My interest in gathering together a collection of this sort was generated by a fortuitous combination of historical studies under Professor Keith Lehrer and studies in cognitive science under Professor R. Michael Harnish at the University of Arizona. Work on the volume began there while I was an instructor in the Department of Linguistics and was greatly encouraged by participants in the Faculty Seminar on Cognitive Science chaired by Professor Lance J. Rips. I wish to express my appreciation to all of these and to many other individuals with whom I discussed the possibility of contribution to this work. I am especially grateful to the authors of the essays included here, as they showed more patience than I could have hoped for in seeing me through a number of uncertain stages in development of the project. My thanks are also due to my colleague Charles Reid for assistance in reviewing submissions, to Tim McFadden for computer resources, and again, to Keith Lehrer for continuing advice in arrangements for publication. Financial support for manuscript preparation was provided in part under University Research Grant No. 617 from the University Research Council, Youngstown State University.

This book is an effort to bring genetic-phenomenological analyses in contact with empirical psychology, neurology, cognitive science and research in primate cognition. The first part adresses the role of weak but not arbitrary phantasy in perception, and argues that it has a transcendental function with several different aspects. Weak phantasma can be found in all fields of sensibility and at all levels of constitution. Relevant aspects of Charles-Bonnet Syndrome are analyzed in addition to the contributions of empirical psychology to our understanding of hallucinations in normal subjects. The second part is dedicated to the process of self-organization in human and animal perception from the point of view of genetic phenomenology, concentrating on the formation, change and use of the so-called "types" (Typus). The third part investigates whether cognition, thinking and other higher order performances of the mind - both human and animal - can be understood by taking into account the contributions of phantasmatic elements in three important fields: scenic imagination in daydreams, feelings, and co-feeling with others. To this end dual-mode theories of mind and some contributions from neurology are taken into account. The conclusion reached is that most higher-order achievements of our mind - which we tend to identify with the performance of our language-system - might in fact be accomplished without language in the low-level system of phantasmatic imagination. This leads to an "inclusive theory of the subject" which allows us to understand how higher-organized animals like primates can think.

This book studies the problem of acquaintance against the background of a more general theory of intentionality. Much of the relevant background is laid out in the book I wrote with Ronald McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality (1982). However, since this book is not focussed on HusserI, I shall not assume the reader's familiarity with the prior book or with HusserI's philosophy. (I have sometimes referred to this book-in progress as Acquaintance; I've rounded out the title a bit. ) of The initial inspiration for this work, in the 1970's, was a confluence ideas from the logic of perception and the logic of demonstratives, ideas in which I found phenomenological inspiration. These included Jaakko Hintikka's notion of perceptual individuation, Romane Clark's account of a demonstrative element in perception, David Kaplan's analysis of the meaning (character and content) of demonstratives, and Hector-Neri Castaneda's notion of quasi-indicators. I would later add to the list John Perry's appraisal of belief reports involving indexicals (extending Castaneda's ideas) and Hilary Putnam's Twin Earth thought-experiments (complementing Clark's and Kaplan's ideas of the same vintage). I want to thank Chuck Dement and Ronald McIntyre for their responses to the first draft. For many discussions of issues addressed in the book I thank David Blinder, Hubert Dreyfus, Dagfinn F llesdal, Jaakko Hintikka, David Kaplan, Ronald McIntyre, Izchak Miller, Esa Saarinen, John Searle, and Peter Woodruff. I have benefited also from colleagues and students too numerous to name but deserving my thanks nonetheless. Philosophy is a surprisingly communal affair."

This book has been a long time in the making. Other issues have taken me away from it from time to extended time. But I kept coming back to the problem of other minds. It has remained a great issue, it is much contested still, and it is, after all, elose to us all. I like believing that the time taken has deepened my understanding of the problem and how it is to be handled. Other people, some by disagreeing vehemently, have helped greatly. I mention in particular, Brian Ellis, Robert Fox, Graeme Marshali, Tim Oakley, Ray Pinkerton and Robert Young. Robert Pargetter argued with me, and kept insisting that I write this book. John Bigelow, Michael Bradley, Keith Campbell, Frank Jackson, and William Lycan assisted by reading an earlier version and providing valued comments. Frank Jackson has been specially helpful, not just on this topic. He can be blamed for initially causing me to take the analogical inference seriously. Tbe La Trobe Philosophy Department has been a good place to do philosophy. I am grateful to Suzanne Hayster, Sandra Paul, and Betty Pritchard for struggling at various times with various recalcitrant manuscripts. Most particularly I thank Gai Larkin. She has seen the project through, with considerably more than efficiency.

Wittgenstein's aphoristic style holds great charm, but also a great danger: the reader is apt to glean too much from a single fragment and too little from the fragments as a whole. In my first confron tations with the Philosophical Investigations I was such a reader, and so, it turned out, were most of the writers on Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Wittgenstein's remarkable ability to bring together many facets of his thought in one fragment is fully exploited in the critical literature; but hardly any attention is paid to the connection with other fragments, let alone to the many hitherto unpublished manuscripts of which the Philosophical Investigations is the final product. The result of this fragmentary and ahistorical approach to Wittgenstein's later work is a host of contradictory interpretations. What Wittgenstein really wanted to say remains insufficiently clear. Opinions are also strongly divided about the value of his work. Some authors have been encouraged by his aphorisms and rhetorical questions to dismiss the whole Cartesian tradition or to halt new movements in linguistics or psychology; others, exasperated, reject his philo sophy as anti-scientific conceptual conservatism. After consulting unpublished notebooks and manuscripts which Wittgenstein wrote between 1929 and 1951, I became a very different reader. Wittgenstein turned out to be a kind of Leonardo da Vinci, who pursued a form from which every sign of chisel ling, every attempt at improvement, had been effaced."

This book is an attempt to make sense of the tension in Nietzsche's work between the unashamedly egocentric and the apparently mystical. While scholars have tended to downplay one or other of these aspects, it is the author's contention that the two are not only compatible but mutually illuminating. This book demonstrates Nietzsche's sustained interest in mysticism from the time of The Birth of Tragedy right through to the end of his productive life. This book argues against situating Nietzsche's religious thought in the context of Buddhist or Christian mystical traditions, demonstrating the inadequacy of attempts to mediate between Nietzsche and Meister Eckhart and the Bodhisattva ideal of Mahayana Buddhism. Rather, it is argued that Nietzsche's egoism and mysticism are best understood in the intellectual context which he himself avowed, according to which his "ancestors" were Heraclitus, Empedocles, Spinoza, and Goethe.

EXPERIENCE AND NATURE JOHN DEWEY LONDON GEORGE ALLEN UNWIN, LTD. RUSKIN HOUSE, 40 MUSEUM STREET, W. CX 1929 w Q W o d U PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONTENTS JPAGE THE PAUL CARUS FOUNDATION .... ix CHAPTER I. EXPERIENCE AND PHILOSOPHIC METHOD . la II. EXISTP NCE AS PRECARIOUS AND AS STABLE . 40 III. NATURE, ENDS AND HISTORIES .... 78 IV. NATURE, MEANS AND KNOWLEDGE . . . 121 V. NATURE, COMMUNICATION AND AS MEANING 166 VI. NATURE, MIND AND THE SUBJECT . . . 208 VII. NATURE, LIFE AND BODY-MIND . . . . 248 VIII. EXISTENCE, IDEAS AND CONSCIOUSNESS . . 298 IX. EXPERIENCE, NATURE AND ART . . . . 354 X. EXISTENCE, VALUE AND CRITICISM . . . 394 INDEX 439 THE PAUL CARUS FOUNDATION Dr. Paul Carus was born in Usenburg, Germany, hi 1852. He was educated at the Universities of Strass burg and Tubingen, from the latter of which he received the doctorate of philosophy in 1876. It was, however, in the United States, to which he shortly after removed, that his life-work was performed. He became editor of the Open Court in 1888, and later established The Monist, remaining throughout his career, editor of these two peri odicals and Director of the editorial policies of the Open Court Company. He died in February, 1919, at La Salle, Illinois. The primary interests which actuated Dr. Caruss life work were in the field of philosophy, touching with almost equal weight the two great phases of modern speculative concern represented by the philosophy of science and com parative religion. To each of these he devoted numerous special studies, and to each he gave the influence of the press which he directed. This influence was in no sense narrow or specialistic. Dr. Caxus was personally pro foundlyconcerned for the broadening of that understand ing in all intellectual fields which he felt must be the foundation of whatever is to be valuable in our future human culture he saw his philosophy never as a closet pursuit, but always as a quest for the social illumination of mankind, in which his hope of betterment lay. In this interest he combatted prejudice, in religion and science alike, seeking to divest the spirit of truth of all cloaking of formula, and turning with eager and open x THE PAUL CARUS FOUNDATION eyes in every direction in which there was a suggestion of light and leading to men and to thought of every com plexion and to all levels of active human concern with matters of reflection. Dr. Cams was, in fact, strongly Socratic in disposition he wished to bring philosophy down from the skies of a too studied abstraction and habituate it to the houses of mens souls and to the rich and changing tides of cultural interests. Certainly so far as America is concerned his service is a signal one. During much of his career he stood almost alone as a philosopher outside academic walls, a living exponent of the fact that philosophy is significant as a force as well as useful as an educational discipline. He looked to the cultivation of philosophy as a frame of mind open to all, lay and professional, who should come to see that social liberty is made secure only where there is growth of a sympathetic public intelligence. It is with the spirit and intention of Dr. Caruss life work in mind that his family have established in his memory the Paul Cams Lectures. In the United States, foundations devoted to the cultivation of philosophy are so confined to scholastic institutions that thewhole field of philosophic concern tends to assume the slant of an immured and scholastic discipline and the observer is tempted to say that the greatest gift that can befall philosophic liberalism is one that will cause its followers to forget their professional character. Such a gift, certainly, is more than suggested by a lectureship which comes with no institutional atmosphere to further the free play of the mind upon all phases of life...

"Lost Works" tells the story a man who once lived and is still alive, seeking to share his poetry, art, stories, creativity, thought, and science with the world.With a strong grounding in physics, Daniel Roberts presents his philosophies for life and living, touching a wide range of topics, from art to virtue to God and religion. "Lost Works" offers a free-form, flowing, prose exploration of many of humanity's most essential questions.v

Although highly influential, Brentano's doctrines from Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint were taken up and changed by his students and subsequent thinkers. Tassone's study of this important text offers readers a better understanding of PES and outlines its ongoing relevance for contemporary philosophy of mind.

Splendid, spiritual, and subversive, this anthology offers a sampler of just some of the feminisms emerging in academic seminars, street demonstrations for justice, and places where people are reclaiming their ancestral values.
"She Is Everywhere Vol. 2" is comprised of international essays, poems, and works of art from the growing community of women and men who recognize Her and feel Her call to expression in many forms. This unique volume presents a fresh look at women in the Judeo-Christian Bible, in the Koran, and in the kaleidoscopic beauty of the world's women from her signs in caves, cliffs, and forests to her many faces, manifestations, and hidden places.
Celebrate woman's spirituality, her colors, her islands and continents, her rages and blessings in weather, her silences, and her surprising epiphanies. "She Is Everywhere Vol. 2" leads the contemporary cultural and political nonviolent revolution for a radically democratic and harmonious world full of compassion, equality, and transformation

A tightly argued and expansive examination of the pitfalls of transhumanism that reacquaints us with what it means to live well. Advocates of transhumanism, or "radical" enhancement, urge us to pursue the biotechnological heightening of select capacities - above all, cognitive ability - so far beyond any human limit that the beings with those capacities would exist on a higher ontological plane. For proponents of such views, humanity's self-transcendence through advancements in science and technology may even be morally required. Consequently, the human stakes of how we respond to transhumanism are immeasurably high. In Posthuman Bliss? The Failed Promise of Transhumanism, Susan B. Levin challenges transhumanists' overarching commitments regarding the mind and brain, ethics, liberal democracy, knowledge, and reality, showing their notion of humanity's self-transcendence into "posthumanity" to be little more than fantasy. Uniting philosophical with scientific arguments, Levin mounts a significant challenge to transhumanists' claim that science and technology support their vision of posthumanity. In a clear and engaging style, she dismantles transhumanists' breezy assurances that posthumans will emerge if we but allocate sufficient resources to that end. Far from offering theoretical and practical "proof of concept" for the vision that they urge upon us, Levin argues, transhumanists engage inadequately with cognitive psychology, biology, and neuroscience, often relying on questionable or outdated views within those fields. Having shown in depth why transhumanism should be rejected, Levin argues forcefully for a holistic perspective on living well that is rooted in Aristotle's virtue ethics but that is adapted to liberal democracy. This holism is thoroughly human, in the best of senses: It directs us to consider worthy ends for us as human beings and to do the irreplaceable work of understanding ourselves rather than relying on technology and science to be our salvation.

Is there a universal biolinguistic disposition for the development of basic' colour words? This question has been a subject of debate since Brent Berlin and Paul Kay's Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution was published in 1969. Naming the Rainbow is the first extended study of this debate. The author describes and criticizes empirically and conceptually unified models of colour naming that relate basic colour terms directly to perceptual and ultimately to physiological facts, arguing that this strategy has overlooked the cognitive dimension of colour naming. He proposes a psychosemantics for basic colour terms which is sensitive to cultural difference and to the nature and structure of non-linguistic experience. Audience: Contemporary colour naming research is radically interdisciplinary and Naming the Rainbow will be of interest to philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, and cognitive scientists concerned with: biological constraints on cognition and categorization; problems inherent in cross-cultural and in interdisciplinary science; the nature and extent of cultural relativism.

Cognitive science, in Howard Gardner's words, has a relatively short history but a very long past. While its short history has been the subject of quite a few studies published in recent years, the current book focuses instead on its very long past. It explores the emergence of the conceptual framework that was necessary to make the rise of modem cognitive science possible in the first place. Over the long course of the history of the theory of perception and of cognition, various conceptual breakthroughs can be discerned that have contributed significantly to the conception of the mind as a physical symbol system with intricate representational capacities and unimaginably rich computational resources. In historical retrospect such conceptual transitions-seemingly sudden and unannounced-are typically foreshadowed in the course of enduring research programs that serve as slowly developing theoretical con straint structures gradually narrowing down the apparent solution space for the scientific problems at hand. Ultimately the fundamental problem is either resolved to the satisfaction of the majority of researchers in the area of investigation, or else-and much more commonly-one or more of the major theoretical constraints is abandoned or radically modified, giving way to entirely new theoretical vistas. In the history of the theory of perception this process can be witnessed at vari ous important junctures."

Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality asks what happens when the sense that "I must" collides with the realization that "I can't." Bringing together philosophical and empirical work in moral psychology, Lisa Tessman here examines moral requirements that are non-negotiable and that contravene the principle that "ought implies can." In some cases, it is because two non-negotiable requirements conflict that one of them becomes impossible to satisfy, and yet remains binding. In other cases, performing a particular action may be non-negotiably required - even if it is impossible - because not performing the action is unthinkable. After offering both conceptual and empirical explanations of the experience of impossible moral requirements and the ensuing failures to fulfill them, Tessman considers what to make of such experience, and in particular, what role such experience has in the construction of value and of moral authority. According to the constructivist account that the book proposes, some moral requirements can be authoritative even when they are impossible to fulfill. Tessman points out a tendency to not acknowledge the difficulties that impossible moral requirements and unavoidable moral failures create in moral life, and traces this tendency through several different literatures, from scholarship on Holocaust testimony to discussions of ideal and nonideal theory, from theories of supererogation to debates about moral demandingness and to feminist care ethics.

Foundations of Islamic Psychology: From Classical Scholars to Contemporary Thinkers examines the history of Islamic psychology from the Islamic Golden age through the early 21st century, giving a thorough look into Islamic psychology's origins, Islamic philosophy and theology, and key developments in Islamic psychology. In tracing psychology from its origins in early civilisations, ancient philosophy, and religions to the modern discipline of psychology, this book integrates overarching psychological principles and ideas that have shaped the global history of Islamic psychology. It examines the legacy of psychology from an Islamic perspective, looking at the contributions of early Islamic classical scholars and contemporary psychologists, and to introduce how the history of Islamic philosophy and sciences has contributed to the development of classical and modern Islamic psychology from its founding to the present. With each chapter covering a key thinker or moment, and also covering the globalisation of psychology, the Islamisation of knowledge, and the decolonisation of psychology, the work critically evaluates the effects of the globalisation of psychology and its lasting impact on indigenous culture. This book aims to engage and inspire students taking undergraduate and graduate courses on Islamic psychology, to recognise the power of history in the academic studies of Islamic psychology, to connect history to the present and the future, and to think critically. It is also ideal reading for researchers and those undertaking continuing professional development in Islamic psychology, psychotherapy, and counselling.

Increasingly, the mind is being treated as a fit subject for scientific inquiry. As cognitive science and empirical psychology strive to uncover the mind's secrets, it is fitting to inquire as to what distinctive role is left for philosophy in the study of mind. This collection, which includes contributions by some of the leading scholars in the field, offers a rich variety of perspectives on this issue. Topics addressed include: the place of a priori inquiry in philosophy of mind, moral psychology, consciousness, social dimensions of intentionality, the relation of logic to philosophical psychology, objectivity and the mind, and privileged access.

This collection offers a critical assessment of transcendentalism, the understanding of consciousness, absolutized as a system of a priori laws of the mind, that was advanced by Kant and Husserl. As these studies show, transcendentalism critically informed 20th Century phenomenological investigation into such issues as temporality, historicity, imagination, objectivity and subjectivity, freedom, ethical judgment, work, praxis. Advances in science have now provoked a questioning of the absolute prerogatives of consciousness. Transcendentalism is challenged by empirical reductionism. And recognition of the role the celestial sphere plays in life on planet earth suggests that a radical shift of philosophy's center of gravity be made away from absolute consciousness and toward the transcendental forces at play in the architectonics of the cosmos.

This book enumerates the components of the unconscious domain (or realm), and attempts to uncover the proposed communicational network of its operation - a communicational network that is able to link inherent participating components of this realm. It is often the case that theoreticians and clinical practitioners refer to the unconscious or unconscious material in a way that implies the sense of it all rather than a specific definition, broadly describing it as "material which is out of one's awareness." This volume therefore examines the complex existence of the entire unconscious realm embraced in an evolutionary historical context, defined here as the 'unconscious domain'.

This book discusses two of the oldest and hardest problems in both science and philosophy: What is matter?, and What is mind? A reason for tackling both problems in a single book is that two of the most influential views in modern philosophy are that the universe is mental (idealism), and that the everything real is material (materialism). Most of the thinkers who espouse a materialist view of mind have obsolete ideas about matter, whereas those who claim that science supports idealism have not explained how the universe could have existed before humans emerged. Besides, both groups tend to ignore the other levels of existence-chemical, biological, social, and technological. If such levels and the concomitant emergence processes are ignored, the physicalism/spiritualism dilemma remains unsolved, whereas if they are included, the alleged mysteries are shown to be problems that science is treating successfully.

Consciousness has become a major topic of scientific interest, and dozens of books have been written in recent years to explain it, yet it still remains a mystery. Science and the Riddle of Consciousness explains why consciousness is a riddle for science, and demonstrates how this riddle can be solved. The questions examined in the book speak directly to neuroscientists, computer scientists, psychologists, and philosophers.

This work examines thoughtlessness and seeks to illuminate the necessity and extent that reflection is involved in becoming practically wise within an Aristotelian virtue ethical framework. Derived from an Arendtian reading of Kantian aesthetic judgment, an account of thinking and judging is offered to supplement traditional accounts of practical wisdom.

In this new kind of entree to contemporary discussions of free will and human agency, Garrett Pendergraft collects and illuminates 50 of the most relevant puzzles, paradoxes, and thought experiments. Assuming no familiarity with the philosophical literature on free will, each chapter describes a case, explains the questions that it raises, briefly summarizes some of the key responses to the case, and provides a list of suggested readings. Every chapter is accessible, succinct, and self-contained. The puzzles are divided into five broad categories: the threat from fatalism, the threat from determinism, practical reason, social dimensions, and moral luck. Entries cover topics such as the grandfather paradox, theological fatalism, the consequence argument, manipulation arguments, luck arguments, weakness of will, action explanation, addiction, blame and punishment, situationism in moral psychology, and Huckleberry Finn. Free Will and Human Agency is an effective and engaging teaching tool as well as a handy resource for anyone interested in exploring the questions that have made human agency a topic of perennial philosophical interest. Key Features: Though concise overall, offers broad coverage of the key areas of free will and human agency. Describes each imaginative case directly and in a memorable way, making the cases accessible and easy to remember. Provides a list of suggested readings for each case.