapter highlights the role of emotions and the ninth is on the different factors that induce happiness in consumers. The last chapter is about raising some unanswered questions and food for thought for readers. Together the contents of the book make for a complete understanding of the concept of happiness and how it is shaping the world of marketing. Addressing the 'what' and 'how' of consumer happiness in the same book makes the book comprehensive.

The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. What is the nature of introspection such that it provides us with a distinctive way of knowing about our own conscious mental states? And what is the nature of consciousness such that we can know about our own conscious mental states by introspection? How should we understand the relationship between consciousness and introspective self-knowledge? Should we explain consciousness in terms of introspective self-knowledge or vice versa? Until recently, questions in epistemology and the philosophy of mind were pursued largely in isolation from one another. This volume aims to integrate these two lines of research by bringing together fourteen new essays and one reprinted essay on the relationship between introspection, self-knowledge, and consciousness.

This book presents a new structural approach to the psychology of the person, inspired by Kenneth Colby's computer-generated simulation, PARRY. The simulation was of a paranoid psychological state, represented in forms of the person's logic and syntax, as these would be evidenced in personal communication. Harwood Fisher uses a Structural View to highlight similarities in the logical form of the linguistic representations of Donald Trump, his avid followers ("Trumpers"), and the paranoid-referred to as "The Trio." He demonstrates how the Structural View forms a series of logical and schematic patterns, similar to the way that content analysis can bring forth associations meanings, and concepts held in the text. Such comparisons, Fisher argues, can be used to shed light on contingencies for presenting, representing, and judging truth. Specifically, Fisher posits that the major syntactic and logical patterns that were used to produce the computer-generated "paranoid" responses in Colby's project can be used to analyze Donald Trump's rhetoric and his followers' reactions to it. Ultimately, Fisher offers a new kind of structural approach for the philosophy of psychology. This novel work will appeal to students and scholars of social and cognitive psychology, psychology of personality, psychiatric classification, psycholinguistics, rhetoric, and computer science.

This book demonstrates for the first time how the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein can transform 4E Cognitive Science. In particular, it shows how insights from Wittgenstein can empower those within 4E to reject the long held view that our minds must involve representations inside our heads. The book begins by showing how proponents of 4E are divided amongst themselves. Proponents of Extended Mind insist that internal representations are always needed to explain the human mind. However, proponents of Enacted Mind reject this claim. Using insights from Ludwig Wittgenstein, the book introduces and defends a new theoretical framework called Structural Enacted or Extended Mind (STEEM). STEEM brings together Enacted Mind and Extended Mind in a way that rejects all talk of internal representations. STEEM thus highlights the anti-representationalist credentials of 4E and so demonstrates how 4E can herald a new beginning when it comes to thinking about the mind.

This book presents a theoretical critical appraisal of the Mechanistic Theory of Human Cognition (MTHC), which is one of the most popular major theories in the contemporary field of cognitive science. It analyses and evaluates whether MTHC provides a unifying account of human cognition and its explanation. The book presents a systematic investigation of the internal and external consistency of the theory, as well as a systematic comparison with other contemporary major theories in the field. In this sense, it provides a fresh look at more recent major theoretical debates in this area of scientific research and a rigorous analysis of one of its most central major theories. Rigorous theoretical work is integrated with objective consideration of relevant empirical evidence, making the discussions robust and clear. As a result, the book shows that MTHC provides a significant theoretical contribution for the field of cognitive science. The content is useful for those interested in theoretical and empirical issues concerning major theories in the contemporary field of cognitive science.

This book is an introduction to Patanjali's Yoga as a system of theory and practice of psychology. It explains and interprets the concepts and procedures in the language and idiom of the currently prevailing Euro-American approaches to psychology. The book describes the context of inquiry focusing on the currently popular image of Yoga as a form of calisthenics and a system of concepts and practices of psychology. It provides a worldview of Yoga originated in ancient Vedas and Upanishads and explains the Vedic 'myth' of the genesis of the world showing how it differs from the Christian and Dravidian views. The book explains the concepts of the Samkhya system used by Patanjali as their basic framework. Interpreted in the light of modern psychology, it highlights the significance of the Yogic thesis about excess of suffering over happiness in life. The book also explains two important aspects of Yoga i.e., afflictions (klesas) and Kriya Yoga and provides a detailed account of the transformation of consciousness. This book will be of interest to students, teachers, researchers and practitioners of psychology, psychiatry, and Yoga Psychology. It will also be of great interest to psychologists, psychiatrists, counselors, mental health professionals, clinical psychologists, and yoga enthusiasts.