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Congress and the Rent-seeking Society (Hardcover)
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Congress and the Rent-seeking Society (Hardcover)
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Total price: R2,258
Discovery Miles: 22 580
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Skillfully blending historical data with microeconomic theory,
Glenn Parker argues that the incentives for congressional service
have declined over the years, and that with that decline has come a
change in the kind of person who seeks to enter Congress. The
decline in the attractiveness of Congress is a consequence of
congressional careerists and of the growth in the rent-seeking
society, a term which describes the efforts of special interests to
obtain preferential treatment by using the machinery of
government--legislation and regulations. Parker provides a fresh
and controversial perspective to the debate surrounding the
relative merits of career or amateur politicians. He argues that
driving career politicians from office can have pernicious effects
on the political system: it places the running of Congress in the
hands of amateur politicians, who stand to lose little if they are
found engaging in illegal or quasi-legal practices. On the other
hand, career legislators risk all they have invested in their long
careers in public service if they engage in unsavory practices. As
Parker develops this controversial argument, he provides a fresh
perspective on the debate surrounding the value of career versus
amateur politicians. Little attention has been given to the
long-term impact of a rent-seeking society on the evolution of
political institutions. Parker examines empirically and finds
support for hypotheses that reflect potential symptoms of adverse
selection in the composition of Congress: (1) rent-seeking
politicians are more inclined than others to manipulate
institutional arrangements for financial gain; (2) the rent-seeking
milieu of legislators are more likely to engage in rent-seeking
activity than earlier generations; (3) and the growth of
rent-seeking activity has hastened the departure of career
legislators. Glenn R. Parker is Distinguished Research Professor,
Florida State University.
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