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Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Western philosophy > Western philosophy, c 500 to c 1600
Aristotle in Aquinas's Theology explores the role of Aristotelian
concepts, principles, and themes in Thomas Aquinas's theology. Each
chapter investigates the significance of Aquinas's theological
reception of Aristotle in a central theological domain: the
Trinity, the angels, soul and body, the Mosaic law, grace, charity,
justice, contemplation and action, Christ, and the sacraments. In
general, the essays focus on the Summa theologiae, but some range
more widely in Aquinas's corpus. For some time, it has above all
been the influence of Aristotle on Aquinas's philosophy that has
been the centre of attention. Perhaps in reaction to philosophical
neo-Thomism, or perhaps because this Aristotelian influence appears
no longer necessary to demonstrate, the role of Aristotle in
Aquinas's theology presently receives less theological attention
than does Aquinas's use of other authorities (whether Scripture or
particular Fathers), especially in domains outside of theological
ethics. Indeed, in some theological circles the influence of
Aristotle upon Aquinas's theology is no longer well understood.
Readers will encounter here the great Aristotelian themes, such as
act and potency, God as pure act, substance and accidents, power
and generation, change and motion, fourfold causality, form and
matter, hylomorphic anthropology, the structure of intellection,
the relationship between knowledge and will, happiness and
friendship, habits and virtues, contemplation and action, politics
and justice, the best form of government, and private property and
the common good. The ten essays in this book engage Aquinas's
reception of Aristotle in his theology from a variety of points of
view: historical, philosophical, and constructively theological.
Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy showcases the best scholarly
research in this flourishing field. The series covers all aspects
of medieval philosophy, including the Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew
traditions, and runs from the end of antiquity into the
Renaissance. It publishes new work by leading scholars in the
field, and combines historical scholarship with philosophical
acuteness. The papers will address a wide range of topics, from
political philosophy to ethics, and logic to metaphysics. OSMP is
an essential resource for anyone working in the area.
Das Buch widmet sich poetischen Positionierungen zu kosmologischen
Problemfeldern in lateinischen und deutschsprachigen Epen des
Hochmittelalters, u.a. der Cosmographia, dem Architrenius, dem
Laborintus, Flore und Blanscheflur, dem Wigalois sowie der Crone.
Dabei plausibilisiert es ein Diskursnetz im Bereich jeweils
kosmologisch fundierter anthropologischer, epistemologischer sowie
poeto-logischer Fragehorizonte. An die Stelle eines einstrangigen
Fortschrittsnarrativs tritt die Annahme einer 'Gemengelage', einer
Textlandschaft aus verstreuten Einheiten. Gezeigt wird, wie diese
sich - zumeist in Form von Verschiebungen, UEberlagerungen und
Synkretismen - zu den drangenden Fragen zeitgenoessischer
Kosmologie im 12./13. Jahrhundert positionieren.
Graciela De Pierris presents a novel interpretation of the
relationship between skepticism and naturalism in Hume's
epistemology, and a new appraisal of Hume's place within early
modern thought. Whereas a dominant trend in recent Hume scholarship
maintains that there are no skeptical arguments concerning
causation and induction in Book I, Part III of the Treatise,
Graciela De Pierris presents a detailed reading of the skeptical
argument she finds there and how this argument initiates a train of
skeptical reasoning that begins in Part III and culminates in Part
IV. This reasoning is framed by Hume's version of the modern theory
of ideas developed by Descartes and Locke. The skeptical
implications of this theory, however, do not arise, as in
traditional interpretations of Hume's skepticism, from the 'veil of
perception.' They arise from Hume's elaboration of a
presentational-phenomenological model of ultimate evidence,
according to which there is always a justificatory gap between what
is or has been immediately presented to the mind and any ideas that
go beyond it. This happens, paradigmatically, in the
causal-inductive inference, and, as De Pierris argues, in
demonstrative inference as well. Yet, in spite of his firm
commitment to radical skepticism, Hume also accepts the
naturalistic standpoint of science and common life, and he does so,
on the novel interpretation presented here, because of an equally
firm commitment to Newtonian science in general and the Newtonian
inductive method in particular. Hume defends the Newtonian method
(against the mechanical philosophy) while simultaneously rejecting
all attempts (including those of the Newtonians) to find a place
for the supernatural within our understanding of nature.
Hegel's Encyclopaedia Logic constitutes the foundation of the
system of philosophy presented in his Encyclopaedia of the
Philosophical Sciences. Together with his Science of Logic, it
contains the most explicit formulation of his enduringly
influential dialectical method and of the categorical system
underlying his thought. It offers a more compact presentation of
his dialectical method than is found elsewhere, and also
incorporates changes that he would have made to the second edition
of the Science of Logic if he had lived to do so. This volume
presents it in a new translation with a helpful introduction and
notes. It will be a valuable reference work for scholars and
students of Hegel and German idealism, as well as for those who are
interested in the post-Hegelian character of contemporary
philosophy.
This volume casts a new light on Byzantium as a geographical and
cultural intersection. For nearly a millennium, Byzantium was an
important crossroads where cultures, people, and institutions from
the entire Mediterranean area came together. Key subjects of
interest explored by this volume include reciprocal cultural and
epistemic processes of reception and transformation and the forms
of knowledge associated with them.
Thomas Aquinas is widely recognized as one of history's most
significant Christian theologians and one of the most powerful
philosophical minds of the western tradition. But what has often
not been sufficiently attended to is the fact that he carried out
his theological and philosophical labours as a part of his vocation
as a Dominican friar, dedicated to a life of preaching and the care
of souls. Fererick Christian Bauerschmidt places Aquinas's thought
within the context of that vocation, and argues that his views on
issues of God, creation, Christology, soteriology, and the
Christian life are both shaped by and in service to the distinctive
goals of the Dominicans. What Aquinas says concerning both matters
of faith and matters of reason, as well as his understanding of the
relationship between the two, are illuminated by the particular
Dominican call to serve God through handing on to others through
preaching and teaching the fruits of one's own theological
reflection.
Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy showcases the best scholarly
research in this flourishing field. The series covers all aspects
of medieval philosophy, including the Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew
traditions, and runs from the end of antiquity into the
Renaissance. It publishes new work by leading scholars in the
field, and combines historical scholarship with philosophical
acuteness. The papers will address a wide range of topics, from
political philosophy to ethics, and logic to metaphysics. OSMP is
an essential resource for anyone working in the area.
Descartes and the First Cartesians adopts the perspective that we
should not approach Rene Descartes as a solitary thinker, but as a
philosopher who constructs a dialogue with his contemporaries, so
as to engage them and elements of his society into his
philosophical enterprise. Roger Ariew argues that an important
aspect of this engagement concerns the endeavor to establish
Cartesian philosophy in the Schools, that is, to replace Aristotle
as the authority there. Descartes wrote the Principles of
Philosophy as something of a rival to Scholastic textbooks,
initially conceiving the project as a comparison of his philosophy
and that of the Scholastics. Still, what Descartes produced was
inadequate for the task. The topics of Scholastic textbooks ranged
more broadly than those of Descartes; they usually had
quadripartite arrangements mirroring the structure of the
collegiate curriculum, divided as they typically were into logic,
ethics, physics, and metaphysics. But Descartes produced at best
only what could be called a general metaphysics and a partial
physics. These deficiencies in the Cartesian program and in its
aspiration to replace Scholastic philosophy in the schools caused
the Cartesians to rush in to fill the voids. The attempt to publish
a Cartesian textbook that would mirror what was taught in the
schools began in the 1650s with Jacques Du Roure and culminated in
the 1690s with Pierre-Sylvain Regis and Antoine Le Grand. Ariew's
original account thus considers the reception of Descartes' work,
and establishes the significance of his philosophical enterprise in
relation to the textbooks of the first Cartesians and in contrast
with late Scholastic textbooks.
For nearly four centuries, when logic was the heart of what we now
call the 'undergraduate curriculum', Peter of Spain's Summaries of
Logic (c. 1230) was the basis for teaching that subject. Because
Peter's students were teenagers, he wrote simply and organized his
book carefully. Since no book about logic was read by more people
until the twentieth century, the Summaries has extensively and
profoundly influenced the distinctly Western way of speaking
formally and writing formal prose by constructing well-formed
sentences, making valid arguments, and refuting and defending
arguments in debate. Some books, like the Authorized Version of the
English Bible and the collected plays of Shakespeare, have been
more influential in the Anglophone world than Peter's Summaries-but
not many. This new English translation, based on an update of the
Latin text of Lambertus De Rijk, comes with an extensive
introduction that deals with authorship, dating, and the place of
the Summaries in the development of logic, before providing a
chapter-by-chapter analysis of Peter's book, followed by an
analysis of his system from the point of view of modern logic. The
Latin text is presented on facing pages with the English
translation, accompanied by notes, and the book includes a full
bibliography.
Richard Cross provides the first complete and detailed account of
Duns Scotus's theory of cognition, tracing the processes involved
in cognition from sensation, through intuition and abstraction, to
conceptual thought. He provides an analysis of the ontological
status of the various mental items (acts and dispositions) involved
in cognition, and a new account of Scotus on nature of conceptual
content. Cross goes on to offer a novel, reductionist,
interpretation of Scotus's view of the ontological status of
representational content, as well as new accounts of Scotus's
opinions on intuitive cognition, intelligible species, and the
varieties of consciousness. Scotus was a perceptive but highly
critical reader of his intellectual forebears, and this volume
places his thought clearly within the context of thirteenth-century
reflections on cognitive psychology, influenced as they were by
Aristotle, Augustine, and Avicenna. As far as possible, Duns
Scotus's Theory of Cognition traces developments in Scotus's
thought during the ten or so highly productive years that formed
the bulk of his intellectual life.
It has been over a decade since the first edition of The Cambridge
Companion to Augustine was published. In that time, reflection on
Augustine's life and labors has continued to bear much fruit:
significant new studies into major aspects of his thinking have
appeared, as well as studies of his life and times and new
translations of his work. This new edition of the Companion, which
replaces the earlier volume, has eleven new chapters, revised
versions of others, and a comprehensive updated bibliography. It
will furnish students and scholars of Augustine with a rich
resource on a philosopher whose work continues to inspire
discussion and debate.
What is the nature of the material world? And how are its
fundamental constituents to be described? These questions are of
central concern to contemporary philosophers, and in their attempt
to answer them, they have begun reconsidering traditional views
about metaphysical structure, including the Aristotelian view that
material objects are best described as 'hylomorphic compounds'-that
is, objects composed of both matter (hyle) and form (morphe). In
this major new study, Jeffrey E. Brower presents and explains the
hylomorphic conception of the material world developed by Thomas
Aquinas, the most influential Aristotelian of the Middle Ages.
According to Brower, the key to understanding Aquinas's conception
lies in his distinctive account of intrinsic change. Beginning with
a novel analysis of this account, Brower systematically introduces
all the elements of Aquinas's hylomorphism, showing how they apply
to material objects in general and human beings in particular. The
resulting picture not only sheds new light on Aquinas's ontology as
a whole, but provides a wholesale alternative to the standard
contemporary accounts of material objects. In addition to
presenting and explaining Aquinas's views, Brower seeks wherever
possible to bring them into dialogue with the best recent
literature on related topics. Along the way, he highlights the
contribution that Aquinas's views make to a host of contemporary
metaphysical debates, including the nature of change, composition,
material constitution, the ontology of stuff vs. things, the proper
analysis of ordinary objects, the truthmakers for essential vs.
accidental predication, and the metaphysics of property possession.
Die menschliche Lebensfuhrung ist weder durch Wesenheiten
vorherbestimmt noch eine beliebige Konstruktion. Sie bedarf der
Aufdeckung der zum Leben notigen Moglichkeiten. Dieser Kategorische
Konjunktiv beugt der unmenschlichen Verstetigung ungespielten
Lachens und Weinens vor. Menschliche Lebewesen brauchen einen
geschichtlichen Prozess, um ihre Natur offentlich herausproduzieren
zu konnen. Die Wahrnehmung der ersten Person bedeutet Teilnahme an
der Semiosis lebendiger Augenblicke. Diesseits von Naturalismus und
Sprachidealismus wird hier der dritte Weg eines
modernitatskritischen Philosophierens erkundet. Auf jenem Weg
Philosophischer Anthropologie kommt der Geschlechterfrage ein hoher
Stellenwert zu. Die Selbstermachtigung zur Produktion biologischer
und soziokultureller Geschlechterbestimmungen hat ihre Grenzen am
notigen Respekt vor unserer erotischen Leibesnatur."
The French author Michel de Montaigne is widely regarded as the
founder and greatest practitioner of the personal essay. A member
of the minor aristocracy, he worked as a judicial investigator,
served as mayor of Bordeaux, and sought to bring stability to his
war-torn country during the latter half of the sixteenth century.
He is best known today, however, as the author of the Essays, a
vast collection of meditations on topics ranging from love and
sexuality to freedom, learning, doubt, self-scrutiny, and peace of
mind. One of the most original books ever to emerge from Europe,
Montaigne's masterpiece has been continuously and powerfully
influential among writers and philosophers from its first
appearance down to the present day. His extraordinary curiosity and
discernment, combined with his ability to mix thoughtful judgment
with revealing anecdote, make him one of the most readable of all
writers. In Montaigne: A Very Short Introduction, William M. Hamlin
provides an overview of Montaigne's life, thought, and writing,
situating the Essays within the arc of Montaigne's lived experience
and focusing on themes of particular interest for contemporary
readers. Designed for a broad audience, this introduction will
appeal to first-time students of Montaigne as well as to seasoned
experts and admirers. Well-informed and lucidly written, Hamlin's
book offers an ideal point of entry into the life and work of the
world's first and most extraordinary essayist.
Terence Parsons presents a new study of the development and logical
complexity of medieval logic. Basic principles of logic were used
by Aristotle to prove conversion principles and reduce syllogisms.
Medieval logicians expanded Aristotle's notation in several ways,
such as quantifying predicate terms, as in 'No donkey is every
animal', and allowing singular terms to appear in predicate
position, as in 'Not every donkey is Brownie'; with the enlarged
notation come additional logical principles. The resulting system
of logic is able to deal with relational expressions, as in De
Morgan's puzzles about heads of horses. A crucial issue is a
mechanism for dealing with anaphoric pronouns, as in 'Every woman
loves her mother'. Parsons illuminates the ways in which medieval
logic is as rich as contemporary first-order symbolic logic, though
its full potential was not envisaged at the time. Along the way, he
provides a detailed exposition and examination of the theory of
modes of common personal supposition, and the useful principles of
logic included with it. An appendix discusses the artificial signs
introduced in the fifteenth century to alter quantifier scope.
Frederick F. Schmitt offers a systematic interpretation of David
Hume's epistemology, as it is presented in the indispensable A
Treatise of Human Nature. Hume's text alternately manifests
scepticism, empiricism, and naturalism in epistemology.
Interpretations of his epistemology have tended to emphasise one of
these apparently conflicting positions over the others. But Schmitt
argues that the positions can be reconciled by tracing them to a
single underlying epistemology of knowledge and probability quietly
at work in the text, an epistemology according to which truth is
the chief cognitive merit of a belief, and knowledge and probable
belief are species of reliable belief. Hume adopts Locke's
dichotomy between knowledge and probability and reassigns causal
inference from its traditional place in knowledge to the domain of
probability-his most significant departure from earlier accounts of
cognition. This shift of causal inference to an associative and
imaginative operation raises doubts about the merit of causal
inference, suggesting the counterintuitive consequence that causal
inference is wholly inferior to knowledge-producing demonstration.
To defend his associationist psychology of causal inference from
this suggestion, Hume must favourably compare causal inference with
demonstration in a manner compatible with associationism. He does
this by finding an epistemic status shared by demonstrative
knowledge and causally inferred beliefs-the status of justified
belief. On the interpretation developed here, he identifies
knowledge with infallible belief and justified belief with reliable
belief, i.e., belief produced by truth-conducive belief-forming
operations. Since infallibility implies reliable belief, knowledge
implies justified belief. He then argues that causally inferred
beliefs are reliable, so share this status with knowledge. Indeed
Hume assumes that causally inferred beliefs enjoy this status in
his very argument for associationism. On the reliability
interpretation, Hume's accounts of knowledge and justified belief
are part of a broader veritistic epistemology making true belief
the chief epistemic value and goal of science. The veritistic
interpretation advanced here contrasts with interpretations on
which the chief epistemic value of belief is its empirical
adequacy, stability, or fulfilment of a natural function, as well
as with the suggestion that the chief value of belief is its
utility for common life. Veritistic interpretations are offered of
the natural function of belief, the rules of causal inference,
scepticism about body and matter, and the criteria of
justification. As Schmitt shows, there is much attention to Hume's
sources in Locke and to the complexities of his epistemic
vocabulary.
Five hundred years before “Jabberwocky” and Tender Buttons,
writers were already preoccupied with the question of nonsense. But
even as the prevalence in medieval texts of gibberish, babble,
birdsong, and allusions to bare voice has come into view in recent
years, an impression persists that these phenomena are exceptions
that prove the rule of the period’s theologically motivated
commitment to the kernel of meaning over and against the shell of
the mere letter. This book shows that, to the contrary, the
foundational object of study of medieval linguistic thought was vox
non-significativa, the utterance insofar as it means nothing
whatsoever, and that this fact was not lost on medieval writers of
various kinds. In a series of close and unorthodox readings of
works by Priscian, Boethius, Augustine, Walter Burley, Geoffrey
Chaucer, and the anonymous authors of the Cloud of Unknowing and
St. Erkenwald, it inquires into the way that a number of
fourteenth-century writers recognized possibilities inherent in the
accounts of language transmitted to them from antiquity and
transformed those accounts into new ideas, forms, and practices of
non-signification. Retrieving a premodern hermeneutics of obscurity
in order to provide materials for an archeology of the category of
the literary, Medieval Nonsense shows how these medieval linguistic
textbooks, mystical treatises, and poems were engineered in such a
way as to arrest the faculty of interpretation and force it to
focus on the extinguishing of sense that occurs in the encounter
with language itself.
Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy showcases the best scholarly
research in this flourishing field. The series covers all aspects
of medieval philosophy, including the Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew
traditions, and runs from the end of antiquity into the
Renaissance. It publishes new work by leading scholars in the
field, and combines historical scholarship with philosophical
acuteness. The papers will address a wide range of topics, from
political philosophy to ethics, and logic to metaphysics. OSMP is
an essential resource for anyone working in the area.
Die MISCELLANEA MEDIAEVALIA prasentieren seit ihrer Grundung durch
Paul Wilpert im Jahre 1962 Arbeiten des Thomas-Instituts der
Universitat zu Koeln. Das Kernstuck der Publikationsreihe bilden
die Akten der im zweijahrigen Rhythmus stattfindenden Koelner
Mediaevistentagungen, die vor uber 50 Jahren von Josef Koch, dem
Grundungsdirektor des Instituts, ins Leben gerufen wurden. Der
interdisziplinare Charakter dieser Kongresse pragt auch die
Tagungsakten: Die MISCELLANEA MEDIAEVALIA versammeln Beitrage aus
allen mediavistischen Disziplinen - die mittelalterliche
Geschichte, die Philosophie, die Theologie sowie die Kunst- und
Literaturwissenschaften sind Teile einer Gesamtbetrachtung des
Mittelalters.
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