Beatrice Longuenesse presents an original exploration of our understanding of ourselves and the way we talk about ourselves. In the first part of the book she discusses contemporary analyses of our use of 'I' in language and thought, and compares them to Kant's account of self-consciousness, especially the type of self-consciousness expressed in the proposition 'I think.' According to many contemporary philosophers, necessarily, any instance of our use of 'I' is backed by our consciousness of our own body. For Kant, in contrast, 'I think' just expresses our consciousness of being engaged in bringing rational unity into the contents of our mental states. In the second part of the book, Longuenesse analyzes the details of Kant's view and argues that contemporary discussions in philosophy and psychology stand to benefit from Kant's insights into self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness. The third and final part of the book outlines similarities between Kant's view of the structure of mental life grounding our uses of 'I' in 'I think' and in the moral 'I ought to,' on the one hand; and Freud's analysis of the organizations of mental processes he calls 'ego' and 'superego' on the other hand. Longuenesse argues that Freudian metapsychology offers a path to a naturalization of Kant's transcendental view of the mind. It offers a developmental account of the normative capacities that ground our uses of 'I,' which Kant thought could not be accounted for without appealing to a world of pure intelligences, distinct from the empirical, natural world of physical entities.

This highly readable translation of the major works of the 18th- century philosopher Etienne Bonnot, Abbe de Condillac, a disciple of Locke and a contemporary of Rousseau, Voltaire, and Diderot, shows his influence on psychiatric diagnosis as well as on the education of the deaf, the retarded, and the preschool child. Published two hundred years after Condillac's death, this translation contains treatises which were, until now, virtually unavailable in English: A Treatise on Systems, A Treatise of the Sensations, Logic.

Mitchell Wilson explores the fundamental role that lack and desire play in psychoanalytic interpretation by using a comparative method that engages different psychoanalytic traditions: Lacanian, Bionian, Kleinian, Contemporary Freudian. Investigating crucial questions Wilson asks: What is the nature of the psychoanalytic process? How are desire and counter-transference linked? What is the relationship between desire, analytic action, and psychoanalytic ethics?

This full-scaled monograph, rich in factographic material, concerns Narayana Guru (1855/56--1928), a founder of a powerful socio-religious movement in Kerala. He wrote in three languages (Malayalam, Sanskrit, Tamil), drawing on three different literary conventions. The world of this complex philosophic-religious literature is brought closer to the reader with rare deft and dexterity by the Author who not only retrieves for us the original circumstances, language and poetic metre of each work but also supplies histories of their reception. Thanks to numerous glosses, comments and elucidations supplied by the Author, we can much better understand how Narayana's mystical universe creatively relates to the Tamil OEaiva Siddhanta and to Kerala's variety of Vedanta tradition. Prof. Cezary Galewicz

Dual-Aspect Monism and the Deep Structure of Meaning investigates the metaphysical position of dual-aspect monism, with particular emphasis on the concept of meaning as a fundamental feature of the fabric of reality. As an alternative to other positions - mainly dualism, physicalism, idealism - that have been proposed to understand consciousness and its place in nature, the decompositional version of dual-aspect monism considers the mental and the physical as two aspects of one underlying undivided reality that is psychophysically neutral. Inspired by analogies with modern physics and driven by its conceptual problems, Wolfgang Pauli, Carl Gustav Jung, Arthur Eddington, John Wheeler, David Bohm, and Basil Hiley are the originators of the approaches studied. A radically novel common theme in their approaches is the constitutive role of meaning and its deep structure, relating the mental and the physical to a psychophysically neutral base.The authors reconstruct the formal structure of these approaches, and compare their conceptual emphases as well as their relative strengths and weaknesses. They also address a number of challenging themes for current and future interdisciplinary research, both theoretical and empirical, that arise from the presented frameworks of thinking. Dual-Aspect Monism and the Deep Structure of Meaning will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in consciousness studies, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, metaphysics, and the history of 20th-century philosophy and physics.

This book explores curiosity from a normative epistemological viewpoint. Taking into account recent developments in the psychology of curiosity, as well as research on the nature and motivation of scientific inquiry, Miscevic identifies curiosity as a positive and vital character trait. Key topics covered include: * Curiosity as a subject in the history of philosophy * Curiosity as a possible ethical virtue * The importance of curiosity about oneself * Whether curiosity is good in itself or only as a means to an end (e.g. in the pursuit of truth). The book begins with a brief historical overview, before turning to the nature of curiosity from both a psychological and philosophical viewpoint. Curiosity is revealed as a crucial instrument in the advancement of science and wisdom, as well as within the wider picture of meaningful human life. Miscevic skilfully defends the idea that curiosity motivates and organises our cognitive abilities, playing the central role in our cognitive lives.

This book explores the methodological strategies for linking philosophy and neuroscience concerning the study of the conscious brain. The author focuses on four distinct methods for relating these two academic disciplines: isolationist, reductionist, neurophenomenological, and non-reductionist. After analyzing the pros and cons of these approaches, Steven S. Gouveia applies them to the concept of Qualia and Information to understand how the metaphilosophical assumptions of each approach influence the definitions of those specific concepts. Gouveia argues for an approach that conceives the interdisciplinarity of both philosophy and neuroscience, in a particular and sound methodology, offering empirical examples of the explanatory power of this methodology over the others. Additionally, he shows how the metaphilosophical assumptions of each methodology-usually taken by researchers implicitly and unconsciously-influence their own approach to the methodological problem.

Donald Olding Hebb, referred to by American Psychologist as one of "the 20th century's most eminent and influential theorists in the realm of brain function and behavior," contributes greatly to the understanding of mind and thought in Essays on Mind. His objective was to learn about thought which he considered "the central problem of psychology -- but also, not less important, to learn how to think clearly about thought, which is philosophy." The volume is written for advanced undergraduates, graduates, professionals, and lay people interested in or studying the mind. Hebb offers an increased understanding of the mind from a biological perspective that affects long-standing philosophical and psychological problems. "Psychology and Philosophy were divorced some time ago but, like other divorced couples, they still have problems in common," writes Hebb. The first three chapters establish the methodological and philosophical basis for his biologically centered theory of behavior, including the evolution of the mind, nature versus nurture, the origination and status of cell-assembly theory, and infant thought and language development. He concludes with a discussion of the workings of scientific thought from a practical rather than theoretical perspective.

Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind is the first book to show how hylomorphism can be used to solve mind-body problems-persistent problems understanding how thought, feeling, perception, and other mental phenomena fit into the physical world described by our best science. Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle. Some individuals, paradigmatically living things, consist of materials that are structured or organized in various ways. Those structures are responsible for individuals being the kinds of things they are, and having the kinds of powers or capacities they have. From a hylomorphic perspective, mind-body problems are byproducts of a worldview that rejects structure. Hylomorphic structure carves out distinctive individuals from the otherwise undifferentiated sea of matter and energy described by our best physics, and it confers on those individuals distinctive powers, including the powers to think, feel, and perceive. A worldview that rejects hylomorphic structure lacks a basic principle which distinguishes the parts of the physical universe that can think, feel, and perceive from those that can't, and without such a principle, the existence of those powers in the physical world can start to look inexplicable and mysterious. But if mental phenomena are structural phenomena, as hylomorphism claims, then they are uncontroversially part of the physical world, for on the hylomorphic view, structure is uncontroversially part of the physical world. Hylomorphism thus provides an elegant way of solving mind-body problems.

This edited book offers a broad selection of interdisciplinary studies within cognitive science. The book illustrates and documents how cognitive science offers a unifying framework for the interaction of fields of study focusing on the human mind from linguistics and philosophy to psychology and the history of science. A selection of renowned contributors provides authoritative historical, theoretical and empirical perspectives on more than six decades of research with a special focus on the progress of cognitive science in Central Europe. Readers encounter a bird's eye view of geographical and linguistic diversity brought about by the cognitive revolution, as it is reflected in the writings of leading authors, many of whom are former students and collaborators of Csaba Pleh, a key figure of the cognitive turn in Central Europe, to whom this book is dedicated. The book appeals to students and researchers looking for the ways various approaches to the mind and the brain intersect.

In late 2018, Michael Harding was in a hotel room in Blanchardstown experiencing severe pains in his chest. He eventually phoned an ambulance and was admitted to hospital, suffering from an acute heart attack. Here, in Chest Pain, he looks at the months before the heart attack when he kept the signs of failing health from his beloved and instead retreated into solitude -- and with his own inimitable style and humour takes us with him through the months after a stent had been inserted in his heart, where he travels the roads of Donegal in a camper van in a journey back to the beloved, and to himself. Chest Pain is a thought-provoking, spell-binding memoir about togetherness and what it means to be alive.

By proposing the Microcosm and Macrocosm analogy for dialogue between Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology, the authors of this volume are reviving the perennial positioning of the human condition in the play of forces within and without the human being. This theme has run from Plato through the Middle Ages, Renaissance and Modernity, and has been ignored by contemporaries. It now acquires a new pertinence and striking significance due to the scientific discoveries into the "infinitely small" in life, on the one hand, and the prodigious technological discoveries of the "infinitely great" on the other. Both open up undreamt-of prospects for the continuing conquest of cosmic forces. The human person - thrown into turmoil by the new approaches to life and needing to acquire new habits of mind, having lost security of all beliefs - desperately seeks a new clarification of the Human Condition within the unity of everything-there-is, of cosmic forces, and of his destiny. The dialogue between Islamic Philosophy and phenomenology of life can show the way.

Papers by: Gholam-Reza A'awani, Mehdi Aminrazavi, Roza Davari Ardakani, Mohammad Azadpur, Gary Backhaus, Marina Banchetti-Robino, William Chittick, Seyed Mostafa Muhaghghegh Damad, Golamhossein Ebrahimi Dinani, Nader El-Bizri, Kathleen Haney, Salahaddin Khalilov, Sayyid Mohammad Khamenei, Mahmoud Khatami, Mieczyslaw Pawel Migon, Nikolay Milkov, Sachiko Murata, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Daniela Verducci.

The main aim of this book is to provide a critical and historical inquiry into Kant's schematism chapter contained in the Critique of Pure Reason. More specifically, the book argues that Kant's schematism chapter is a necessary step within the project of the Critique. It deals with a problem of its own, one which is not the object of the previous chapters: How can categories be applied to intuitions? The author shows that the term 'schema' has an interesting and long tradition of different philosophical uses that finds in the works of Kant a point of no-return. In the philosophical works written before Kant, the notion of schema did not have a specific and distinctive meaning and function of its own but was rather used in different contexts (from rhetoric to logic to psychology). After Kant, all philosophers who speak of schemata refer in one way or another back to Kant's distinctive notion, which possesses a specific, epistemic meaning. Moreover, this book aims to provide a contribution to the understanding of the relation between philosophy and the sciences. It is by means of demonstrating the importance of the schematism chapter not only within the Critique but also from a broader perspective, deriving from the fact that Kant's doctrine of schemata had an impressive influence not only on philosophers but also on psychologists.

This book analyzes the relation between the flow time and poetic speech in drama and rhetoric. It begins with the classical understanding of time as flux, and its problems and paradoxes entailing from Aristotle, Augustine, Kant and Husserl. The reader will see how these problems unfold and find resolutions through dramatic speech and rhetoric which has an essential relation to the flow of time. It covers elements in poetic speech such as affect, rhythm, metaphor, and syntax. It uses examples from classical rhetorical theories by Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, dramatic speeches from Shakespeare, as well as other modern dramatic texts by Chekhov, Beckett, Jelinek and Sarah Kane. This book appeals to students and academic researchers working in the philosophical fields of aesthetics and phenomenology as well those working in theater and the performing arts.

This book is devoted to the last part of Aristotle's collection of short treatises known today as the Parva Naturalia, i.e. the treatise On Youth and Old Age, on Life and Death, on Respiration. In the three main sections of the book, the author offers a translation, a commentary and a thorough analysis of this work. The author argues in favour of the unity of the work and contextualises its ideas within Aristotle's corpus and the medical tradition of his time. After an Introduction to the nature of the work and its significance for the history of natural philosophy and science, a new English translation follows, along with a detailed commentary of Chapters 1-6, which combines philosophical discussion with philological observations. The book includes four interpretive essays, which tackle problems related to the whole treatise on a more philosophical basis, including questions about the structure and unity of the work, the organisation of the material, Aristotle's methodological principles, his aims and target audience as well as the relevance of his selected themes to the thematic agenda of some Hippocratic writings. This book is of interest to students and researchers in Aristotle's psychophysiology, and his views about the embodied mind, as well as to anyone concerned with the history of natural philosophy and science more generally.

Discussions about the nature of the emotions in Hellenistic philosophy have aroused intense scholarly interest over the last few years. The topics covered by the essays in this volume range from the classical background of Hellenistic theories, through debates on emotion in the major Hellenistic schools, to discussions in later antiquity. Special emphasis is placed on the development of the Stoic views on the nature and value of the emotions. The essays are written with a high level of philosophical and classical scholarship, but contain no exclusive technicalities. Audience: This first comprehensive treatment of the emotions in Hellenistic philosophy can be read with pleasure and profit not only by professionals in ancient philosophy but also all those who are interested in the philosophy of mind and its history.

Panpsychism is the view that consciousness - the most puzzling and strangest phenomenon in the entire universe - is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the world, though in a form very remote from human consciousness. At a very basic level, the world is awake. Panpsychism seems implausible to most, and yet it has experienced a remarkable renaissance of interest over the last quarter century. The reason is the stubbornly intractable problem of consciousness. Despite immense progress in understanding the brain and its relation to states of consciousness, we still really have no idea how consciousness emerges from physical processes which are presumed to be entirely non-conscious. The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism provides a high-level comprehensive examination and assessment of the subject - its history and contemporary development. It offers 28 chapters, appearing in print here for the first time, from the world's leading researchers on panpsychism. The chapters are divided into four sections that integrate panpsychism's relevance with important issues in philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and even ethics: Historical Reflections Forms of Panpsychism Comparative Alternatives How Does Panpsychism Work? The volume will be useful to students and scholars as both an introduction and as cutting-edge philosophical engagement with the subject. For anyone interested in a philosophical approach to panpsychism, the Handbook will supply fascinating and enlightening reading. The topics covered are highly diverse, representing a spectrum of views on the nature of mind and world from various standpoints which take panpsychism seriously.

Trust is pervasive in our lives. Both our simplest actions - like buying a coffee, or crossing the street - as well as the functions of large collective institutions - like those of corporations and nation states - would not be possible without it. Yet only in the last several decades has trust started to receive focused attention from philosophers as a specific topic of investigation. The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy brings together 31 never-before published chapters, accessible for both students and researchers, created to cover the most salient topics in the various theories of trust. The Handbook is broken up into three sections: I. What is Trust? II. Whom to Trust? III. Trust in Knowledge, Science, and Technology The Handbook is preceded by a foreword by Maria Baghramian, an introduction by volume editor Judith Simon, and each chapter includes a bibliography and cross-references to other entries in the volume.

This carefully designed, multi-authored textbook covers a broad range of theoretical issues in cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience. With accessible language, a uniform structure, and many pedagogical features, Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introdution is the best high-level overview of this area for an interdisciplinary readership of students. Written specifically for this volume by experts in their fields who are also experienced teachers, the book's thirty chapters are organized into the following parts: I. Background Knowledge II. Classical Debates III. Consciousness IV. Crossing Boundaries Each chapter starts with relevant key words and definitions and a chapter overview, then presents historical coverage of the topic, explains and analyzes contemporary debates, and ends with a sketch of cutting edge research. A list of suggested readings and helpful discussion topics conclude each chapter. This uniform, student-friendly design makes it possible to teach a cohort of both philosophy and interdisciplinary students without assuming prior understanding of philosophical concepts, cognitive science, or neuroscience. Key Features: Synthesizes the now decades-long explosion of scientifically informed philosophical research in the study of mind. Expands on the offerings of other textbooks by including chapters on language, concepts and non-conceptual content, and animal cognition. Offers the same structure in each chapter, moving the reader through an overview, historical coverage, contemporary debates, and finally cutting-edge research. Packed with pedagogical features, like defined Key Terms, Suggested Readings, and Discussion Questions for each chapter, as well as a General Glossary. Provides readers with clear, chapter-long introductions to Cognitive Neuroscience, Molecular and Cellular Cognition, Experimental Methods in Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysical Issues, and Epistemic Issues.

An epic exploration of the historical foundations, philosophic and scientific mechanisms of infinite universe cosmology, Mechanisms offers personal exploration of the physical mechanisms of eternal consciousness, starting from the smallest known quanta found so far, the most fundamental physical particles and molecular systems, proceeding through the simplest life forms to the most complex nervous systems and beyond, to sets and metasets of pattern equivalent and pattern-related minds- entities which generate eternal consciousness. For thousands of years, great thinkers have argued passionately and even died for the idea that the universe is infinite, that all of us live endless times and have endless potential. This belief has been common worldwide throughout history. Many scientists still struggle with the ideas of actual infinity and eternity, but modern science has reached a level of knowledge of the physical, chemical and biological systems of our universe that will allow us to start building theories explaining phenomena once thought to be forever in the realm of faith and closed to science. Let's see if the the physical and the spiritual are so exclusive of one another after all. This work will appeal to spiritual seekers who want to integrate scientific evidence for eternal, transcendent consciousness into their lives as well as to scientific thinkers who suspect there is more to existence than can be explained by modern reductionist science. All beings live endless times and have endless possibilities. and seems to come from deep human instinct. There is great power in this debate, on one side for the individual, free-thinking mind and on the other for those who wish to declare themselves authorities over the realities of the universe and existence. In every age there has been no shortage of the latter, and they have often tried actively to silence the former. The debate has evolved over the centuries, but modern science still struggles with the idea of actual infinites and eternities. The idea reaches deeply into personal, religious, philosophical and scientific realms, and over the ages has been seen by its proponents as highly liberating, offering the best paradigm for endless potentials of all types, spiritual and scientific. Critics and antagonists have seen it as threatening and humiliating to their fixed spiritual and scientific systems. Transcend intentionally limited conceptual and physical barriers to understanding our existence and meaning in the universe handed down by "authorities" who rely on two-dimensional reductionist assumptions and methods. Don't assume that only experts in particle physics and astrophysics can have ideas on what the universe is and how it works, it is here with us on all levels. No special or transcendent mode exists for higher consciousness in the modern cosmological paradigm, but advanced science indicates that neural systems (minds) are actually infinitely self-contained and self-creating. Universal fractal geometry, holistic biology and chaos science show that no pattern category is more real or absolute than any other.

This book tackles the challenging question which mathematical formalisms and possibly new physical notions should be developed for quantitatively describing human cognition and behavior, in addition to the ones already developed in the physical and cognitive sciences. Indeed, physics is widely used in modeling social systems, where, in particular, new branches of science such as sociophysics and econophysics have arisen. However, many if not most characteristic features of humans like willingness, emotions, memory, future prediction, and moral norms, to name but a few, are not yet properly reflected in the paradigms of physical thought and theory. The choice of a relevant formalism for modeling mental phenomena requires the comprehension of the general philosophical questions related to the mind-body problem. Plausible answers to these questions are investigated and reviewed, notions and concepts to be used or to be taken into account are developed and some challenging questions are posed as open problems. This text addresses theoretical physicists and neuroscientists modeling any systems and processes where human factors play a crucial role, philosophers interested in applying philosophical concepts to the construction of mathematical models, and the mathematically oriented psychologists and sociologists, whose research is fundamentally related to modeling mental processes.

According to the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. This book elucidates the nature of the cognitive penetrability and impenetrability hypotheses, assesses their plausibility, and explores their philosophical consequences. It connects the topic's multiple strands (the psychological findings, computationalist background, epistemological consequences of cognitive architecture, and recent philosophical developments) at a time when the outcome of many philosophical debates depends on knowing whether and how cognitive states can influence perception. All sixteen chapters were written especially for the book. The first chapters provide methodological and conceptual clarification of the topic and give an account of the relations between penetrability, encapsulation, modularity, and cross-modal interactions in perception. Assessments of psychological and neuroscientific evidence for cognitive penetration are given by several chapters. Most of the contributions analyse the impact of cognitive penetrability and impenetrability on specific philosophical topics: high-level perceptual contents, the epistemological consequences of penetration, nonconceptual content, the phenomenology of late perception, metacognitive feelings, and action. The book includes a comprehensive introduction which explains the history of the debate, its key technical concepts (informational encapsulation, early and late vision, the perception-cognition distinction, hard-wired perceptual processing, perceptual learning, theory-ladenness), and the debate's relevance to current topics in the philosophy of mind and perception, epistemology, and philosophy of psychology.

As the crowd stood and applauded for the neurophysiologist Du Bois-Reymond's lecture on August 14, 1872, they did not know that his lecture on the seven riddles of the universe would be long remembered. Scientists at the time believed that science could unlock all of the mysteries of the universe. However, the scientific revolution of the early 20th century fueled by relativity and quantum mechanics would upend the scientific world confirming Du Bois-Reymond's insights. This book explores the brilliance of Du Bois-Reymond's life and work and a vastly expanded scientific understanding of these riddles through the modern disciplines of physics, chemistry, and biology. Despite the progress, underlying metaphysical notions still haunt the riddles. Utilizing notions from Whitehead's Process Philosophy, the author delves into the underlying structure of our universe and outlines the nature of the deity that emerges. Part two of this book examines the riddles consequent demands on theology and religion through the lens of the extraordinary teacher, philosopher, and theologian William DeWitt Hyde. The author clarifies notions about miracles, immortality, and wisdom. This book takes the reader on a vivid, imaginative journey towards unraveling the mysteries of our existence, roles in society, and personal loyalties.

Emotions shape our mental and social lives. Their relation to morality is, however, problematic. Since ancient times, philosophers have disagreed about the place of emotions in morality. One the one hand, some hold that emotions are disorderly and unpredictable animal drives, which undermine our autonomy and interfere with our reasoning. For them, emotions represent a persistent source of obstacles to morality, as in the case of self-love. Some virtues, such as prudence, temperance, and fortitude, require or simply consist in the capacity to counteract the disruptive effect of emotions. On the other hand, venerable traditions of thought place emotions such as respect, love, and compassion at the very heart of morality. Emotions are sources of moral knowledge, modes of moral recognition, discernment, valuing, and understanding. Emotions such as blame, guilt, and shame are the voice of moral conscience, and are central to the functioning of our social lives and normative practices. New scientific findings about the pervasiveness of emotions posit new challenges to ethical theory. Are we responsible for emotions? What is their relation to practical rationality? Are they roots of our identity or threats to our autonomy? This volume is born out of the conviction that philosophy provides a distinctive approach to these problems. Fourteen original articles, by prominent scholars in moral psychology and philosophy of mind, offer new arguments about the relation between emotions and practical rationality, value, autonomy, and moral identity.