Scientists use concepts and principles that are partly specific for
their subject matter, but they also share part of them with
colleagues working in different fields. Compare the biological
notion of a 'natural kind' with the general notion of
'confirmation' of a hypothesis by certain evidence. Or compare the
physical principle of the 'conservation of energy' and the general
principle of 'the unity of science'. Scientists agree that all such
notions and principles aren't as crystal clear as one might wish.
An important task of the philosophy of the special sciences, such
as philosophy of physics, of biology and of economics, to mention
only a few of the many flourishing examples, is the clarification
of such subject specific concepts and principles. Similarly, an
important task of 'general' philosophy of science is the
clarification of concepts like 'confirmation' and principles like
'the unity of science'. It is evident that clarfication of concepts
and principles only makes sense if one tries to do justice, as much
as possible, to the actual use of these notions by scientists,
without however following this use slavishly. That is, occasionally
a philosopher may have good reasons for suggesting to scientists
that they should deviate from a standard use. Frequently, this
amounts to a plea for differentiation in order to stop debates at
cross-purposes due to the conflation of different meanings.
While the special volumes of the series of Handbooks of the
Philosophy of Science address topics relative to a specific
discipline, this general volume deals with focal issues of a
general nature.
After an editorial introduction about the dominant method of
clarifying concepts and principles in philosophy of science, called
explication, the first five chapters deal with the following
subjects. Laws, theories, and research programs as units of
empirical knowledge (Theo Kuipers), various past and contemporary
perspectives on explanation (Stathis Psillos), the evaluation of
theories in terms of their virtues (Ilkka Niiniluto), and the role
of experiments in the natural sciences, notably physics and biology
(Allan Franklin), and their role in the social sciences, notably
economics (Wenceslao Gonzalez).
In the subsequent three chapters there is even more attention to
various positions and methods that philosophers of science and
scientists may favor: ontological, epistemological, and
methodological positions (James Ladyman), reduction, integration,
and the unity of science as aims in the sciences and the humanities
(William Bechtel and Andrew Hamilton), and logical, historical and
computational approaches to the philosophy of science (Atocha
Aliseda and Donald Gillies).
The volume concludes with the much debated question of demarcating
science from nonscience (Martin Mahner) and the rich
European-American history of the philosophy of science in the 20th
century (Friedrich Stadler).
- Comprehensive coverage of the philosophy of science written by
leading philosophers in this field
- Clear style of writing for an interdisciplinary audience
- No specific pre-knowledge required
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