State-controlled listed companies have always dominated Chinese
stock markets. As a result of the rampant scandals related to them,
there have been voluminous academic efforts to explore their
corporate governance, underpinned by agency costs. However, these
studies have yet to examine the phenomenon from the perspective of
venture capital and adaptive efficiency.
During the last ten years, despite China's remarkable progress
in the development of its venture capital market, its domestic
venture capital has been marginalized by American competitors.
Given the different performance between them, the author contends
that the corporate governance system of Chinese state-controlled
listed companies has hampered the performance of the institutional
factors which are responsible for the prosperity of American
venture capital in Chinese venture capital markets.
With the practice of American venture capital as the mirror, he
empirically demonstrates that Chinese domestic venture capital
lacks the four factors related to the success of their American
counterparts: large and independent funding, application of
incentive mechanisms, efficient exit channels, and a high risk
tolerance level. More importantly, these defects as a whole are
closely linked to the corporate governance of state-controlled
listed companies. Considering the potential negative consequences
on economic and social development, the author identifies policy
reforms underway to harmonize agency costs and adaptive efficiency.
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