"Minds, Causes, and Mechanisms" questions the internal consistency
of causal physicalism, and vindicates a novel approach to mental
causation. Through a series of original and detailed arguments, it
is made clear that many difficulties in the physicalist picture
derive from an implausible view about causality. An alternative
approach is defended which shows how mental contents, as opposed to
functional properties, may be causally efficacious without having
an implementing mechanism.
This volume includes a lucid discussion of recent developments
by philosophers such as Block, Davidson, Fodor, Kim, Lewis, Mellor,
Putnam, Schiffer, Shoemaker, and Yablo.
No one who wants to deal with the issue of mental causation, or
causation in general, will be able to ignore the strong case
against physicalism that this book makes.
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