This monograph provides a new account of justified inference as
a cognitive process. In contrast to the prevailing tradition in
epistemology, the focus is on low-level inferences, i.e., those
inferences that we are usually not consciously aware of and that we
share with the cat nearby which infers that the bird which she sees
picking grains from the dirt, is able to fly. Presumably, such
inferences are not generated by explicit logical reasoning, but
logical methods can be used to describe and analyze such
inferences.
Part 1 gives a purely system-theoretic explication of belief and
inference. Part 2 adds a reliabilist theory of justification for
inference, with a qualitative notion of reliability being employed.
Part 3 recalls and extends various systems of deductive and
nonmonotonic logic and thereby explains the semantics of absolute
and high reliability. In Part 4 it is proven that qualitative
neural networks are able to draw justified deductive and
nonmonotonic inferences on the basis of distributed
representations. This is derived from a soundness/completeness
theorem with regard to cognitive semantics of nonmonotonic
reasoning. The appendix extends the theory both logically and
ontologically, and relates it to A. Goldman's reliability account
of justified belief.
This text will be of interest to epistemologists and logicians,
to all computer scientists who work on nonmonotonic reasoning and
neural networks, and to cognitive scientists.
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