Timothy Williamson's 2000 book Knowledge and Its Limits is perhaps the most important work of philosophy of the decade. Eighteen leading philosophers have now joined forces to give a critical assessment of ideas and arguments in this work, and the impact it has had on contemporary philosophy. They discuss epistemological issues concerning evidence, defeasibility, skepticism, testimony, assertion, and perception, and debate Williamson's central claim that knowledge is a mental state.

There are few more unsettling philosophical questions than this: What happens in attempts to reduce some properties to some other more fundamental properties? Reflection on this question inevitably touches on very deep issues about ourselves, our own interactions with the world and each other, and our very understanding of what there is and what goes on around us. If we cannot command a clear view of these deep issues, then very many other debates in contemporary philosophy seem to lose traction - think of causation, laws of nature, explanation, consciousness, personal identity, intentionality, normativity, freedom, responsibility, justice, and so on. Reduction can easily seem to unravel our world.
Here, an eminent group of philosophers helps us answer this question. Their novel contributions comfortably span a number of current debates in philosophy and cognitive science: what is the nature of reduction, of reductive explanation, of mental causation? The contributions range from approaches in theoretical metaphysics, over philosophy of the special sciences and physics, to interdisciplinary studies in psychiatry and neurobiology. The authors connect strands in contemporary philosophy that are often treated separately and in combination the chapters allow the reader to see how issues of reduction, explanation and causation mutually constrain each other. The anthology therefore moves the debate further both at the level of contributions to specific debates and at the level of integrating insights from a number of debates.

Personalised accounts of out-of-body (OBE) and near-death (NDE) experiences are frequently interpreted as offering evidence for immortality and an afterlife. Since most OBE/NDE follow severe curtailments of cerebral circulation with loss of consciousness, the agonal brain supposedly permits 'mind', 'soul' or 'consciousness' to escape neural control and provide glimpses of the afterlife.
Michael Marsh critically analyses the work of five key writers who support this so-called "dying brain" hypothesis. He firmly disagrees with such otherworldly 'mystical' or 'psychical' interpretations, ably demonstrating how they are explicable in terms of brain neurophysiology and its neuropathological disturbances. The original basis and thrust of Marsh's claim sees the recorded phenomenology as reflections of brains rapidly reawakening to full conscious-awareness, consistent with other reported phenomenologies attending recovery from antecedent states of unconsciousness: the "re-awakening brain" hypothesis. From this basis, Marsh also offers a re-classification of NDE into early and late phase sequences, thereby dismantling the untenable concepts of "core" and "depth" experiences.
Marsh further provides a detailed examination of the spiritual and quasi-religious overtones accorded OBE/NDE, highlighting their inconsistencies when compared with classical accounts of divine disclosure, and the eschatological precepts of resurrection belief as professed credally. In assessing the implications of anthropological, philosophical, and theological concepts of 'personhood' and 'soul' as arguments for personal survival after death, Marsh celebrates the role of conventional faith in appropriating the expectant biblical promises of a 'New Creation'.

Descartes s concern with the proper method of belief formation is evident in the titles of his works e.g., "The Search after Truth," "The Rules for the Direction of the Mind" and "The Discourse on Method of rightly conducting one s reason and seeking the truth in the sciences." It is most apparent, however, in his famous discussions, both in the "Meditations" and in the "Principles," of one particularly noteworthy source of our doxastic errors namely, the misuse of one s will. What is not widely recognized, let alone appreciated and understood, is the relationship between his concern with belief formation and his concern with virtue. In fact, few seem to realize that Descartes regards doxastic errors as "moral" errors and as "sins" both because such errors are intrinsically vicious and because they entail notably deleterious social consequences.

"Reforming the Art of Living" seeks to rectify this rather common oversight in two ways. First, it aims to elucidate the nature of Descartes s account of virtuous belief formation. Second, it aims both (i) to illuminate the social significance of Descartes s philosophical program as it relates to the understanding and practice not of science, but of religion and (ii) to develop a kind of Leibnizian critique of this aspect of his program. More specifically, it aims to show that Descartes s project is dangerous, insofar as it is subversive not only of traditional Christianity but also of other traditional forms of religion, both in theory and in practice."

BLURB for Self and Spirit What is the basis and purpose of esoteric religion, and what is the self? Self and Spirit answers these questions in depth and in a way true to the spirit of traditional wisdom. This book illuminates from a new angle the Non-Dualistic conceptions that have become influential through the work of many modern traditionalists, including Ren Gunon and Frithjof Schuon, whose influence is evident in Dr. Bolton's treatment of religion and tradition. Here, Gnostic ideas usually taken to support pantheistic religion are shown to be able to provide a foundation for belief in a personal God. Religion is not forced into a preconceived system, because no attempt is made to evaluate all religious doctrines by the standard of one doctrine. Instead, certain profound ideas common to many traditions are invoked, these ideas being of a kind that cannot be identified with any one confessional origin. This in turn sheds new light on the dividing-line between the esoteric and the exoteric, and allows these ideas to combine in ways that are natural and free. The key to this new departure is the true nature of the individual self, a subject largely ignored by Non-Dualist thought. Here it is given its full weight, however, and its impact on all other realities is made clear. The relation of the self to its world is also here connected significantly to the cosmic role of religion, illustrating how a conversion from worldly to spiritual priorities can have consequences far beyond the personal concerns of those involved. Throughout, Bolton's thinking is daring, yet true to traditional spirituality.

Things is a collection of twelve metaphysical essays by Stephen Yablo. The essays address a range of first-order topics, including identity, coincidence, essence, existence, causation, and properties. Some first-order debates are not worth pursuing, Yablo maintains; there is nothing at issue in them. Several of the papers explore the metaontology of abstract objects, and more generally of objects that are 'preconceived', their principal features being settled already by their job-descriptions. Yablo rejects standard forms of fictionalism, opting ultimately for a view that puts presupposition in the role normally played by pretense. Almost all of Yablo's published work on these topics is collected here, along with the previously unpublished 'Carving Content at the Joints'.

This book explores the thought of Alexius Meinong, a philosopher known for his unconventional theory of reference and predication. The chapters cover a natural progression of topics, beginning with the origins of Gegenstandstheorie, Meinong's theory of objects, and his discovery of assumptions as a fourth category of mental states to supplement his teacher Franz Brentano's references to presentations, feelings, and judgments. The chapters explore further the meaning and metaphysics of fictional and other nonexistent intended objects, fine points in Meinongian object theory are considered and new and previously unanticipated problems are addressed. The author traces being and non-being and aspects of beingless objects including objects in fiction, ideal objects in scientific theory, objects ostensibly referred to in false science and false history and intentional imaginative projection of future states of affairs. The chapters focus on an essential choice of conceptual, logical, semantic, ontic and more generally metaphysical problems and an argument is progressively developed from the first to the final chapter, as key ideas are introduced and refined. Meinong studies have come a long way from Bertrand Russell's off-target criticisms and recent times have seen a rise of interest in a Meinongian approach to logic and the theory of meaning. New thinkers see Meinong as a bridge figure between analytic and continental thought, thanks to the need for an adequate semantics of meaning in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, making this book a particularly timely publication.

Three particular themes are basic to this study. First, that the human race and its environment are involved in a slowly progressive process of revelation and understanding of its inherent features. And that we are all participating in this ongoing evolutionary cycle. Second, and closely related to the first tenet, man is not separable from his environment. We all share in this cyclic development. Third, that our egoic structures, with the data and experiences they involve, can play a key role in our personal understanding of this ongoing developmental process. The role of the ego is paradoxical. It can be a relatively stable reference used to enhance personal insight concerning its own dynamic structure and similar aspects of its environment. Or it can be maintained with a rigidity that hinders progressive learning. That is, the ego unit has the dual possibilities of affording a focus aiding progressive insight, or becoming a barrier that temporarily diminishes it. The aim of this study is therefore to reduce possible restrictive rigidity as we investigate the role of the egoic unit in seeking greater understanding of its own dynamic structures and their similarly dynamic environment. To pursue this aim we refer to insights from medical practice, philosophy and science. The underlying awareness of an evolving consciousness means that the insights and ideas presented are shared in the expectation that they too will be modified in due course. But if they help provoke interest and insight concerning the paradoxical nature o f our personal processes, they will have served their purpose.

Our thought and talk are situated. They do not take place in a vacuum but always in a context, and they always concern an external situation relative to which they are to be evaluated. Since that is so, Francois Recanati argues, our linguistic and mental representations alike must be assigned two layers of content: the explicit content, or lekton, is relative and perspectival, while the complete content, which is absolute, involves contextual factors in addition to what is explicitly represented. Far from reducing to the context-independent meaning of the sentence-type or, in the psychological realm, to the "narrow" content of mental representations, the lekton is a level intermediate between context-invariant meaning and full propositional content. Recognition of that intermediate level is the key to a proper understanding of context-dependence in language and thought.
Going beyond the usual discussions of indexicality and unarticulated constituents in the philosophy of language, Recanati turns to the philosophy of mind for decisive arguments in favour of his approach. He shows, first, that the lekton is the notion of content we need if we are to properly understand the relations between perception, memory, and the imagination, and second, that the psychological 'mode' is what determines the situation the lekton is relative to. In this framework he provides a detailed account of de se thought and the first person point of view. In the last part of the book, Recanati discusses the special freedom we have, in discourse and thought, to shift the situation of evaluation. He traces that freedom to a special mode--the anaphoric mode--which enables us to go beyond the egocentric stage ofpre-human thought.

Aristotle is considered by many to be the founder of "faculty psychology"--the attempt to explain a variety of psychological phenomena by reference to a few inborn capacities. In The Powers of Aristotle's Soul, Thomas Kjeller Johansen investigates his main work on psychology, the De Anima, from this perspective. He shows how Aristotle conceives of the soul's capacities and how he uses them to account for the souls of living beings. Johansen offers an original account of how Aristotle defines the capacities in relation to their activities and proper objects, and considers the relationship of the body to the definition of the soul's capacities. Against the background of Aristotle's theory of science, Johansen argues that the capacities of the soul serve as causal principles in the explanation of the various life forms. He develops detailed readings of Aristotle's treatment of nutrition, perception, and intellect, which show the soul's various roles as formal, final and efficient causes, and argues that the so-called 'agent' intellect falls outside the scope of Aristotle's natural scientific approach to the soul. Other psychological activities, various kinds of perception (including "perceiving that we perceive"), memory, imagination, are accounted for in their explanatory dependency on the basic capacities. The ability to move spatially is similarly explained as derivative from the perceptual or intellectual capacities. Johansen claims that these capacities together with the nutritive may be understood as "parts" of the soul, as they are basic to the definition and explanation of the various kinds of soul. Finally, he considers how the account of the capacities in the De Anima is adopted and adapted in Aristotle's biological and minor psychological works.

This volume features essays that explore the insights of the 14th-century Parisian nominalist philosopher, John Buridan. It serves as a companion to the Latin text edition and annotated English translation of his question-commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul. The contributors survey Buridan's work both in its own historical-theoretical context and in relation to contemporary issues. The essays come in three main sections, which correspond to the three books of Buridan's Questions. Coverage first deals with the classification of the science of the soul within the system of Aristotelian sciences, and surveys the main issues within it. The next section examines the metaphysics of the soul. It considers Buridan's peculiar version of Aristotelian hylomorphism in dealing with the problem of what kind of entity the soul (in particular, the human soul) is, and what powers and actions it has, on the basis of which we can approach the question of its essence. The volume concludes with a look at Buridan's doctrine of the nature and functions of the human intellect. Coverage in this section includes the problem of self-knowledge in Buridan's theory, Buridan's answer to the traditional medieval problem concerning the primary object of the intellect, and his unique treatment of logical problems in psychological contexts.

At least since Locke, philosophers and psychologists have usually held that concepts arise out of sensory perceptions, thoughts are built from concepts, and language enables speakers to convey their thoughts to hearers. Christopher Gauker holds that this tradition is mistaken about both concepts and language. The mind cannot abstract the building blocks of thoughts from perceptual representations. More generally, we have no account of the origin of concepts that grants them the requisite independence from language. Gauker's alternative is to show that much of cognition consists in thinking by means of mental imagery, without the help of concepts, and that language is a tool by which interlocutors coordinate their actions in pursuit of shared goals. Imagistic cognition supports the acquisition and use of this tool, and when the use of this tool is internalized, it becomes the very medium of conceptual thought.

Within are the words of a highly gifted individual--the Prophet of Gold, whose wisdom and words come from dimensions not considered by most humans.

The secrets and mysteries of life revealed within can do much to help a spiritual life journey, bringing success and understanding, which we all need in these present changing times.

This book is written as to be easily understood with simplicity of words, to make it easy for the reader who wishes to put the valuable information into productive use and benefit from it.

The gold of the wisdom within from The Prophet of Gold will fill your cup of gold, bringing you peace, love, and a higher understanding of life and nature, as well as a brighter future to come.

This book explores a wide range of topics relating to scientific and religious learning in the work of Bishop Robert Grosseteste (c. 1168-1253) and does so from various perspectives, including those of a twenty-first century scientists, historians, and philosophers as well as several medievalists. In particular, it aims to contribute to our understanding of where to place Grosseteste in the history of science (against the background of the famous claim by A.C. Crombie that Grosseteste introduced what we now might call "experimental science") and to demonstrate that the polymathic world of the medieval scholar, who recognized no dichotomy in the pursuit of scientific and philosophical/theological understanding, has much to teach those of us in the modern world who wrestle with the vexed question of the relationship between science and religion. The book comprises an edited selection of the best papers presented at the 3rd International Robert Grosseteste Conference (2014) on the theme of scientific and religious learning, especially in the work of Grosseteste.

This is a concise, accessible, easy-to-navigate introduction to the key terms, concepts, thinkers and texts in philosophy of mind. "Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind" offers an introduction to a central topic in philosophy. The book offers a comprehensive overview of the key terms, concepts, thinkers and major works in the history of this key area of philosophical thought. Ideal for first-year students coming to the subject for the first time, "Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind" will serve as the ideal companion to the study of this fascinating subject. Pete Mandik provides detailed summaries of all the key concepts in the study of philosophy and the mind. There is an introductory chapter that provides context and background, while the following chapters offer detailed definitions of key terms and concepts, introductions to the work of key thinkers, summaries of key texts and advice on further reading. Designed specifically to meet the needs of students and assuming no prior knowledge of the subject, this is the ideal reference tool for those coming to philosophy of mind for the first time. "The Key Terms" series offers undergraduate students clear, concise and accessible introductions to core topics. Each book includes a comprehensive overview of the key terms, concepts, thinkers and texts in the area covered and ends with a guide to further resources.

This book presents an original approach to the study of psychiatry that is based on a justified epistemological position, which demands that both the natural and the human/social sciences are necessary in developing our understanding. Psychiatry as a medical specialism was constructed in the nineteenth century through the interplay of both the natural sciences and the human/social sciences. This interplay has created a hybrid discipline that spans biological and socio-cultural-historical domains, which has raised challenges for its understanding and research. This book focuses on one of the principal challenges - how can we explore mental symptoms and mental disorders as complexes of neurobiology on the one hand and meaning on the other? The chapters in this book, dedicated to German E Berrios, founder of the Cambridge school of psychopathology, tackles distinctive aspects of psychopathology or related areas. By means of a combination of approaches, chapters seek to unfold another element in our understanding of this field as well as raise new directions for its further study. Rethinking Psychopathology is a valuable resource for clinical psychologists and psychotherapists, psychological researchers, historians of psychology, cultural psychologists, critical psychologists, social scientists, philosophers of psychology, and philosophers of science.

This book originated at a workshop by the same name held in May 2018 at the University of Pavia. The aim was to encourage a cross-disciplinary discussion on the limits of cognition. When venturing into cognitive science, notwithstanding the approach, one of the first riddles to be solved is the definition of cognition. Any definition immediately sparks the ascription debate: who/what cognizes? Definitions may appear either too loose, or too demanding. Are bacteria included? What about plants? Is it a human prerogative? We engage in the quest for artificial intelligence, but is artificial cognition already the case? And if it was a human prerogative, are we doing it all the time? Is cognition a process, or the sum of countless sub processes? Is it in the brain, or also in the body? Or does it go beyond the body? Where does it start? Where does it end? We tried answering these questions each from our own perspectives, as philosophers, ethnographers, psychologists and rhetoricians, handing each other our peculiar insight.

We have known for over a thousand years that the brain underlies behavioral expression, but effective scientific study of the brain is only very recent. Two things converge in this book: a great respect for neuroscience and its many variations, and a sense of investigation and inquiry demythologized. Think of it as foraging for coherence.

This volume addresses the complex interplay between the conditions of an agent's personal autonomy and the constitution of her self in light of two influential background assumptions: a libertarian thesis according to which it is essential for personal autonomy to be able to choose freely how one's self is shaped, on the one hand, and a line of thought following especially the seminal work of Harry Frankfurt according to which personal autonomy necessarily rests on an already sufficiently shaped self, on the other hand. Given this conceptual framework, a number of influential aspects within current debate can be addressed in a new and illuminating light: accordingly, the volume's contributions range from 1) discussing fundamental conceptual interconnections between personal autonomy and freedom of the will, 2) addressing the exact role and understanding of different personal traits, e.g. Frankfurt's notion of volitional necessities, commitments to norms and ideals, emotions, the phenomenon of weakness of will, and psychocorporeal aspects, 3) and finally taking into account social influences, which are discussed in terms of their ability to buttress, to weaken, or even to serve as necessary preconditions of personal autonomy and the forming of one's self. The volume thus provides readers with an extensive and most up-to-date discussion of various influential strands of current philosophical debate on the topic. It is of equal interest to all those already engaged in the debate as well as to readers trying to get an up-to-date overview or looking for a textbook to use in courses.

A sweeping reconstruction of human consciousness and its breakdown, from the Stone Age through modern technology Why has humankind developed so differently from other animals? How and why did language, culture, religion, and the arts come into being? In this wide-ranging and ambitious essay, Christoph Turcke offers a new answer to these timeworn questions by scrutinizing the phenomenon of the dream, using it as a psychic fossil connecting us with our Stone Age ancestors. Provocatively, he argues that both civilization and mental processes are the results of a compulsion to repeat early traumas, one to which hallucination, imagination, mind, spirit, and God all developed in response. Until the beginning of the modern era, repetition was synonymous with de-escalation and calming down. Then, automatic machinery gave rise to a new type of repetition, whose effects are permanent alarm and distraction. The new global forces of distraction, Turcke argues, are producing a specific kind of stress that breaks down the barriers between dreams and waking consciousness. Turcke's essay ends with a sobering indictment of this psychic deregulation and the social and economic deregulations that have accompanied it.

'if AI is outside your field, or you know something of the subject and would like to know more then Artificial Intelligence: The Basics is a brilliant primer.' - Nick Smith, Engineering and Technology Magazine November 2011 Artificial Intelligence: The Basics is a concise and cutting-edge introduction to the fast moving world of AI. The author Kevin Warwick, a pioneer in the field, examines issues of what it means to be man or machine and looks at advances in robotics which have blurred the boundaries. Topics covered include: how intelligence can be defined whether machines can 'think' sensory input in machine systems the nature of consciousness the controversial culturing of human neurons. Exploring issues at the heart of the subject, this book is suitable for anyone interested in AI, and provides an illuminating and accessible introduction to this fascinating subject.

How are truths about physical and mental states related? Physicalism entails that non-physical truths are redescriptions of a world specifiable in narrowly physical terms. In The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental Robert Kirk argues that physicalists must therefore hold that the physical truth 'logico-conceptually' entails the mental truth: it is impossible for broadly logical and conceptual reasons that the former should have held without the latter. 'Redescriptive physicalism' is a fresh approach to the physical-to-mental connection that he bases on these ideas. Contrary to what might have been expected, this connection does not depend on analytic truths: there are holistic but non-analytic conceptual links, explicable by means of functionalism-which, he argues, physicalism entails. Redescriptive physicalism should not be confused with 'a priori physicalism': although physicalists must maintain that phenomenal truths are logico-conceptually entailed by physical truths, they must deny that they are also entailed a priori. Kripke-inspired 'a posteriori physicalism', on the other hand, is too weak for physicalism, and the psycho-physical identity thesis is not sufficient for it. Though non-reductive, redescriptive physicalism is an excellent basis for dealing with the problems that mental causation raises for other non-reductive views. 'Cartesian intuitions' of zombies and transposed qualia may seem to raise irresistible objections; Kirk shows that the intuitions are false. As to the 'explanatory gap', there is certainly an epistemic gap, but it has a physicalistically acceptable explanation which deals effectively with the problem of how the physical and functional facts fix particular phenomenal facts.

The Sublime in Schopenhauer's Philosophy transforms our understanding of Schopenhauer's aesthetics and anthropology. Vandenabeele seeks ultimately to rework Schopenhauer's theory into a viable form so as to establish the sublime as a distinctive aesthetic category with a broader existential and metaphysical significance.