America's second war against Iraq differed notably from its first.
Operation Desert Storm was a limited effort by coalition forces to
drive out those Iraqi troops who had seized Kuwait six months
before. In contrast, the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi
Freedom in 2003 was a more ambitious undertaking aimed at
decisively ending Saddam Hussein's rule.
After several days of intense air strikes against fixed enemy
targets, allied air operations began concentrating on Iraqi ground
troops. The intended effect was to destroy Iraqi resistance and
allow coalition land forces to maneuver without pausing in response
to enemy actions. Iraqi tank concentrations were struck with
consistently lethal effect, paving the way for an allied entrance
into Baghdad that was largely unopposed. Hussein's regime finally
collapsed on April 9. Viewed in hindsight, it was the combination
of allied air power as an indispensable enabler and the unexpected
rapidity of the allied ground advance that allowed coalition forces
to overrun Baghdad before Iraq could mount a coherent defense.
In achieving this unprecedented level of performance, allied air
power was indispensable in setting the conditions for the
campaign's end. Freedom from attack and freedom to attack prevailed
for allied ground forces. The intended effect of allied air
operations was to facilitate the quickest capture of Baghdad
without the occurrence of any major head-to-head battles on the
ground.
This impressive short-term achievement, however, was soon
overshadowed by the ensuing insurgency that continued for four
years thereafter in Iraq. The mounting costs of that turmoil
tended, for a time, to render the campaign's initial successes all
but forgotten. Only more recently did the war begin showing signs
of reaching an agreeable end when the coalition's commander put
into effect a new counterinsurgency strategy in 2007 aimed at
providing genuine security for Iraqi citizens.
The toppling of Hussein's regime ended the iron rule of an odious
dictator who had brutalized his people for more than 30 years. Yet
the inadequate resourcing with which that goal was pursued showed
that any effective plan for a regime takedown must include due
hedging against the campaign's likely aftermath in addition to
simply seeing to the needs of major combat. That said, despite the
failure of the campaign's planners to underwrite the first need
adequately, those who conducted the three-week offensive in pursuit
of regime change performed all but flawlessly, thanks in
considerable part to the mostly unobserved but crucial enabling
contributions of allied air power.
General
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