This book articulates an original scheme for the conceptualization
of action. Beginning with a new approach to the individuation of
acts, it delineates the relationships between basic and non-basic
acts and uses these relationships in the definition of ability and
intentional action. The author exhibits the central role of wants
and beliefs in the causation of acts and in the analysis of the
concept of action. Professor Goldman suggests answers to
fundamental questions about acts, and develops a set of ideas and
principles that can be used in the philosophy of mind, the
philosophy of language, ethics, and other fields, including the
behavioral sciences. Originally published in 1977. The Princeton
Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again
make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished
backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the
original texts of these important books while presenting them in
durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton
Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly
heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton
University Press since its founding in 1905.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!