Will higher pay provide an incentive for better work? Can
productivity be increased by changing the way workers are
compensated? In response to the urgent need to improve productivity
performance in American industry, leading economists examine
alternative compensation schemes to assess their efficiency in
raising productivity.
Over the years a number of suggestions have been made for
improving labor productivity by changing the manner in which
laborers are compensated for their efforts. The ideas presented and
analyzed in this volume have all been put into practice, in
modified form or on a small scale, in the United States or
elsewhere. Some are new; others quite old.
David I. Levine and Laura D'Andrea Tyson consider the effects of
employee participation in decisionmaking on firm performance, and
Martin L. Weitzman and Douglas L. Kruse discuss the implications of
profit sharing and related forms of pay for group performance.
Michael A. Conte and Jan Svejnar analyze employee stock ownership
plans in the United States and other forms of worker ownership in
Europe; Masanore Hashimoto uses a transaction-cost perspective to
assess Japanese employment and wage systems. Daniel J. B. Mitchell,
David Lewin, and Edward E. Lawler III give an overall analysis of
traditional and alternative pay systems, their history,
development, and curent use, and recommend further experimentation
with alternative compensation plans to ensure more adaptability on
the part of U.S. firms. Blinder provides an overview of the
findings and conclusions.
General
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