Rooted in Gricean tradition, this book concentrates on game- and decision-theoretic (GDT) approaches to the foundations of pragmatics. An introduction to GDT, an overview of GDT pragmatics research to date, its relation to semantics and to Gricean pragmatics are followed by contributions offering a high-level survey of current GDT pragmatics and the field of its applications, demonstrating that this approach provides a sound basis for synchronic and diachronic explanations of language use.

Following Nietzsche's call for a "philosopher-physician" and his own use of the bodily language of "health" and "illness" as tools to diagnose the ailments of the body politic, this book offers a reconstruction of the concept of "political physiology" in Nietzsche's thought, bridging gaps between Anglo-American, German and French schools of interpretation.

This book introduces the reader to Whitehead's complex and often misunderstood metaphysics by showing that it deals with questions about the nature of causation originally raised by the philosophy of Leibniz. Whitehead's philosophy is an attempt at rehabilitating Leibniz's theory of monads by recasting it in terms of novel ontological categories.

Through the works of key figures in ethics since modernity this book charts a shift from dominant fixated, objective moral systems and the dependence on moral authorities such as God, nature and state to universal, formal, fallible, individualistic and/or vulnerable moral systems that ensue from the modern subject's exercise of reason and freedom.

This is the one and only book by the pioneer of the identity theory of mind. The collection focuses on Place's philosophy of mind and his contributions to neighbouring issues in metaphysics and epistemology. It includes an autobiographical essay as well as a recent paper on the function and neural location of consciousness.

This book challenges common debates in philosophy of mind by questioning the framework of placement problems in contemporary metaphysics. The author argues that placement problems arise when exactly one fundamental ontology serves as the base for all entities, and will propose a pluralist alternative that takes the diversity of our conceptual resources and ontologies seriously. This general pluralist account is applied to issues in philosophy of mind to argue that contemporary debates about the mind-body problem are built on this problematic framework of placement problems. The starting point is the plurality of ontologies in scientific practice. Not only can we describe the world in terms of physical, biological, or psychological ontologies, but any serious engagement with scientific ontologies will identify more specific ontologies in each domain. For example, there is not one unified ontology for biology, but rather a diversity of scientific specializations with different ontological needs. Based on this account of scientific practice the author argues that there is no reason to assume that ontological unification must be possible everywhere. Without this ideal, the scope of ontological unification turns out to be an open empirical question and there is no need to present unification failures as philosophically puzzling "placement problems".

From Descartes to Hume, philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries developed a dialectic of radically conflicting claims about the nature of the self. In the Paralogisms of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant comes to terms with this dialectic, and with the character of the experiencing self. Powell seeks to elucidate these difficult texts, in part by applying to the Paralogisms insights drawn from Kant's Transcendental Deduction. His reading shows that the structure of the Paralogisms provides an essential key to understanding both Kant's critique of `rational psychology' and his theory of self-consciousness. As Kant realized, the ways in which we must represent ourselves to ourselves have import not only for epistemology, but for our view of persons and of our own immortality, and for moral philosophy as well. Kant's theory of self-consciousness is also shown to have implications for contemporary discussions of the problem of other minds, functionalism, and the problem of indexical self-reference.

This volume describes and analyzes in a systematic way the great contributions of the philosopher Krister Segerberg to the study of real and doxastic actions. Following an introduction which functions as a roadmap to Segerberg's works on actions, the first part of the book covers relations between actions, intentions and routines, dynamic logic as a theory of action, agency, and deontic logics built upon the logics of actions. The second section explores belief revision and update, iterated and irrevocable beliefs change, dynamic doxastic logic and hypertheories. Segerberg has worked for more than thirty years to analyze the intricacies of real and doxastic actions using formal tools - mostly modal (dynamic) logic and its semantics. He has had such a significant impact on modal logic that "It is hard to roam for long in modal logic without finding Krister Segerberg's traces," as Johan van Benthem notes in his chapter of this book.

This volume brings together new essays that consider Wittgenstein's treatment of the phenomenon of aspect perception in relation to the broader idea of conceptual novelty; that is, the acquisition or creation of new concepts, and the application of an acquired understanding in unfamiliar or novel situations. Over the last twenty years, aspect perception has received increasing philosophical attention, largely related to applying Wittgenstein's remarks on the phenomena of seeing-as, found in Part II of Philosophical Investigations (1953), to issues within philosophical aesthetics. Seeing-as, however, has come to occupy a broader conceptual category, particularly in philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology. The essays in this volume examine the exegetical issues arising within Wittgenstein studies, while also considering the broader utility and implications of the phenomenon of seeing-as in the fields of aesthetics, philosophical psychology, and philosophy of mathematics, with a thematic focus on questions of novelty and creativity. The collection constitutes a fruitful interpretative engagement with the later Wittgenstein, as well as a unique contribution to considerations of philosophical methodology.

Freud's Philosophy of the Unconscious is the only comprehensive, systematic study of Sigmund Freud's philosophy of mind. Freud emerges as a sophisticated philosopher who addresses many of the central questions that concern contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists while anticipating many of their views. While still a student in Vienna, Freud was initiated into philosophy by Franz Brentano. The book charts Freud's intellectual development as he deals with the mind-body problem, the nature of consciousness, folk psychology versus scientific psychology, the relationship between language and thought, realism and antirealism in psychology, and the nature of unconscious mental events. The book also critically examines writings on Freud by Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Searle, demonstrating their weakness as interpretations and criticisms of Freud's position. Readership: Philosophers, cognitive scientists, psychologists, psychoanalysts, psychotherapists and psychiatrists.

Naturalism and Pragmatism offers reflections on the pragmatic tradition from a fresh perspective: that of a working neuroscientist. Though naturalism and evolution are not the only topics of discussions, they are important themes of the book. Both pragmatism and modern behavioral science grew up in the wake of Darwin's theory of evolution. Indeed it is impossible to imagine either without evolutionary theory and the more general nineteenth-century trend of naturalism from which modern evolutionary theory emerged. And yet, for a variety of reasons, these common origins have not ensured a close affinity between pragmatic philosophy and the behavioral sciences. Among the wide diversity of scientific theories of human cognition and its evolutionary origins, only a few are congenial to pragmatism in its original or classical' form, which embraces the full range of human experience

vii 1 ~OOUCTIONANOOVERVlliW 1 2 SEITING THE STAGE: PERSONAL IDENTITY ANO THE MErAPHYSICS OFMIND 1. Introduction 6 2. The Problem of Personal Identity over Time 7 3. The Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity over Time 12 4. The Neo-Lockean Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity 16 5. The Circularity Objection 19 6. Problems of Logical Form 21 7. The Lack of a Third-Person Criterion for Reidentification 23 8. The Unity of the Mental Bundle 25 9. The Individuation ofPersons 26 10. The Neo-Lockean Criterion and Physicalism: a 'Natural' Alliance 28 11. One 'Solution' to Five Problems 35 3 PARFIT'S REDUcrIO OF A SUBSTRATUM-ORIENTEO CONCEPfION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUlTY 43 1. Introduction 2. Relation R 45 51 3. Relation R and the Neo-Lockian Paradigm 4. Psychological Atomism 56 61 5. The Central Place of Q-Memory in the Neo-Lockean Paradigm 64 6. The Trouble with Q-memory 74 7. Contents and Contexts. The Other Four Problems 79 8. Conclusions 4 A CON1ENT-ORIENTEO CONCEPTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY 82 1. Introduction 83 2. Two Kinds of Psychological Continuity 91 3. Levels of N-Continuity 93 4. The Unity of N-Continuous Sequences. The Role of the Body 105 5. N-Continuity and Psychological Connectedness 109 6. Summary vi 5 A PSYCHOLOGICAL CRI1ERION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY: THE AVE PROBLEMS REVISITED 1. Introduction 111 2. Circularity, Q-Memory, and N-Continuity 112 119 3. Narrativity and Logical Form 127 4. Third-Person Criteria of Reidentification: The Role of the Body 5.

In three volumes, a distinguished group of scholars from a variety of disciplines in the natural and social sciences, the humanities and the arts contribute essays in honor of Robert S. Cohen, on the occasion of his 70th birthday. The range of the essays, as well as their originality, and their critical and historical depth, pay tribute to the extraordinary scope of Professor Cohen's intellectual interests, as a scientist-philosopher and a humanist, and also to his engagement in the world of social and political practice. Science, Mind and Art, Volume III of Essays in honor of Robert S. Cohen focuses on issues in contemporary epistemology, aesthetics, and philosophy of mind as well as on the relations of science and human values in ethical and religious thought. It also has important new work in contemporary metaphysics, as well as in the history of philosophy, and on questions of multiculturalism in science education. Contributors include Paul Feyerabend, Adolf GrA1/4nbaum, Joseph Margolis, JoAlle Proust, Erazim Kohak, Elie Wiesel, Miriam Bienenstock, and John Silber, among others.

People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact that the reasons for an action are not always good reasons.

We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action.
Libet's striking results are often claimed to undermine traditional views of free will and moral responsibility and to have practical implications for criminal justice. His work has also stimulated a flurry of further fascinating scientific research--including findings in psychology by Dan Wegner and in neuroscience by John-Dylan Haynes--that raises novel questions about whether conscious will plays any causal role in action. Critics respond that both commonsense views of action and traditional theories of moral and legal responsibility, as well as free will, can survive the scientific onslaught of Libet and his progeny. To further this lively debate, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel have brought together prominent experts in neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and law to discuss whether our conscious choices really cause our actions, and what the answers to that question mean for how we view ourselves and how we should treat each other.

In Embodied Minds in Action, Robert Hanna and Michelle Maiese work out a unified treatment of three fundamental philosophical problems: the mind-body problem, the problem of mental causation, and the problem of action. This unified treatment rests on two basic claims. The first is that conscious, intentional minds like ours are essentially embodied. This entails that our minds are necessarily spread throughout our living, organismic bodies and belong to their complete neurobiological constitution. So minds like ours are necessarily alive. The second claim is that essentially embodied minds are self-organizing thermodynamic systems. This entails that our mental lives consist in the possibility and actuality of moving our own living organismic bodies through space and time, by means of our conscious desires. The upshot is that we are essentially minded animals who help to create the natural world through our own agency. This doctrine--the Essential Embodiment Theory--is a truly radical idea which subverts the traditionally opposed and seemingly exhaustive categories of Dualism and Materialism, and offers a new paradigm for contemporary mainstream research in the philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience.

This book addresses a part of a problem. The problem is to determine the architecture of cognition, that is, the basic structures and mechanisms underlying cognitive processing. This is a multidimensional problem insofar as there appear to be many distinct types of mechanisms that interact in diverse ways during cognitive processing. Thus, we have memory, attention, learning, sensation, perception, and who knows what else, interacting to produce behavior. As a case in point, consider a bit of linguistic behavior. To tell a friend that I think Greg won a stunning victory, I must evidently rely on various bits of information stored in my memory, including who my friends are, who Greg is, what he won, and what natural languages I share with my friend. I must sense and perceive that my friend is within hearing distance, how loud I need to speak, how loud I am speaking, and whether my friend is paying attention. I must avail myself of what I know about the language I share with my friend, along with innumerable principles about human "folk psychology. " This book does not address the full range of contemporary theorizing about cognitive architecture, but only a part. It addresses theories of cognitive architecture that hypothesize that there exist cognitive representations, then begins to explore the possible structure of these representations. One of the leading hypotheses concerning the structure of cognitive representations is that it is akin to that found in symbolic logic.

Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet present eleven original essays on weakness of will, a topic straddling the divide between moral philosophy and philosophy of mind, and the subject of much current attention. An international team of established scholars and younger talent provide perspectives on all the key issues in this fascinating debate; the book will be essential reading for anyone working in the area.

The ten essays in this collection were written to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the lectures which became Wilfrid Sellars's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, one of the crowning achievements of 20th-century analytic philosophy. Both appreciative and critical of Sellars's accomplishment, they engage with his treatment of crucial issues in metaphysics and epistemology. The topics include the standing of empiricism, Sellars's complex treatment of perception, his dissatisfaction with both foundationalist and coherentist epistemologies, his commitment to realism, and the status of the normative (the "logical space of reasons" and the "manifest image"). The volume shows how vibrant Sellarsian philosophy remains in the 21st century.

The book would make a perfect company with the new

Neuroscience has raised many questions for philosophy and its traditional focus on the mind, but what does the emerging field of neurophilosophy teach us about the relationship between mind and brain? How have the new debates transformed our understanding of consciousness, the self and free will? Georg Northoff is a world-leading expert in this exciting area, and in Minding the Brain he provides a comprehensive introduction to non-reductive neurophilosophy, charting the developments of the discipline and applying its ideas to the debates that have captivated philosophers for centuries. Minding the Brain: * employs extensive pedagogy to help the reader get to grips with complex concepts * takes a transdisciplinary approach unifying science, psychology and philosophy Unearthing new ways to tackle age-old debates, Minding the Brain is a stimulating text for anyone interested in philosophy, psychology, the cognitive sciences and neuroscience.

This book offers an analysis of experimental psychology that is embedded in a general understanding of human behavior. It provides methodological self-awareness for researchers who study and use the experimental method in psychology. The book critically reviews key research areas (e.g., rule-breaking, sense of agency, free choice, task switching, task sharing, and mind wandering), examining their scope, limits, ambiguities, and implicit theoretical commitments. Topics featured in this text include: Methods of critique in experimental research Goal hierarchies and organization of a task Rule-following and rule-breaking behavior Sense of agency Free-choice tasks Mind wandering Experimental Psychology and Human Agency will be of interest to researchers and undergraduate and graduate students in the fields of experimental psychology, cognitive psychology, theoretical psychology, and critical psychology, as well as various philosophical disciplines.