Jonathan Y. Tsou examines and defends positions on central issues
in philosophy of psychiatry. The positions defended assume a
naturalistic and realist perspective and are framed against
skeptical perspectives on biological psychiatry. Issues addressed
include the reality of mental disorders; mechanistic and disease
explanations of abnormal behavior; definitions of mental disorder;
natural and artificial kinds in psychiatry; biological essentialism
and the projectability of psychiatric categories; looping effects
and the stability of mental disorders; psychiatric classification;
and the validity of the DSM's diagnostic categories. The main
argument defended by Tsou is that genuine mental disorders are
biological kinds with harmful effects. This argument opposes the
dogma that mental disorders are necessarily diseases (or
pathological conditions) that result from biological dysfunction.
Tsou contends that the broader ideal of biological kinds offers a
more promising and empirically ascertainable naturalistic standard
for assessing the reality of mental disorders and the validity of
psychiatric categories.
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