This Element presents a philosophical exploration of the notion of
scientific representation. It does so by focussing on an important
class of scientific representations, namely scientific models.
Models are important in the scientific process because scientists
can study a model to discover features of reality. But what does it
mean for something to represent something else? This is the
question discussed in this Element. The authors begin by
disentangling different aspects of the problem of representation
and then discuss the dominant accounts in the philosophical
literature: the resemblance view and inferentialism. They find them
both wanting and submit that their own preferred option, the
so-called DEKI account, not only eschews the problems that beset
these conceptions, but further provides a comprehensive answer to
the question of how scientific representation works. This title is
also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
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